When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

When is it time to stop? When good enough becomes bad enough

This article draws on Winnicott’s concept of the good enough mother to discuss how to know whether a therapeutic situation is good enough to continue or bad enough to end. This dilemma is explored in terms of clinical syndromes, such as anorexia and pathological gambling, but focuses mainly on analyst-initiated endings, which are termed the ‘Casablanca dilemma’, based on an amplification of the ending of the film Casablanca. The author goes on to discuss such one-sided endings, drawing on interviews with 40 analysts and therapists about their clinical experience. A typology of bad enough endings is presented. The psychological differences between a good enough analysis as opposed to a bad enough one are explored through the ideas of Winnicott and Neumann.     

Better than average? When can we say that subsampling of items is better than statistical summary representations?

Myczek and Simons (2008) have described a computational model that subsamples a few items from a set with high accuracy, showing that this approach can do as well as, or better than, a model that captures statistical representations of the set. Although this is an intriguing existence proof, some caution should be taken before we consider their approach as a model for human behavior. In particular, I propose that such simulation-based research should be based on a more expanded range of phenomena and that it should include more accurate representations of errors in judgments.     

What is it Like to Have an Unconscious Mental State?

Philosophical Studies - HOST is the theory that to be conscious of a mental state is totarget it with a higher-order state (a `HOS'), either an innerperception or a higher-order thought. Some...     

When is received social support related to perceived support and well-being? When it is needed

How do perceptions of being supported relate to the amount of social support received? Received and perceived support have generally been found to be only moderately related. Previous research has however focused on the amount of support received regardless of whether it was needed. We hypothesized that a measure of support received when needed would predict perceived support and well-being better than would an unqualified measure of received support. Study 1 found that correlations between received support and perceived support measures were, on average, twice as high when received support was measured as the proportion of times support was received when needed (average r = .54) than when it was measured as the number of times support was received (average r = .28). Similar results were found for correlations between received support and mental health which rose from r = .04 to r = .31 when need for support was considered. Study 2 replicated the strong relationship between support received when needed and both perceived support and mental health. Received support measures should be adapted to take the need for support into consideration in future investigation of these relationships. Social support interventions may only be beneficial if the recipient’s support needs are not already being met.     

When and why is it disrespectful to excuse an attitude?

Philosophical Studies - It is intuitive that, under certain circumstances, it can be disrespectful or patronizing to excuse someone for an attitude (even for an attitude one finds objectionable)....     

When is it Okay to be Alone? Gender Differences in Normative Beliefs about Social Withdrawal in Emerging Adulthood

Sex Roles - Informed by prior work on social withdrawal and gender role norms, the present study utilizes data from a large sample of U.S. (n?=?656) and Canadian (n?=?560)...     

Assessing the Integrity of Clinical Data: When is Statistical Evidence Too Good to be True?

Evidence, as viewed through the lens of statistical significance, is not always as it appears! In the investigation of clinical research findings arising from statistical analyses, a fundamental initial step for the emerging fraud detective is to retrieve the source data for cross-examination with the study data. Recognizing that source data are not always forthcoming and that, realistically speaking, the investigator may be uninitiated in fraud detection and investigation, this paper will highlight some key methodological procedures for providing a sounder evidence base for withdrawing from a study on grounds of integrity. The promotion of patient safety is paramount. However, there is a broader rationale for disseminating these ideas. This includes empowering researchers to optimize their personal integrity, make informed choices regarding membership of future research collaborations and successfully voice their concerns to journal editors, particularly where a conflict of interests can render such dialogues particularly difficult. Recommendations will be supported by topical case studies and practical steps involving data exploration, testing of baseline data and application of Benford’s Law. While this paper has a clinical focus, the advice provided is transferrable to a wide range of multidisciplinary research settings outside of Medicine.     

When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?

Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what's wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to remain undebunked.     

Better Never to Have Been?: The Unseen Implications

This paper will directly tackle the question of Benatar’s asymmetry at the heart of his book Better Never to have Been and provide a critique based on some of the logical consequences that result from the proposition that every potential life can only be understood in terms of the pain that person would experience if she or he was born. The decision only to evaluate future pain avoided and not pleasure denied for potential people means that we should view each birth as an unmitigated tragedy. The result is that someone who seeks to maximize utility could easily justify immense suffering for current people in order to prevent the births of potential people. This paper offers an alternative framework for evaluating the creation of people that addresses Benatar’s asymmetry without overvaluing the potential suffering of potential people.     

