Is it the end or just the beginning of ubuntu? Response to Matolino and Kwindingwi in view of Metz’s rebuttal

In this article we offer a critical review of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s article “The end of ubuntu” in which they put forward their view, based on conditions in contemporary South Africa, that the philosophy of ubuntu is dead. In the main, we intend to uphold what we believe is the more plausible argument, as suggested by the title of Metz’s paper, “Just the beginning of ubuntu”. We argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s arrival at the conclusion that ubuntu is over is influenced by their point of departure, which appears to be established on the dubious pre-philosophic assumption that ubuntu, as a normative ethical theory, is a “narrative of return”. We further question their assertion that contemporary conditions in South Africa are the basis on which ubuntu moral theory should be dismantled. Matolino and Kwindingwi argue for the demise of ubuntu without supporting their position with convincing, logical reasons. We argue that ubuntu, insofar as it is a moral theory, is competitive and will ultimately prove to be a desirable ethic which could contribute positively towards developing moral character in the contemporary sociopolitical environment in parts of Africa. This article intends to explore the methodology and logic of the debate. However, in the pursuit of pure academic critique, we reject Metz’s allegation that the criticism by Matolino and Kwindingwi is ad hominem.     

In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu

Abstract

This response to Thaddeus Metz’s “Toward an African Moral Theory” engages with his discussion of an autocentric, or “self-development” account of ubuntu as a morally normative theory. It is argued that an autocentric ubuntu, sharing certain strategies available to eudaimonist ethics, is both more plausible and more attractive than Metz suggests, particularly in that it engages directly with the immoralist (amoralist).     

The end of ubuntu or its beginning in Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate: An exercise in conversational philosophy

Matolino and Kwindingwi in an essay “The end of ubuntu” published in this journal in 2013 argue that ubuntu has stalled both as a way of life and as an ethical theory which led them to draw the far-reaching conclusion that ubuntu has reached its end. In 2014 Metz published a rejoinder in this journal with the title “Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi” in which he gestures that the justifications on which Matolino and Kwindingwi rested their conclusion were unfounded. Reacting to Metz in an essay published in this journal in 2015 with the title “A response to Metz’s reply on the end of ubuntu”, Matolino claims that Metz’s rejoinder poses no serious threat to their original position and insists that Metz’s counter-position is not only weak but grossly indefensible. In fact, he characterises Metz’s arguments as dogmatic rather than philosophical. In this paper, I wade into this encounter, which I now tag the “Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate”, not for the sake of argument but to show the philosophical significance of the “Matolino-Kwindingwi conundrum”. That ubuntu has reached its end is not a mere declaration or position or conclusion, it is a problem, one whose significance would redefine not only the sphere of ubuntu philosophy but the historicity of African philosophy as a whole. I shall argue also that though the conundrum remains decisive, I agree with Metz that the arguments marshalled in its support are not decisive. Metz on the other hand may have offered systematisation of ubuntu but I agree with Matolino that his new system may not be as impregnable as he envisages. In showing the philosophical significance of the conundrum and in showing the weaknesses in the arguments of these actors, I shall argue not for the restoration but for the re-invention of ubuntu using the tool of conversational thinking.     

Fromm’s ethic of solidarity and the potential for critical communitarianism

It can be (and has been) claimed that one of the central thematic concerns in Erich Fromm’s immense body of critical work is the exposition of a new “radical” humanist ethic, based upon the normative foundations of human solidarity/relatedness and love. The role of community in this ethic is vital, as Fromm argues for the existence of an intrinsically human need for belonging and communion. According to Fromm, the breakdown of traditional societies in modernity and the adoption of strong anti-traditionalist paradigms in both liberalism and Marxism has paradoxically led to the desire in the contemporary individual to “escape” this freedom, too often resulting in an uncritical adoption of what Eric Hobsbawm calls “invented traditions” in order to rediscover a shared sense of humankind. This article therefore contends that 1) Fromm advocates a form of “critical communitarianism”; and 2) that critical communitarianism can provide a strong foundation for an ethical confrontation with neoliberal modernity, and thereby a reconsidered form of community through human solidarity.     

