共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
George Sher 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):223-226
In his response to my essay “Out of Control,” Neil Levy contests my claims that (1) we are often responsible for acts that
we do not consciously choose to perform, and that (2) despite the absence of conscious choice, there remains a relevant sense
in which these actions are within our control. In this reply to Levy, I concede that claim (2) is linguistically awkward but
defend the thought that it expresses, and I clarify my defense of claim (1) by distinguishing my position from attributionism.
相似文献
George SherEmail: |
2.
Kurt Mosser 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):1-20
Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience
are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s
claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for
“common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly
cannot, provide.
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Kurt MosserEmail: |
3.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
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Anna MahtaniEmail: |
4.
Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):573-586
The aim of the present paper is to show that Hegel’s concept of personal respect is of great interest to contemporary Critical
Theory. The author first analyzes this notion as it appears in the Philosophy of Right and then offers a new interpretation of the conceptual relation between personal respect and the institutions of (private)
property and (capitalist) markets. In doing so, he shows why Hegel’s concept of personal respect allows us to understand markets
as possible institutionalizations of this kind of recognition, and why it is compatible with a critique of neoliberal capitalism.
He argues that due to these features Hegel’s notion of personal respect is of great interest to theoreticians within the tradition
of critical theory.
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Hans-Christoph Schmidt am BuschEmail: |
5.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
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Erin EakerEmail: |
6.
J. L. Dowell 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):19-46
Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate
the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion
of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument
for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on
a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking
Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions
as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies
with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other
words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.
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J. L. DowellEmail: |
7.
“Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception
of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
相似文献
Michel BitbolEmail: |
8.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
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John Martin FischerEmail: |
9.
Michael Strevens 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):91-100
Elliott Sober argues that the statistical slogan “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” cannot be taken literally:
it must be interpreted charitably as claiming that the absence of evidence is (typically) not very much evidence of absence.
I offer an alternative interpretation, on which the slogan claims that absence of evidence is (typically) not objective evidence of absence. I sketch a definition of objective evidence, founded in the notion of an epistemically objective likelihood,
and I show that in Sober’s paradigm case, the slogan can, on this understanding, be sustained.
相似文献
Michael StrevensEmail: |
10.
Mikel Burley 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):411-416
This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I
examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition
as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams
therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought
to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly
should be rejected.
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Mikel BurleyEmail: |
11.
12.
Andrea Lavazza 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(2):159-182
This paper focuses on the emergent neo-Jamesian perspective concerning the phenomenology of art and aesthetic experience.
Starting from the distinction between nucleus and fringe in the stream of thought described by William James, it can be argued
that our appreciation of a work of art is guided by a vague and blurred perception of a much more powerful content, of which
we are not fully aware. Accordingly, a work of art is seen as a kind of metaphor of our mental life, objectified to be able
to reach out to a much larger audience. However, it is a “realistic” theory rooted in evolutionary psychology, which claims
that our mind developed within a framework shaped by environmental pressures. The aesthetics illustrated by several novelists
develops a paradigm for this theory. The search for the neuronal correlates of stream of consciousness allows to make a comparison
with the recent findings of neuroaesthetics and to reject its claim that it is unnecessary to take phenomenology and psychology
into account.
相似文献
Andrea LavazzaEmail: |
13.
James R. Beebe 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):181-196
The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear
in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities
on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of
the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue
that the notion of probability he relies upon is deeply problematic, that he incorporates an implausible double-standard concerning
a priori and a posteriori justification, and that his view is vulnerable to skepticism about the a priori. I suggest that
some of these problems are due to idiosyncratic commitments BonJour makes and that abductivists would be better off without
them. I conclude with some suggestions about how to improve BonJour’s abductivist response to skepticism.
相似文献
James R. BeebeEmail: |
14.
Emmanuelle Danblon 《Argumentation》2009,23(3):351-359
According to Perelman (Rhétoriques, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1989: 80), a pseudo-argument is an argument that is supposed to be convincing from a given audience viewpoint, while it is not
from another audience viewpoint. Such a claim raises the traditional problem of the boundaries between the well known “convince
versus persuade” dichotomy. This paper aims at investigating it from a contemporary rhetorical and argumentative perspective
which will take into account the fictional dimension of persuasion. In this perspective, it will be claimed that the notion
of an “as if” argument better fits to some rhetorical phenomena.
相似文献
Emmanuelle DanblonEmail: |
15.
A. D. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):197-212
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent
public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the
objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general
objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
相似文献
A. D. SmithEmail: |
16.
Markos Valaris 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):427-445
There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual
thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two:
on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of
concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist
conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the
exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue,
two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori
knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching
a different way to think of that link.
相似文献
Markos ValarisEmail: |
17.
Patrick Toner 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):281-297
In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts.
The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are “human atoms” co-located with human organisms.
It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances,
this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do.
相似文献
Patrick TonerEmail: |
18.
Luca Incurvati 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):261-274
Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue
that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of
a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious
objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of
the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with
Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.
相似文献
Luca IncurvatiEmail: |
19.
Kious BM 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(4):213-234
There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a
practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral
transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive,
suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.
相似文献
Brent M. KiousEmail: |
20.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |