Instruction-based response activation depends on task preparation

An increasing number of studies have demonstrated that a response in one task can be activated automatically on the basis merely of instructed stimulus–response (S–R) mappings belonging to another task. Such instruction-based response activations are considered to be evidence for the formation of S–R associations on the basis of the S–R mappings for an upcoming, but not yet executed, task. A crucial but somewhat neglected assumption is that instructed S–R associations are formed only under conditions that impose a sufficient degree of task preparation. Accordingly, in the present study we investigated the relation between task preparation and the instruction-based task-rule congruency effect, which is an index of response activation on the basis of instructions. The results from two experiments demonstrated that merely instructed S–R mappings of a particular task only elicit instruction-based response activations when that task is prepared for to a sufficient degree. Implications are discussed for the representation of instructed S–R mappings in working memory.     

Strategic influences on implementing instructions for future actions

Temporal and strategic factors that might influence the transformation of verbal task rules into functional stimulus–response associations were investigated in three experiments. In a dual task paradigm of the ABBA type participants were presented new S–R instructions for the A-task at the beginning of each trial. On varying proportions of trials No-go signals rendered the instructed A-task mappings irrelevant before instruction implementation was assessed during performance of an unrelated B-task. Our results indicate that participants refrain from implementing the mappings during instruction presentation when No-go signals appear frequently and late (Exp. 2), and that they can interrupt implementing instructed S–R mappings when frequent No-go signals appear early enough during implementation (Exp. 3). When No-go signals are rare and late, however (Exp. 1), the instructed stimulus features always activate their associated responses during performance of the embedded B-task in an automatic manner. Together, these findings suggest that participants strategically control whether or not they implement verbal instructions. Once implemented, however, instructed S–R associations influence behaviour even when the instructed mappings are no longer task relevant.

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Instruction-induced feature binding

In order to test whether or not instructions specifying the stimulus-response (S-R) mappings for a new task suffice to create bindings between specified stimulus and response features, we developed a dual task paradigm of the ABBA type in which participants saw new S-R instructions for the A-task in the beginning of each trial. Immediately after the A-task instructions, participants had to perform a logically independent B-task. The imperative stimulus for the A-task was presented after the B-task had been executed. The present data show that the instructed S-R mappings influence performance on the embedded B-task, even when they (1) have never been practiced, and (2) are irrelevant with respect to the B-task. These results imply that instructions can induce bindings between S- and R-features without prior execution of the task at hand.     

Unconscious priming of task sets: The role of spatial attention

Unconscious stimuli activate task sets, mental programs that orchestrate performance of complex tasks, but the role of attention in such effects has not been addressed. In previous studies, unconscious prime stimuli appeared at attended locations and were explicitly specified in the task instructions; spatial attention to the prime and/or a specific conscious attentional set may thus be required for such unconscious activation to arise. In the present experiments, a learning phase established associations between unconscious prime stimuli and performance of two tasks. These associations influenced task performance in a subsequent test phase, even though the primes were not specified in current task instructions. This is the first demonstration that unconscious stimuli can prime task sets independently of a current attentional set that specifies stimulus-task mappings. Such priming was not influenced by spatial attention cues, in contrast to clear attention influences in comparison trials that mimicked conditions employed by previous studies.     

Top-down versus bottom-up: when instructions overcome automatic retrieval

Research on human action has extensively covered controlled and automatic processes in the transformation of stimulus information into motor action, and how conflict between both types of processes is solved. However, the question of how automatic stimulus–response (S–R) translation per se depends on top-down control states remains unanswered. The present study addressed this issue by manipulating top-down control state (instructed S–R mapping) and automatic bottom-up processing (retrieval of S–R memory traces) independently from each other. Using a color/shape task-switching paradigm, we compared cross-talk triggered by distractor stimuli, for which the instructed S–R mapping and the S–R associations compiled at the beginning of the experiment matched, with the cross-talk triggered by distractor stimuli, for which (re-)instructed mapping and compiled S–R associations did not match. We show that the latter distractors do not yield any cross-talk in RTs and even reversed cross-talk in error rates, demonstrating that automatic S–R retrieval is modulated by top-down control states.     

