荀子诚论发微北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文尝试透过一种精神修持的视角考察荀子的诚论思想。在战国时代的心术思潮中,荀子的"治气养心之术"代表了一种典型的儒家的心术理论。本文指出,作为一种精神修持(心灵修养)的方式,荀子的诚以道德修养作为理想和目的。并且,在其自然主义人性论背景之下,诚的思想在荀子整个道德修养学说中具有一种特别的理论意义。本文特别指出,以诚养心的修持过程也正是心逐渐理性化、精神化,进而最终转化为道德理性主体的过程。最后,对诚的实践的分析表明,荀子的诚主要表现为行为主体在内在的心志上专一于对道德理性的信守和贯彻,从而为以心治性的道德修养实践提供了主体基础。     

荀子养心说新探——一种精神修持理论视域下的考察

本文尝试透过一种精神修持理论的视角考察荀子的养心理论。在战国时代的心术思潮中,荀子的"治气养心之术"代表了一种典型的儒家的心术理论。荀子提出最好的养心方法在于诚("君子养心莫过于诚"),本文则指出,作为一种心灵修养(养心)的方式,荀子的诚以道德修养(养德)作为理想和目的。并且,在其自然主义人性论背景之下,诚的思想在荀子整个道德修养学说中具有一种特别的理论意义。本文特别指出,以诚养心的修持过程也正是心逐渐理性化、精神化,进而最终转化为道德理性主体的过程。最后,对诚的实践的分析表明,荀子的诚主要表现为行为主体在内在的心志上专一于对道德理性的信守和贯彻,从而为以心治性的道德修养实践提供了主体基础。     

吴虞对荀子的评说

吴虞对儒家的基本态度是从根本上予以否定,从孔子、孟子到董仲舒等儒家代表人物都受到他的攻毁。但他对战国末年的儒学大师荀子却是个例外。 本来吴虞对荀子亦持基本的否定,但后来经过他对《荀子》的重新审视,又以为荀子的见识度超越儒家与诸子,甚至视荀子为儒学中的路德、中国古代学术界的培根。并写作了《荀子之政治论》、《荀子之〈天论〉与辟机祥》、《荀子之〈劝学〉及〈礼论〉》等三篇论著,来阐发荀子的政治观、天道观与人性修养学说,对荀子的学说作了高度的评价。     

荀子的人性论新探

儒家伦理－政治哲学所关注的核心是“人”：对人性问题的探讨,对人格培育的范导,构成了儒学的根本任务;从人出发来考察人与社会、人与自然的关系,构成了儒学的基本脉络。作为一代大儒的荀子的思想体系,亦不能不鲜明地表现出这一儒学特色。人性问题是荀子的思考重心,荀子的一系列重要的哲学观念与政治主张都与他对人性的理解与阐释具有直接联系。本文拟对荀子人性论提出一些新的看法,以供时贤指正。一、关于性恶说谈到荀子的人性论,人们都会不约而同地想到他的著名的性恶说。荀子主性恶与孟子主性善适成鲜明对照,是为儒学史上的最大…     

荀子的“美善同一”观

荀子对于美、善及其关系的看法,充分体现在他的“美善同一”观里。尽管荀子的美学思想由于受历史条件的制约,存在着这样或那样的缺陷,但是他的“美善同一”观的真理颗粒,并不因为历史长河的奔流而失去其夺目的光辉。 荀子的“美善同一”在关于社会美即人的美的看法中直接地、集中地表达出来。对于人的美,荀子曾经做过探索。在《非相》篇中,他批判了先秦时代那种相人之术的迷信活动,明确地把决定人的美丑善恶的“心术”看作比人的容貌、体态更重要。 他说:“故相形不如论心,论心不如择术。形不     

文质论视野下的荀子人性论——兼评性朴论之争

近二十年来学界关于荀子性朴还是性恶的讨论，是一场非常有意义的学术争论。笔者并不赞同荀子性朴说，但认为性朴论者提出了非常重要的问题。笔者认为，荀子在《礼论》中提出性是本始材朴，是对何谓性的定义，而非对人性善恶的评判，故与性恶并非同一层面的问题。荀子非常自觉地继承和发展了孔子以来的文质论传统，并在这个理论框架下讨论人性与礼制。他在《性恶》等篇中将作为质的人性理解为恶，但在《礼论》等篇中又非常肯定情与质，这展现了文质论的理论张力。相对而言，孟子对文质论没有像荀子那样讨论得那么深刻，但性善论更符合文质论的理论模式。     

