Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy’s view

In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.     

Imagination in the Zhuangzi: the madman of Chu’s alternative to Confucian cultivation

This paper examines the role of the imagination in the Zhuangzi. There are many avenues through which the various types of imaginations in the Zhuangzi could be investigated, but this paper will concentrate on only one, namely the use of imagination to criticize Confucius’ way. Specifically, the Zhuangzi finds Confucius’ views on virtuosity, moral cultivation, and social roles to include exceedingly limited imagined restrictions. The Daoist classic thereby creates (in a somewhat paradoxical fashion) stories to inspire the imagination of its readers, with the goal of broadening the ways in which people understand morality, society, and themselves. Accordingly, the Zhuangzi suggests that people can ‘zigzag’ through life, temporarily taking on different perspectives or roles, without cultivating a corresponding sense of self. Imagination is key for promoting this type of existential mode of existence—what the Zhuangzi calls ‘genuine’ (zhen 真).     

Reversibility and chiasm: false equivalents? An alternative approach to understanding difference in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy

The chiasm is usually considered the key notion for Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. I argue against a common conclusion, namely that ‘the chiasm’ is equivalent to ‘reversibility’. Even when the two terms are not taken as interchangeable, the precise nature of their relation has not been adequately established. Focusing exclusively on ‘reversibility’ has implications for a range of philosophical issues, including relations between self and other. The danger of substituting one term for the other is that existential relations are construed as inversions, rather than as genuine exchanges. I examine two trajectories that can be discovered in ‘The Intertwining—The Chiasm’. The first is the inclusion of difference within a peculiar, extended sense of ‘reversibility’. The second is the development of a plurality of expressions, among which ‘reversibility’ is necessary but not sufficient. I go on to argue that Merleau-Ponty secures difference within the chiasm by supplementing the notion of reversibility with ‘imminence’, the idea that something has not yet occurred. I also propose that the figure of a threshold illuminates how the chiasm operates as a transition where both joining and differentiation occur.     

Process as reality: Kierkegaard’s aesthetic approach to the ethical

This paper makes the point that Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning individuality cannot be understood clearly without placing them in the context of what I am calling ontological isolation. This means the radical deprivation by selfhood of every aspect of reality, to the point where not even the possibility or illusion of reality is available to the self. In this context the self is required to become itself, forming itself in and out of its own absolute nothingness, ontological destitution, or wrongness. With this form of isolation as our investigative key, we unlock what Kierkegaard means by his command to become a self, where becoming itself, in absence of prior possibility, constitutes the reality of self, and why Kierkegaard places crucial emphasis, contrary to the tradition, on the priority of negativity. By having the self originate itself in “absolute difficulty,” or that wherein the act itself, or pure doing without result, is primary, Kierkegaard now replaces metaphysics with ethics in order of priority, and places the self inseparably in a world that responds directly to that act. I show here a parallel between Kierkegaard’s approach to ethical action with that of artistic creation of a kind of world, the work of art. In doing so I reveal the inadequacy of interpretations that would impose traditional forms of isolation, social and cosmic, on Kierkegaard, as some of his critics do, or that would place Kierkegaard’s ethics within traditional developmental models, as many of his sympathizers do.     

From existential alterity to ethical reciprocity: Beauvoir’s alternative to Levinas

Continental Philosophy Review - While Simone de Beauvoir’s theory of alterity has been the topic of much discussion within Beauvoir scholarship, feminist theory, and social and political...     

Millennials and the World of Work: An Economist’s Perspective

This article uses an economic approach to address whether and how the Millennial generation is significantly different from its predecessors. Particular attention is paid to the normal life cycle stages through which all generations pass, and the implications for forecasting how the Millennials’ relationship with the world of work will evolve. A second key issue is the extremely large differences in economic opportunity that exist among the members of each generation, and which have increased for more recent generations, particularly those with lower levels of education. Other key issues include the rise in international competition for jobs, and the rising cost of a college education. These factors together imply that simple stereotypes about Millennials taking a privileged view of the world of work may be simplistic at best, and likely are significantly off target.     

Perelman’s Pseudo-Argument as Applied to the Creationism Controversy

If you want to challenge or at least weaken the adhesion to a system of values, you can basically adopt two radically opposed rhetorical strategies. Either you will attack the system in a frontal way: for instance, fundamentalists or fascists deny any validity to democratic values and human rights. Or you will pretend to argue from within the system (by saying that you accept some of its basic premises), while subtly distorting the process of reasoning in order to get to your conclusions. If the audience is naïve or poorly informed, you will be able to defend positions that are fundamentally at odds with liberal-democratic values while seeming to argue from inside the system. I would like to show how such a process of “perverse” translation works in the context of the Darwinism/Creationism “controversy”. The attacks on the teaching of evolutionary biology began approximately one century ago. The way Creationists have argued and changed several times their rhetorical strategies seems very interesting to me, in that it exemplifies an important contemporary phenomenon, which I call “perverse translation” or “the wolf in the sheepfold”.     

