道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

Preschoolers' social dominance, moral cognition, and moral behavior: an evolutionary perspective

Various aspects of moral functioning, aggression, and positive peer regard were assessed in 153 preschool children. Our hypotheses were inspired by an evolutionary approach to morality that construes moral norms as tools of the social elite. Accordingly, children were also rated for social dominance and strategies for its attainment. We predicted that aspects of moral functioning would be only loosely related to each other and that moral cognitions about rules (unlike emotion attributions and moral internalization) would demonstrate patterns suggestive of instrumentality. Results showed that cognitions about moral rules and internalized conscience were unrelated and that sociomoral behavior was more strongly related to the latter than to the former. In addition, promoting group norms (Selective Moral Engagement) positively predicted social dominance, whereas internalized conscience negatively predicted social dominance. Children who controlled resources via both prosocial and coercive means (i.e., bistrategic) showed enhanced moral cognitions about rules (despite high levels of aggression) but had deficits in emotional aspects of moral functioning in the eyes of teachers. Patterns of Selective Moral Engagement invite comparisons to tattling and impression management. The findings are contrasted with alternative hypotheses that are advanced from traditional yet prevailing approaches.     

The Influence of Multiple Group Identities on Moral Foundations

Moral foundations theory provides a theoretical framework for understanding the universal and societal aspects of morality. The focus thus far has been on understanding the influence of group categories on moral foundations by controlling for relevant factors and then examining the unique contribution of a single factor. Although this type of analysis was critical to demonstrate the efficacy of the Moral Foundations Theory and Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), the current study examines moral responses from the intersection of culture, ethnic identity and gender group membership in the United States and India. Significant results suggest that moral foundations are better understood through a multiple group identity perspective and that the MFQ is equipped to capture differences in moral foundations within subgroups.     

Morality in Groups: On the Social‐Regulatory Functions of Right and Wrong

Applying what we know about group‐based identities and concerns allows us to improve our understanding of the ways in which morality is relevant to social judgments of right and wrong. We distinguish between three different social functions of moral standards and moral judgments. The identity defining function of morality indicates where people want to belong, and how they are regarded by others. The group dynamic function indicates consensual definitions of what is right and wrong that guide individual behavioral choices. The intergroup relations function of group morality, speaks to the way people tend to communicate with and behave towards members of other groups that have different moral standards.     

Zones of consensus and zones of conflict: questioning the "common morality" presumption in bioethics

Many bioethicists assume that morality is in a state of wide reflective equilibrium. According to this model of moral deliberation, public policymaking can build upon a core common morality that is pretheoretical and provides a basis for practical reasoning. Proponents of the common morality approach to moral deliberation make three assumptions that deserve to be viewed with skepticism. First, they commonly assume that there is a universal, transhistorical common morality that can serve as a normative baseline for judging various actions and practices. Second, advocates of the common morality approach assume that the common morality is in a state of relatively stable, ordered, wide reflective equilibrium. Third, casuists, principlists, and other proponents of common morality approaches assume that the common morality can serve as a basis for the specification of particular policies and practical recommendations. These three claims fail to recognize the plural moral traditions that are found in multicultural, multiethnic, multifaith societies such as the United States and Canada. A more realistic recognition of multiple moral traditions in pluralist societies would be considerable more skeptical about the contributions that common morality approaches in bioethics can make to resolving contentious moral issues.     

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation.     

匿名、流动性与道德需求

人们总以为匿名特别是网络的匿名性使得身份难于辨认,容易产生不道德行为;同时现代社会的流动性也使得原有的道德监督机制难于发挥作用,也容易使人们产生偏离行为,所以匿名和流动性皆不会产生道德需求和形成道德秩序。但本文经分析发现,现代社会不可避免的匿名与流动性同样能产生对道德的需求并最终有利于整个社会道德秩序的形成,特别是在匿名与流动性的间接作用下,同时也在网络的直接作用下,构建了社会前所未有的公共空间,形成了民主、道德等社会文明发展所必不可少的公共观念。     

Common morality as an alternative to principlism.

Unlike the principles of Kant, Mill, and Rawls, those of principlism are not action guides that stem from an underlying, integrated moral theory. Hence problems arise in reconciling the principles with each other and, indeed, in interpreting them as action guides at all, since they have no content in and of themselves. Another approach to "theory and method in bioethics" is presented as an alternative to principlism, though actually the "alternative" predates principlism by about 10 years. The alternative's account of morality stays close to ordinary, common morality with its rules and ideals, which in turn are grounded in aspects of human nature. As such, morality must be understood to be a rational, impartial, and public system that is incumbent on everyone. Morality is a unified and integrated system. The moral rules and ideals are also "culture-" and "profession-sensitive" in that they are interpreted more specifically within these various contexts.     

A bad taste in the mouth: gustatory disgust influences moral judgment

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.     