Afro-communal virtue ethic as a foundation for environmental sustainability in Africa and beyond

This paper addresses the question: Can an Afro-communal virtue ethic provide a plausible foundation for environmental sustainability? Drawing on Thaddeus Metz’s perspective and contributions to the Afro-communal ethic tradition, this paper examines the extent to which his proposal provides plausible grounds for environmental sustainability. Metz, in several essays, advances the need for an ethic of communion, which rests on the ubuntu (humanness) virtue principles of shared identity, solidarity, and participative empathy. This paper argues that Metz’s view is a version of virtue ethics, of which flourishing, care and goodwill are important aspects. While this African ethical construct has some limitations, this paper nevertheless maintains that it entails some virtues that have promising normative implications for environmental sustainability. Metz’s views on an Afro-communal virtue ethic is relevant to motivating behavioural changes in the environmental sustainability quest through its capacity to provoke salient virtuous attitudes and values of responsible inter-generational and intra-generational Earth stewardship. Though an African ethical construct, this paper argues that the potential foundational import of Metz’s proposal for environmental sustainability reaches far beyond the geopolitical boundaries of Africa.     

The end of ubuntu

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, there has been a concerted effort at reviving the notion of ubuntu. Variously conceived, it is seen as the authentic African ethical concept, a way of life, an authentic mode of being African, an individual ideal, the appropriate public spirit, a definition of life itself and the preferred manner of conducting public and private business. Thus, among other public displays of the spirit of ubuntu, the government of the day has deliberately chosen its service delivery mantra and its public slogan as Batho Pele (people first) to animate, or perhaps pay obeisance to, ubuntu. In this paper we seek to advance arguments that question such a public, widespread, and concerted ‘ubuntu-isation’ of the intellectual, business, public and private lives. Our project follows two main lines of reasoning. (1) We seek to show that the aggressive promotion of ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa is an elitist project so conceived by the new black elite. It is conceived both as a restorative move that is aimed at securing the dignity of the black masses as well as an attempt at forging a so-called black identity. This line of reasoning will rely on similar historical cases on the continent that sought to aggressively promote an African mode of being, which coincided with both the end of colonialism and the rise of black elitism. We note that such attempts always ended in very public social and political failure. (2) We seek to question the desirability of ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit of the nation. Here our critique shall be concentrated on the disjunct that exists between the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of ubuntu and the stark ontological and ethical crisis facing the new elite and ‘our people’.     

马克思政治经济学批判的话语萌发与思想发端——《关于林木盗窃法的辩论》的文本贡献

《关于林木盗窃法的辩论》的主导话语是哲学话语,在该文中,马克思也开始使用政治经济学话语,在以哲学批判为主导分析框架的前提下构建了政治经济学批判的辅助分析框架。马克思在坚持从哲学层面分析“物质利益难事”的同时,使用了“劳动”“价值”和“额外价值”这些政治经济学核心话语。这些话语蕴含着马克思思想中的无产阶级立场、客观价值论和资本批判的方法。当然,这时政治经济学批判思想还不成熟,立场、观点和方法都处于话语萌发和思想发端阶段。     

A response to Metz's reply on the end of ubuntu

Thaddeus Metz argues against our position that ubuntu has reached its end. He rejects our recommendation that ubuntu both as a way of life and as an ethical theory must be jettisoned as it is no longer applicable to modern conditions. He thinks that both our recommendations are wrong. Hence he seeks to show that ubuntu is defensible both as an ethical theory and as a way of life. Further, he thinks there is a role to be played by ubuntu in how life could be lived in modern day (South) Africa. He also seeks to offer a defence of the relevance of ubuntu theorists. For these reasons he couches his responding title with the phrase ‘Just the beginning of ubuntu [?…?]’. In this paper I continue the debate by seeking to show that Metz's response poses no threat to our original position. I then endeavour to show that my assessment of his position puts him in an unenviable position of defending the indefensible. I further suggest that Metz's current defence of ubuntu is not philosophical but dogmatic.     

Allegories of the Bioethical: Reading J.M. Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year

This essay reads J.M. Coetzee’s novel, Diary of a Bad Year, as an occasion to problematize contemporary bioethical (and neoliberal) paradigms. Coetzee’s rhetorical strategies are analyzed to better understand the “scene of address” within which ethical claims can be voiced. Drawing on Foucault’s Socratic understanding of ethics as the self’s relation to itself, self-relation is explored through the rhetorical figure of catachresis. The essay ultimately argues that the ethical voice emerges when the terms—terms by which I relate to myself, to others, to my own body, and to the bodies of others—are themselves subject to catachrestic refiguration.     

