The conceptualisation of the psychical in psychoanalysis

This article aims to clarify the psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the psychical, which includes a discussion of the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The unconscious is conceived of as being on the border between the so-called 'ego's conscious intending' and a rudimentary body-ego experiencing. Phenomenological ideas on the essence of consciousness are used in order to help delineate the crucial differences between consciousness and the unconscious. Only consciousness is characterised by an awareness of itself, that is; self-consciousness. Furthermore, consciousness is characterised by an intentional, synthesising capacity, whereas the functioning of the unconscious, in its most radical form, is the opposite ofthe intentionality of consciousness. It is argued that the unconscious pre-supposes certain pre-sexual processes, in the form of a body-ego's formation of continuity, coherence and wholeness. The body-ego belongs to the sphere of consciousness/self-consciousness, even if self-consciousness is only given implicitly in the body-ego and not as a fully fledged ego cogito . Attention is drawn to neglected issues in psychoanalytic theorising, namely self-consciousness and the constitution of existence. The importance of this neglected area for the psychoanalytic process is illustrated with clinical examples.     

CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUANTUM MECHANICS: OPTING FROM ALTERNATIVES

We present a model of a fundamental property of consciousness as the capacity of a system to opt among presented alternatives. Any system possessing this capacity is “conscious” in some degree, whether or not it has the higher capacity of reflecting on its opting. We argue that quantum systems, composed of microphysical particles, as studied by quantum mechanics, possess this quality in a protomental form. That is, such particles display the capacity to opt among alternatives, even though they lack the ability to experience or communicate their experiences. Human consciousness stands at the opposite end of the hierarchy of conscious life forms as the most sophisticated system of which we have direct acquaintance. We contend that it shares the common characteristic of a system capable of opting among alternatives. Because the fundamental property of consciousness is shared by human beings and the constituents of elementary matter in the universe, our model of consciousness can be considered as a modified form of panpsychism.     

The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

Luther's Radical Conception of Faith: God,Christ, and Personhood in a Post‐Metaphysical Age

Luther's exposition of Paul's letter to the Galatians offers a premier window into a deconstruction of the tandem God, ego and symbolic order of the law by proposing a radical “technology of the self,” a new understanding of what it means to be a person in light of God's own becoming in the flesh—a new subjective perspective. This places the event of belief as a displacement of a socially and ecclesiastically constructed ego‐consciousness and the emergence of a new (social) center of subjectivity—Christ consciousness, that is, faith. For Luther the “person” emerges as a radical break with the self‐referentiality of the ego and through the perspectival assimilation of God's own subjective experience in the flesh.     

A price above rubies: Patriarchy and the feminine

Jung's understanding of individuation as the way consciousness develops in some people in the second half of life is not well conveyed by images suggesting the heroic capture or sacrifice of consciousness by an ego seeking to gain a broader standpoint. Such images derive from Jung's writings in the first half of his professional career, when his own psychological horizon was rapidly enlarging, but he had not yet arrived at a conception of the Self. What he means by individuation once the Self enters the picture becomes clearer if we turn to Chinese philosophy, whose three main traditions, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, all influenced Jung's mature psychology. That the move from ego to Self involves a change in perspective as to the nature and origin of consciousness is made evident by the process of “turning the light around,” described in The Secret of the Golden Flower, which has been identified as a practice of Buddhist meditation. As a consequence of the successful cultivation of the Self, individuation also entails a difference in the level of a person's consciousness, a difference that the Confucian Classic of Change, the I Ching, recommends that the person take into account. Finally, the consciousness produced by individuation, because it hovers between ego and Self, is often uncertain of its ground. This paradoxical development is beautifully conveyed by the Taoist philosopher Chuang-Tzu, whose famous dream of himself as a butterfly led him, upon waking, to question his true identity.     