Sleep and theology: ‘An half adieu to the world’

The study of sleep has become a field of widespread interest. It engages many disciplines from neuroscience to sociology, philosophy to evolutionary biology. It features in the lifestyle sections of newspapers and websites often because of its connections with mental and physical wellbeing. Yet theology has, in the most part, remained silent on the subject, despite many Biblical references to sleep in both the Old and New Testaments. There is a theological story to be told about sleep ? as a gift, and not an affliction ? despite the unfortunate occasional conflation of sleep with sloth. It is a state of grace and not of sin. It refreshes and renews yet can never be earned; all we can do is to be in a posture of receptivity so that it falls upon us. Sleep is profoundly precarious and sometimes frustratingly elusive and is suggestive of the fragility and vulnerability of human existence. When it comes to us, sleep transforms our experience of waking life. The eschatological character of sleep points us to reflect on mortality and resurrection. This article argues that it is possible to speak of a ‘theology of sleep’, but that it is not to be found in a coherent body of teaching or theological exploration. Rather, a theology of sleep is found articulated in Christian practices such as the Office of Compline, the keeping of vigils and the Examen of Consciousness, and in evening hymnody and prayers before bed. The author will suggest that the word theosomnia encapsulates this understanding of sleep.     

What the reader’s eye tells the mind’s ear: Silent reading activates inner speech

Although copious research has investigated the role of phonology in reading, little research has investigated the precise nature of the entailed speech representations. The present study examined the similarity of “inner speech” in reading to overt speech. Two lexical decision experiments (in which participants gave speeded word/nonword classifications to letter strings) assessed the effects of implicit variations in vowel and word-initial consonant length. Responses were generally slower for phonetically long stimuli than for phonetically short stimuli, despite equal orthographic lengths. Moreover, the phonetic length effects displayed principled interactions with common factors known to affect lexical decisions, such as word frequency and the similarity of words to nonwords. Both phonetic length effects were stronger among slower readers. The data suggest that acoustic representations activated in silent reading are best characterized as inner speech rather than as abstract phonological codes.     

On the relationship between reading, listening, and speaking: It’s different for people’s names

Two experiments are reported that tested predictions derived from the framework of face, object, and word recognition proposed by Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart (1996). The findings were as follows: (1) Production of a celebrity’s name in response to seeing the celebrity’s face primed a subsequent familiarity decision to the celebrity’s printed name. The degree of repetition priming observed was as great as that observed when a familiarity decision to the printed name was repeated in the prime and test phases of the experiment. (2) Making a familiarity decision to an auditory presentation of a celebrity’s name primed a familiarity decision to the same celebrity’s name presented visually. The magnitude of cross-modality priming was as great as the magnitude of within-modality repetition priming. This result for people’s names contrasted with the effects observed in lexical decision tasks, in which no reliable cross-modality priming was observed. The results cannot be accounted for by previous models of face and name processing. They show a marked contrast between processing people’s names and processing words. The results support the framework proposed by Valentine et al. (1996). The implications for models of speech production, perception, and reading are discussed, together with the potential of the methodology to elucidate our understanding of proper name processing.     

A Psychoanalytic Reader’s Commentary: On Erasure and Negation as a Barrier to the Future

This paper is a psychoanalytically informed critical race theoretical commentary on Daniel Gaztambide’s paper, “A Preferential Option for the Repressed: Psychoanalysis Through the Eyes of Liberation Theology,” which received the 2014 Multiculturalism and Psychoanalysis Award by the NYU Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis’ Committee on Ethnicity, Race, Culture, Class & Language. This discussion is an attempt to utilize psychoanalytic and literary techniques to explore some of the ways psychoanalysis continues to inscribe cultural practices and normative thinking that foreclose opportunities to expand its margins to be more inclusive. I selected one sentence and used it to suggest how it affected this Black American reader who is also a psychoanalyst.     

Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems

In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can’t be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen’s modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) “manipulation arguments,” involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist’s favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise.     

Sexuality and corrections: An administrator’s perspective

Any consideration of human sexuality inevitably refers to fundamental and powerful physical, psychological, behavioral, attitudinal, and social forces that permeate many important aspects of human life and culture. As with many issues impacting society in general, these become magnified within the correctional environment.     

Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale

Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the world are similar to scientific methods used to make claims about the world, but that the subjects of metaphysics are not the subjects of science. Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar. In the first section of the paper, I will describe the sort of subject matter that metaphysics tends to engage with. In the second section of the paper, I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories (instead of consensus on a single theory), to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context.     

On universals: an extensionalist alternative to Quine’s resemblance theory

The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine’s austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine’s reason for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine’s approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1–80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties. Editor’s Note: Nathan Stemmer died on 6 April 2007. Due to this, the proofreading was only done by the editors. All colleagues being acquainted with Nathan Stemmers work are deeply concerned about the loss.     

Transcendental Phenomenology and the Way to Happiness: Husserl’s Reply to Csikszentmihalyi

It is an unprecedented task to interpret Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy of happiness. Although happiness has been discussed in many psychologies, Csikszentmihalyi’s positive psychology defines happiness as “flow”, a psychic state of ongoing immersion guided by intrinsic motivations and rewards. In this paper, I interpret our transcendental consciousness as a radical “flow” maker and claim that in our transcendental life, happiness is what we ourselves are. Then, I propose this not only as an appeal to a change of attitude (i.e. reduction) for happiness, but also as a deep hermeneutics of the mental skills and activity designs suggested by positive psychology. In this way, worldly happiness dictums can be profoundly re-examined. Understood as such, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology leaves us the task of how to make a concrete form of qualitative or hermeneutical research on happiness out of it.