Discussions Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science

Summary  Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence.     

Social dynamics in the preschool

In this paper, we consider how concepts from dynamic systems (such as attractors, repellors, and self-organization) can be applied to the study of young children’s peer relationships. We also consider how these concepts can be used to explore basic issues involving early peer processes. We use the dynamical systems approach called state space grid (SSG) analysis and consider how it can be expanded beyond the study of dyads to the study of larger social groups and networks. In particular, we explore the role of homophily—that is, behavioral and sex similarity—as factors in the self-organization of young children’s social groups. A dynamic systems approach allows for consideration of peer processes difficult to assess using more traditional approaches.     

From embodied to socially embedded agents – Implications for interaction-aware robots

First, this article proposes a minimal definition of embodiment that can be applied across animals and artefacts. We discuss the potential contributions of this operational definition with respect to assessing and measuring the degree of embodiment in different biological and artificial systems. Second, we outline how this definition can be extended to lead to the particular notion of social embeddedness. Socially embedded agents are structurally coupled with their social environment, in that their sensorimotor activity is grounded in the social environment that the agent is surrounded by. Lastly, based on research in the social sciences on human–human interaction, we discuss perceptual requirements for interaction-aware robotic agents—agents whose identification and interpretation of the (social) environment is facilitated by awareness of the structure of agent–agent interactions (including humans ‘in the loop’). We suggest relevant concepts and heuristics that can contribute to studies of degrees of embodiment of robots that interact with social environments. Manipulating and systematically investigating these heuristics permits variation of the degree of embodiment of such interaction-aware robots.     

The Sociology of Complex Systems: An Overview of Actor-System-Dynamics Theory

This article illustrates the important scientific role that a systems approach might play within the social sciences and humanities, above all through its contribution to a common language, shared conceptualizations, and theoretical integration in the face of the extreme (and growing) fragmentation among the social sciences (and between the social sciences and the natural sciences). The article outlines a systems theoretic approach, actor-system-dynamics (ASD), whose authors have strived to re-establish systems theorizing in the social sciences (after a period of marginalization since the late 1960s). This is done, in part, by showing how key social science concepts are readily incorporated and applied in social system analysis.     

Knowledge in science and engineering

It is now fashionable to say that science and technology are social constructions. This is true, or rather, a truism. Man is a social animal. Man is a linguistic animal, and language is social. Hence all products of human activities and everything that involves language are social constructions. But an assertion that covers everything becomes empty. The constructionist mantra that science or technology is “not a simple input from nature” attacks a straw man, for no one denies the necessity of enormous human efforts in research, development, and design. To say that these are social activities should not imply that they are indistinguishable from other social activities such as politicking or profiteering. An investigation into their peculiarities will bring to relief their intellectual and technical characteristics. The argument that science and technology are social constructions because they involve many assumptions is again a truism. Whenever we think, whenever we find things intelligible, we invariably have used some concepts and made some assumptions. Philosophers such as Kant have painstakingly analyzed concepts without which intelligibility is impossible. The important questions are not whether scientists and engineers make assumptions but what kind of assumptions they make; not whether they make judgments, but what kind of reasons they offer to support their judgments. Are the assumptions and justifications all social? Or are they mainly technical? Admittedly, the boundaries between the two are not always sharp, but is it impossible to make any differentiation at all?     

Evolutionary Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Dynamical Systems: Building an Integrative Paradigm

Cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and dynamical systems theory have all been proposed as frameworks for linking the diverse subdisciplines of psychology with one another, and with other scientific disciplines. Traditional cognitive science focused on content-free general processing and deemphasized motivation. An evolutionary perspective emphasizes the centrality of motivational systems and the specificity of mechanisms designed to solve particular recurrent problems. The evolutionary perspective provides a set of broad general principles linking diverse behaviors in humans as well as other species. The dynamic approach seeks even broader principles, searching for emergent patterns in all complex systems, whether animate or inanimate. Natural selection is itself one such broad principle, as is the broader principle of self-organization, which helps explain dynamic equilibria found in groups of humans and in diverse species linked together within ecosystems. Proponents of the major contending interdisciplines will need to build more bridges if the dream of a unifying paradigm is to be realized. This review samples some of the reasons why evolutionary psychologists, dynamical systems theorists, and traditional cognitive scientists need one another.     