What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?

In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti‐psychologism’ and ‘non‐psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti‐psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non‐psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought and communication.     

What is it to be healthy?

According to Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), 'health' is statistically normal function in a reference class, and 'health' and 'disease' are empirical, objective and value-free concepts. I demonstrate that the success of the BST depends on its choice of reference classes; different reference classes result in different accounts of health. I argue that nothing in nature empirically or objectively dictates the use of reference classes Boorse proposes. Reference classes in the BST, and the concept of health, are therefore not value-free. Nor is there a reason to favour the BST over accounts of health that use different reference classes.     

Better to Exploit than to Neglect? International Clinical Research and the Non‐Worseness Claim

Clinical research is increasingly ‘offshored’ to developing countries, a practice that has generated considerable controversy. It has recently been argued that the prevailing ethical norms governing such research are deeply puzzling. On the one hand, sponsors are not required to offshore trials, even when participants in developing countries would benefit considerably from these trials. On the other hand, if sponsors do offshore, they are required not to exploit participants, even when the latter would benefit from and consent to exploitation. How, it is asked, can it be worse to exploit the global poor than to neglect them when exploitation is voluntary and makes them better off? The present article seeks to respond to this challenge. I argue that mutually beneficial and voluntary exploitation can be worse than neglect when — as is typically true of exploitative international research — it takes advantage of unjust background conditions. This is because, in such cases, exploitation overlaps with another, less familiar wrong: complicity in injustice. Recognising complicity as a distinct wrong should make us judge exchanges arising from background injustice more harshly than we typically do, in research and elsewhere.     

What is it to lose hope?

This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ orientation or ‘existential feeling’, by which I mean something in the context of which certain kinds of intentional state, including intentional hope, are intelligible. I go on to discuss severe depression, lack of aspiration, demoralisation and loss of trust in the world, in order to distinguish some qualitatively different forms that loss of hope can take.     

When is guessing incorrectly better than studying for enhancing memory?

Recently, Kornell, Hays, and Bjork (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 35:989-998, 2009) demonstrated that incorrect guessing can benefit subsequent memory to a greater degree than can an equivalent amount of study time. We explored this intriguing finding to determine which factors moderate the advantage of incorrect guessing relative to study. In contrast to the findings of Kornell et al., our Experiment 1 revealed that incorrect guessing resulted in worse performance than did studying and that the number of incorrect guesses did not moderate the effect. In contrast, Experiment 2 revealed that the timing of subsequent study moderated the effectiveness of incorrect guessing over study. Final test performance was greater for incorrectly guessed items than for prestudied items when a subsequent study opportunity occurred immediately after the pretrial, whereas the pattern reversed when subsequent study was delayed. This crossover interaction emerged largely because prestudy items showed a classic spacing effect, whereas the guess items did not. One plausible explanation for the absence of a spacing benefit for guess items is that delaying the subsequent study trial increases source-monitoring errors during retrieval, such that participants confuse their original guess with the correctly studied target. However, Experiment 3 provided evidence against this source-monitoring account. We concluded by discussing other possible accounts of why the timing of study could moderate the effectiveness of incorrect guessing.     

Better than me or better than thee? Reactions to intrapersonal and interpersonal performance feedback

When people compare their own performance across domains, the comparison may be based on differences in their absolute (objective) performance and/or on diffrences in their performance relative to others Differential sensitivity to the interpersonal (relative) and intrapersonal (absolute) comparison information was examined as a function of the closeness of the social comparison target and individual differences in self-esteem Subjects (162) worked on two tasks with a partner, receiving item-by-item feedback, the partner was either a friend or a stranger The feedback was designed such that subjects' objective performance was better on one task (Task A) than on the other task (Task B), but their performance relative to that of the partner was better on Task B than on Task A High self-esteem subjects and subjects in the friend condition were more satisfied and evaluated the test more positively on the task associated with better relative performance (despite the fact that their objective performance was worse on that task) Low self-esteem subjects and subjects in the stranger condition expressed more positive reactions on the task associated with better objective performance (despite the fact that their relative performance was worse on that task) Results are discussed in terms of the informational and affective consequences of engaging in social comparison