The X-claim argument against religious belief offers nothing new

Stephen Law has recently offered an argument against the rationality of certain religious beliefs that he calls the X-claim argument against religious beliefs (Law in Relig Stud, 2017,  https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412526000330). The argument purports to show that it is irrational to believe in the existence of extraordinary beings associated with religions. However, the X-claim argument is beset by certain ambiguities that, once resolved, leave the argument undifferentiated from two other common objections to the rationality of religious belief: the objection from religious diversity and the objection from unreliable sources. And though the latter pose serious obstacles to the rationality of religious belief, the X-claim argument adds no further difficulty.     

Personality Traits Predict Irrational Beliefs

Irrational beliefs are the focus of many psychological theories, since research has shown that holding irrational beliefs often leads to unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors, and psychological disturbances. The aim of such therapies as rational emotive behavioral therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy is to dispute irrational beliefs to promote more rational ways of thinking; however they do not take into account individual personality differences. The aim of this study was to determine whether personality traits predict rational and irrational beliefs in a mixed student and clinical sample. It was hypothesized that the domains of the five factor model of personality would predict rational beliefs as well as a range of irrational beliefs. Our findings supported the hypothesis, showing distinct associations between personality traits and each specific irrational belief. Neuroticism predicted rational beliefs as well as six out of the seven types of irrational beliefs measured. Additionally, extraversion predicted rationality and self-downing, openness predicted need for comfort and total irrationality, and conscientiousness predicted need for achievement and demand for fairness. Agreeableness did not predict any type of rational or irrational beliefs. Knowledge of these distinct relationships may increase a clinician’s ability to conceptualize a therapy case and determine the best approach to treatment.     

Credulism

Conclusion The credulity principle approach to the issue of the rationality of religious belief is a clear advance over the proof approach. For the proof approach, in the end, is simply too wedded to an infallibilist conception of rational belief; and initially, at least, the credulity principle approach seems to avoid this conception. In the end, however, it affirms that same viewpoint; for if it does not embody an infallibilist conception of epistemic principles, its critical property of intersubjectivity is beyond defense. Thus, in recognizing the inadequacy of infallibilist conceptions of rationality, we can see the inadequacy of both the proof approach and the credulity principle approach to the existence of God. It is simply false that the experiences of others is efficacious in conferring rationality on our beliefs.But if neither of these approaches is adequate, how is one to approach the issue of the rationality of religious belief? The subjective nature of rational belief provides the answer - if one wishes to argue that God exists, one will have to provide as many arguments as there are divergent sets of acceptable epistemic principles. There still is a place for such arguments; but only given the assumption that we share views about what sorts of inferences are proper, or that other arguments can be constructed for the superiority of certain epistemic principles. The view that must be given up, however, is that the discussions philosophers have of these issues need bear any relation to whether or not the normal religious believer has a reasonable belief or not - he does not need there to be a good philosophical argument that God exists in order to reasonably believe that God exists. Nor is any non-believer necessarily irrational just because there is such a good argument.Thus, once the nature of rational belief is properly appreciated, it appears that the question of the rationality of religious belief is not a central question any longer. Whether such beliefs are rational is a quite subjective question not capable of being answered by any sort of universal generalization about all religious believers and/or non-believers.     

The relationship between perceived parents' childrearing practices,own later rationality,and own later depression

The present study tested Ellis' (1971) hypothesis that maladjusted emotion is caused by irrational beliefs learned during childhood to some extent from the parents. Students enrolled at the University of Orebro (n=180) completed questionnaires assessing parents' child-rearing practices during the respondent's first sixteen years of childhood as perceived and remembered by the respondent, the respondent's own rationality, and the respondent's own depression. A regression analysis indicated that child-rearing practices characterized of enmeshed relationships between parent and child is indicative of irrational beliefs on behalf of the parents. In turn, this leads to an irrational kind of child-rearing that significantly predicted the child's own rationality as an adult. The child's own rationality in turn significantly predicted the child's own depression. Results were interpreted as supportive of Ellis' hypothesis.The author wants to express his thanks to Miss Sofia Bergenbrandt, Miss Cathrin Gustafson, and Miss Katarina Hedlund for doing the data collection.     

