Aging and susceptibility to attitude change

Two hypotheses about the relation between age and susceptibility to attitude change were tested. The impressionable years hypothesis proposes that individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood and that susceptibility drops precipitously immediately thereafter and remains low throughout the rest of the life cycle. The increasing persistence hypothesis proposes that people become gradually more resistant to change throughout their lives. Structural equation models were applied to data from the 1956-1960, 1972-1976, and 1980 National Election Panel Studies in order to estimate the stability of political attitudes and unreliability in measures of them. The results support the impressionable years hypothesis and disconfirm the increasing persistence hypothesis. A decrease in the over-time consistency of attitude reports among 66- to 83-year-olds was found to be due to increased random measurement error in their reports, not to increased attitude change.     

Social categorization and attitude change

Two experiments were carried out investigating the effect of categorization on attitude change. It was predicted that the division of a number of individuals into two subgroups (categorization), in such a way that initial attitudes correlate with subgroup membership, would lead to accentuation of attitudinal differences between subgroups. It was further predicted that an identical distribution of initial attitudes without superimposed categorization would lead to convergence of attitude positions. In experiment 1, the effect of a male-female classification on attitude change was studied. It was indeed found that subjects changed their attitudes in the direction opposite to the position of the outgroup (intergroup attitude differentiation), but only for groups who were initially more extreme than the comparison group. In the control condition (no categorization), conformity effects were observed. In experiment 2, an antagonistic intergroup setting was induced. In this situation, strong intergroup attitude differentiation effects were observed, which were not affected by the magnitude of the initial intergroup discrepancy. In the control condition, subjects did not show conformity to the overall group mean, but maintained their initial noncentral attitude position.     

Perceptions of entitativity and attitude change

The current work explored the properties of groups that lead them to be persuasive and the processes through which such persuasion occurs. Because more entitative groups induce greater levels of information processing, their arguments should receive greater elaboration, leading to persuasion when members of groups present strong (vs. weak) counter attitudinal arguments. Experiment 1 explored these hypotheses by examining if idiosyncratic perceptions of group entitativity and manipulations of argument strength affect attitude change and argument elaboration. Experiment 2 experimentally manipulated group entitativity and argument strength independently to examine the causal relationship between entitativity, attitude change, and argument elaboration. In both experiments, it was found that groups greater in entitativity were more persuasive when presenting strong (vs. weak) arguments and induced greater argument elaboration. Implications for our understanding of entitativity, persuasion, and information processing about social groups are discussed.     

Internalization of conflict and attitude change

In a 2 × 2 × 2 design, eighty smokers were exposed to an anti-smoking appeal attributed either to an expert source (superior status) or a minority source (inferior status). Subjects were either allowed or not to smoke during the experiment. In addition subjects had to memorize part of the appeal and a recall task either followed after reading the appeal (completed task) or not (uncompleted task). The results show that the expert source produces more attitude change than the minority when the tension induced by the source is weakened (either by the opportunity to smoke or task completion). In contrast the minority has more impact when subjects are not able to smoke or when the task is not completed, which is to say when the conflict has been internalized. An explanation of these effects is offered in terms of the more defensive forms of resistance involved with respect to sources of superior status compared to more assertive forms with respect to minorities.     

Distraction and attitude change: A resolution

Previous studies have shown that distraction may either increase or decrease attitude change. The present experiment, designed to reconcile earlier findings, was based on the hypothesis that distraction should interfere with message reception but also increase yielding to the message. Distraction should thus increase attitude change to a simple message (one which is easily understood but not very convincing), but decrease attitude change to a complex message (one which is difficult to understand but convicing if understood). Subjects beard messages on two topics, sometimes while distracted by a tape recording of music and sometimes not. Message complexity was successfully manipulated for one of the topics. The results support a model of attitude change which considers the effects of independent variables on both reception and yielding.     

Presidential debates and change in students' attitude

The effects of debates on influencing potential voters' attitudes were assessed in a group of 45 undergraduates who watched the third presidential debate of election year 2000 between candidates Bush and Gore. A repeated measures t test indicated a significant change in immediate ratings of attitude from pretest to posttest, with Gore being rated higher at posttest.     

Evaluative language,cognitive effort and attitude change

The present article deals with the effects of the use of evaluatively biased language on attitudes, and with the role of cognitive effort. We tested whether active information processing — formulating arguments on the basis of evaluatively biased language — was a necessary condition for attitude change. Results of the present study support the prediction that using evaluative language can infuence attitudes, but that these effects depend on the amount of cognitive effort.     

Numerical support,information processing and attitude change

In two experiments we studied the prediction that majority support induces stronger convergent processing than minority support for a persuasive message, the more so when recipients are explicitly forced to pay attention to the source's point of view; this in turn affects the amount of attitude change on related issues. Convergent processing is the systematic elaboration on the sources position, but with a stronger focus on verification and justification rather than falsification. In Experiment 1 it was found that numerical support is related to information processing as predicted: The greater the support, the more convergent the processing. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and furthermore confirmed our expectations regarding attitude change: The more convergent processing occurs, the less subjects change their attitude on related issues.     

Self-generated attitude change: A person by situation analysis of attitude polarization and attenuation

The potential moderating effects of differences in the need for cognition on the attitude polarization process were explored. Based on putative schematabased differences in information processing, it was predicted that an increased opportunity for thought would result in (a) more attitude polarization for low need for cognition persons than for high need for cognition persons and (b) more attitude attenuation for high need for cognition persons than for low need for cognition persons. Participants completed the Need for Cognition scale and were given either little or ample time to think about issues toward which they previously held moderate attitudes. Attitudes were reassessed following thought about the issues. The results were consistent with the predicted moderating effects of individual differences in the need for cognition on thought-induced attitude polarization. Implications of and alternative explanations for the findings are discussed.