Semantic distance in memory structure: The retrieval of conceptual relationships

Four experiments are described which aim to distinguish the relative contributions of measures of semantic distance based on formal and normative criteria. Experiment I replicates a previous finding by Collins and Quillian (1969) that sentence confirmation RTs support a hierarchically-organised memory model. Experiments II and III minimised the role of syntactic processes and examined the times taken to “see the relationship” between pairs of concepts. The results also supported a hierarchical model but cast doubt upon the formal distinction between superset and property relationships. Experiment IV showed similar results using only property relationships of the “has” form. Multiple regression analyses of the data indicate that “number of intervening links” is a more consistent predictor of RT than “associative” measures of semantic relatendness and confirm strong linearity effects consistent with a hierarchical model of storage.     

Does it all go together when it goes? The nineteenth Bartlett memorial lecture

As groups of people age, the differences in the cognitive abilities of the most and least able become more extreme. This increase in between-individual variance is accompanied by an increase in within-individual variance: the difference between individuals' levels of performance on their best and least well retained skills. The implications of increasing between-individual variance are discussed in terms of the range of different factors that may affect cognitive ageing. Increases in within-individual variance are discussed in terms of differences betweeen “fluid” and “crystallized” abilities. The usefulness of this distinction and its functional implications are questioned. The hypothesis that age-related declines in “fluid” abilities are best modelled in terms of declines in a single factor is evaluated. Evidence is presented of disparate rates of decline, even of “fluid” cognitive abilities, such as performance on IQ tests, ability on information-processing tasks, and efficiency on memory tasks. Data from large-scale cross-sectional studies suggests that cognitive skills do not “all go together when they go”, but that there may, rather, be characteristic patterns, or syndromes, of cognitive ageing.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

Verbal learning: Incremental vs. all-or-none theory

The incremental and all-or-none theories of verbal learning are compared by means of a little-used but methodologically superior variation of the “drop-out” paradigm with paired associates. Earlier experiments purporting to be relevant to the controversy are rejected as failing to offer a conclusive distinction between the two theories. The results presented here are taken to support the incremental theory. It is suggested that irregularities in the results of this and other experiments are caused by several intrusive factors, and a “dual-factor” hypothesis which was put forward to account for these irregularities is questioned on logical and methodological grounds.     

The development of socialization skills in an electively mute child

In a booth designed especially for work with both autistic and electively mute children, a 4-yr-old girl named Dolly, who had no communicative speech or imitative skills, was given a preliminary session in which her verbal output was assessed. To elicit sounds from Dolly, an instrument called a “color organ” was used as a positive reinforcer. After this baseline assessment, in 40 half-hour sessions, Dolly was taught to make eye contact with E, and to obey instructions—although it was first necessary to extinguish her disruptive behavior, particularly her opérant crying. In addition, she learned non-verbal imitative behavior, such as hand clapping; and verbal imitative behavior, such as saying “Hi!” Social (play) sessions were begun after session 21, and continued for the remaining time. These were helpful in generalizing Dolly's learned skills to an environment other than the booth; and to other tasks, such as singing “Ee-eye-ee-eye-oh” in the refrain of the song, “Old McDonald”; and pointing to E's eyes, saying “ice”.     

The learning of surface structure clues to deep structure by a puppet show technique

Fifty-six children were classified in terms of their developmental level on the linguistic structure “John is easy/eager to please”, and an experiment was carried out teaching them “new” (nonsense) words in related transformations by a puppet show technique. These transformations serve as frames for differentiating those new words which indicate a surface structure derived from a transformed deep structure, from those which do not. Results showed that children used different strategies at different developmental levels. Of children who did not use fixed strategies, only children who had correctly performed on all normal adult words (“Passers”) were able to learn which deep structures were called for by some of the new words; all other groups performed at chance levels on all types of new words. However, even these Passers performed correctly only on words given in structures indicating that the tested structure was to be treated as a transformation. The possibility of a language-learning principle related to the marked/unmarked distinction in natural languages is discussed.     

Short-term memory for repeated and non-repeated items

Digit sequences containing repeated items are retained differently in short-term memory from sequences containing no repeated items. The repeated items are remembered better or worse than items in the corresponding positions of “all-different” sequences depending on the number of times the item is repeated, the number of items repeated, the number of items intervening between the occurences of a repeated item, and the position of the repeated items in relation to the beginning and end of the sequence. In every type of repetition studied, except one, memory for the non-repeated items in sequences with repeated items is better than for the corresponding items of all-different sequences. This is true in some cases despite significant specific interference between the (non-repeated) items following the separated occurrences of repeated items. The negative effects in memory for repeated items and the positive effects in memory for non-repeated items are greater when the items are presented at the rate of five per sec. than at one per sec., contrary to the hypothesis that differential rehearsal is responsible for these effects. The results are interpreted as supporting an “associative,” as opposed to a “non-associative,” theory of short-term memory, as this distinction is defined in the paper.     

Speech—Language clinicians'' and university students'' impressions of women and girls who stutter

To identify impressions speech—language clinicians and university students have of females who stutter, a 47-scale semantic differential form was administered to members of each group to obtain their responses to eight hypothetical constructs, i.e., “A Girl,” “A Girl Who Stutters,” “A Boy,” “A Boy Who Stutters,” “A Woman,” “A Woman Who Stutters,” “A Man,” and “A Man Who Stutters.” Both groups were found to possess negative stereotypes for all four categories of stutterers. The nature of the stereotypes appeared to be influenced by a stutterer's gender and relative age. Clinicians considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on females and on children. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Girl Who Stutters.” University students considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on males. Their stereotypes of stutterers seemed unaffected by the relative age of the stutterer. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Man Who Stutters.” Several theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

The effect of an irrelevant dimension on “same-different” judgements of multi-dimensional stimuli

Subjects made “same”-“different” judgements of simultaneously presented pairs of visual stimuli which could vary either in shape and colour independently, or in shape alone. In both conditions only shape was relevant to the “same”-“different” judgement. In the former condition “same” and “different” reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the states (“same” or “different”) of the relevant and the irrelevant dimension, colour, were the same. This result is interpreted as support for either a perceptual or a response interference hypothesis. The presence of an irrelevant dimension did not appear to affect differentially “same” and “different” judgements. The need for a re-evaluation of the results from other studies of multi-dimensional stimulus discrimination is discussed.     

A study of the effect of structural information and familiarity in form perception

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the influence of structural information and familiarity on the processing of visual forms. Pairs of “well” structured and nameable and “poorly” structured and non-nameable fragmented forms were employed as stimuli. The effects of structure and familiarity were assessed by manipulating the visual hemifield of presentation and the task. In Experiment 1 stimuli were judged as being either in the same orientation or mirror-reversed, a task that does not require high-level semantic information to be processed. Experiment 2 required physically identical forms to be matched, which may use either physical or name information. In Experiment 1 “same” judgements were equivalent for both types of stimuli, and “different' judgements were longer for the “poorly” structured (non-nameable) forms. In Experiment 2 there was little overall difference between “well” and “poorly” structured forms, though response times to “well” structured (nameable) forms were slowed for right-visual-field presentations. It is suggested that familiarity may not be sufficient to provide a perceptual advantage for nameable forms, as the advantage for nameable stimuli was confined to “same” judgements in Experiment 1 and response times were shorter for non-nameable stimuli in Experiment 2. Rather, performance depends upon factors such as the computation of global shape (due to structural properties of collinearity and closure) and on the use of different kinds or representations (physical versus name) in matching.     

Perceptions of speakers with minimal eye contact: Implications for stutterers

One hundred and thirty-three college students responded to percentage definitions of “good,” “minimal,” and “no” eye contact. They also judged their perceptions of a speaker with “little or no eye contact” on a semantic differential scale containing 60 polarized adjective pairs regarding personality traits. The majority of the student respondents defined an individual with “good” eye contact as looking at his/her audience/listener 90–100% of the time. This is a more stringent definition than other literature has indicated. Furthermore, speakers with little or no eye contact were judged less favorably on 70% of the items, which indicates that low eye contact adversely affects perceptions of a speaker's personality. Therefore, stutterers need to be made aware of the importance of and determinants of effective eye contact in communication. Also, the development of effective eye contact needs to be incorporated as a major goal in stuttering therapy.     