In defense of the one-factor doxastic account: A phenomenal account of delusions

According to the doxastic model, delusions are beliefs. In the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings mistaken for beliefs. I argue that endorsement of false second-order beliefs could also create unpleasant dissonance, that mentally healthy people often endorse irrational or conflicting beliefs, and that the lack of delusion-motivated action can be explained by the influence of nonbelief factors on action. The two-factor doxastic model posits irrationality as necessary, and one metric of rationality many scholars employ is whether a response is easily understood by folk psychology. A precedent for folk-psychological acceptance of contextually bizarre beliefs as a result of personal experience can already be found in the lack of imaginative resistance encountered not in response to the impossibilities portrayed in speculative fiction, but in response to the characters’ ability to incorporate these occurrences into their mental frameworks, despite them often being at odds with these characters’ bedrock understanding of the world.     

Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a ??Grand State Space??, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. On the other hand, this notion of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs.     

The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Received View of Spinoza on Democracy

On many interpretations of Spinoza’s political philosophy, democracy emerges as his ideal type of government. But a type of government can be ideal and yet it can be unwise to implement it if certain background conditions obtain. For example, a dominion’s people can be too ‘wretched by the conditions of slavery’ to rule themselves. This begs the following question. Do Spinoza’s arguments for democracy entail that all political bodies should be democracies at all times (the received view), or do they merely entail that we should only have a democracy when the right sort of background conditions are in place (the challenging view)? This paper argues that a new interpretation of one of the four versions of the rationality argument for democracy as it features in the Tractatus entails that the received view is correct. The paper also explains away part of the appeal of the challenging view by arguing that none of the other versions of the rationality argument supports the received view. It closes by arguing that a slightly modernised version of the rationality argument can be important for contemporary political philosophy.     

Religious diversity and epistemic luck

A familiar criticism of religious belief starts from the claim that a typical religious believer holds the particular religious beliefs she does just because she happened to be raised in a certain cultural setting rather than some other. This claim is commonly thought to have damaging epistemological consequences for religious beliefs, and one can find statements of an argument in this vicinity in the writings of John Stuart Mill and more recently Philip Kitcher, although the argument is seldom spelled out very precisely. This paper begins by offering a reconstruction of an argument against religious beliefs from cultural contingency, which proceeds by way of an initial argument to the unreliability of the processes by which religious beliefs are formed, whose conclusion is then used to derive two further conclusions, one which targets knowledge and the other, rationality. Drawing upon recent work in analytic epistemology, I explore a number of possible ways of spelling out the closely related notions of accidental truth, epistemic luck, and reliability upon which the argument turns. I try to show that the renderings of the argument that succeed in securing the sceptical conclusion against religious beliefs also threaten scepticism about various sorts of beliefs besides religious beliefs.     

Rationality and the tu quoque argument

The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a sine qua non for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axiom ? The tradition views only the life‐long commitment as real. Viewing rationality as experimental open‐mindedness, we may consider a rationalist unable to retreat into any life‐long commitment — even commitment to science. In this way the logic of the tu quoque argument is made irrelevant: anyone able to face the choice between rationality and commitment is already beyond such a choice; it is one thing to be still naïve and another — and paradoxical — thing to return to one's naïveté.     

Non-cognitivism and rational inference

Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege–Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege–Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr’s argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr’s argument equivocates between two different notions of evidence, and that once this equivocation is noted there is no reason to doubt that non-cognitivism is consistent with the rationality of such inferences, at least if it is assumed that the Frege–Geach problem can be solved. In particular, I will show that non-cognitivists can endorse the same explanation of the rationality of such inferences that cognitivists should endorse, and that there is thus no need for non-cognitivists to offer any sort of idiosyncratic account of the epistemology of such cases, in contrast to what other commentators on Dorr’s argument have thought.     

Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.     

