Lasting false beliefs and their behavioral consequences

False beliefs and memories can affect people's attitudes, at least in the short term. But can they produce real changes in behavior? This study explored whether falsely suggesting to subjects that they had experienced a food-related event in their childhood would lead to a change in their behavior shortly after the suggestion and up to 4 months later. We falsely suggested to 180 subjects that, as children, they had gotten ill after eating egg salad. Results showed that, after this manipulation, a significant minority of subjects came to believe they had experienced this childhood event even though they had initially denied having experienced it. This newfound autobiographical belief was accompanied by the intent to avoid egg salad, and also by significantly reduced consumption of egg-salad sandwiches, both immediately and 4 months after the false suggestion. The false suggestion of a childhood event can lead to persistent false beliefs that have lasting behavioral consequences.     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

So that's why I don't remember: normalizing forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

Young at heart,old at work? Relations between age, (meta-)stereotypes,self-categorization,and retirement attitudes

The aims of this study were to examine how workers' negative age stereotypes (i.e., denying older workers' ability to develop) and negative meta-stereotypes (i.e., beliefs that the majority of colleagues feel negative about older workers) are related to their attitudes towards retirement (i.e., occupational future time perspective and intention to retire), and whether the strength of these relationships is influenced by workers' self-categorization as an “older” person. Results of a study among Dutch taxi drivers provided mixed support for the hypotheses. Negative meta-stereotypes, but not negative age stereotypes, were associated with fewer perceived opportunities until retirement and, in turn, a stronger intention to retire. Self-categorization moderated the relationships between negative age (meta-)stereotypes and occupational future time perspective. However, contrary to expectations, the relations were stronger among workers with a low self-categorization as an older person in comparison with workers with a high self-categorization in this regard. Overall, results highlight the importance of psychosocial processes in the study of retirement intentions and their antecedents.     

Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy

A broad array of infant studies are reviewed that appear to be consistent with the idea that belief understanding specifically, and mental attribution generally, emerge much earlier than previously acknowledged. We first examine existing false-belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. After surveying theories that both favor and reject early development of theory of mind (TOM), we address two recent bodies of visual fixation research that provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy. The first indicates that infants of 13–15 months are sensitive to others’ false beliefs (and therefore have a representational TOM), the second, that by 12 months or younger infants have two antecedently related psychological understandings: (a) that when agents look they “see” and (b) that seeing plays a presumptive role in producing knowledge. This raises the broader question of whether “mentalism” might be part of core knowledge, which takes us to the earliest manifestation of psychological attribution, the construal of agentive behavior as intentional. Contrary to previous assumptions, recent studies indicate that infants of 3–9 months do not accord intentionality exclusively to humans or to self-propelled objects but rather to any entity that: (1) chooses flexibly among means and ends, (2) responds non-randomly to social overtures, and (3) reacts rationally to changing circumstances (i.e., that is not a mere automaton but is selectively and adaptively responsive to the environment). Other evidence is then examined which suggests that infants begin to construe these and other behaviors in mentalist rather than teleological terms much earlier than expected. Finally, the implications of this empirical record for domain-specific and domain-general theories of TOM are considered.     

Sex is power belief and women’s mental health: The mediating roles of self-objectification and sexual subjectivity

Sex is power belief (SIPB) positively relates to self-objectification. This research aims at expanding this finding. We propose that SIPB involves an instrumental view of one’s own body (i.e., self-objectification) that leads women to experience the negative consequences classically associated with self-objectification. We further suggest that SIPB positively relates to sexual subjectivity—multidimensional sexual self-perceptions and positive sexual experiences—and that such relation counterbalances some of the negative effects of SIPB. We examine the effect of SIPB on women’s negative eating attitudes and sexual satisfaction, and test the mediating roles of self-objectification and sexual subjectivity in three studies (N1 = 121, N2 = 296, N3 = 320). Results supported our predictions that beliefs in one’s sexual power lead both to negative (via self-objectification) and positive (via sexual subjectivity) consequences for women’s mental health. The discussion focuses on the potential consequences of SIPB at both individual and collective levels.     

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

A smart unconscious? Procedural origins of automatic partner attitudes in marriage

The paper examines potential origins of automatic (i.e., unconscious) attitudes toward one’s marital partner. It tests the hypothesis that early experiences in conflict-of-interest situations predict one’s later automatic inclination to approach (or avoid) the partner. A longitudinal study linked daily experiences in conflict-of-interest situations in the initial months of new marriages to automatic evaluations of the partner assessed four years later using the Implicit Associations Test. The results revealed that partners who were initially (1) treated less responsively and (2) evidenced more self-protective and less connectedness-promoting “if-then” contingencies in their thoughts and behavior later evidenced less positive automatic partner attitudes. However, these factors did not predict changes in love, satisfaction, or explicit beliefs about the partner. The findings hint at the existence of a “smart” relationship unconscious that captures behavioral realities conscious reflection can miss.     

