Gnosisssss ‐ A response to Wouter Hanegraaff

Researchers in psychology of religion in America and Britain have inherited the theoretical and research traditions established by W. James, S. Freud and J. Dittes. New nomothetic or theoretical frameworks have been called for in order to organize a plethora of idiographic data. A response to the call has been slow, but Paul Pruyser designated at least six areas in which the development of psychology of religion might most fruitfully occur; and the suggestion has been that altered states of consciousness research is perhaps the most important item of all six to consider for research methodology. This particular item, it was broadly suggested, may possibly serve as a bridge between East and West, thereby bringing psychologists of religion out of the darkness of Western methodological ethnocentrism, and into the light of cross-cultural, universally-applicable concerns sought in the spirit of the scientific study of religion. Psychologists of religion must rely on the tradition of Religion-swissenschaft for much of the ‘non-reducible’ data they study. Although the preponderence of general activity in the field is occurring in America, little attention along these lines is evident there. In Britain, the discipline is floundering. Yet, in spite of its quandaries, recognition of the need to encounter Eastern psychologies and religions, perhaps by means of the ‘bridge’ of altered states of consciousness research, appears to be more clearly stated in Britain (though infrequent, often obscure) than it has been elsewhere.     

A response to Penrose’s “Sandel on enhancement: A response to Van Niekerk”

In this article the author responds to Brian Penrose’s critical response to his (Van Niekerk’s) article “Biomedical enhancement and the pursuit of mastery and perfection: a critique of the views of Michael Sandel” that appeared in the PSSA conference edition of the SAJP 33(2), 2014. While Van Niekerk is appreciative of the opportunity for spirited dialogue that Penrose’s response provides, he nevertheless takes issue with several charges Penrose raises. He responds to Penrose’s claims that Van Niekerk does not fully understand “the Sandel project” and thus that Van Niekerk creates and shoots down a straw man in his argument against Sandel. Van Niekerk argues that Penrose’s claims are indicative of significant methodological differences between their respective approaches. Penrose acknowledges the “fuzziness” of Sandel’s arguments with regards to biomedical enhancement. He then develops an interpretation of Sandel’s views that claims to have “filled in the complete picture” of what Sandel attempts to do, and then reproaches Van Niekerk for not responding to that “completed picture”, i.e. the “Sandel project”. Van Niekerk finds this to be an unreasonable and methodologically highly problematic demand on him. Van Niekerk responds to a number of Penrose’s arguments, and then concludes that while there are, of course, good reasons to exercise caution at the prospect of biomedical enhancement with regard to its risks, the possibilities offered by enhancement need not elicit a prima facie reaction of pessimism. Rather, such prospects can also be regarded in a positive light as an exciting opportunity to take our own evolution in hand.     

Muslim American communities�� response to queer visibility

Muslims in the U.S. are comparatively well-educated, economically indistinct from the rest of the population, with a set of attitudes broadly compatible with the political mainstream. One of the few issue areas on which they stand out as distinctly conservative is on homosexuality, where rates of “disapproval” are at the same level as among evangelical Protestants. This view is reflected in the positions taken by most organized Muslim groups in the U.S., and almost certainly by the vast majority of religious leaders. There are indications of Muslims adapting their faith to the western context, and to intergenerational change in attitudes to sexual diversity. However, increasing sensitivity among American Muslims to the distrust or disdain to which their faith is subject, and to the heightened sense of scrutiny that they experience, may well be contributing to a retention of selective moral traditionalism.     

“Strong” narrativity—a response to Hutto

This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.     

Does response interference contribute to face composite effects?

Holistic processing of faces can be measured as a failure of selective attention to one face-half under instructions to ignore the other face-half in a naming or same/different matching task. But is interference from the irrelevant half due to response interference rather than to holistic processing? Here, participants learned to name two faces “Fred” and two “Bob.” At test, composites were created from top and bottom halves of different learned faces or of a novel face, and composites were either aligned or misaligned. Naming was slower when the irrelevant half was from a different face as opposed to the same face, regardless of whether it was associated with the same name, a different name, or no name, suggesting holistic processing. Interference was eliminated when composite halves were misaligned. These results suggest that, unlike Stroop effects, composite effects are not due to response interference.     

Are curmudgeon personality scales resistant to response distortion?

Curmudgeon personality, which is assessed by having participants evaluate a heterogeneous set of attitude objects, provides an applied value beyond that of more established personality traits. Recent research, for instance, suggests that curmudgeon personality is distinct from the Five Factor Model personality traits and that it predicts unique variance in important criteria, such as job attitudes and well-being. In the current paper we contribute to this literature by testing an explanation of how curmudgeon personality is distinct from other traits—their potential resistance to response distortion. We estimated response distortion for scales of curmudgeon personality and FFM traits across two quasi-experimental studies. As expected, the score shifts between nonapplicant and applicant conditions were smaller for scales of curmudgeon personality compared to scales of emotional stability and conscientiousness. We argue that curmudgeon personality scales may be more resistant to response distortion than are measures of other traits because curmudgeon personality items are semi-implicit and lack an obvious desirable response. The resistance to response distortion should serve as a call to future researchers to test the criterion validity of curmudgeon personality in regard to performance criteria.     

