Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request "hints" when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.     

Susceptibility to memory distortion: how do we decide it has occurred?

When given suggestive information, some people can be led to believe that they had experiences that they did not actually have. For example, they may come to believe falsely that they got sick eating particular foods as children, and as a result of that belief they may avoid the foods. But how do we know that someone has developed a false belief or memory in this research? The criteria we choose when classifying whether someone has fallen for the suggestion are somewhat arbitrary. We reanalyze our prior data, using different criteria for deciding that a person fell for the suggestion (called a "believer") or did not (called a "non-believer"). Changing criteria obviously affects the percentage of people who are called susceptible and could conceivably affect the conclusions reached about that group. Comparisons between false memories and true memories could differ, too, depending on how memories are defined.     

Animals may not be stuck in time

Humans have the ability to mentally travel forward and back in time. They can retrieve vivid memories of past events (episodic memories) and can imagine the future (planning). Although it has been suggested that this is a uniquely human ability, the evidence for subjective time travel in humans is typically based on verbal report and elaboration. Such evidence cannot be obtained from animals. However, we may have indirect evidence for episodic memory and planning. For example, we can show that animals can ‘report’ about their recent past experience when they are unexpectedly asked to do so—performance that is analogous to episodic memory. We can also show that animals use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action—analogous to planning. Thus, we have suggestive evidence that animals may not be stuck in time.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).     

A non‐human primate’s understanding of solidity: dissociations between seeing and acting

Studies often reveal a dissociation between what infants know as revealed by action and what they know as revealed by perception. We explored whether non‐human primates exhibit a similar dissociation, focusing on what rhesus macaques know about solidity. In a series of search experiments, Hauser (2001) found that rhesus do not possess a complete understanding of solidity, searching below a solid shelf for an invisibly displaced object. In the present experiments, we explored how rhesus would perform in expectancy violation versions of the same tasks. Subjects looked longer when an apple appeared to fall through a solid shelf and when it appeared to roll through a solid barrier. These results suggest that macaques have some understanding of solidity when tested using looking paradigms even though they do not appear to use this knowledge when searching for food. We speculate that this dissociation is similar to that demonstrated in human development.     

Remembering Early Childhood: How Much, How, and Why (or Why Not)

In this article, we consider recent research on three questions about people's memories for their early childhood: whether childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, whether implicit memories survive when explicit memories do not, and why early episodic memories are sketchy. The research leads us to form three conclusions. First, we argue that childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, as long as the term is defined clearly. Specifically, people are able to recall parts of their lives from the period between ages 2 and 5 years, but they recall less from that period than from other periods. Second, we conclude that implicit memories from early childhood may be evident even when explicit memories are not, a finding that suggests early experience may affect behavior in ways that people do not consciously recognize. Third, we argue that although young children are well known to be wonderfully efficient learners of semantic information, they have difficulty in either encoding or retrieving the interlinked aspects of events that lend them their autobiographical character. Although more evidence is needed, the relative lack of episodic memories of early childhood may be linked to maturation of prefrontal cortex.     

Domestic dogs conceal auditory but not visual information from others

A number of studies have shown that dogs are sensitive to a human’s perspective, but it remains unclear whether they use an egocentric strategy to assess what humans perceive. We investigated whether dogs know what a human can see and hear, even when the dogs themselves are unable to see the human. Dogs faced a task in which forbidden food was placed in a tunnel that they could retrieve by using their paw. Whereas the dogs could not see the experimenter during their food retrieval attempts, the experimenter could potentially see the dog’s paw. In the first experiment, dogs could choose between an opaque and a transparent side of the tunnel, and in the second experiment, they could choose between a silent and a noisy approach to the tunnel. The results showed that dogs preferred a silent approach to forbidden food but they did not hide their approach when they could not see a human present. We conclude that dogs probably rely on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what the human can see and hear.     