Five arguments on the rationality of suicide terrorists

This is a critical review of five arguments against the scholarly consensus that individual suicide terrorists are rational actors. The first three arguments are analytic, meaning that they hold that suicide terrorism is inherently irrational, based on assumptions regarding the nature of the perpetrators' interests as individuals. The fourth argument is empirical, based on alleged evidence of suicide terrorist psychopathology. And the fifth argument is pragmatic, based on the strategic implications of ‘conceding’ the status of rationality to enemies. This article highlights weaknesses in these arguments and considers assessing the rationality of suicide terrorists by measuring their act to cultural or community goals subject to a division of labor principle.     

Two minds rationality

I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore driven entirely by repeating behaviours which succeeded in the past. The new mind, however, permits the solution of novel problems by reasoning about the future, enabling consequential decision making. I suggest that the concept of epistemic rationality—striving for true knowledge—can only usefully be applied to the new mind with its access to explicit knowledge and beliefs. I also suggest that we commonly interpret behaviour as irrational when the old mind conflicts with the new and frustrates the goals of the conscious person.     

The Rationality of the Arms Racers

Abstract  Against Peter Baehr's 'The "irrationality" of the arms race', published in Vol. 2 No. 2 of the Journal of Applied Philosophy, this paper argues that, at least directly and in the first instance, both rationality and irrationality characterise individual beliefs and individual behaviour. Furthermore it is fundamental to the understanding of persons that, before putting anyone down as in either respect irrational, we should first reconsider whether we were right, either in attributing to them beliefs which it would have been irrational for them to hold, or in assuming that their actual purposes and priorities were indeed such as to make their behaviour—by these standards—counterproductive. Once our present questions are approached in this way it becomes apparent that we have been given no sufficient reason for concluding that there is significantly more irrationality here than elsewhere. More than enough is too much.     

Does rationality presuppose irrationality

Abstract

Although irrationality always presupposes rationality, I think there are good arguments to claim that sometimes rationality presupposes irrationality.This paper tries to show how irrational action can support rationality in two ways: it can develop and preserve rationality. I also argue that sometimes the development and the conservation of rationality can only be realized by irrational action.     

Rationality and Judgment

Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.     

TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION: INFERENTIAL OR NON-INFERENTIAL?

Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. I show that her argument begs important questions. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs.     

Are creationists rational?

Creationism is usually regarded as an irrational set of beliefs. In this paper I propose that the best way to understand why individual learners settle on any mature set of beliefs is to see that as the developmental outcome of a series of “fast and frugal” boundedly rational inferences rather than as a rejection of reason. This applies to those whose views are opposed to science in general. A bounded rationality model of belief choices both serves to explain the fact that folk traditions tend to converge on “anti-modernity”, and to act as a default hypothesis, deviations from which we can use to identify other, arational, influences such as social psychological, economic and individual dispositions. I propose some educational and public policy strategies that might decrease the proportion of learners who find creationism and anti-science in general a rational choice.     

Irrational beliefs and self-esteem: Predictors of depressive symptoms in children?

The role of self-esteem and irrational beliefs in predicting depressive symptoms in 965 children aged 8 to 13 years was investigated using multiple regression analysis. The results provided empirical support for a cognitive basis for depression in a large non-clinical sample. Three irrational beliefs together with self-esteem accounted for 28% of the variation in childhood depressive symptoms. For boys, 24% of variation in depressive symptoms was attributed to two irrational beliefs and self-esteem, whilst for girls 32% of variation was accounted for by three irrational beliefs and self-esteem. Global beliefs about self as a person were found to be predictive of depressive symptoms in conjunction with irrational beliefs. Therapeutic implications are discussed. Currently, Dr. Burnett is Senior Lecturer in Research Methods within the School of Learning and Development at the Queensland University of Technology as well as Director of the Research Concentration in Cognition in Learning and Development.     

Debunking Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Do the cognitive origins of our theistic beliefs debunk them or explain them away? This paper develops an empirically motivated debunking argument and defends it against objections. First, we introduce the empirical and epistemological background. Second, we develop and defend the main argument, the debunking argument from false god beliefs. Third, we characterize and evaluate the most prominent religious debunking argument to date: the debunking argument from insensitivity. It is found that insensitivity-based arguments are problematic, which makes them less promising than the debunking argument from false god beliefs.