What is Ubuntu,? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent

Abstract

In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question ‘What is ubuntu,?’ that I have been able to identify among South Africans of African descent (SAADs). I show that it is possible to distinguish between two clusters of answers. The answers of the first cluster all define ubuntu, as a moral quality of a person, while the answers of the second cluster all define ubuntu, as a phenomenon (for instance a philosophy, an ethic, African humanism, or, a worldview) according to which persons are interconnected. The concept of a person is of central importance to all the answers of both clusters, which means that to understand these answers, it is decisive to raise the question of who counts, as a person according to SAADs. I show that some SAADs define all Homo sapiens, as persons, whereas others hold the view that only some Homo sapiens, count as persons: only those who are black, only those who have been incorporated into personhood, or only those who behave in a morally acceptable manner.     

Capes on the W-Defense

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Widerker (Philosophical Perspectives 14: 181-201, 2000) offers an intriguing argument for PAP as it applies to moral blameworthiness. His argument is known as the “What-should-he-have-done defense” of PAP or the “W-defense” for short. In a recent article, Capes (Philosophical Studies 150: 61-77, 2010) attacks Widerker’s argument by rejecting the central premise on which it rests, namely, the premise that a person is blameworthy for his action only if in the circumstances it would be morally reasonable to expect him not to have acted as he did. In this paper, I show that Capes’ criticism does not undermine this premise and, to this extent, Widerker’s argument is safe from Capes’ attack.     

The strategic performance of heterotopic experiences in higher education: Imagining spaces of potentiality for new South African identities

In an interview published in Esprit, Achille Mbembe asks “what is ‘today’, and what are we today? What are the lines of fragility, the lines of precariousness, the fissures in contemporary African life? And, possibly, how could what is, be no more, how could it give birth to something else?” As a response to this question of African identity, this article is twofold. Firstly, I aim to draw together an argument that recent and ongoing debates about decolonising knowledge (including Mbembe’s 2015 WISER lecture and open public conversations with the #RhodesMustFall [#RMF] student movement) can be read as part of the search for ways “to be otherwise”. In fact, higher education (HE) institutions should be, can be, and often are, crucial spaces of potentiality in this regard. An essential part of realising Mbembe’s vision of a new kind of human, therefore, would be to ensure that institutions in the contemporary HE landscape recognise, embrace and therefore (paradoxically) become what they are, namely “heterotopias”. Heterotopology is a metaphor Michel Foucault suggests in his 1967 lecture Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias. Accepting that HE is a heterotopically discursive site, this article provides a brief, broad Foucaultian heterotopology of the contemporary HE landscape, with specific reference to the South African context. It focuses on Foucault’s three types of heterotopia (crisis, deviation and compensation) and his six principles of heterotopia. Secondly, it would be something of a performative contradiction if this article were merely to follow the conventions of a traditionally organised philosophical argument about an engaging metaphor (“heterotopia”). As an experimental “strategic performance”, the writing itself aims to produce a heterotopic reading experience, thereby joining in the heuristic excavation of experience, which is the task of the heterotopia. It draws disparate, clashing elements into a complex textual web, which should generate at least some feeling of disturbance or cognitive dissonance. In the article’s fissures and joints, readers should find points of entry for critical and creative thinking. As Johnson puts it in his analysis of Foucault’s metaphor, “heterotopias glitter and clash in their incongruous variety, illuminating a passage for our imagination”.     

The Cross‐Cultural Relevance of Person‐Centered Counseling in Postapartheid South Africa

In this article, the need for effective cross‐cultural counseling in South Africa is emphasized against the background of the country's sociocultural context. The characteristics of person‐centered counseling that make it cross‐culturally suitable in the South African situation are discussed. Rogers's cross‐cultural group work during his visits to South Africa is briefly described. The ways in which specific cross‐cultural obstacles can be overcome by means of the person‐centered approach are pointed out. The relationship between person‐centered counseling and traditional African healing practices is described. Finally, ways to address the language barriers in cross‐cultural counseling in South Africa are discussed.     

Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action1

Abstract

In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action – ‘reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set’ – are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action would be centered, not on the concept of desire-independent reasons, but rather on the concept of rational desire.     

Whites' and Asian Americans' Perceptions of Asian Americans as Targets of Affirmative Action1

Although Asian Americans are technically a protected group, perceptions of Asian Americans as targets of affirmative action are largely unexplored, as are the attitudes of Asian Americans toward affirmative action. This study compared Whites' (N = 142) and Asian Americans' (N = 85) perceptions of workplace‐related discrimination and affirmative action beneficiary status for Asian Americans, African Americans, and Hispanic Americans. Whites and Asian Americans agreed that Asian Americans experience less adverse impact on tests and benefit less from affirmative action than do Blacks or Hispanics. However, Asian Americans were more likely than Whites to perceive that Asian Americans suffer from discrimination and underrepresentation and should benefit from affirmative action.     

Who is umuntu in Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu? Interrogating moral issues facing Ndau women in polygyny

Discussions on the African communitarian idea of personhood have generated several debates among African philosophers about how it is conceived and perceived. While scholars like Wiredu and Gyekye maintain that personhood is gender-neutral, others such as Oyowe suggest that personhood is gendered. The position that African communitarian personhood is gendered is the basis for the argument in this article. Defenders of this notion argue that the gender-neutral conception of personhood has created situations where gender issues have been glossed over, thereby perpetuating gender inequality in African communities. It is within this context that we take the argument further by interrogating the word umuntu in the popular southern African maxim on personhood, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. We ask the question: if personhood is gendered, then who is umuntu in this aphorism? In an attempt to answer this question, we advance two important claims. First, we claim that umuntu refers to a person whose interest is upheld in the community as well as those who are able to determine their own interest. Second, we also say that this concept of umuntu has perpetuated cultural practices that adversely impact women and girls in most African rural communities. Although some scholars might object to these claims, in this article we will not be addressing those objections, but rather we argue that umuntu is gendered male in the aphorism.     

Redeeming Apartheid's Legacy: Collective Guilt, Political Ideology, and Compensation

This paper reports two studies among white South African students on feelings of collective guilt about apartheid and attitudes to affirmative action. Study 1 reports on 21 in-depth interviews, Study 2 on results from 180 survey questionnaires. Substantial proportions of the participants in both studies displayed feelings of collective guilt. Among participants in both studies who identified strongly with white South Africans, some displayed strong feelings of collective guilt while others displayed no such feelings. Our survey data suggest that political ideology functions as a moderator. Strong feelings of guilt were found among students who identified strongly with white South Africans and defined themselves as liberals. If they defined themselves as conservatives then no feelings of collective guilt were observed. Strong feelings of collective guilt were accompanied by positive attitudes toward affirmative action. The influence of political ideology on attitudes toward affirmative action was mediated by collective guilt.     

The ethics of selection quotas in South African sport1

This article explores and unpacks the public debate on the ethics of applying selection quotas to South African international sport sides to achieve transformation, with special attention to cricket and rugby, the Proteas and Springboks respectively. I claim that for quotas to be morally called for, the racial transformation they are in service of must be morally required. Following an earlier article of mine on the subject of transformation in South African sport, I briefly reject two manifestations of the goal of having the sides’ racial demographics match those of the country as a whole, and proceed to defend and develop two different transformational requirements: the ending of ongoing racial bias and the provision of equality of opportunity. I argue that while there may be a place for alternative forms of affirmative selection, the case for rigid quotas is marginal at best. While I do not argue for the claim here, it neither follows from this, nor do I believe, that the use of quotas is morally wrong. I argue only that the case for them is not particularly strong and depends, particularly, on the extent to which ongoing racial bias in selection persists.     

The Doctrine of Double Effect and Affirmative Action

ABSTRACT William Cooney has recently argued ( The Journal of Applied Philosophy , Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable by-product. In this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action debate.     

