A behavioural experiment in virtual reality to verify the role of action function in space coding

Neurophysiological data indicate that the reachable peripersonal space and the unreachable extrapersonal space are represented in segregated parietofrontal circuits and that when the unreachable space becomes reachable because of tool use, it is automatically coded by the network selective for peripersonal space. Here we directly tested the role of action's consequences in space coding. Thirty-eight participants bisected lines at either a reachable distance (60 cm) or unreachable distance (120 cm) using either a laser pointer or laser cutter. The laser cutter but not the laser pointer had an action consequence; the line broke into two pieces. The results showed that distance moderated the effect of action. At an unreachable distance, the mean bisection point was closer to the centre when participants used the laser cutter compared to when they used the laser pointer. There were no differences at a reachable distance (60 cm). This result suggests that the space in which the individual may determine a physical consequence is categorized as peripersonal space, independently from its actual distance from the individual's body.     

On sensation, perception and thought: A reply to Rönnberg

A traditional partition of cognitive phenomena into sensation, perception and thought is reintroduced in response to recent arguments (Rönnberg, 1990) for conditions that must be met in order to distinguish between perception and cognition. The suggested division seems grossly compatible with Ronnberg's basic aim and receives support from several different lines of inquiry, including single cell recordings in the brain, neurospsychology, computational studies of vision and experimental psychology.     

Uncertainty and group identification: Moderation by warmth and competence as cues to inclusion and identity validation

Drawing upon uncertainty-identity theory, we argue that self-uncertainty creates a motivated mindset in which people desire to have their social identity validated thorough inclusion, and that this transforms the meaning of group warmth and competence to cue inclusion. US College students (N = 289) participated in an on-line experiment in which self-uncertainty and the perceived warmth and competence of their college were primed, and group identification was measured as the dependent variable. As predicted, the three-way interaction significantly affected group identification. Specifically, uncertainty weakened identification with cold-but-competent groups. We also found that uncertainty strengthened identification with cold-and-incompetent groups. This research highlights the preference for certain group attributes under uncertainty.     

Perfectionism: A contributor to social anxiety and its cognitive processes

The present study aimed to examine how perfectionism is contributing to social anxiety and its cognitive processes of post‐event rumination and self‐perception of performance following a speech task. Forty‐eight undergraduate students completed measures of perfectionism and trait social anxiety prior to performing a 3‐min impromptu speech task. Immediately following the speech task, participants rated their state anxiety and self‐perception of performance, and 24 hr later, their level of post‐event rumination was measured. Structural equation modelling revealed that perfectionism, in the form of socially prescribed perfectionism and doubts about actions, directly influences trait social anxiety, and indirectly influences post‐event rumination and self‐perception of performance through its relationship with trait social anxiety and state anxiety. This is the first study to investigate how perfectionism is contributing to social anxiety and its cognitive processes. The findings of this study provide evidence in support of the potential predictive role of perfectionism in social anxiety.     

Experience,action and representations: Critical realism and the enactive theory of vision

This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment, so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential stage in visual processing.

Correspondence between definitions and procedures: A reply to Stokes, Osnes, and Guevremont

Stokes, Osnes, and Guevremont's (1987) implicit definition of correspondence classes appears close to ours (Matthews, Shimoff, & Catania, 1987). Their definition, however, is fundamentally procedural and thus may have to be modified as experimental methodologies are refined. The advantage of our contingency-space analysis is that it is independent of specific procedures and focuses attention on problems inherent in some procedural definitions. Specifically, a contingency-space analysis addresses the issue of distinguishing specific instances from classes and reminds us that correspondence can be identified as a class only on the basis of observing a population of opportunities for say/do sequences in which the subject sometimes does not say.     

Three obstructions: forms of causation,chronotopoids, and levels of reality

The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better, and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.

权力距离感对公平感与组织公民行为关系的调节作用研究

本文以188名企业员工及其同事为被试,运用问卷调查法和分层回归分析的统计方法考察了权力距离对公平感与组织公民行为之间关系的调节作用。结果发现:权力距离可以正向调节程序公平与同事评价OCB-I、OCB-G和OCB-O之间的关系,即权力距离感越强,则程序公平感与同事评价OCB-I、OCB-G和OCB-O之间的相关越强。     

Task effects, performance levels, features, configurations, and holistic face processing: A reply to Rossion