Webers Idealtypus Als Methode Zur Bestimmung Des Begriffsinhaltes Theoretischer Begriffe in Den Kulturwissenschaften

Weber's Ideal Type as a Method of Forming the Content of Theoretical Concepts in Social Sciences}. Max Weber introduced the ideal type as the specific method of concept formation in social sciences. But the ideal type is not established in social research. Instead, authors in philosophy of science until today try to reconstruct and interpret what Weber said about ideal types as well as what might be their importance in Weber's social theory. The thesis of the following paper is that the difficulties in understanding Weber's ideal types are linked with Weber's intensional logic of concept formation. The thesis is defended in three steps. The first step deals with Weber's understanding of what is a scientific question in cultural sciences. Secondly Weber's critical arguments against positivism, hegelianism and historism are worked out. Thirdly, Weber's method of concept formation is reconstructed.     

Why Social Science is Biological Science

The social sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of one particular biological species.     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Achievements of the hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to natural science A comparison with constructivist sociology

The hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to the natural sciences has a special interest in the interpretive phases of these sciences and in the circumstances, cognitive and social, that lead to divergent as well as convergent interpretations. It tries to ascertain the role of the hermeneutic circle in research; and to this end it has developed, over the past three decades or so, a number of adaptations of hermeneutic and phenomenological concepts to processes of experimentation and theory-making. The purpose of the present essay is to show how appropriate these concepts are to an important current research program (solar neutrinos) and thus to point out what difference they make to our understanding of science as a whole. This goal is pursued by means of comparison. The program of social constructivism in natural science has produced alternative but parallel concepts, embodied in an alternative and parallel vocabulary. The contrast between this vocabulary and that of hermeneutics and phenomenology reveals, so I argue, the advantages of the latter. But actually it does more: It reveals as well the pre-understanding or prejudgment of science embedded in each approach.     

Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality

This paper proposes a basic revision of the understanding of teleology in biological sciences. Since Kant, it has become customary to view purposiveness in organisms as a bias added by the observer; the recent notion of teleonomy expresses well this as-if character of natural purposes. In recent developments in science, however, notions such as self-organization (or complex systems) and the autopoiesis viewpoint, have displaced emergence and circular self-production as central features of life. Contrary to an often superficial reading, Kant gives a multi-faceted account of the living, and anticipates this modern reading of the organism, even introducing the term self-organization for the first time. Our re-reading of Kant in this light is strengthened by a group of philosophers of biology, with Hans Jonas as the central figure, who put back on center stage an organism-centered view of the living, an autonomous center of concern capable of providing an interior perspective. Thus, what is present in nuce in Kant, finds a convergent development from this current of philosophy of biology and the scientific ideas around autopoeisis, two independent but parallel developments culminating in the 1970s. Instead of viewing meaning or value as artifacts or illusions, both agree on a new understanding of a form of immanent teleology as truly biological features, inevitably intertwined with the self-establishment of an identity which is the living process.     

Ageism in science: Fair-play between generations

This paper discusses the role of age in scientific practice from an ethical perspective. In social perception, people tend to categorise others rather automatically along three major dimensions: race, sex, and age.¹ Much empirical and theoretical attention has been devoted to the study of racism and sexism, but comparatively little research in the social and behaviural sciences has been directed at understanding what some refer to as the third ‘-ism’: ageism.² For a serious understanding of the implications of ageism in science, it is necessary to discuss, first, the conflicting relationships between classical and modern concepts of time and calendar age, and thereafter the concept of ageism. Paper presented at the Fondation des Treilles Colloquium “Ethics and the European Space”, Les Treilles, France, 3–9 April 2003.     

Agency,Chance, and the Scientific Status of Psychology

Psychologists generally reject the reductionist, physicalist, “nothing but” stance of the natural sciences. At the same time they consider their discipline a science and wonder why it does not enjoy the status (and funding) of the natural sciences. Ferguson American Psychologist, 70, 527-542 (2015), Lilienfeld American Psychologist, 67, 111-129 (2012), and Schwartz et al. American Psychologist, 71, 52-70 (2016) are among those who adopt a soft naturalism of nonreductive physicalism which declares, or implies, that when it comes to humans, there is more than what the natural sciences can unravel. They envision psychology as scientific in the epistemological sense of generating reproducible results, but reject the reductive ontology of science which currently points to the undeterminable chance of quantum theory as the closest physics has come to the beginnings and what might loosely be called the foundation of the universe (e.g., Bridgman Harper's, 158, 443-451 1929; Eddington 1948). The case made here is that any science, including a psychological one, must be based on a naturalist ontology. This implies restricting the term science to disciplines which not only meet epistemological criteria like reproducibility, but which also adopt—on the ontological level—the parsimonious assumption that at present it makes sense to think that “there is nothing but time and chance” (e.g., Cox and Forshaw 2011; Crease and Goldhaber 2014; Rorty 1989). From this perspective, psychology emerges as two distinct disciplines, one a natural science, the other a human science in the broad sense of science as scientia.     