Disgust as embodied loss aversion

A quickly expanding literature has examined the link between physical disgust and morality. This article critically integrates the existing evidence and draws the following conclusions: First, there is considerable evidence that experimentally induced disgust and cleanliness influence moral judgment, but moderating variables and attributional processes need to be considered. Second, moral considerations have substantial effects on behavioural concomitants of disgust, such as facial expressions, economic games and food consumption. Third, while disgust involves a conservation concern, it can manifest itself in both liberal and conservative political attitudes. Overall, disgust can be considered to form part of a behavioural loss aversion system aimed at protecting valuable resources, including the integrity of one’s body. Recommendations are offered to investigate the role of disgust more rigorously in order to fully capture its role in moral life.     

Emotions in sexual morality: Testing the separate elicitors of anger and disgust

Recent work suggests that negative moral judgements of sexual activities are informed by disgust and anger. A correlational study (N=62) and an experiment (N=176) examined the specific antecedents that elicit these distinct, though correlated, moral emotions. Participants in Study 1 rated their emotional reactions to, and judgements of, 10 sexual scenarios. Across scenarios, judgements of abnormality predicted disgust independent of anger, and judgements of harm/rights violation predicted anger independent of disgust. Study 2 replicated these results in an experimental design. Participants rated their emotions and judgements in response to behaviours that varied in degree of potential sexual morality violation (non-sexual, heterosexual, homosexual) and rights violation (no harm, indirect harm, direct harm). Judgement of rights violation mediated the effects of harm on anger. Judgements of abnormality, but not other antecedents proposed to elicit moral disgust, mediated the effects of sexual immorality on disgust.     

Disgust in Emotion Theory,Development, and Clinical Work: A Discussion of Josephs

Disgust is one of the primal emotions described by Darwin and strongly influences human motivation, behavior, and psychopathology. Disgust has sensory aspects, but when combined with certain cognitions it can take on moral implications. Although the biological source of disgust is protection from harmful substances, it can be manipulated to achieve political ends. Disgust combined with lust can sometimes lead to heightened sexual excitement. Disgust reactions may also be a defensive denial of our hidden desires. Psychotherapists must be careful to distinguish their own disgust reactions from the patient’s lovemap. In couples therapy, disgust reactions and mutual shaming processes can be clarified and restructured.     

Parental Morality and Family Processes as Predictors of Adolescent Morality

This study investigated the extent to which parents' moral thought and family processes are involved in the socialization of adolescent moral thought. Olson et al's (1992) Circumplex Model and White's (2000) Family Socialization Model provided the conceptual framework for predicting that families high in cohesion, adaptability and communication would facilitate the transmission of moral values between parents and adolescents more effectively than families low in these family processes. Results involving 218 adolescent-parent dyads revealed that perceived family cohesion and communication moderated the father-adolescent moral thought relationship; that several facets of both parents' morality significantly predicted adolescents' morality; and that all three family processes significantly predicted certain aspects of adolescent morality. Therefore the extent to which parents' socialize adolescent moral values will vary according to each parent's moral view, the strength of family processes and the content of moral thought being transmitted.     

Emotions in sexual morality: Testing the separate elicitors of anger and disgust

Recent work suggests that negative moral judgements of sexual activities are informed by disgust and anger. A correlational study (N=62) and an experiment (N=176) examined the specific antecedents that elicit these distinct, though correlated, moral emotions. Participants in Study 1 rated their emotional reactions to, and judgements of, 10 sexual scenarios. Across scenarios, judgements of abnormality predicted disgust independent of anger, and judgements of harm/rights violation predicted anger independent of disgust. Study 2 replicated these results in an experimental design. Participants rated their emotions and judgements in response to behaviours that varied in degree of potential sexual morality violation (non-sexual, heterosexual, homosexual) and rights violation (no harm, indirect harm, direct harm). Judgement of rights violation mediated the effects of harm on anger. Judgements of abnormality, but not other antecedents proposed to elicit moral disgust, mediated the effects of sexual immorality on disgust.     

不同注意资源水平上核心厌恶和道德厌恶刺激加工分离效应的ERPs研究

厌恶帮助人类避免接触生物病菌、社会道德威胁物。本研究采用“线索—靶”范式考察不同注意资源水平上核心和道德厌恶刺激的认知加工特征。结果发现,核心厌恶刺激诱发的P2波幅显著大于道德厌恶和中性刺激;有效线索下核心厌恶刺激的P3波幅与道德厌恶刺激间差异不显著,而无效线索下核心厌恶刺激的P3波幅显著大于道德厌恶。结果表明两类厌恶刺激在不同注意资源水平上存在加工分离效应,支持了厌恶情绪“异质性”的观点。     

MORAL APES, HUMAN UNIQUENESS, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.     

Responsibility Ethics,Shared Understandings,and Moral Communities

Margaret Walker's Moral Understandings offers an “expressive‐collaborative,” culturally situated, practice—based picture of morality, critical of a “theoretical‐juridical” picture in most prefeminist moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick. This essay compares her approach to ethics with that of John Rawls, another exemplar of the “theoretical‐juridical” model, and asks how Walker's approach would apply to several ethical issues, including interaction with (other) animals, social reform and revolution, and basic human rights.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.