Professional handball coaches management of players' situated understanding during official games

ObjectivesThis study, based on the team cognition approach, investigated the information content expressed by coaches when helping players build or update their understanding of the unfolding game. The focus was on how this content fits into the usual task-work/teamwork and procedural/declarative taxonomies.DesignThe data were collected through the audio and video recording of the communications and behaviors of three professional head coaches throughout a total of 15 games. We used deductive content analysis, crossing information contents related to task-work or teamwork with information contents related to declarative or procedural knowledge across the five game periods (first and second half of the first and second half-time, break-time period), and the three score differentials between the teams (favorable, balanced, and unfavorable).MethodWe first performed a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using a 5 (Game Periods) × 3 (Score Difference) factorial design. Follow-up ANOVAs with repeated-measures were performed to identify the variables contributing to the multivariate effect. We then performed a repeated-measures analysis of variance for information contents related to declarative and procedural knowledge in occurrences of task-work and teamwork categories.ResultsThe results showed that the coaches expressed information related more often to players' procedural knowledge than to their declarative knowledge. We discovered two main effects (game periods and score differences) in coaches' information contents delivered to players. Information related to procedural knowledge was not addressed to the team as a whole, but to certain players.ConclusionsThis suggests that an information flow was more distributed than shared.     

Methods,minds, memory,and kinds

ABSTRACT

The acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds.     

The Explicit and Implicit Domains in Psychoanalytic Change

New research findings of the development and organization of the mind, brain, and behavior bolster the ongoing relational- or intersubjective-field paradigmatic revision of psychoanalytic theory. A multisystems view of learning, memory, and knowledge provide us with a more complex picture of information processing that has fundamental implications for a psychoanalytic theory of therapeutic action.

If the implicit and explicit learning/memory systems are viewed as parallel processes, not easily translatable from one to the other, then new implicit relational experience carries considerably more power as compared to explicit/declarative processing in changing and establishing new implicit mental models. When these cognitive processing systems are viewed as more closely interconnected with a developmental emphasis on connecting them through language, then exploratory/interpretive work becomes more central. REM, dream, infant, and cognitive research evidence suggests that imagistic symbolic capacity exists at birth. Learning and remembering using imagistic symbolic processing could suggest a more easily translatable connection with later developed verbal symbolic processing and a closer, although varied, interconnection between implicit and explicit (symbolic) memory systems.

Explicit attitudes are more directly modifiable through an explicit/declarative focus. Implicit mental models, it is proposed, are variably modifiable through two different change processes: (1) accommodation or transformation of expectancies through new implicit procedural experience (not requiring explicit focus) and (2) diminished activation and increased capacity to deactivate implicit mental models through explicit/declarative processing and the establishment of contrasting implicit models through new implicit procedural experience.     

Neural predictive mechanisms and their role in cognitive incrementalism

Many neuroscientists view prediction as one of the core brain functions, especially on account of its support of fast movements in complex environments. This leads to the natural question whether predictive knowledge forms the cornerstone of our common-sense understanding of the world. However, there is little consensus as to the exact nature of predictive information and processes, or of the neural mechanisms that realize them. This paper compares procedural versus declarative notions of prediction, examines how the brain appears to carry out predictive functions, and discusses to what degree, and at what level, these neural mechanisms support cognitive incrementalism: the notion that high-level cognition stems from sensorimotor behavior.     

Novice motor performance: Better not to verbalize

Offline verbalization about a new motor experience is often assumed to positively influence subsequent performance. Here, we evaluated this presumed positive influence and whether it originates from declarative or from procedural knowledge using the explicit/implicit motor-learning paradigm. To this end, 80 nongolfers learned to perform a golf-putting task with high error rates (i.e., explicit motor learning), and thus relied on declarative knowledge, or low error rates (i.e., implicit motor learning), and thus relied on procedural knowledge. Afterward, they either put their memories of the previous motor experience into words or completed an irrelevant verbal task. Finally, they performed the putting task again. Verbalization did not improve novice motor performance: Putting was impaired, overall, and especially so for high-error learners. We conclude that declarative knowledge is altered by verbalization, whereas procedural knowledge is not.     

