Experience and self-consciousness

Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.     

Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject’s undergoing experiences with those contents requires them to possess the concepts that characterize those contents. I maintain that these ways of understanding conceptualism and nonconceptualism are orthogonal to one another. This is revealed by the conceptual coherence of positions in which the contents of experiences have both conceptual and nonconceptual features; positions which possess their own distinctive sources of philosophical motivation. I argue that the fact that there is a place in conceptual space for such positions, and that there may be good reason for theorists to adopt them, creates difficulties for both the central argument for nonconceptualism and the central argument for conceptualism. I set out each of these arguments; the Argument from Possession-Independence and the Epistemically-Driven Argument. I then try to show how the existence of mixed positions about perceptual content derived from a clear distinction between compositional and possessional considerations constitutes a significant obstacle for those arguments as they stand. The takehome message of the paper is that unless one clearly acknowledges the distinction between issues about the composition of perceptual content and issues about how subject’s capacities to undergo certain experiences relates to their possession of concepts one runs the risk of embracing unsatisfying philosophical arguments in which conclusions relevant to one conception of nonconceptual and conceptual content are grounded on arguments that concern only the other; arguments that cannot, in themselves, sustain them.     

Capturing conceptual implicit memory: The time it takes to produce an association

Conceptual implicit memory is demonstrated when, in the absence of explicit retrieval, performance on a task requiring conceptual processing benefits more from prior conceptual encoding than from prior nonconceptual encoding. In the present study, we sought to provide an improved measure of conceptual implicit memory by minimizing contamination from explicit retrieval. On a modified word association test, participants free-associated to the actually studied items, with response time to produce any associate serving as the dependent measure. Experiment 1 varied whether words were read or generated at study and showed that generated words were associated to more quickly than were read words. Experiment 2 varied level of processing at study and showed that words processed semantically were associated to more quickly than were words processed nonsemantically. With modifications to ensure its implicit nature, a conceptual implicit test can be consistently affected by the same encoding manipulations as those that affect conceptual explicit memory tests.     

The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness

Five studies demonstrated that private self-consciousness is associated with nonconscious, automatic behaviors. In 2 studies, high but not low self-conscious individuals walked more slowly following exposure to an implicit elderly prime. In a 3rd study, high but not low self-conscious individuals showed improved performance following exposure to a subliminal success prime relative to a subliminal failure prime. In a 4th study, subliminal exposure to an angry prime was shown to increase blood pressure relative to a relax prime. In a final study, the latter effect was shown to be true only for high self-conscious individuals and only for subliminal presentations. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding a variety of effects associated with self-consciousness and self-awareness.     

Mutual influences between the implicit and explicit self-concepts: The role of memory activation and motivated reasoning

Whereas previous research has predominantly focused on dissociations between the explicit and implicit self-concepts, the current research investigates how these aspects of self-representation come into correspondence through the activation of information about the self in memory. Experiment 1 provides evidence for a “bottom-up” process of self-construal in which information activated in the implicit self-concept produces congruent changes in the explicit self-concept. Experiment 2 provides evidence for a “top-down” process of self-construal in which the motivated assertion of a propositional belief in the explicit self-concept leads, via a process of confirmatory hypothesis testing, to the activation of substantiating information in the implicit self-concept. These two processes of self-concept change are integrated within a framework that specifies how the explicit and implicit self-concepts are related within an overall, dynamic self-system. Possibilities for expanding the framework to account for self-concept dissociations are discussed.     

Qualitative character and sensory representation

Perceptual experience seems to involve distinct intentional and qualitative features. Inasmuch as one can visually perceive that there is a Coke can in front of one, perceptual experience must be intentional. But such experiences seem to differ from paradigmatic intentional states in having introspectible qualitative character. argues that a perceptual experience's qualitative character is determined by intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. But also argues that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual representational content in addition to conceptual content and nonrepresentational sensational properties. He thus distinguishes between conceptual, nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual but representational aspects of perceptual experience. I will argue that Peacocke posits too much. Contrary to his (1983) arguments, the sensational properties Peacocke claims are nonrepresentational are best construed as representational; they are best explained in terms of their relation to the perceptible properties they enable us to perceive. Since sensational properties are arguably nonconceptual, they are best construed as nonconceptual representational properties. I offer the Homomorphism View of sensory qualities, pioneered by, as a unified account of qualitative character and nonconceptual sensory representation. According to this view, a sensory quality represents a perceptible stimulus property in virtue of resembling and differing from other sensory qualities in ways parallel to the ways the stimulus property resembles and differs from other perceptible properties.     