Freud's Views and the Contemporary Application of Hypnosis: Enhancing Therapy Within a Psychoanalytic Framework

Freud's theoretical writings on hypnosis are reviewed and reasons for his abandoning of this clinical tool are suggested. Clinical hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness which has its own felt reality and does not bypass the ego. In fact, many of the essential characteristics of hypnosis are ego functions. Functions such as focused or free-floating attention, deep absorption, enhanced memory, imagery, ego-receptivity, ego-activity, defenses, and the capacity for self-observation all remain intact in hypnosis. This view is contrasted with Freud's early uses of hypnosis which were not informed by his later psychoanalytic discoveries. Clinical material is presented which illustrates how the conversion from a psychoanalytic psychotherapy to a hypnoanalysis resolved a therapeutic impasse and allowed for a productive treatment. Fromm's view of hypnosis, as a special form of adaptive regression in the service of the ego is clinically illustrated. It is postulated that the altered state of hypnosis facilitates an increased ego mobility. It is the psychic mobility of hypnosis which facilitates the vacillation between primary and secondary process thinking; the experiencing ego and the observing ego, and conscious and unconscious experience. It is largely the ego-mobility and available memory in hypnosis that account for its advantages as compared to non-hypnotic treatment. Relational and self-psychological components of hypnosis are also proposed.     

简论里贝特的意识理论

里贝特是人类意识和自由意志的实验研究领域的一个卓越的、先驱性的神经科学家。里贝特的意识研究工作涉及如下四个方面：（1）关于意识研究的认识论原则;（2）对意识现象本性的界定;（3）意识机制的时控理论;（4）对自由意志的阐释和有意识的心智场理论。里贝特的意识研究独树一帜,其时控理论具有坚实可信的实验证据,它从时间维度揭示了有意识的主观体验以及无意识的心智功能与神经活动之间的时间机制。     

Defining consciousness in the context of incidental sequence learning: theoretical considerations and empirical implications

The notion that sequential regularities can be learned implicitly without ensuing conscious knowledge has sparked off a prolific research program within cognitive psychology. However, there is continuing dissent among researchers about the very existence of the phenomenon. This is, at least in part, due to a failure to ground research on implicit sequence learning in conceptual definitions of “consciousness” and “conscious sequence knowledge.” In this article the authors take up a definition of consciousness according to which conscious mental contents are characterized by their global availability to cognitive processes (e.g., Baars in: A cognitive theory of consciousness Cambridge University Press, 1988; in: In the theater of consciousness: the workspace of the mind Oxford University Press, 1997). It is argued that unlike recognition tests or generate tasks, verbal report is a sensitive and specific measure of conscious (i.e., globally available) sequence knowledge. Finally, it is shown that the choice between two commonly used measures of conscious sequence knowledge can profoundly affect the outcome of a sequence learning experiment.     

The Individuation Process in Post-Modernity

C. G. Jung defined individuation as the process of differentiation from the general collective psychology—from the norms and the values of the society in which the individual is immersed. Accordingly, individuation occurs in relation to the culture of the time and the zeitgeist. During the second half of life, the process, according to Jung, takes the shape of a lifetime dynamic dialogue between the ego and the unconscious contents, aiming to reach psychic completeness. One of the participants in this dialogue is the ego, and since the ego necessarily develops inside a culture, this part of the individuation process also occurs in relation to the culture of the time. We are now fully immersed in post-modernity, and the zeitgeist is represented by the society of technology. In relation to this totally new scenario, do we still deal with the same individuation process described by Jung? How many of our patients confront themselves with the Self and its symbols, stepping toward some kind of psychic totality? This article hints at different forms of individuation reflective of our post-modern technologically dominated times, and it touches upon the concept of the end of meaning and the “death of God.” Considering this epochal passage, we might be compelled to outline a further form of individuation: that of a conscious revolt of the ego toward its basic ingredients (will to power, primary narcissism, and need of identity) and toward the old image of the Self, so similar to that God that should be dead.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

Ego transcendence in postmodern perspective

Based on the author's previous specification of the conventional ego mind as the primary barrier to “realization of the ground of consciousness,” postmodern perspectives on the ego mind barrier are compared with premodern and modern approaches. Postmodernists view the ego as a socio‐linguistic construct. Modern assumptions of consistent subjectivity and a unitary self or identity are rejected, and reduction of the ego mind barrier to transcendence is seen to follow from exploration of alternative self‐concepts. This perspective is manifest in theories of “possible selves” and in the contrast between formulations such as the “saturated self vs. the “empty self.” Though forms of ego transcendence likely in postmodern cultures will differ from those in premodern cultures, many of the same functions will be served, as may be observed in such phenomena as “ecomysticism.”     

Personal identity and the otherness of one’s own body

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person.