Affirmative action. Psychological data and the policy debates

The authors bring psychological research to bear on an examination of the policy of affirmative action. They argue that data from many studies reveal that affirmative action as a policy has more benefits than costs. Although the majority of pro-affirmative action arguments in the social sciences stress diversity, the authors' argument focuses on issues of merit. The merit-based argument, grounded in empirical studies, concludes that the policy of affirmative action conforms to the American ideal of fairness and is a necessary policy.     

The effect of affirmative action on attributions about minority group members

In the first study subjects were given information about an applicant to graduate school and asked to rate his qualifications. The information experimentally varied (a) whether the school had an affirmative action policy, (b) the ethnicity of the applicant, and (c) whether the applicant was accepted or rejected. Based on Kelley's discussion of the discounting and augmentation principles, it was predicted that the minority applicant would be rated as less qualified when the university was committed to an affirmative action program. The reverse pattern was predicted for the non-minority applicant. The results supported the first prediction but not the second. Experiment 2 was designed to eliminate alternative interpretations of the data and the same results were found. Possible interpretations for the failure of affirmative action in affecting the ratings of nonminority applicants are discussed.     

EXTERNAL REASONS

Abstract: In this article I consider Bernard Williams's argument against the possibility of external reasons for action and his claim that the only reasons for action are therefore internal. Williams's argument appeals to David Hume's claim that reason is the slave of the passions, and to the idea that reasons are capable of motivating the agent who has them. I consider two responses to Williams's argument, by John McDowell and by Stephen Finlay. McDowell claims that even if Hume is right, there might nevertheless be external reasons. Finlay also claims that external reasons exist but, rejecting the connection between reasons and motivation, claims that they don't matter—that is, aren't motivationally significant for the agent whose reasons they are. Although I reject aspects of McDowell's and Finlay's arguments, I argue that external reasons do exist and in particular that any agent has an external reason to satisfy the preconditions of his or her agency.     

The Motivation for “Toward an African Moral Theory”

Abstract

Here I introduce the symposium issue of the South African Journal of Philosophy that is devoted to critically analysing my article “Toward an African Moral Theory.” In that article, I use the techniques of analytic moral philosophy to articulate and defend a moral theory that both is grounded on the values of peoples living in sub-Saharan Africa and differs from what is influential in contemporary Western ethics. Here, I not only present a précis of the article, but also provide a sketch of why I have undertaken the sort of project begun there, what I hope it will help to achieve, and how the contributors to the symposium principally question it.     

The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch

In this essay, I review Matthew Fulkerson's The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. In this first philosophical book on the sense of touch, Fulkerson provides an account of the nature and content of tactual experience. Central to Fulkerson's view is the claim that exploratory action plays a fundamental role in touch. In this review, I put pressure on two of his arguments: (1) the argument that tactual experience is unisensory and (2) the argument that tactual experience does not depend on explicit bodily awareness.     

Book Review

Abstract

In this article, I respond to questions about, and criticisms of, my article “Toward an African Moral Theory” that have been put forth by Allen Wood, Mogobe Ramose, Douglas Farland and Jason van Niekerk. The major topics I address include: what bearing the objectivity of moral value should have on cross-cultural moral differences between Africans and Westerners; whether a harmonious relationship is a good candidate for having final moral value; whether consequentialism exhausts the proper way to respond to the value of a hannonious relationship; what makes a moral theory count as “African”; how the existing literature on African ethics relates to the aim of analytically developing and defending a single foundational moral principle; whether the intuitions I appeal to ground an African moral theory are pro tanto right-makers or general moral truths; whether the moral theory I defend can capture pro tanto rightness; and whether the best interpretation of African ethics is self-regarding (deeming the only basic moral reason for action to be that it would develop one’s own valuable human nature) or other-regarding (holding that a certain kind of harmonious relationship between individuals could ground a basic moral reason for action).