Facing the mirror: A relativist account of immune nonconceptual self-representations

There is a consensus among philosophers that some “I”-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. In some recent papers, this property has been formulated in the following deflationist way: an “I”-thought is immune to error through misidentification when it can misrepresent the mental or bodily property self-ascribed but cannot misrepresent the subject (if any) possessing that property. However, it has been put forward that the range of mental and bodily states that are immune in that limited sense cannot include nonconceptual forms of self-representation. In this paper, I claim the opposite. I argue in favor of a theoretical framework inspired by semantic relativism that solves the problem of immune nonconceptual self-representations. In order to do so, I refute an argument against the relativist account which is based on the existence of shared representations. This argument, I contend, rests on a confusion between two conditions to which a relativist may appeal when considering whether a certain mental content is relative to the self: a strong invariance condition and a weak invariance condition. I then argue that even if we acknowledge the existence of shared representations, the weak invariance condition is still satisfied, and consequently the relativist framework can make sense of INSRs. I argue that this weak invariance condition is satisfied by a representational function that self-relativizes certain representations. I then provide an empirical instance of such a function by discussing some of the recent literature on motor representations and the sense of agency. In the last part of the paper, I answer several potential objections. These potential objections lead me to distinguish two fundamental kinds of error relative to the self: error through misidentification and error through misapplication. This distinction allows me to answer a fundamental question raised by the very idea of de facto immunity to error through misidentification.     

Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski, Hoffman, and Wilbur (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA.     

Gender differences in implicit and explicit personality traits

This article investigates gender differences in implicit and explicit measures of the Big Five traits of personality. In a high-powered study (N = 14,348), we replicated previous research showing that women report higher levels of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion and Neuroticism. For implicit measures, gender differences were much smaller for all, and opposite in sign for Extraversion. Somewhat higher levels of implicit Neuroticism and Agreeableness were observed in women, and somewhat higher levels of implicit Extraversion and Openness were observed in men. There was no gender difference in implicit Conscientiousness. A possible explanation is that explicit self-concepts partly reflect social norms and self-expectations about gender roles, while implicit self-concepts may mostly reflect self-related experiences.     

Parallel processing in visual perception and memory: What goes where and when?

This article begins with reviews of parallel processing models in the areas of visual perception and memory, pointing out kinds of information purported to be processed in each, and the overlap in the physiological substrates involved. Next, some pertinent literature having to do with the linkage between perception and memory is reviewed (e.g., visual memory for what or where), concluding that there exists a serious lack of research and knowledge of how different perceptual processes may lead to facilitated, distorted or impaired memory in different forms of storage. Some possible scenarios are presented concerning how perceptual information might be interfaced with memorial mechanisms, and some working hypotheses are considered. Finally, a new paradigm is outlined that examines the linkage between local and global perceptual processing and explicit and implicit learning. This paradigm combines the global precedence paradigm of Navon (1977; 1981) and the sequence learning paradigm of Nissen and Bullemer (1987). Convincing arguments indicate that global stimuli are mediated more quickly via one perceptual stream (the M-cell pathway), but can be processed more slowly by another (the P-cell system). Local aspects of the stimuli are exclusively mediated by the P-cell system. The results of two experiments employing iterations of stimulus sequence, in which sequence learning is possible and measurable in terms of reaction time changes over trials are presented. The second experiment indicates that information thought to be mediated by the M-cell pathway results in incidental sequential learning, while other information thought to be mediated by the P-cell pathway does not. Spatial filtering of the visual stimuli reveals that low spatial frequencies are necessary for sequence learning to occur. The issue of whether this learning is implicit or explicit is also discussed. Ideas for future research, exploring this new area of interest, are proposed. Current knowledge of perceptual and memorial deficits in special populations are considered in an attempt to identify new areas of investigation.     

Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention

In “Truth by Convention” W.V. Quine gave an influential argument against logical conventionalism. Even today his argument is often taken to decisively refute logical conventionalism. Here I break Quine’s arguments into two—(i) the super-task argument and (ii) the regress argument—and argue that while these arguments together refute implausible explicit versions of conventionalism, they cannot be successfully mounted against a more plausible implicit version of conventionalism. Unlike some of his modern followers, Quine himself recognized this, but argued that implicit conventionalism was explanatorily idle. Against this I show that pace Quine’s claim that implicit conventionalism has no content beyond the claim that logic is firmly accepted, implicit rules of inference can be used to distinguish the firmly accepted from the conventional. As part of my case, I argue that positing syntactic rules of inference as part of our linguistic competence follows from the same methodology that leads contemporary linguists and cognitive scientists to posit rules of phonology, morphology, and grammar. The upshot of my discussion is a diagnosis of the fallacy in Quine’s master critique of logical conventionalism and a re-opening of possibilities for an attractive conventionalist theory of logic.     

Effects of an 8-week meditation program on the implicit and explicit attitudes toward religious/spiritual self-representations

Explicit self-representations often conflict with implicit and intuitive self-representations, with such discrepancies being seen as a source of psychological tension. Most of previous research on the psychological effects of mindfulness-meditation has assessed people’s self-attitudes at an explicit level, leaving unknown whether mindfulness-meditation promotes changes on implicit self-representations. Here, we assessed the changes in implicit and explicit self-related religious/spiritual (RS) representations in healthy participants following an 8-week mindfulness-oriented meditation (MOM) program. Before and after meditation, participants were administered implicit (implicit association test) and explicit (self-reported questionnaires) RS measures. Relative to control condition, MOM led to increases of implicit RS in individuals whit low pre-existing implicit RS and to more widespread increases in explicit RS. On the assumption that MOM practice may enhance the clarity of one’s transcendental thoughts and feelings, we argued that MOM allows people to transform their intuitive feelings of implicit RS as well as their explicit RS attitudes.     

Assessing normal and abnormal personality functioning: strengths and weaknesses of self-report, observer, and performance-based methods

Assessing personality characteristics; distinguishing the boundaries between normal and abnormal functioning; identifying impairment in the domains of work, interpersonal relationships, and emotional state due to maladaptive personality traits; and translating these findings into effective, appropriate treatment interventions is a complicated endeavor. Valid, reliable conclusions about an individual's personality functioning and adjustment cannot be reached unless one has accurate information about that person's patterns of behavior, cognitions, emotions, and interpersonal relationships. I discuss strengths and weaknesses of assessment approaches utilizing explicit assessment methods, such as self-report measures and clinical interviews; information obtained from knowledgeable observers; and performance-based, implicit assessment methods such as the Rorschach Comprehensive System (Exner, 2003). In contrast to explicit methods of assessment, implicit methods can provide salient information about a personality construct whether or not individuals have accurately conceptualized that construct, have weighed how the construct describes them, are self-aware, and are willing to openly provide information relevant to that construct. I propose that the accuracy of conclusions about an individual's personality style, problems in adjustment, and treatment needs may be improved if conclusion are based on a multimethod assessment approach that incorporates information gathered using explicit assessment methods, information provided by significant others, and data from performance-based or implicit measures of personality.     

Children retain implicitly learned phonological sequences better than adults: a longitudinal study

Whereas adults often rely on explicit memory, children appear to excel in implicit memory, which plays an important role in the acquisition of various cognitive skills, such as those involved in language. The current study aimed to test the assertion of an age‐dependent shift in implicit versus explicit learning within a theoretical framework that explains the link between implicit sequence memory and word‐form acquisition, using the Hebb repetition paradigm. We conducted a one‐year, multiple‐session longitudinal study in which we presented auditory sequences of syllables, co‐presented with pictures of aliens, for immediate serial recall by a group of children (8–9 years) and by an adult group. The repetition of one Hebb sequence was explicitly announced, while the repetition of another Hebb sequence was unannounced and, therefore, implicit. Despite their overall inferior recall performance, the children showed better offline retention of the implicit Hebb sequence, compared with adults who showed a significant decrement across the delays. Adults had gained more explicit knowledge of the implicit sequence than children, but this could not explain the age‐dependent decline in the delayed memory for it. There was no significant age‐effect for delayed memory of the explicit Hebb sequence, with both age groups showing retention. Overall performance by adults was positively correlated with measures of post‐learning awareness. Performance by children was positively correlated with vocabulary knowledge. We conclude that children outperform adults in the retention over time of implicitly learned phonological sequences that will gradually consolidate into novel word‐forms. The findings are discussed in the light of maturational differences for implicit versus explicit memory systems that also play a role in language acquisition. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/G5nOfJB72t4     

