Civic Republicanism and Education: Democracy and Social Justice in School

The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit’s recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit’s republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational theories, but also make civic republican education a viable alternative to current educational approaches.     

Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom.     

The development of beliefs and values in early adolescence: a case study through religious education pedagogy

Remarks on current educational language precede discussions of: pupils’ educational development; pupil voice; adolescence and action research. There follows a report of an innovation in religious education pedagogy, designed to address concerns that pupils should be helped to understand the emergence of their own beliefs and values over time. This report then prompts some reflections on religious education’s turn in the direction of hermeneutics. A form of religious education is sketched where pupils’ awareness of changes to their own beliefs and values over time is a key feature. Such awareness marks spiritual, moral, social and cultural development, an issue granted less than adequate coverage in the present UK education agenda.     

Pupils' perceptions of self and of labels: Moderate learning difficulties in mainstream and special schools

Background: The study is set in the context of international moves towards more inclusion of children with disabilities into mainstream schools and the greater importance attached to the child's voice in decision making in education. Aims: To examine how children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) in mainstream and special schools see themselves; to investigate their positive, negative and mixed self‐perceptions; to explore their evaluations of the terms and labels used by others to describe them; and to examine whether their perceptions vary according to special educational placement, age or gender. Sample: One hundred and one children; 50 in special and 51 in mainstream schools, of whom 51 were age 10–12 and 50 13–14 years; within each age group half were boys and half were girls. Method: Semi‐structured in‐depth interviews based on a common framework derived from the research questions. Results: Most pupils were aware of their learning difficulties and felt mainly negative about their difficulties. Pupils in special schools had more positive self‐perceptions of educational abilities than those in mainstream schools. Self‐perceptions of general characteristics were mainly a mixture of positive and negative with no differences by placement. ‘Stupid’ and ‘thick’ were perceived as the most negative labels, while ‘has help’ was the most positive label. The SEN term was infrequently recognized. Conclusions: The findings are discussed within the context of a multi‐dimensional, complex and contrary framework of self‐perceptions, and reference groups as the bases for self‐perceptions and as an active and interpretive process in the formation of self‐perceptions.     

Rawls on Liberty and Domination

One of the central elements of John Rawls’ argument in support of his two principles of justice is the intuitive normative ideal of citizens as free and equal. But taken in isolation, the claim that citizens are to be treated as free and equal is extremely indeterminate, and has virtually no clear implications for policy. In order to remedy this, the two principles of justice, together with the stipulation that citizens have basic interests in developing their moral capacities and pursuing their conceptions of the good life, are meant to provide a more precise interpretation of what is involved in treating citizens as free and equal. Rawls’ critics, however, have argued that satisfying the two principles of justice is not the most appropriate or plausible way to respect the status of citizens as free and equal. In relation to this debate, the present paper has two aims. The first is to examine Rawls’ account of the type of freedom that a just society must guarantee equally to its citizens. I will argue that those who think of Rawls as a theorist of freedom as non-interference are mistaken, because his notion of liberty resembles in important respects the republican notion of freedom as non-domination. Second, I will consider the extent to which Rawls’ principles of justice successfully protect the freedom as non-domination of all citizens so as to effectively treat them as free and equal.     

Exploring the ethics of agency through the lens of Bildung

Experiencing something of a renaissance, the German pedagogical idea ‘Bildung’ has recently been reconsidered for contemporary education. Historically proposed by von Humboldt, Bildung’s interplay represents a relational movement between a learner and the world that aims for personal freedom and growth. It is also identified as a means by which learners might become aware of their personal capacity to develop responses to daily experiences. Thus, it attends to agency and has resonance with children’s spirituality. Whilst such a notion of learning might be promoted as an alternative to a functionalistic educational paradigm, this paper highlights ethical concerns regarding pedagogical freedom. It highlights philosophically the illusion of freedom and considers critically the place of power in learner-led methods. Finally, the paper proposes how a nuanced, Kierkegaardian application of Bildung might address the ethical concerns raised and proposes how a re-considered understanding of the notion might be valuable for education today.     