Comment

I want a laity, not arrogant, not rash in speech, not disputatious, but men who know their religion, who enter into it. who know just where they stand, who know what they hold, and what they do not, who know their creed so well, they can give an account of it, who know so much of history they can defend it. I want an intelligent, well-instructed laity …     

Infantile amnesia: A neurogenic hypothesis

In the late 19th Century, Sigmund Freud described the phenomenon in which people are unable to recall events from early childhood as infantile amnesia. Although universally observed, infantile amnesia is a paradox; adults have surprisingly few memories of early childhood despite the seemingly exuberant learning capacity of young children. How can these findings be reconciled? The mechanisms underlying this form of amnesia are the subject of much debate. Psychological/cognitive theories assert that the ability to maintain detailed, declarative-like memories in the long term correlates with the development of language, theory of mind, and/or sense of "self." However, the finding that experimental animals also show infantile amnesia suggests that this phenomenon cannot be explained fully in purely human terms. Biological explanations of infantile amnesia suggest that protracted postnatal development of key brain regions important for memory interferes with stable long-term memory storage, yet they do not clearly specify which particular aspects of brain maturation are causally related to infantile amnesia. Here, we propose a hypothesis of infantile amnesia that focuses on one specific aspect of postnatal brain development-the continued addition of new neurons to the hippocampus. Infants (humans, nonhuman primates, and rodents) exhibit high levels of hippocampal neurogenesis and an inability to form lasting memories. Interestingly, the decline of postnatal neurogenesis levels corresponds to the emergence of the ability to form stable long-term memory. We propose that high neurogenesis levels negatively regulate the ability to form enduring memories, most likely by replacing synaptic connections in preexisting hippocampal memory circuits.     

Vocational Choices in College

Our society presses unreasonably on students to “know” what they want to do vocationally. The pressure is unreasonable, especially when applied to high school seniors and college freshmen, because most of them have not yet learned enough about themselves or about occupations to be able to make a first, satisfying choice. And especially they have not learned enough about the nature of their limitations in college-level work. As a result, many students commit themselves to vocational choices prematurely and then perceive the experience as a “failure.” Students should be encouraged to consider any early decision as tentative, a choice to be tested, confirmed, or disconfirmed. They should be relieved of pressure to “know” what they want to do, and helped to see their task as one of confirming or discovering what they want to do by way of a process of exploration, experimentation, and personal development that may go on through their lifetime.     

Christian Initiation,Apprenticeship in Prayer

Abstract

I confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know what time is. Yet I confess too that I do know that I am saying this in time, that I have been talking about time for a long time, and that this long time would not be a long time if it were not for the fact that time has been passing all the while. How can I know this, when I do not know what time is? Is it that I do know what time is, but do not know how to put what I know into words? I am in a sorry state, for I do not even know what I do not know!     

The semantics and acquisition of number words: integrating linguistic and developmental perspectives

This article brings together two independent lines of research on numerally quantified expressions, e.g. two girls. One stems from work in linguistic theory and asks what truth conditional contributions such expressions make to the utterances in which they are used--in other words, what do numerals mean? The other comes from the study of language development and asks when and how children learn the meaning of such expressions. My goal is to show that when integrated, these two perspectives can both constrain and enrich each other in ways hitherto not considered. Specifically, work in linguistic theory suggests that in addition to their 'exactly n' interpretation, numerally quantified NPs such as two hoops can also receive an 'at least n' and an 'at most n' interpretation, e.g. you need to put two hoops on the pole to win (i.e. at least two hoops) and you can miss two shots and still win (i.e. at most two shots). I demonstrate here through the results of three sets of experiments that by the age of 5 children have implicit knowledge of the fact that expressions like two N can be interpreted as 'at least two N' and 'at most two N' while they do not yet know the meaning of corresponding expressions such as at least/most two N which convey these senses explicitly. I show that these results have important implications for theories of the semantics of numerals and that they raise new questions for developmental accounts of the number vocabulary.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) "play the odds": information-seeking strategies in relation to cost, risk, and benefit

Recent research has examined whether animals possess metacognition, or the ability to monitor their knowledge states. However, the extent to which animals actively control their knowledge states is still not well delineated. Although organisms might be capable of seeking information when it is lacking, it does not mean that it is always adaptive to do so. In the present set of experiments, we examined the flexibility of this behavior in captive orangutans (Pongo abelii; two adults and one juvenile) in a foraging task, by varying the necessity of information-seeking, the cost associated with it, the likelihood of error, and the value of the reward. In Experiment 1, subjects searched for information most often when it was "cheapest" energetically. In Experiment 2, subjects searched for information most often when the odds of making an error were the greatest. In Experiment 3, subjects searched for information more when the reward was doubled in value. In Experiment 4, adult subjects adapted to risk/benefit trade-offs in their searching behavior. In every experiment, subjects sought information more often when they needed it than when they already knew the solution to the problem. Therefore, the current research suggests that information-seeking behavior in orangutans shows a sophisticated level of flexibility, comparable to that seen in human children, as they appear to "play the odds" when making the decision to seek information or not.     