     

焦点阅读中信息加工的意识性研究

采用独立记得-知道范式(IRK)和加工分离范式(PDP)探讨焦点阅读中文本表征的意识性。根据阅读材料中人物特征与其目标行为的关系,创设一致和恢复一致两种实验条件,实验1、2分别使用独立记得-知道范式,加工分离范式研究文本表征的意识性问题。研究结果发现被试在两种实验条件下的有意识加工和无意识加工指标上有显著差异,说明在焦点阅读中命题表征和情境模型的建构都是有意识的。     

Whistles,bells, and cogs in machines: Thomas Huxley and epiphenomenalism

In this paper I try to shed some historical light upon the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, by focusing on the version of epiphenomenalism championed by Thomas Huxley, which is often treated as a classic statement of the doctrine. I argue that it is doubtful if Huxley held any form of metaphysical epiphenomenalism, and that he held a more limited form of empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness but not with respect to mentality per se. Contrary to what is conventionally supposed, Huxley's empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness was not simply based upon the demonstration of the neurophysiological basis of conscious mentality, or derived from the extension of mechanistic and reflexive principles of explanation to encompass all forms of animal and human behavior, but was based upon the demonstration of purposive and coordinated animal and human behavior in the absence of consciousness. Given Huxley's own treatment of mentality, his characterization of animals and humans as “conscious automata” was not well chosen. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Both Earlier Times and the Future Are “Front”: The Distinction Between Time‐ and Ego‐Reference‐Points in Mandarin Speakers’ Temporal Representation

Mandarin speakers, like most other language speakers around the world, use spatial terms to talk about time. However, the direction of their mental temporal representation along the front‐back axis remains controversial because they use the spatial term “front” to refer to both earlier times (e.g., front‐year means “the year before last”) and the future (e.g., front‐road means “prospect”). Although the linguistic distinction between time‐ and ego‐reference‐point spatiotemporal metaphors in Mandarin suggests a promising clarification of the above controversy, there is little empirical evidence verifying this distinction. In this study, Mandarin speakers’ time‐ and ego‐reference‐point temporal representations on three axes (i.e., sagittal, lateral, and vertical) were separately examined through two tasks. In a time‐reference‐point task, Mandarin speakers judged whether the time point of the second picture was earlier or later than the time point of the first picture, while in an ego‐reference‐point task, they judged whether an event or phase had happened in the past or would happen in the future. The results indicate that Mandarin speakers construe an earlier‐times‐in‐front‐of‐later‐times temporal sequence and adopt the front‐to‐the‐future orientation.     

Damasio’s body-map-based view,Panksepp’s affect-centric view,and the evolutionary advantages of consciousness

Although dualism has the advantage of being intuitively plausible, it is not compatible with a 21^st-century (scientific) world view. Jaak Panksepp and Antonio Damasio are contemporary writers who reject dualism, and whose views take the form of “biological naturalism”. I first discuss how their views compare in five specific respects; and then I look more closely at how the different emphases of the views affect their ability to account for the evolutionary advantages of consciousness, specifically. Both authors agree that “consciousness” provides creatures with a survival advantage in terms of their ability to produce novel and/or flexible responses, their ability to plan ahead, and their motivation to promote their own survival – but the exact means by which they think these advantages are conferred, in each of these respects, differ. One might say that, whereas Damasio thinks the main evolutionary advantages of “consciousness” (the “higher reaches” of which are unique to humans) have to do with enabling creatures to work out what to do to promote their well-being, Panksepp thinks the main advantage of “consciousness” is that being “conscious” of affective feelings urgently motivates creatures to take action when their well-being is threatened. Considering that “working out what do” is only possible for a small selection of cognitively sophisticated organisms, I argue that Panksepp’s account is more plausible than Damasio’s account.     

SECOND NATURE AND SPIRIT: HEGEL ON THE ROLE OF HABIT IN THE APPEARANCE OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient spirit retains a “moment” of the natural that marks a limitation compared to “pure thought” but that also makes perceptual consciousness possible. This makes Hegel's account analogous in important respects to John McDowell's “naturalism of second nature.” But Hegel's account of habit can be seen as a version of a Kantian synthesis of the productive imagination—and hence presupposes a given material that can become one's own by means of habit. This does not mean that Hegel falls into the Myth of the Given, but it does suggest that an appropriate account of second nature might be committed to something McDowell wants to deny: that nonconceptual states of consciousness play a role (even if not a justificatory role) in perception.