Implicit sequence learning based on instructed task set

How does the way we code and control actions influence automatic skill acquisition processes? Wenke and Frensch (2005) showed that instructions can lead participants to code spatial responses based on color. Here, we tested in 3 experiments to what extent response labeling and instruction-based response coding can determine what is learned in implicit sequence learning. Instructions mapped 4 gray shape stimuli to 1 of the 4 keys each in a serial reaction task, referring to the keys in terms of either their color or their spatial location. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that people in the color instruction conditions used color for action control and acquired sequence knowledge containing color: They were susceptible to irrelevant stimulus colors at transfer and could transfer color sequence knowledge to a new arrangement of response positions and fingers, whereas participants who had received spatial instructions could not. Implicit sequence learning was thus surprisingly flexible. Depending on whether an arbitrary nonspatial response feature was used or not used to explain the stimulus-response mappings, we either found or did not find evidence that this feature became part of action control and sequence learning. Furthermore, Experiment 3 suggested that response position might become part of the sequence knowledge even if instructions do not emphasize this response feature. Together, the findings suggest that implicit sequence learning is based on action control, which in turn strongly, but not entirely, depends on which response features are used to explain the stimulus-response mappings in the instructions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Unconscious manipulation of free choice by novel primes

The extent to which non-conscious perception can influence behaviour has been a topic of considerable controversy in psychology for decades. Although a challenging task, convincing empirical demonstrations have emerged suggesting that non-consciously perceived ‘prime’ stimuli can influence motor responses to subsequent targets. Interestingly, recent studies have shown that the influence of masked primes is not restricted to target-elicited responses, but can also bias free-choices between alternative behaviours. The present experiment extends these findings by showing that free-choices could also be biased by novel primes that never appeared as targets and therefore could not trigger acquired stimulus–response (S–R) mappings. This new evidence suggests that free-choice behaviour can be influenced by non-consciously triggered semantic representations. Furthermore, the results reported here support accounts of masked priming that posit an automatic semantic categorisation of non-consciously perceived visual stimuli.     

S-R compatibility and response selection

In serial stage models, perception and action are usually thought to be linked to each other by an S-R translation mechanism. However, phenomena of S-R compatibility suggest a more direct relationship between perceptual and action domains. We discuss behavioral and psychophysiological evidence that irrelevant stimulus information automatically activates response codes, but then decays over time.

In a series of reaction time studies and electrophysiological experiments, we investigated both temporal and functional properties of the assumed automatic response activation process. We found that the amount of interference due to irrelevant spatial information depends upon how long its availability precedes that of the information relevant for response selection. This indicates that response activation decays rather quickly. If response-relevant and irrelevant spatial information are simultaneously available, electrophysiological measurements show that automatic activation of the spatially corresponding response rises soon after stimulus onset, but then dissipates and gets replaced by the activation of the response indicated by the relevant stimulus attribute.

We conclude that these findings do not support a pure translation account, but rather suggest the presence of two parallel and (at least partially) independent routes from perception to action: A direct route, allowing for automatic activation of response codes if stimulus and response features overlap, and an indirect route linking S and R codes in an arbitrary manner. Via the direct route responses may be primed independent of task-specific contingencies, while the correct response is selected via the indirect route. This use suggests that (a) the transmission of stimulus information to response stages does not (fully) depend on task relevance and that (b) different stimulus features can be transmitted asynchronously and independently from one another.     

On the minimization of task switch costs following long-term training

Flexible, context-dependent linkages between stimulus and response are fundamental to adaptive behavior. In the present article, we evaluate the limits of this flexibility by exploring the asymptotic efficiency of people’s ability to switch between two different sensorimotor mappings. Two stimulus—response (S—R) mappings were learned, either both on the same hand (unimanual condition) or one mapping per hand (intermanual condition). The S—R mappings presented bivalent stimuli and employed the same response keys. A novel training regimen successfully reduced task-switch costs to approximately 20 msec, suggesting that residual switch costs cannot be eliminated. These costs cannot be entirely attributed to the cognitive control process of task-set reconfiguration, because they are observed over cued switch intervals of several seconds. Two additional issues in motor learning were addressed: the single or dual loci of manual motor control and the coordinate system of task representation. First, the results favored the notion of independent controllers for each hand instead of a single dominant controller, since intermanual performance was superior to unimanual performance. Second, a transfer task tested internal (egocentric) and external (allocentric) coordinate systems. Transfer was more effective using the external coordinate system, suggesting that the S—R mappings reflected the association between the bivalent stimuli and external goals (i.e., the individual keys) rather than the concrete pattern of muscle contractions (i.e., the finger pressing the key). Finally, retention tests revealed that these learned S—R associations were remarkably durable, since no decrements in fluent task-switching performance were observed after 10 months without practice.     