Catholic Social Teaching,Economic Inequality,and American Society

The essay begins with an explanation of the underlying theological vision that supports Catholic social teaching's commitment to the centrality of the common good and the role of solidarity as both a virtue and a norm. The vision of humanity as one family and the church as a sacrament of unity is the foundation for a communitarian ethic that prizes inclusion, participation, and relative equality in the quest for a truly just society. An array of social science studies is then employed to show that economic inequality “bleeds” into other realms of public life to undermine fundamental commitments of American society, namely, equal opportunity and political democracy. The essay concludes that an understanding of Catholic social teaching promotes a critical perspective that is deeply at odds with ongoing trends in the U.S. economy.     

Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi

In an article titled ‘The end of ubuntu’ recently published in this journal, Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi argue that contemporary conditions in (South) Africa are such that there is no justification for appealing to an ethic associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’. They argue that political elites who invoke ubuntu do so in ways that serve nefarious functions, such as unreasonably narrowing discourse about how best to live, while the moral ideals of ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone, pre-modern age. Since there is nothing ethically promising about ubuntu for today's society, and since elite appeals to it serve undesirable purposes there, the authors conclude that ubuntu in academic and political circles ‘has reached its end’. In this article, I respond to Matolino and Kwindingwi, contending that, in fact, we should view scholarly enquiry into, and the political application of, ubuntu as projects that are only now properly getting started.     

Subjek en etiese verantwoordelikheidsbesef Die Idee van die Oneindige in Levinas se Totality and Infinity

Subject and the realisation of ethical responsibility - The Idea of the Infinite in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity. In Totality and Infinity Emmanuel Levinas writes about the categorical character of the ethical responsibility that the subject owes to the other. The confrontation with the suffering other puts the subject’s natural self-interest into question, and brings him/her to realise an ethical responsibility of which s/he cannot unburden himself/herself. The question arises as to what in the constitution of the subject makes him/her susceptible to the realisation of ethical responsibility. This article illustrates that in order to accentuate ethical responsibility as strongly as he does, Levinas needs to take a quasi-metaphysical step. The “trace of the infinite” that “creation” has left on the finite subject, predisposes the subject to the appeal of the other. Levinas’ use of words such as “God”, “the Good”, “creation” and “the Idea of Infinity” does not have a theological or a mystical underpinning. These metaphysical concepts are philosophical figures of speech that Levinas borrows from Plato and Descartes.     

Essential building blocks of the Ubuntu debate; or: I write what I must

This article is in part a response to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s “The end of Ubuntu” and Metz’s response “Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi”, both of which appeared in the South African Journal of Philosophy. My contribution also stands alone as an outline of the basic minimum of conceptual moves any Ubuntu theorist has to make in order for their text to avoid the twin seductions of being either a contemporary variant of an outdated ethnophilosophy, or an ahistorical analysis of Ubuntu that remains oblivious to the historicity of the concept. The obvious fact that Ubuntu has had a complicated history, first as pre-colonial praxis and then as abstract postcolonial philosophical construct, demands of the postcolonial theorist to pay attention to the epistemic shifts that have historically determined how Ubuntu interacted with various hegemonic, that is, Western-dominated, theoretical discourses.     

Internet Addiction in China: The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of Youth

This paper analyzes the lifeworld of those labelled “Internet addicts” in China. Contrary to professional belief, such deviant youth are not simply having trouble controlling their Internet use, but, more seriously, with the normal functioning of society. Underneath this existential, ethical, and social crisis is a social-economic-political phenomenon which pivots around the competition—between China’s education system expressed through the parents (work), and its consumer society expressed through the online gaming industry (leisure)—for the hearts and minds of transforming and individualizing youth. These “Internet addicts” uncover not individual pathology but the following psycho-social-structural dilemma: citizens cannot live on economic reforms alone.     

Women’s ‘Ethical’ Pornographic Spectatorship

‘Ethics’ has assumed prominence in the neoliberal iteration of responsibilized and self-governing individuals. Spectatorship—what we view and how we view it—has been conceptualized under this frame as a disciplinary practice where concerns of ethics and ethical conduct come to the fore. This paper seeks to connect pornographic spectatorship with the neoliberal project of responsibilized and ethical self-regulation and decision-making, in order to commence the conversation surrounding how women not only watch pornography, but how normative gender boundaries constrain how women talk about their spectatorship and how they make decisions of what to watch. Based on in-depth focus group and individual interviews of 26 women on their experiences of using pornography, this paper explores the sorts of ‘ethical’—and fundamentally gendered—spectatorial decision-making these women engaged in vis-à-vis their use of pornographic materials.     