荀子心"合"物论发微

关于荀子认识论的研究,学者通常都从主观和客观分别对待出发,认为荀子力图使主观"符合"客观,以期求得全面荀正确的认识.本文作者认为,这种看法可以说符合常识的理解,但却没有切近苟子的本意.子的认识论是心物一体的认识论,心不是"主观",物也不是"客观",他更没有提出"符合"论,也不以"客观"为认识的标准.荀子的认识论是心"合"物论,也就是心物相合不二之论.     

荀子的音乐观浅述

荀子是中国历史上最杰出的思想家之一,是先秦儒家的最后一位大师,他不仅继承了儒家“礼”的观念并将之系统化,而且继承并发展了儒家的音乐理论。荀子把音乐理论更为系统化,他从人的本性出发,主张用“礼”规范人的行为,用“乐”调理熏陶人的本性,其目的就是引导人们改恶向善、去争止乱,从而维系社会安定。本文拟从以下两个方面简略论述荀子的乐论观：     

荀子“礼”论的审美意蕴

以往对于荀子美学思想的探讨多是从其“乐”论出发,而对于“礼”论中隐含的审美思想发掘不够。实际上,荀子的“礼”论中包含了丰富而深刻的审美意蕴。首先荀子将“礼”奠基在人的丰富感性基础之上,将生命本身的存在作为价值建构的原点,表现出对于生命存在的关注和尊重;其次荀子认为与“礼”相关的各种仪式活动,是以具体而物化的形式恰当地表现了人存在的各种生命情态,具有一定的审美效果,是对于人类生命情感的美化和装饰;最后“礼”的最终的目标和价值在于通过“行义之美”,构建一个“美善相乐”的理想世界,这个理想世界不仅具有伦理和谐的意味,还具有审美大化的韵味。荀子的“礼”论不仅在中国审美文化史上具有一定的地位,而且对于我们今天的理论建设仍具有启发意义。     

略论回族学者王岱舆的伊斯兰道德修养观

王岱舆是明末清初著名回族伊斯兰学者。他从伊斯兰教的根本信仰出发,同时结合苏非神秘主义的修道方式,在自己的汉文译著中提出了一系列道德修养方法。本文着重从“习学”、“三品十条”和“正心”等方面,讨论了王岱舆的伊斯兰道德修养观及其修养方法。     

Two Senses of “Wei 偽”: A New Interpretation of Xunzi’s Theory of Human Nature

In contrast to the traditional and ordinary interpretation of Xunzi??s theory of human nature, which considers Xunzi??s theory as claiming that human nature is bad or evil, this article aims at, first, arguing that the interpretation is wrong or at least incomplete and, second, constructing a new interpretation that, according to Xunzi??s text, there are some factors in human nature that are able to promote good behaviors. I shall demonstrate that some major paragraphs in Xunzi??s text were misinterpreted and misarranged, analyze that the word wei (artifice) in the chapter of ??Zhengming?? has two different but related senses, one of which designates some of the potential capacities of human nature, and argue that the 23 words in the chapter of ??Rongru?? should not be deleted as redundant, as was done by the two famous philologists in Qing dynasdy, Wang Niansun and Wang Xianqian.     

Zhi and Neng belong to mind: a study of the capacity to be good in the mind of Xunzi

ABSTRACT

The mainstream of academia thinks that Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which claims that human nature is bad, is in contrast with those of Confucius and Mencius and is unable to provide a foundation for human moral subjectivity. However, there are more and more scholars bringing up different ideas, such as Lu Debin and Fung Yiuming. They think that Xunzi’s wei 偽 (artifice), which includes zhi知 (knowing) and neng 能 (capacity), is a kind of inborn capacity to think and activate that belongs to xing. This paper points out that zhi and neng belong to xin 心 (mind) rather than xing. In the text of Xunzi, xing is mainly regarded as human emotions and desires which would result in chaos if not controlled. Making zhi and neng belong to xing does not accord with Xunzi’s theory and will confuse people with the connotation of Xunzi’s xing.     