A recent article in Acta Psychologica (“Picture-plane inversion leads to qualitative changes of face perception” by Rossion [Rossion, B. (2008). Picture-plane inversion leads to qualitative changes of face perception. Acta Psychologica (Amst), 128(2), 274-289]) criticized several aspects of an earlier paper of ours [Riesenhuber, M., Jarudi, I., Gilad, S., & Sinha, P. (2004). Face processing in humans is compatible with a simple shape-based model of vision. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B (Supplements), 271, S448-S450]. We here address Rossion’s criticisms and correct some misunderstandings. To frame the discussion, we first review our previously presented computational model of face recognition in cortex [Jiang, X., Rosen, E., Zeffiro, T., Vanmeter, J., Blanz, V., & Riesenhuber, M. (2006). Evaluation of a shape-based model of human face discrimination using FMRI and behavioral techniques. Neuron, 50(1), 159-172] that provides a concrete biologically plausible computational substrate for holistic coding, namely a neural representation learned for upright faces, in the spirit of the original simple-to-complex hierarchical model of vision by Hubel and Wiesel. We show that Rossion’s and others’ data support the model, and that there is actually a convergence of views on the mechanisms underlying face recognition, in particular regarding holistic processing.     

A matter of design: Priming context and person perception

A matter of considerable debate is whether people spontaneously use categorical knowledge (i.e., stereotypes) to guide their interactions with others. Despite initial evidence for the unconditional automaticity of category activation, recent research has identified a range of factors that moderate this process. Extending this line of inquiry, the current investigation explored the extent to which contextual influences—specifically the order in which priming stimuli are presented to participants—may modulate person categorization. Using a standard semantic-priming paradigm to index category and stereotype activation, participants were presented with priming stimuli that were either intermixed or blocked by sex. The results revealed that: (i) category and stereotype activation are moderated by the order in which priming stimuli are presented; and (ii) priming effects decrease monotonically as a function of category repetition. The theoretical implications of these findings are considered.     

The mediating effects of time structure on the relationships between time management behaviour,job satisfaction,and psychological well‐being

This article examined the relationship between time structure and Macan's process model of time management. This study proposed that time structure—‘appraisal of effective time usage’—would be a more parsimonious mediator than perceived control over time in the relationship between time management behaviours and outcome variables, such as job satisfaction and psychological well‐being. Alternative structure models were compared using a sample of 111 university students. Model 1 tested Macan's process model of time management with perceived control over time as the mediator. Model 2 replaced perceived control over time by the construct of time structure. Model 3 examined the possibility of perceived control over time and time structure as being parallel mediators of the relationships between time management and outcomes. Results of this study showed that Model 1 and Model 2 fitted the data equally well. On the other hand, the mediated effects were small and partial in both models. This pattern of results calls for reassessment of the process model.     

Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one’s own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.     

A reexamination of mental arithmetic models and data: A reply to Ashcraft

In a review of the chronometric literature, M. Ashcraft (1982, Developmental Review, 2, 213–236) concludes that adults store each basic arithmetic fact in a table-like retrieval network. In my commentary (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 225–230), I argued that procedural knowledge (stored rules, principles, or heuristics) might be a cognitively more economical basis for generating many number combinations. In this paper, I draw an analogy between this alternative model of number fact representation and how computers efficiently reconstruct arithmetic combinations, note that the research findings do not clearly support any one model of mental arithmetic, and attempt to address Ashcraft's (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 231–235) criticisms of my model.     

The psychophysics of chasing: A case study in the perception of animacy

Psychologists have long been captivated by the perception of animacy – the fact that even simple moving shapes may appear to engage in animate, intentional, and goal-directed movements. Here we report several new types of studies of a particularly salient form of perceived animacy: chasing, in which one shape (the ‘wolf’) pursues another shape (‘the sheep’). We first demonstrate two new cues to perceived chasing – chasing subtlety (the degree to which the wolf deviates from perfectly ‘heat-seeking’ pursuit) and directionality (whether and how the shapes ‘face’ each other). We then use these cues to show how it is possible to assess the objective accuracy of such percepts, and to distinguish the immediate perception of chasing from those more subtle (but nevertheless real) types of ‘stalking’ that cannot be readily perceived. We also report several methodological advances. Previous studies of the perception of animacy have faced two major challenges: (a) it is difficult to measure perceived animacy with quantitative precision; and (b) task demands make it difficult to distinguish perception from higher-level inferences about animacy. We show how these challenges can be met, at least in our case study of perceived chasing, via tasks based on dynamic visual search (the Find-the-Chase task) and a new type of interactive display (the Don’t-Get-Caught! task).     

More than words: A reply to Malt and Sloman

In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of artifact categorization (e.g., [Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29]), and as supporting instead their alternative theory that naming is determined by communicative goals. This response begins by distinguishing the problem of artifact categorization (determining the categories that artifacts belong to) from the problem of artifact naming (deciding how to talk about members of these categories). In light of this distinction, it turns out that Malt and Sloman’s findings are fully consistent with all theories of artifact categorization, including the intentional-historical one. Moreover, contrary to what they argue, there are actually many cases where the relative contributions of categorization and pragmatics can be clearly distinguished. Finally, it is argued that Malt and Sloman’s own account of artifact naming presupposes a capacity for artifact categorization; it cannot work without one.