A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience

While accounts of “aesthetic” experience inspire art study and drive its cognitive goals the current modeling of art perception, based on the analytic tradition emphasizing successful assimilation of art information, is unable to truly address this phenomenon, leaving us without means of accounting for disruption and fundamental change—either perceptual or self-referential—as well as epiphany and insight, within the experience of art; and no means of addressing ’art’s ability to mark and change lives. To address this, we introduce a five-stage model of art-perception, organized around initial disruption and subsequent meta-cognitive reflection and self-transformation, which allows for this needed discussion of perceptual and conceptual change, and a connection of art-viewing to viewer personality. Based on this, we consider belletristic accounts of aesthetic experience, and discuss the inter-relation of emotional, cognitive and appraisal factors that may be important for objective research.     

Emotions and goals: Assessing relations between values and emotions

Whereas most current theories on emotions posit a central position to goals, direct tests of associations between emotions and goals have been sparse. We investigated such relations by comparing ratings of value importance and frequency of emotional experiences in daily life. The results confirmed our general expectation that associations would be found between values and emotions related to corresponding goals. We argue that data like these are fundamental to further development of emotion theory.     

Influence of aesthetic perception on visual event-related potentials

The aim of the study was to assess the effects of visual aesthetic perception on event-related potentials (ERPs). Eight subjects assigned an aesthetic judgment (beautiful, neutral, or ugly) and a 10-step beauty estimation to the target stimuli, consisting of famous artistic pictures and geometric shapes. In a further task, the subjects performed a motor response to the previously judged pictures and geometric shapes. ERPs were recorded through 54 scalp electrodes during both tasks. The P3b amplitude was increased during the categorization of the geometric shapes compared to the artistic figures and during the vision of the beautiful targets preceding the motor response. The categorization of the aesthetic qualities of geometrical shapes seems to induce a higher level of attention, while a higher arousal variation was elicited by the recognition of beauty, in any form that was presented.     

Contribution to the mathematical biophysics of visual perception with special reference to the theory of aesthetic values of geometrical patterns

On the basis of previous mathematico-biophysical studies, a theory of visual perception is outlined. The theory is applied to the aesthetic values of polygonal patterns and found in fair agreement with experimental results.     

Visual perception of technical execution and aesthetic quality in biological motion

This study tests the contributions of structural and transformational information in the perception of technical execution and aesthetic quality in gymnastics judging. A focal question was whether the quality of human movement usually called aesthetic belongs to some category different from mere transformations of position over time, i.e., kinematics. Qualified gymnastics judges (Elite/Class I and Class III) and naive observers rated 30 performances of a 30-sec pass from a compulsory balance beam routine (Class III girls). The same performances were rated for technical execution and aesthetic quality under point-light and normal viewing conditions. Within observer groups there were no differences in scores for technical execution or aesthetic quality. Correlation analyses indicated that all three groups of observers rated performances with similar trends across point-light and normal display conditions for technical execution (range 0.67–0.87). Significantly lower correlations were found for aesthetic quality within all three groups(range 0.46–0.56). Naive observers showed the highest correlations between technical execution and aesthetic quality in both point-light and normal display conditions. Results suggest that transformational information provides much of necessary information for the evaluation of technical execution and aesthetic quality although observer experience affects the pick-up of this information.     

Emotions,Attitudes, and Reasons

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes.     

Voters, Emotions, and Memory

In this paper we argue that emotional response to information encountered in campaigns has implications for the likelihood of remembering that information at the time of the vote. Most voting models are built on what voters remember—whether it is the placement of candidates on issues, or opened ended responses to prompts. That recall of memory is biased is well-known, but the extent to which those biases are driven by affective response to candidate information has not been studied. Using dynamic process tracing, we examine voters' emotional responses, information search, and candidate evaluations during a simulated presidential primary campaign. By manipulating anxiety and the amount of incongruent information that voters encounter, we can detect the direct influence of affect in information processing. We find evidence that voters are more likely to remember information that generates any affective reaction as opposed to information for which the subjects report no emotional response. However, we find little evidence that anxiety has a special role, compared to enthusiasm or anger, in increasing the likelihood that an individual item is remembered. This challenges a primary contention of the theory of Affective Intelligence that anxiety leads to more memories for campaign information.     

Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment

I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to the actual emotional reactions of victims' relatives, however, does not find support for retributivism. Instead, it suggests punishment should be understood as part of a process of recovery with a complex set of demands. Retributive concerns can play a role in the process, but they don't have the priority that retributivism requires.     

Emotions,feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.     

Emotions,narrative and change

There is a wide agreement that emotions are central to the evaluation and understanding of change processes in psychotherapy. Unfortunately, most of the debate on the role of emotions has been influenced by the reductionist view of ‘psychophysiological symbolism’ (Averill 1996). We defend the position that, in order to understand their role in psychotherapy fully, we need to move in the direction of a more complex view of emotions. This paper presents a view of emotionsas social constructed phenomena operating via language and narrative. We present research suggesting that these narratives may be an essential process for understanding psychological disorders, how these disorders are developed and, finally, how they can be changed.     

Toward a reliable and valid measure of institutional mission and values perception: the DePaul values inventory

Across three studies, the development of a reliable and valid measure of perceptions by students of an urban, private, faith‐based teaching university's mission and values was assessed. Study 1 presented scale construction and reliability of the DePaul Values Inventory (DeVI) with undergraduates (n = 111), yielding a final 22‐item rating scale with four subscales. Study 2 supported the psychometric structure of the DeVI through a confirmatory factor analysis (n = 292). Study 3 assessed the DeVI's discriminant validity by correlating scores with social desirability and personal values surveys (n = 106). Overall, the DeVI was determined to be a reliable and valid measure of students' perceptions of an institution's mission and values, regardless of student gender, and independent of one's personal values even controlling for social approval tendencies. Future studies should examine the DeVI and its applicability for other similar institutions of higher learning.     

Emotions,Decisions, and the Brain

This article presents a commentary on the Appraisal‐Tendency Framework (ATF) developed by Lerner and her colleagues. The article explores ways by which the ATF can be extended including (a) incorporating elements from other frameworks, (b) incorporating the role of arousal, (c) exploring individual‐difference factors, and (d) examining the neural correlates of some of the key elements of the ATF. The article concludes with a discussion of the promise that decision neuroscience offers to further enrich an already exciting and thriving area of research in emotion and decision making.     

Emotions,Me, Myself and I

We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they are about an object and evaluate it – this means that the relation between emotions and the self may take different shapes. My discussion focuses on three different claims about this relation. According to the first claim, all emotions are about the subject who undergoes them. The second claim appeals to a more moderate form of reflexivity and affirms that emotions always feature a representation of other psychological states of the subject. The third understands the relation between emotions and the self in evaluative terms: emotions are said to evaluate relationally, one of the terms of this relation being the subject who undergoes it. I argue that all three claims apply, at best, only to a limited subset of emotions and that they must sometimes give way to claims that do not presuppose any intentional connection between emotions and the self.