Lawyer and pastoral counselor: A team for divorce counseling

Conclusion The dull thud of the gavel ends a way of life. At the same time, a new status that is both easier and more difficult is created. Gone is the strain of an unhappy home full of bitterness, recriminations, and unhappy memories that can be recalled and repeated like peeling off the layers of an onion. On the horizon is a new way life, full of optimism and aspirations. Yet this new life is not without its own hazards. Life is like a river that may run smooth for a while but that ultimately will face rapids. We can almost hear the rapids in the distance and know they are there. We don't know now exactly what form they will take and exactly how they can be overcome.When spouses face a divorce, they are intimately involved in unfamiliar territory. With the help of a qualified pastoral counselor and an attorney functioning as an interdisciplinary team, they can face divorce and post-divorce problems bravely, in an informed manner, with proper perspective and realistically. Each should be prepared to discuss and evaluate the future relationship of the parties and their children in the areas of future finances, credit, the second marriage, visitation, relationship to the children, and their insurance estates. Then there are few surprises. The new life can begin with an increased awareness that prepares each party for future contingencies. Also, the lawyer and pastoral counselor become a supportive team who are available both now and in the future.     

Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? Making Choices for Non‐Human Animals

Animals are usually considered to lack the status of autonomous agents. Nevertheless, they do appear to make ostensible choices. This article considers whether, and how, I should respect animals' choices. I propose a concept of volitionality which can be respected if, and insofar as, doing so is in the best interests of the animal. Applying that concept, I (we) will argue that an animals' choices be respected when the relevant human decision maker's capacities to decide are potentially challenged or compromised. For example, it will be best to respect the animals' choice when the human decision maker: (1) lacks accurate knowledge of the animal's subjective experiences; (2) does not know what will lead to desirable experiences or allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones; (3) is biased; (4) is less aware of the animal's specific situation; (5) cannot appreciate all elements comprehensively, including considering any (content‐neutral) value to the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, such as where a lack of control or liberty would be unpleasant or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of choice‐making; and (6) when the animal's choice is achievable. This additionally suggests that we may often beneficially choose to set up situations that empower animals to make better choices.     

Reports of recovered memories of childhood abuse in therapy in France

ABSTRACT

Recovered memories of abuse in therapy are especially controversial if the clients were not aware they were abused before therapy. In the past, such memory recovery has led to legal action, as well as a debate about whether such memories might be repressed, forgotten, or false memories. More than two decades after the height of the controversy, it is unclear to what degree such memories are still recovered today, and to what extent it occurs in France. In our French survey of 1312 participants (M_age?=?33; 53% female), 551 reported having done therapy at some point. Of that 551, 33 (6%) indicated they had recovered memories of abuse in therapy that they did not know about before therapy. Sexual abuse was the most commonly reported type that was recovered in therapy (79%). As in past research, discussing the possibility of repressed memories with therapists was associated with reports of recovered memories of abuse. Surprisingly, memory recovery occurred just as much in behavioural and cognitive therapies as it did in therapies focused on trauma. We found recovered memories in a proportion of clients who began therapy recently. Recovered memories in therapy appears to be an ongoing concern in France.     

Intending,knowing how,infinitives

Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.     

When Photographs Create False Memories

ABSTRACT— Photographs help people illustrate the stories of their lives and the significant stories of their society. However, photographs can do more than illustrate events; in this article, we show that photographs can distort memory for them. We describe the course of our "false-memory implantation" research, and review recent work showing that photographs can sometimes increase—while other times decrease—false memories. First, we discuss research showing that a doctored photo, showing subjects taking a completely fictitious hot-air-balloon ride, can cultivate false memories for that experience. We hypothesize that the photograph helps subjects to imagine details about the event that they later confuse with reality. Second, we show that although photographs are indeed powerful sources of influence on memory, they are not necessarily as powerful as narrative. In fact, in certain circumstances, photographs might constrain imagination. Third, we discuss research showing that true photographs can also cultivate false memories. Finally, we present recent work showing that photographs can create false memories for current events.