Geographic heuristics or shortcuts to failure?: response to Snook et al.

Snook, Taylor, and Bennell, in ‘Geographic profiling: The fast, frugal, and accurate way’ (Applied Cognitive Psychology, January 2004, volume 18, pp. 105–121), suggest that by invoking two simple rules untrained individuals can perform geographic profiling tasks as accurately as sophisticated computer software. While the results are interesting in terms of geographic heuristics, the authors' reach conclusions unsupported by their data and methods. Though they claim to address ‘the ongoing debate about whether individuals can perform as well as actuarial techniques when confronted with real world, consequential decisions,’ their laboratory experiment bears little resemblance to the reality of criminal investigation. Major flaws exist with both data selection (the cases used may not have met the assumptions underlying geographic profiling, and they only involved a series of three locations, too low for pattern detection), and methods of analysis (nonlinear error was measured linearly, and computerized geographic profiling search strategies were distorted). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reduction and abduction in chemistry‐a response to Scerri

Eric Scerri has proposed an account of how reduction might be understood in chemistry. He claims to build on a general aspect of Popper's views which survives his otherwise heavy criticism, namely adherence to actual scientific practice. This is contrasted with Nagel's conception, which Scerri takes to be the philosopher's standard notion. I argue that his proposal, interesting though it is, is not so foreign to ideas in the tradition within which Nagel wrote as Scerri would have us believe. Moreover, actual scientific practice can be commandeered in support of a holistic conception which Popper contrasted with what he saw as the admirable strivings towards reduction in science.     

The necessary a posteriori: A response to Tichý

Conclusion Some of Tichý's conclusions rest on an assumption about substitutivity which Kripke would not accept. If we grant the assumption, then Tichý successfully shows that we can discover true identity statements involving names a priori, but not that we can discover a priori what properties things have essentially. Many of Tichý's arguments require an implausible rejection of the possibility of indirect belief as described in Section III. 25Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we certainly can discover necessary propositions a posteriori, but have left it an open question whether there are necessary propositions which we can only discover a posteriori.What effect do the considerations here presented have on the positivist doctrine that the a priori and the necessary coincide? My explanation of how we discover necessary propositions a posteriori involves our believing them indirectly, in virtue of believing contingent propositions. I would argue that Kripke's examples of the contingent a priori involve, similarly, our believing the contingent propositions in directly, in virtue of believing necessary propositions.This suggests that a reformulation of the positivist thesis along something like the following lines may well be correct. Let us say that someone directly believes a proposition just in case he could not fail to believe it without being in a different cognitive state. Then perhaps one can directly believe a proposition on the basis of a priori evidence only if it is necessary, and can directly believe a proposition on the basis of a posteriori evidence only if it is contingent.     

Do young and old preschoolers exhibit response bias due to different mechanisms? Investigating children's response time

Previous studies have suggested that younger preschoolers exhibit a yes bias due to underdeveloped cognitive abilities, whereas older preschoolers exhibit a response bias due to other factors. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the response latency to yes-no questions pertaining to familiar and unfamiliar objects in 3- to 6-year-olds. The 3-year-olds exhibited a strong yes bias for both objects, and their response latency was significantly shorter than that of the 6-year-olds. The 4- and 5-year-olds did not exhibit any response bias, whereas the 6-year-olds exhibited a nay-saying bias (a response bias to say “no”) for unfamiliar objects. Overall, children’s response bias scores were stronger for familiar objects than for unfamiliar objects. The results suggest that 3-year-olds exhibit a yes bias automatically, but 5- and 6-year-olds are sensitive to question context.     

Infant imitation and the self—A response to Welsh

Talia Welsh (2006 Welsh, T. 2006. Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self and other awareness. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 221–238. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a “theory of mind,” Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge “theory of mind” theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts.     

Other road users’ adaptations to increase safety in response to older drivers’ behaviour

Changes in physical and cognitive abilities not only challenge the driving ability of older adults, in some situations age-related changes in driving behaviour require other road users to adapt their behaviour to maintain a safe traffic situation. In this study, we aimed to map age-related differences in driving behaviour and assess the impact on other road users. A group younger and a group older adults drove four different routes containing challenging situations (e.g., merging into motorway traffic) in a driving simulator while measures of driving behaviour were collected. Other road users’ deceleration responses to the driver’s behaviour were also collected as a measure of behavioural adaptation. Our results showed similar driving performance between young and older drivers when task complexity was low, but reduced performance in older drivers when tasks requirements increased. Lower driving speed and longer waiting times that were observed in older drivers can be interpreted as compensatory behaviour aimed at creating more time to lower task requirements. Crucially, in a non-time critical situation this compensatory behaviour was found to be successful, however in a time-critical situation (merging onto a motorway) this strategy had negative side effects because other road users had to decelerate in order to keep a safe distance. Our results show the importance of anticipation and adaptation by other road users for the success of older driver’s strategies and traffic safety.