Misplaced Priorities: Gutmann’s Democratic Theory,Children’s Autonomy,and Sex Education Policy

This paper offers a critique of the “democratic state of education” proposed by Amy Gutmann in her influential book Democratic Education. In the democratic state of education, educational authority is shared among the state, parents and educational professionals; and educational objectives are geared toward equipping future citizens to participate in what Gutmann calls “conscious social reproduction”—the collective shaping of the future of society through democratic deliberation. Although I agree with some of Gutmann’s broad recommendations for civic education, I have misgivings about the centrality that she gives to conscious social reproduction in her theory of education. I argue that in focusing so intently on the facilitation of conscious social reproduction, Gutmann’s theory makes insufficient room for the basic interests of individual children, and in particular, their prospective interest in autonomy. Gutmann’s considered position on sex education policy—specifically, her willingness to allow local communities to deny their children access to sex education—exemplifies the shortcomings of her theory. Ultimately, her democratic state of education fails to acknowledge the fundamental moral importance of individual flourishing, and the contribution that education can and should make to it.     

Changing the Definition of Education. On Kant’s Educational Paradox Between Freedom and Restraint

Ever since Kant asked: “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?” in his lecture on education, the tension between necessary educational influence and unacceptable restriction of the child’s individual development and freedom has been considered an educational paradox. Many have suggested solutions to the paradox; however, this article endorses recent discussions in educational philosophy that pursue the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of education and upbringing. In this article it is argued that it is incomprehensible to describe an intervention of an educator as a constraint on a child’s actions and that such an intervention would be in need of justification; as Kant and many others after him have done. Educational intervention should not be understood as a restriction of a child’s endeavour to learn, because any educational intervention is educational. Furthermore, it is argued that the notion of restraint is based on the concept of human beings as radically separated which lead to the assumption that education is restrictive per se. In contrast, this article argues that indoctrination, manipulation, and coercion are rather phenomena within our educational forms of life. Recognizing the interrelations between human beings should play a constitutive part in the conceptualisation of individual freedom. A bond with others is the foundation upon which a child develops its own identity and an understanding of itself as an agent who can express its own will and takes responsibility for its words and actions.     

Poverty,affect and breaking the cycle: Implementing a ‘vulnerability unit’ in a white working-class community school

Schools serving communities experiencing poverty continue to be challenged as to how to best meet the needs of their pupils. This article documents how educators in one school in Wales developed and implemented a ‘vulnerability unit’ – called The Bridge – which centred on trusting relationships to improve the educational experience for primarily white working-class pupils. In the United Kingdom, the white working class remains the lowest performing socio-economic group. To make sense of the ‘emotional archive’ of the vulnerability unit and how subjects were constituted in this school space, I draw on theories of affect. The investigation considers affective relationships as not only integral to fostering inclusive practices but also closely aligned with physical and social spatiality within the community school. I argue The Bridge is a dynamic space which informs the participants' relationships with themselves and each other. With this in mind, the article contributes to research on the importance of affect and space to inclusive education and pastoral support.     

The ‘weak pupil’ as a social representation: (re)production in dialogue between compulsory school teachers in Sweden

Attributing negative categories such as ‘weak’ to pupils is a common practice in Sweden and a known phenomenon worldwide. While there has been a substantial amount of research on different expressions of ‘deviance’ in the educational arena, the research on how teachers communicate about pupils as ‘weak’ is scarce. In this study, teachers’ communication about pupils as ‘weak’ is examined in dialogues produced in focus group discussions by 29 teachers in six different Swedish compulsory schools. Through the lens of social representations theory and a dialogical perspective, this study suggests that ‘weak pupil’ as a social representation can be characterized by a range of different and sometimes contradicting themes and mainly two themata: normal/deviant and nature/nurture. The results show that ‘weak pupil’ is used as a multifaceted communicative resource to describe pupils who do not perform according to schools’ expectations. In contrast to several previous studies, the use of ‘weak pupil’ is partially challenged by participants who, to some extent, place perceived problems within the educational institution instead of the individual pupil. The study has implications for the understanding of how perceptions of normality might be perceived and collectively (re)produced in communication about pupils as well as for future research using social representations theory within the educational field.