Lowering of an auditory threshold by a near threshold warning signal

Following previous experiments on the effect of suprathreshold “warning” signals in lowering the threshold for stimuli in another modality, we have used visual “warning” signals which are themselves within the threshold range. These near threshold “warnings” appear to act in exactly the same way as suprathreshold “warnings” provided they are seen. Very weak “warnings” have a reduced effect, probably because they are not always seen. The experiment is of interest in that it supports the theory that the effect is due to the “warning” signal reducing the subject's uncertainty about when the threshold stimulus will occur, and secondly because it indicates that under these conditions at least, the subject can attend effectively to two simultaneous near-threshold stimuli.     

Nonstutterers'' perceptions of stuttering and speech difficulty

Two versions of Woolf's (1967) Perception of Stuttering Inventory (PSI) were administered to nonstuttering college students in three experiments. In one (Woolf's published version) the word “stuttering” appeared and in another [a version developed by Daly, Oakes, Breen, and Mishler (1981)] “stuttering” was replaced by “speech difficulty.” Nonstutterers' scores on the PSI were found to be affected by knowledge of—or attention to—“stuttering” or “stutterers” as well as orientation toward speech or speech pathology. It was concluded that a total PSI score of 5 is presently a more defensible criterion of normality for stutterers than the more commonly used score of 10.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

Preferred tempo in the learning of a gross cyclical action

Seventy-five subjects, randomly assigned to one of five training conditions, were required to learn to make large-amplitude, high-tempo, fluent movements on a so-called ski-simulator over a period of four days. Subjects trained under different tempo conditions. In four of the conditions the tempo was prescribed (“preferred”, high, low, or increasing), augmented feedback being provided to enable subjects to stay on “target”. “Preferred” tempo was based on the weight of the subject and was derived from a regression equation based on previous empirical research. In a fifth condition, subjects trained on “discovery learning” principles, i.e. without the tempo being prescribed. The results obtained on the three parameters (amplitude, frequency, and fluency) during the daily test sessions (in which the tempo was not prescribed) formed the data for the analyses.

A learning effect was apparent on all three parameters over the four-day training period. Subjects who trained under the high or the low prescribed tempos, however, were shown to produce significantly smaller amplitude movements than subjects who trained under the other three conditions. Training under the low-tempo condition was also shown to have disadvantageous effects on the parameters tempo and fluency. It was concluded that, for these kinds of action, training at a high or a low tempo—and particularly the latter—has undesirable effects. Such disadvantageous effects, however, were shown to be avoidable if training is begun with the “preferred” tempo of the subject and increased successively by 7% over days.     

Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?

This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a “theory of mind” because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a “metarepresentational” deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985: Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves “false” photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack “metarepresentational” ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.     

Remembering, Familiarity, and Source Monitoring

Two experiments investigated recollective experience in a source monitoring task. Subjects saw an array of objects and performed, watched, or imagined actions involving pairs of objects. In a subsequent recognition test, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements were made on the basis of conscious recollective experience (“remember” responses), or on some other basis such as familiarity (“know” responses). The proportions of correct “remember” responses for both objects and actions decreased from performed, through watched, to imagined actions, whereas the proportions of correct “know” responses were uninfluenced by the source of the memories. In addition, the relationship between recollective experience and accuracy of source judgement varied across sources. Source accuracy for performed actions was obtained only in “remember” responses, whereas source accuracy for imagined actions was obtained only in “know” responses. Source accuracy for watched actions was obtained in both “remember” and “know” responses. The findings suggest that the types of memory attributes available at retrieval determine the quality of subsequent memory experience, and it is proposed that memories with strongly self-referential attributes (arising from performed actions) powerfully cue recollective experience during retrieval.     

Assumptions underlying psychological testing

Tests purporting to reflect the learning aptitudes of school children differ much more than generally is recognized. However, error in assesing such learning aptitude inheres much more in the users of the tests than in the tests themselves. Assumptions fundamental to such assessment, or even testing, are considered. It is particularly important that the assessor, or tester, constantly be sensitive to the nature of the relationship between the psychological demands of test items or tests and the learning demands confronting the child. Even tests that generally are grossly or crudely used often can yield psychoeducationally meaninful information if their results are differentially perceived in terms of the light they throw on the psychological operations fundamental to learning, “process,” as contrasted with that thrown on the results of the functioning of such operations, “product.”