Explicit and implicit emotion regulation: a dual-process framework

It is widely acknowledged that emotions can be regulated in an astonishing variety of ways. Most research to date has focused on explicit (effortful) forms of emotion regulation. However, there is growing research interest in implicit (automatic) forms of emotion regulation. To organise emerging findings, we present a dual-process framework that integrates explicit and implicit forms of emotion regulation, and argue that both forms of regulation are necessary for well-being. In the first section of this review, we provide a broad overview of the construct of emotion regulation, with an emphasis on explicit and implicit processes. In the second section, we focus on explicit emotion regulation, considering both neural mechanisms that are associated with these processes and their experiential and physiological consequences. In the third section, we turn to several forms of implicit emotion regulation, and integrate the burgeoning literature in this area. We conclude by outlining open questions and areas for future research.     

Small or Big in the Eyes of the Other: On the Developmental Psychopathology of Self-Conscious Emotions as Shame,Guilt, and Pride

The self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, and pride typically occur when people evaluate their own self through the eyes of another person. This article will first of all discuss the nature and function of self-conscious emotions, and describe their developmental course in children and adolescents. Then, a number of variables are discussed that are thought to increase young people’s proneness to experience self-conscious emotions. Following this, the empirical evidence on the relationships between guilt, shame, and pride and various types of psychopathology in children and adolescents will be summarized. A model is presented to explain why these self-conscious emotions are associated with a diversity of psychopathological outcomes. Finally, recommendations for clinical practice are made in terms of assessment and interventions targeting the origins and sequelae of self-conscious emotions.     

Explicit and implicit emotion regulation: A dual-process framework

It is widely acknowledged that emotions can be regulated in an astonishing variety of ways. Most research to date has focused on explicit (effortful) forms of emotion regulation. However, there is growing research interest in implicit (automatic) forms of emotion regulation. To organise emerging findings, we present a dual-process framework that integrates explicit and implicit forms of emotion regulation, and argue that both forms of regulation are necessary for well-being. In the first section of this review, we provide a broad overview of the construct of emotion regulation, with an emphasis on explicit and implicit processes. In the second section, we focus on explicit emotion regulation, considering both neural mechanisms that are associated with these processes and their experiential and physiological consequences. In the third section, we turn to several forms of implicit emotion regulation, and integrate the burgeoning literature in this area. We conclude by outlining open questions and areas for future research.     

Professor Fisher on suppositions

I first support Alec Fisher's thesis that premises and conclusions in arguments can be unasserted first by arguing in its favor that only it preserves our intuition that it is at least possible that two arguments share the same premises and the same conclusion although not everything that is asserted in the one is also asserted in the other and second by answering two objections that might be raised against it. I then draw from Professor Fisher's thesis the consequence that in suppositional arguments the falsity (or unacceptability) of a supposition does not tell unfavorably in the evaluation of the argument, because the falsity (or unacceptability) of a (nonredundant) premise counts against an argument if and only if that premise is asserted. Finally, I observe that, despite the fact that they are neither expressed nor even alluded to, implicit assumptions in arguments are always asserted, unless the conclusion, but none of the explicit premisses, is unasserted. Hence, apart from an exceptional case of the kind just mentioned, the falsity (or unacceptability) of implicit assumptions always counts against an argument.I am indebted to Thomas E. Gilbert and Alec Fisher for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.     

My body as an object: self-distance and social experience

In phenomenology the body is often referred to as the lived body which makes the world familiar to me. In this paper, however, I discuss bodily self-consciousness in terms of self-distance. Self-distance is the suggestion that bodily self-consciousness consist in a reflective stance where you conceive of your body as a physical thing, an object in the world as well as the subject of bodily experiences. I argue that we are bodily self-conscious because we experience our own body in more than one way and that these ways are not derivative of one another or hierarchically ordered. This latter claim conflicts with certain phenomenological readings of how the body is experienced, one of which I will refer to and discuss as the Familiarity Objection to my idea of self-distance. I end the paper with a discussion of why we need the conception of experienced objectification that is entailed in the notion of self-distance to account for both pathological and non-pathological bodily self-experiences. The notion of self-distance improves our understanding of how the body plays a central role in psychosis for the experience of distorted inter-subjective relations.