     

Rawlsian Civic Education: Political not Minimal

abstract In Political Liberalism and later work John Rawls has recast his theory of justice as fairness in political terms. In order to illustrate the advantages of a liberal political approach to justice over liberal non‐political ones, Rawls discusses what kind of education might be required for future citizens of pluralistic and democratic societies. He advocates a rather minimal conception of civic education that he claims to derive from political liberalism. One group of authors has sided with Rawls’ political perspective and educational proposal, holding that a political approach and educational requirements that are not too demanding would have the advantage of being acceptable to a wide range of citizens with different religious, moral and philosophical perspectives. A second group of authors have criticized Rawls’ educational recommendations, holding that the production of a just society composed of reasonable citizens requires a more demanding civic education and, hence, that the political approach is not viable. The present paper argues that both groups are only partially right, and that there is a third way to understand civic education in Rawlsian terms, a way that is political but not minimal.     

Ubuntu and the modern society

The incompatibility school of thought maintains that ubuntu is incompatible with modern society’s politico-juridical order and neoliberal economic system that promotes individualism and unequal distribution of wealth in the context of economic marginalisation and severe impoverishment of the black African majority. Furthermore, the postcolonial state tends to undermine the common good of society. The pro-ubuntu camp maintains that ubuntu is relevant as a normative ethical concept and as the underlying moral framework of reconciliatory politics of South Africa’s rainbow nation. I will show that the limitation of ubuntu due to its application in the framework of liberal constitutional democracy and neoliberal “global institutional order” that serve the interests of global capital and at the same time undermine the economic interests of impoverished black Africans requires ubuntu normative ethical theory to establish an understanding of a rearrangement of the “global institutional order” in a way which fits ubuntu. This work is novel as I appropriate Metz’s understanding of ubuntu as a normative ethical theory to show the importance and the nature of the realignment of the “global institutional order” to ubuntu in a way which promotes the common good of the global community of human beings.     

The Right to Meaningful Education: The role of values and beliefs

This article argues that children have a right to education that assists them to find a meaning in life. The right of children to meaningful education is interpreted as a right to be raised within a coherent concept of the good and to learn about a variety of alternative conceptions. Both parents and teachers have duties that correspond with the two aspects of meaningful education. I argue that parents have a freedom to raise their children within the conception of the good they themselves hold, but that this freedom is restricted in two ways. Firstly, they have to give their children the freedom to explore alternative conceptions. Secondly, the conception of the good that they offer to their children has to be moral.     

Democracy & democratic education

A profound problem posed by education for any pluralistic society with democratic aspirations is how to reconcile individual freedom and civic virtue. Children cannot be educated to maximize both individual freedom and civic virtue. Yet reasonable people value and intermittently demand both. We value freedom of speech and press, for example, but want (other) people to refrain from false and socially harmful expression. The various tensions between individual freedom and civic virtue pose a challenge that is simultaneously philosophical and political. How can we resolve the tensions philosophically in light of reasonable political disagreements over the relative value of individual freedom and civic virtue? Instead of giving priority to one value or the other, this essay defends a democratic ideal ofconscious social reproduction, which consists of three principles:nonrepression, nondiscrimination, and democratic deliberation.     

Education as an intergenerational process of human learning, teaching, and development

In this article I argue that the future of psychological research on educational processes would benefit from an interdisciplinary approach that enables psychologists to locate their objects of study within the cultural, social, and historical contexts of their research. To make this argument, I begin by examining anthropological accounts of the characteristics of education in small, face-to-face, preindustrial societies. I then turn to a sample of contemporary psychoeducational research that seeks to implement major, qualitative changes in modern educational practices by transforming them to have the properties of education in those self-same face-to-face societies. Next I examine the challenges faced by these modern approaches and briefly describe a multi-institutional, multidisciplinary system of education that responds to these challenges while offering a model for educating psychology students in a multigenerational system of activities with potential widespread benefits.     