A biphasic relational approach to the evolution of human consciousness

Background/objectiveHuman consciousness is arguably unique, and its features are hard to explain. Continuous and discrete accounts of consciousness are commonly viewed as incompatible, but both have limitations. Continuous accounts cannot readily account for what appears to be unique about human consciousness; discrete accounts have a hard time explaining how human consciousness could have evolved. The present position paper shows how both continuous and discontinuously elements can be combined.MethodA biphasic model is constructed by unifying complex systems theory, the evolution of symbolic reasoning as a relational extension of human cooperation, and evolutionary science. The application of this approach to modern views of consciousness is then explored.ResultsOur analysis suggests that human consciousness may be viewed as a discontinuous event, that emerged from continuous foundations. This biphasic account contains processes that can be targeted clinically. For example, developmentally delayed children with problems in consciousness may be helped by targeting the processes the present account suggests are important at different levels of complexity.ConclusionsThis biphasic relational approach fits with the evolutionary record and with data on human cognitive development. It may be useful in guiding clinical intervention.     

An historian's view of American social science

This paper explicates the argument of The Origins of American Science. Starting from my own historical premises and the origin of the social sciences in both historicism and science, I compare the divergent historical orientations of the sociologies of Robert Park and Max Weber. I argue that the inclination of American social science toward scientism and liberalism derives from the national ideology of American exceptionalism. Since this structural feature of American political culture was itself a part of history, I indicate how changes in historical consciousness and politics led American social scientists to reformulate exceptionalism and their disciplines. By the 1920s, their hope of establishing scientific control over, and maintaining the liberal direction of, the fast-changing national history was embodied in scientism. I close with some thoughts about the continuing power of scientism and exceptionalism since the 1920s and the possibility that an historical, Weberian model of social science could bridge the widening gap between scientistic and hermeneutic wings of the social science disciplines.     

What Is an Immature Science?

Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation, etc. However, there are some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in this sense. If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of immaturity, based on Dudley Shapere’s work on the internal/external distinction. I then go on to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social sciences. Acceptance of disunity may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity.     

Decision-making theories: linking the disparate research areas of individual and collective cognition

In order to maximize their fitness, animals have to deal with different environmental and social factors that affect their everyday life. Although the way an animal behaves might enhance its fitness or survival in regard to one factor, it could compromise them regarding another. In the domain of decision sciences, research concerning decision making focuses on performances at the individual level but also at the collective one. However, between individual and collective decision making, different terms are used resulting in little or no connection between both research areas. In this paper, we reviewed how different branches of decision sciences study the same concept, mainly called speed-accuracy trade-off, and how the different results are on the same track in terms of showing the optimality of decisions. Whatever the level, individual or collective, each decision might be defined with three parameters: time or delay to decide, risk and accuracy. We strongly believe that more progress would be possible in this domain of research if these different branches were better linked, with an exchange of their results and theories. A growing amount of literature describes economics in humans and eco-ethology in birds making compromises between starvation, predation and reproduction. Numerous studies have been carried out on social cognition in primates but also birds and carnivores, and other publications describe market or reciprocal exchanges of commodities. We therefore hope that this paper will lead these different areas to a common decision science.     

The price of anarchy in social dilemmas: Traditional research paradigms and new network applications

Research on social dilemmas has largely been concerned with whether, and under what conditions, selfish decisions by autonomous individuals jointly result in socially inefficient outcomes. By contrast, considerably less emphasis has been placed on the extent of the inefficiency in those outcomes relative to the social optimum, and how the extent of inefficiency in theory compares with what is observed in experiments or practice. In this expository article, we introduce and subsequently extend the price of anarchy (PoA), an index that originated in studies on communication in computer science, and illustrate how it can be used to characterize the extent of inefficiency in social dilemmas. A second purpose of our article is to introduce a class of social dilemmas that occur when individuals selfishly choose routes in networks, and illustrate how the concept of PoA can be helpful in studying them.