荀子性恶论的多维解读

在传统思想研究中,苟子是以性恶论而与孟子、老庄一同构成了中国古典人性论。其实,深入阅读苟子读本,笔者发现荀子对人性的评判较为复杂。传统性恶论远不能揭示荀子人性论思想的丰富性和多元性。笔者现从苟子之“性”的中性色彩、苟子之“恶”的真实解释、苟子人性论中的向善和知善、人和环境的互动四个层面予以展开论述。     

Is Xunzi a utilitarian? Revisiting a disagreement

ABSTRACT

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies.     

逆性与顺性——荀子人性论的内在紧张

本文从一个新的角度(逆性与顺性的内在紧张 )来讨论荀子的人性论。逆性的思想主要表现于《性恶》一篇。但是 ,荀子的人性论思想不仅表现于此篇中 ,而且还表现于其他篇 (如《礼论》、《王霸》等 )。本文认为 ,在《性恶》以外的诸篇中 ,荀子有明显的顺性思想 ,从而意味着性不恶。针对一般论者只局限于《性恶》一篇来考察荀子的人性论 ,本文强调他篇的意义。本文还试图从几种路子来解释荀子人性论逆性与顺性的紧张 ,并把他的性恶论与韩非以及西方的性恶论略作比较。     

"旧人"的否弃和"新人"的形塑--论马克思对人的价值形象的设计

任何关于人的理论都有自己理想的人的价值形象。它既是观察和评价现实生活的标准,也是实践活动所追求的目标。本文旨在将马克思所设计的人的价值形象从他复杂的理论构造中剥离出来。马克思关于人的理论以批判性的建构为鲜明特色,他对理想的人的价值形象的设计跟他对人的实际生活状况的否定是相辅相成的,亦即对“旧人”的否弃和对“新人”的塑形是同时进行的。这个“新人”的主要内涵如下：人应该是民主制度下的人。应该是追求现实幸福的人,应该是自由地自觉地活动的人,应该是全面发展的人。     

The nature and grounds of Xunzi's disagreement with Mencius

This, paper argues that the debate between Mencius and Xunzi, as to whether human nature is intrinsically good or evil, represents not so much a disagreement as to the empirical facts of human nature as a disagreement over the nature of morality. Specifically, it argues that Mencius holds a virtue‐theoretic conception of morality while Xunzi subscribes to a rule‐based conception of morality. These differences in their conceptions of morality lead the two philosophers to radically different evaluations of human nature although they are in substantial agreement as to the empirical facts of human nature.     

论荀子的性情观

在近年出土的战国楚简中,“性”和“情”及其表达的思想特别引人注目,这不能不使我们重新思考传统文献特别是《荀子》中“性”“情”思想的含义。荀子论性,一面认同性乃自然成就,一如白纸;一面又认为它既有恶的倾向,又有善的倾向。荀子论情,是把它放在后天的位置上,并赋予广泛的内容,使之具有善恶一体、两端相对的特征。荀子论性情关系,一个在先,一个在后,经由心的统摄而联为一体,没有性,情无所出,没有情,性无由见。荀子的所谓性恶论,更准确地说应该是情恶论,这一层应该引起特别的注意。     

Before and after Ritual: Two Accounts of Li as Virtue in Early Confucianism

In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li??as moral virtue and as civic virtue??in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive political theories of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms??human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi.     

Reading Xunzi through Nāmā: Two Ancient Inquiries into the Nature of Names

This essay is a comparison between two ancient theories of language—the 5th century BCE Indian etymologist Yāska and the 4th century BCE Chinese philosopher Xunzi 荀子. Specifically, it is a reading of the theory of “the rectification of names” in Xunzi through the lens of Yāska. Xunzi is known for his view that humanity’s innate tendencies need to be shaped through education and ritual. Similarly, ancient Indian authors like Yāska understand that a person is created, or made, through the performance of Vedic sacrifice. Both thinkers’ constructivist theories of language and meaning proceed from these ritual assumptions. However, Yāska would query Xunzi’s inherent distrust of multiple meanings of words and their negative effects on a functional state. Guided instead by a theory of the transcendence of Vedic language, Yāska would argue that the more one can proliferate possible meanings the more powerful a word becomes.