Defending a Common World: Hannah Arendt on the State,the Nation and Political Education

For a long time, one of the most important tasks for education in liberal democracies has been to foster the next generation in core democratic values in order to prepare them for future political responsibilities. In spite of this, general trust in the liberal democratic system is in rapid decline. In this paper, the tension between the ambitions of liberal-democratic educational systems and contemporary challenges to central democratic ideas is approached by reconsidering Hannah Arendt’s critique of political education. This will be done informed by her analysis of the tension between the concepts of state and nation. By showing how education, depending on its role as a tool of the state or the nation, may be a fundamental requirement for the establishment of a common world or the most effective tool for its destruction, the paper argues for the need to understand Arendt’s educational thinking in light of her wider political analysis. Rather than downplaying the provocative aspects of her critique, the paper argues for the need to use it as a starting point for thinking again how education may become an emancipatory undertaking capable of disarming contemporary threats to human plurality and freedom.     

Freedom,Firearms, and Civil Resistance

The claim that guns can safeguard freedom is common in US political discourse. In light of a broadly republican understanding of freedom, I evaluate this claim and its implications. The idea is usually that firearms would enable citizens to engage in revolutionary violence against a tyrannical government. I argue that some of the most common objections to this argument fail, but that the argument is fairly weak in light of other objections. I then defend a different argument for the claim that guns can safeguard freedom. I claim that firearm ownership among members of oppressed groups can hinder the use of systematic violence aimed at preventing them from exercising their basic liberties. I show how a commitment to armed self-defense is compatible with non-violent civil resistance as a tool of political change, and show how the former facilitated the latter during the Civil Rights Movement. Finally, I consider the policy implications of my argument. I don’t think it vindicates lax gun control policies. However, it may vindicate some individuals acquiring guns and learning how to use them, and some organizations aiding them in doing so.

     

The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice

Classical conceptual distinctions in philosophy of education assume an individualistic subjectivity and hide the learning that can take place in the space between child (as educator) and adult (as learner). Grounded in two examples from experience I develop the argument that adults often put metaphorical sticks in their ears in their educational encounters with children. Hearers’ prejudices cause them to miss out on knowledge offered by the child, but not heard by the adult. This has to do with how adults view education, knowledge, as much as child, and is even more extreme when child is also black. The idea is what Miranda Fricker calls ‘epistemic injustice’ which occurs when someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Although her work concerns gender and race, I extrapolate her radical ideas to (black) child. Awareness of the epistemic injustice that is done to children and my proposal for increased epistemic modesty and epistemic equality could help transform pedagogical spaces to include child subjects as educators. A way forward is suggested that involves ‘cracking’ the concept of child and a different non-individualised conception of education.     

The Pharmakon of Educational Technology: The Disruptive Power of Attention in Education

Is physical presence an essential aspect of a rich educational experience? Can forms of virtual encounter achieve engaged and sustained education? Technophiles and technophobes might agree that authentic personal engagement is educationally normative. They are more likely to disagree on how authentic engagement is best achieved. This article argues that educational thinking around digital pedagogy unhelpfully reinforces this polarising debate by failing to recognise that digitalisation is, as Stiegler has argued, pharmacological: both a poison and a cure. I suggest that Biesta’s critique of learnification can be applied to online learning, but that any such application does not sufficiently acknowledge the pharmacological nature of modern technology. While Stiegler has something important to contribute on the relation between technology, attention and education, I suggest his account is rather too bound up with critical theories of technology. In the end I turn to philosophers of religion, such as Eliade and Smith to suggest different ways of conceiving the role of attention in education that does set technologies up over/against the formation of attention essential to education.