Conceptual Constructs and Social Classes: A Review of Capitalizing Religion

Capitalizing Religion is a good addition to the growing number of works in the last decade that examine the intertwinings of religion, spirituality, and capitalism in the neoliberal present. Through an examination of scholarly discourses on modern religion and contemporary fiction and spirituality manuals, Martin demonstrates how, within the consumer capitalist present, the ideologies of individualism, consumption, quietism, and productivity shape conversations, habits, relationships, and fantasies. Martin tells us that the goal of social theory should be to account for how individuals and their choices are propelled by the material, historical, and structural forces that constitute them. He is a writer who has long been particularly attentive to the fact that “religion” is not some particular entity that exists “out there” that can be examined, but rather a bounded construct whose definition – through processes of inclusion and exclusion – performs works of distinction that benefit some interests, groups, and individuals to the detriment of others. Capitalizing Religion reminds us that the choices that many sociologists of religion make in dividing social formations into categories such as “religious,” “spiritual,” “institutional,” “individual,” or “paranormal” don’t just describe the world, but rather attempt to constitute it through taxonomies that are anything but natural and given.     

Joint Effects of Corporate Positions and Prospects on Perceptions of Business Ethics Among Japanese Students: A Reflection of Collectivistic Cultures1

This study was designed to account for inconsistencies between past research indicating that executives in general are more ethically oriented than employees. The reality in Japan's society is that it has been mostly top executives who violate business ethics. Japanese students (N = 201) assumed that they were “executives” or “employees” in a manufacturing company, and their company had “high” or “low” financial prospects. The high‐prospect executives were most ethically oriented, while the low‐prospect executives were least ethically oriented. Ethical orientation did not change across the two prospect conditions for the employees. The findings are interpreted in terms of ethical dissonance created by dual pressures from acceptance of Western global ethical standards and strength of indigenous collectivistic ethical standards.     

In What Sense Christian?: The Humane Economic Ethic of Wilhelm Röpke

Christian social thinkers who strongly support the free‐market system often have drawn connections between the social values of their faith and the ideas of Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek. Hayek's comments on religion, however, seem to predict its demise for the sake of progress, whereas his colleague Wilhelm Röpke posits “transcendent” religion and established moral traditions as essential to a humane economy. This essay contends that what Röpke described as “enmassment” has similarities to the present “financialization” of society, which involves the rising influence of financial values in all institutions, exaggerated emphasis on quantitative performance measures, and reliance on technical processes in lieu of human relationships. Röpke's “Christian humanist” philosophy advances the kind of ethical entrepreneurialism needed to morally sustain a global society experiencing enmassment and financialization simultaneously.     

A Thomistic appraisal of human enhancement technologies

Debate concerning human enhancement often revolves around the question of whether there is a common “nature” that all human beings share and which is unwarrantedly violated by enhancing one’s capabilities beyond the “species-typical” norm. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’s influential theory of human nature, noting certain key traits commonly shared among human beings that define each as a “person” who possesses inviolable moral status. Understanding the specific qualities that define the nature of human persons, which includes self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective thought, and volitional autonomy, informs the ethical assessment of various forms of enhancement. Some forms of cognitive and physical enhancement may be desirable from the perspective of what constitutes the “flourishing” of human persons in our fundamental nature; while other forms of enhancement, such as emotive or so-called “moral” enhancement, run the risk of detracting from human flourishing when evaluated from the virtue-theoretic perspective Aquinas promotes.     

为什么归纳逻辑需要所罗门诺夫先验?(英文)

二十世纪五十年代,卡尔纳普发展了归纳逻辑,他把概率看作一种证据对假设对"确证度";二十世纪六十年代,所罗门诺夫用通用归纳方法进行预测。为了增强归纳逻辑的归纳预测能力以及扩展所罗门诺夫通用归纳方法的表达力,本文整合二者。本文首先将所罗门诺夫先验概率的思想引入归纳逻辑中,在这个框架下,证明一阶逻辑版本的所罗门诺夫完全性定理,然后比较二者的优略。在卡尔纳普的归纳逻辑中,不管正面证据有多少,对像"所有乌鸦都是黑的"这种全称句的支持度最终都为零,而在用所罗门诺夫先验改造的归纳逻辑中,可以证明,在任何可计算的世界中,"所有乌鸦都是黑的"可以得到确证,只要在那些世界上真的所有乌鸦都是黑的。在所罗门诺夫的模型中,要证明完全性定理需要记录所有的过去信息,在修改后的归纳逻辑中,我们可以只关注某种具体的模式而忽略其它无关信息并证明类似的收敛定理。我们甚至可以不用记录所有的相关信息而采用随机抽样的方法建立合理的信念。