Transfer of orthogonal stimulus–response mappings to an orthogonal Simon task

When up–down stimulus locations are mapped to left–right keypresses, an overall advantage for the up–right/down–left mapping is often obtained that varies as a function of response eccentricity. This orthogonal stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) effect also occurs when stimulus location is irrelevant, a phenomenon called the orthogonal Simon effect, and has been attributed to correspondence of stimulus and response code polarities. The Simon effect for horizontal stimulus–response (S–R) arrangements has been shown to be affected by short-term S–R associations established through the mapping used for a prior SRC task in which stimulus location was relevant. We examined whether such associations also transfer between orthogonal SRC and Simon tasks and whether correspondence of code polarities continues to contribute to performance in the Simon task. In Experiment 1, the orthogonal Simon effect was larger after practising with an up–right/down–left mapping of visual stimuli to responses than with the alternative mapping, for which the orthogonal Simon effect tended to reverse. Experiment 2 showed similar results when practice was with high (up) and low (down) pitch tones, though the influence of practice mapping was not as large as that in Experiment 1, implying that the short-term S–R associations acquired in practice are at least in part not modality specific. In Experiment 3, response eccentricity and practice mapping were shown to have separate influences on the orthogonal Simon effect, as expected if both code polarity and acquired S–R associations contribute to performance.     

Retrieval of bindings between task-irrelevant stimuli and responses can facilitate behaviour under conditions of high response certainty

Repetition priming can be driven by the encoding and retrieval of stimulus–response (S–R) bindings. When a previously encoded S–R binding is retrieved, and is congruent with the response currently required, it can bias response-selection processes towards selecting the retrieved response, resulting in facilitation. Previous studies have used classification tasks at retrieval. Here, two (or more) response options are competing, and it is likely that any evidence (e.g., an S–R binding) in favour of one option will be utilized to effect a decision. Thus, S–R effects are likely to be seen when using such a task. It is unclear whether such effects can be seen under conditions of higher response certainty, when participants are explicitly cued to make a response. Across two experiments, evidence for a modulating influence of S–R bindings is seen despite using a response cueing method at retrieval to minimize response uncertainty and despite stimuli being task irrelevant. Finally, the results suggest that responses within these S–R bindings are coded at the level of left versus right hand, and not a more fine-grained within-hand thumb versus index finger. The results underline the resilience of S–R effects, suggesting that they are present even under conditions where no explicit object-oriented decision is required.     

Distinguishing between automaticity and attention in the processing of emotionally significant stimuli

There is contradicting evidence as to whether irrelevant but significant emotional stimuli can be processed outside the focus of attention. In the current study, participants were asked to ignore emotional and neutral pictures while performing a competing task. In Experiment 1, orienting of attention to distracting pictures was manipulated via a peripheral cue. In Experiment 2, attentional load was varied, either leaving spare attention to process the distracting pictures or, alternatively, depleting attentional resources. Although all pictures were task irrelevant, negative pictures were found to interfere more with performance in comparison to neutral pictures. This finding suggests that processing of negative stimuli is automatic in the sense that it does not require execution of conscious monitoring. However, interference occurred only when sufficient attention was available for picture processing. Hence, processing of negative pictures was dependent on sufficient attentional resources. This suggests that processing of emotionally significant stimuli is automatic yet requires attention.     

Processing irrelevant location information: Practice and transfer effects in choice-reaction tasks

Left or right keypresses to a relevant stimulus dimension are faster when the stimulus location, although irrelevant, corresponds with that of the response than when it does not. This phenomenon, called the Simon effect, persisted across 1,800 trials of practice, although its magnitude was reduced. Practice with the relevant stimulus dimension presented at a centered location had little influence on the magnitude of the Simon effect when irrelevant location was varied subsequently, and practice with location irrelevant prior to performing with location relevant slowed responses. After practice responding to stimulus location with an incompatible spatial mapping, the Simon effect was reversed (i.e., responses were slower when stimulus location corresponded with response location) when location was made irrelevant. When the response keys were labeled according to the relevant stimulus dimension (the Hedge and Marsh [1975] task variation), this reversal from practice with a spatially incompatible mapping was found for both the congruent and the incongruent relevant stimulus-response mappings. Thus, task-defined associations between stimulus location and response location affect performance when location is changed from relevant to irrelevant, apparently through producing automatic activation of the previously associated response.     

When you fail to see what you were told to look for: Inattentional blindness and task instructions

Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black–white discrimination easier than the square–diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for.     

Effects of associative learning on age differences in task-set switching

Costs of switching between tasks may disappear when subjects are able to learn associations between tasks, stimuli, and responses (cf. Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between simple cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, 207-231). The first aim of this study was to examine this possibility by manipulating stimulus-set size. We expected that costs of switching between tasks would be strongly reduced under conditions of small stimulus-set sizes (n=4) as compared to large stimulus-set sizes (n=96) with increasing time on task. The second aim was to determine whether younger as well as older adults were able to create associations between task components. As age differences in task switching are often found to be larger when response mappings are incompatible we also investigated interactions with response compatibility. Results of our study indicated that practice effects on switch costs were much more pronounced for small than large stimulus-set sizes, consistent with the view that the strength of associations between task components facilitates task switching. Furthermore, we found that practice benefits on task switching for small stimulus-set sizes were sensitive to age and response compatibility. In contrast to younger adults, who showed a reduction of switch costs for both response mapping conditions, older adults showed a reduction of switch costs only when response mappings were compatible. That is, older adults showed less associative learning when the currently irrelevant task feature had to be suppressed, supporting the view that older adults have primarily problems in separating overlapping task-set representations.     