A META‐ANALYTIC EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPUTER‐BASED SIMULATION GAMES

Interactive cognitive complexity theory suggests that simulation games are more effective than other instructional methods because they simultaneously engage trainees’ affective and cognitive processes ( Tennyson & Jorczak, 2008 ). Meta‐analytic techniques were used to examine the instructional effectiveness of computer‐based simulation games relative to a comparison group (k= 65, N= 6,476). Consistent with theory, posttraining self‐efficacy was 20% higher, declarative knowledge was 11% higher, procedural knowledge was 14% higher, and retention was 9% higher for trainees taught with simulation games, relative to a comparison group. However, the results provide strong evidence of publication bias in simulation games research. Characteristics of simulation games and the instructional context also moderated the effectiveness of simulation games. Trainees learned more, relative to a comparison group, when simulation games conveyed course material actively rather than passively, trainees could access the simulation game as many times as desired, and the simulation game was a supplement to other instructional methods rather than stand‐alone instruction. However, trainees learned less from simulation games than comparison instructional methods when the instruction the comparison group received as a substitute for the simulation game actively engaged them in the learning experience.     

In pursuit of knowledge: comparing self-explanations, concepts, and procedures as pedagogical tools

Explaining new ideas to oneself can promote learning and transfer, but questions remain about how to maximize the pedagogical value of self-explanations. This study investigated how type of instruction affected self-explanation quality and subsequent learning outcomes for second- through fifth-grade children learning to solve mathematical equivalence problems (e.g., 7 + 3 + 9 = 7 + _). Experiment 1 varied whether instruction was conceptual or procedural in nature (n = 40), and Experiment 2 varied whether children were prompted to self-explain after conceptual instruction (n = 48). Conceptual instruction led to higher quality explanations, greater conceptual knowledge, and similar procedural knowledge compared with procedural instruction. No effect was found for self-explanation prompts. Conceptual instruction can be more efficient than procedural instruction and may make self-explanation prompts unnecessary.     

The development of procedural knowledge: An alternative explanation for chronometric trends of mental arithmetic

In a review of the Chronometrie literature, M. H. Ashcraft (Developmental Review, 1982, 2, 213–236) concluded that the development of number fact efficiency is due to a shift from relying on procedural knowledge such as counting to relying on declarative knowledge (a stored network of facts). This model assumes that all procedural processes are slow or remain slow, which is probably not the case. An alternative account posits that the key change in number fact efficiency involves a shift from slow counting procedures to principled procedural knowledge. As rules, heuristics, and principles become more familiar and interconnected, their use, for example, in producing the number facts becomes more automatic. The use of such procedural knowledge would be cognitively more economical than storing individual facts in long-term memory. Finally, existing Chronometric data can readily be interpreted in terms of this alternative model.     

Sleep in children enhances preferentially emotional declarative but not procedural memories

Although the consolidation of several memory systems is enhanced by sleep in adults, recent studies suggest that sleep supports declarative memory but not procedural memory in children. In the current study, the influence of sleep on emotional declarative memory (recognition task) and procedural memory (mirror tracing task) in 20 healthy children (10-13 years of age) was examined. After sleep, children showed an improvement in declarative memory. Separate analysis with respect to the emotional stimulus content revealed that sleep enhances the recognition of emotional stimuli (p > .001) rather than neutral stimuli (p = .084). In the procedural task, however, no sleep-enhanced memory improvement was observed. The results indicate that sleep in children, comparable to adults, enhances predominantly emotional declarative memory; however, in contrast to adults, it has no effect on the consolidation of procedural memory.     

Memory systems and the control of skilled action

ABSTRACT

In keeping with the dominant view that skills are largely automatic, the standard view of memory systems distinguishes between a representational declarative system associated with cognitive processes and a performance-based procedural system. The procedural system is thought to be largely responsible for the performance of well-learned skilled actions. Here we argue that most skills do not fully automate, which entails that the declarative system should make a substantial contribution to skilled performance. To support this view, we review evidence showing that the declarative system does indeed play a number of roles in skilled action.     

The Many Faces of Trauma - Psychic trauma as an inner experience

Abstract

Two types of memory processes, declarative and non-declarative have been identified by cognitive scientists. Cognitive science is currently making a distinction between 1) declarative memory and non-declarative memory. This paper is concerned with one type of non-declarative memory, procedural memory. Declarative knowledge refers to the things we know such as names, places, dates. Procedural knowledge is information associated with a highly practiced schema or action which is usually not conscious when the sequence is activated. The implications of procedural knowledge for psychoanalytic treatment are now beginning to be explored. This paper is a further step in this exploration.

It has been hypothesized that because of the automaticity of learned procedures underlying character pathology, character change can best be accomplished by intervening at the procedural level. This paper suggests that such interventions are optimal when they are noninterpretive and occur within the context of an interactive, mutually regulated, dyadic system. Procedures, when they become accessible to the analyst through empathy and introspection, can be, and in the case discussed below, were addressed within the context of the dyad. The psychotherapy of an adult man with difficulties at the procedural level is utilized to illustrate the importance of noninterpretive interventions that address the procedure in order to engage it in the dyad where it can begin to undergo therapeutic transformation. This paper illustrates the importance of understanding procedural knowledge and how this can provide a valuable additional tool to shape the modes of therapeutic action utilized in psychoanalytic treatment.     

Intact Procedural Knowledge in Patients with Alzheimer's Disease: Evidence from Golf Putting

Can Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients efficiently learn to perform a complex motor skill when relying on procedural knowledge? To address this question, the authors compared the golf-putting performance of AD patients, older adults, and younger adults in 2 different learning situations: one that promotes high error rates (thus increasing the reliance on declarative knowledge) or one that promotes low error rates (thus increasing the reliance on procedural knowledge). Motor performance was poorer overall for AD patients and older adults relative to younger adults in the high-error condition but equivalent between similar groups in the low-error condition. Also, AD patients in the low-error condition had better performance at the final putting distance relative to those in the high-error condition. This performance facilitation for AD patients likely stems from intact procedural knowledge.     

Analogous selection processes in declarative and procedural working memory: N-2 list-repetition and task-repetition costs

Working memory (WM) holds and manipulates representations for ongoing cognition. Oberauer (Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 51, 45–100, 2009) distinguishes between two analogous WM sub-systems: a declarative WM which handles the objects of thought, and a procedural WM which handles the representations of (cognitive) actions. Here, we assessed whether analogous effects are observed when participants switch between memory sets (declarative representations) and when they switch between task sets (procedural representations). One mechanism assumed to facilitate switching in procedural WM is the inhibition of previously used, but currently irrelevant task sets, as indexed by n-2 task-repetition costs (Mayr & Keele, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(1), 4–26, 2000). In this study we tested for an analogous effect in declarative WM. We assessed the evidence for n-2 list-repetition costs across eight experiments in which participants switched between memory lists to perform speeded classifications, mental arithmetic, or a local recognition test. N-2 list-repetition costs were obtained consistently in conditions assumed to increase interference between memory lists, and when lists formed chunks in long-term memory. Further analyses across experiments revealed a substantial contribution of episodic memory to n-2 list-repetition costs, thereby questioning the interpretation of n-2 repetition costs as reflecting inhibition. We reanalyzed the data of eight task-switching experiments, and observed that episodic memory also contributes to n-2 task-repetition costs. Taken together, these results show analogous processing principles in declarative and procedural WM, and question the relevance of inhibitory processes for efficient switching between mental sets.     

集体问题解决中的知识、惯例和绩效

在Cohen和Bacdayan发明的两人TTT纸牌游戏的基础上开发了三人TTT游戏,并以此为实验任务,考察了三人集体问题解决活动能否形成惯例,比较了有问题图式组和无问题图式组之间在惯例和绩效上的差异。实验结果表明：（1）三人问题解决能够形成惯例;（2）有图式组的惯例化程度总体上低于无图式组,而其惯例化程度提高的速度则快于后者;（3）无图式组的绩效高于有图式组,但前期差异显著,后期不显著。这些结果将前人基于两人TTT游戏所做的惯例研究进一步拓展到三人情境,证实了三人互动中惯例的生成,为研究涉及更多人互动的真正意义上的组织惯例奠定了基础;阐明了知识,特别是前人在组织惯例研究中所忽视的陈述性知识,对于惯例形成和绩效提升的影响,并揭示了其在组织管理和决策活动中的实际意义。     

Longitudinal associations between children's understanding of emotions and theory of mind

Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse.     

学前儿童对“知道”和“会”的认知

72名3至5岁儿童接受了陈述性知识和程序性知识的学习任务,探查他们在获得新知识前后对自己是否“知道”和 “会”的认知和知识获取方式的认知 。结果显示,有部分学前儿童在不知道或不会的情况下报告自己“知道”或“会”,对自己的判断倾向于作出肯定回答;在学习新知识之后,学前儿童对自己是否“知道”的认识要比是否“会”的认知准确;儿童对陈述性知识的获取方式的认识好于程序性知识,3岁儿童对知识获取方式的认识存在困难。     

ALL THE (MANY,MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE*

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.     

On the development of procedural knowledge

Amnesic patients demonstrate by their performance on a serial reaction time task that they learned a repeating spatial sequence despite their lack of awareness of the repetition (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). In the experiments reported here, we investigated this form of procedural learning in normal subjects. A subgroup of subjects showed substantial procedural learning of the sequence in the absence of explicit declarative knowledge of it. Their ability to generate the sequence was effectively at chance and showed no savings in learning. Additional amounts of training increased both procedural and declarative knowledge of the sequence. Development of knowledge in one system seems not to depend on knowledge in the other. Procedural learning in this situation is neither solely perceptual nor solely motor. The learning shows minimal transfer to a situation employing the same motor sequence.