When the voluntary mind meets the irresistible event: Stimulus–response correspondence effects on task selection during voluntary task switching

In the present study, we investigated how task selection is biased by inherent stimulus characteristics in the voluntary task-switching paradigm. We used digits as the task stimuli, since they may automatically induce spatially horizontal representations of numbers. Specifically, we examined whether an irrelevant spatial representation of a number coincides with its associated response codes and whether such a stimulus–response (S–R) correspondence effect biases task selection for a digit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two different action code layout conditions: Two numerical tasks were arranged as inner/outer in the horizontal layout condition or as upper/down in the vertical layout condition. Participants in the horizontal layout condition were more likely to choose a task when the task’s action code and the digit’s spatial representation corresponded, as compared with when they did not. On the other hand, no selection bias was observed in the vertical layout condition, since there was no overlapping spatial representation between the stimulus and response. The present study extends previous findings by considering the influence of the stimulus-driven effect on task selection with regard to the S–R correspondence effect.     

Interference resolution in major depression

In two experiments, we investigated individual differences in the ability to resolve interference in participants diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD). Participants were administered the “Ignore/Suppress” task, a short-term memory task composed of two steps. In Step 1 (“ignore”), participants were instructed to memorize a set of stimuli while ignoring simultaneously presented irrelevant material. In Step 2 (“suppress”), participants were instructed to forget a subset of the previously memorized material. The ability to resolve interference was indexed by response latencies on two recognition tasks in which participants decided whether a probe was a member of the target set. In Step 1, we compared response latencies to probes from the to-be-ignored list with response latencies to nonrecently presented items. In Step 2, we compared response latencies to probes from the to-be-suppressed list with response latencies to nonrecently presented items. The results indicate that, compared with control participants, depressed participants exhibited increased interference in the “suppress” but not in the “ignore” step of the task, when the stimuli were negative words. No group differences were obtained when we presented letters instead of emotional words. These findings indicate that depression is associated with difficulty in removing irrelevant negative material from short-term memory.     

Stimulus–response compatibility for mixed mappings and tasks with unique responses

For two stimulus locations mapped to two keypresses, reaction time is shorter when the mapping is compatible than when it is not (the stimulus–response compatibility, SRC, effect). A similar result, called the Simon effect, occurs when stimulus location is irrelevant, and colour is relevant. When compatibly mapped trials are intermixed with incompatibly mapped trials or Simon task trials, the compatibility effect is eliminated, and the Simon effect is influenced by the location mapping. In five experiments, we examined whether similar mixing effects occur when the two spatial mappings or location-relevant and location-irrelevant tasks use distinct keypresses on the left and right hands. Mixing had considerably less influence on the SRC and Simon effects than it does when the intermixed trial types or tasks share the same responses, even though response time was lengthened to a similar extent. Mixing two tasks for which stimulus location was irrelevant yielded no within-task Simon effect, but the effect was also absent when four stimuli were assigned to two responses on a single hand. The relative lack of influence of mixing on the SRC and Simon effects when the tasks have unique responses implies that suppression of direct activation of the corresponding response occurs primarily when the tasks share responses.     

Expectations about stimulus structure in implicit learning

In two experiments, artificial grammar learning was used to create learning tasks of identical symbolic complexity that differed in terms of the instructions and the appearance of the stimuli. In Experiment 1, the stimuli were letter strings that appeared in either upper- or lowercase; however, letter case was irrelevant to the learning task. Participants were unable to take into account the instruction to ignore letter case. In Experiment 2, the stimuli were sequences of cities that corresponded to the routes of a traveling salesman. It was assumed that participants would adopt the expectation that the salesman would prefer short journeys. When the structure of the stimuli was inconsistent with this expectation, performance on the learning task was inhibited. The results suggest that there are circumstances in which explicit expectations about the structure of a set of stimuli can affect implicit learning of the stimuli.     

Automatic effects of instructions do not require the intention to execute these instructions

Prior research established that newly instructed stimulus-response mappings, which have never been executed overtly before, can lead to automatic response-congruency effects. Such instruction-based congruency effects have been taken as evidence for the hypothesis that the intention to execute stimulus-response mappings results into functional associations that serve future execution. The present study challenges this hypothesis by demonstrating in a series of four experiments that maintaining instructed stimulus-response mappings for future recognition, rather than for future execution, can also lead to an instruction-based congruency effect. These findings indicate that the instruction-based congruency effect emerges even when it is very unlikely that participants form the intention to execute instructions. Alternative interpretations of the instruction-based congruency effect are discussed.