听障儿童错误信念理解与谎言理解的关系：情绪理解的调节作用

目的：本研究主要探讨听障儿童自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系,以及情绪理解在其中的调节作用。方法：实验一采用错误信念理解和谎言理解来探讨自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系。实验二增加了情绪理解任务,并探讨情绪理解在错误信念理解和谎言理解之间的背后机制。结果：(1)听障儿童他人错误信念理解、谎言意图理解的正确率显著不如典型发展儿童,且他人错误信念理解越好,越容易进行真假信息辨别和谎言意图理解;(2)典型发展儿童自我/他人错误信念理解越准确,谎言意图理解越好：(3)当听障儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我/他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断具有正向预测作用;(4)典型发展儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我错误信念对真假信息辨别有正向预测作用,他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别有正向预测作用。结论：这些研究结果不仅表明听障儿童他人错误信念理解对谎言理解具有解释作用,而且推动高情绪理解在谎言理解中的促进作用,以及表明高情绪理解对错误信念理解与谎言理解中的调节作用更加显著。     

自闭症儿童非言语错误信念任务的实验研究

心理理论是指对自己和他人心理状态(如需要、信念、意图、动机、感觉等)的认识,并由此对相应行为做出因果性的预测和解释。国内外心理理论研究较多关注一般儿童的心理理论能力,而对自闭症儿童领域的心理理论的研究不够。本研究在原有的错误信念任务的基础上,对任务进行完全“非言语”改进,以意外内容任务为主要测试内容,将智力落后儿童作为对照组纳入到实验当中,进一步探索自闭症儿童心理理论发展情况。研究结果表明：改编后的非言语意外内容任务适用于自闭症和智力落后儿童;包括低言语能力个体在内的所有自闭症儿童的心理理论能力显著低于智力落后儿童;智力落后儿童的心理理论能力与以往研究结果相一致;相对于智力落后儿童,自闭症儿童在物品转移和调换的注意方面存在更大障碍。     

Young children's understanding of belief constraints on intention

One important characteristic of rational action is that our intentions should be consistent with our beliefs. That is, an intention to perform an action should normally be accompanied by a belief that the action will in fact be performed, and be supported by other relevant beliefs. Thus, if the intention is unfulfilled it will have been accompanied by false beliefs. Two studies examined whether 3-year-olds understand these belief constraints on intention. Children were shown films in which actors displayed great surprise and sadness at their failure to bring about the outcomes they intended and expected. They were then questioned about the actors' unfulfilled intentions and false beliefs. In both studies their understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent, and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs. Nevertheless, they also revealed considerable understanding of the beliefs underpinning intentions and, in Study 2, their performance in terms of such beliefs was significantly better than that on standard false-belief tasks. Three-year-olds thus appear to have a threshold understanding of the role of belief in intentional action.     

Objects, events and "to be" verbs in Spanish--an ERP study of the syntax-semantics interface

In Spanish, objects and events at subject position constrain the selection of different forms of the auxiliary verb “to be”: locative predicates about objects require “estar en”, while those relating to events require “ser en”, both translatable as “to be in”. Subjective ratings showed that while the “object + ser + en” is considered as incorrect, the “event + estar + en” combination is also perceived as unacceptable but to a lesser degree. In an ERP study, we evaluated the impact of a purely semantic distinction (object versus events) on the subsequent processing of these auxiliary verbs followed by locatives in Spanish. For the “ser en” predicate, the P600 component was larger when the subject was an object than when it was an event. This P600 effect is consistent with an online repair of the defining predicate when it does not fit with the adequate semantic properties of the subject. On the other hand, for the “estar en” predicate, event subjects when compared to object subjects showed more positive ongoing amplitudes between 280 and 380 ms after the presentation of the “en” preposition, followed by a longer positive wave starting around 400 ms and lasting until 700 ms after the presentation of the following determiner, with central and frontal scalp distributions respectively. Thus, the different subject-predicate combinations, depending on the semantic features of the subjects, triggered syntactic reparatory processes at a structural level. These findings are consistent with an incremental interpretation of sentence meaning based on the interaction between syntactic and semantic information.     

The Development and Initial Validation of the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) emphasizes the relationship a person has with their thoughts and beliefs as potentially more relevant than belief content in predicting the emotional and behavioral consequences of cognition. In ACT, “defusion” interventions aim to “unhook” thoughts from actions and to create psychological distance between a person and their thoughts, beliefs, memories, and self-stories. A number of similar concepts have been described in the psychology literature (e.g., decentering, metacognition, mentalization, and mindfulness) suggesting converging evidence that how we relate to mental events may be of critical importance. While there are some good measures of these related processes, none of them provides an adequate operationalization of cognitive fusion. Despite the centrality of cognitive fusion in the ACT model, there is as yet no agreed-upon measure of cognitive fusion. This paper presents the construction and development of a brief, self-report measure of cognitive fusion: The Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ). The results of a series of studies involving over 1,800 people across diverse samples show good preliminary evidence of the CFQ’s factor structure, reliability, temporal stability, validity, discriminant validity, and sensitivity to treatment effects. The potential uses of the CFQ in research and clinical practice are outlined.     

Identifying Salient Beliefs About Leisure Activities: Frequency of Elicitation Versus Response Latency1

Sets of 16 beliefs about the consequences of each of 6 leisure activities were selected in a pilot study by means of free elicitation. The beliefs varied in salience (salient vs. nonsalient), valence (positive vs. negative), and type (instrumental vs. effective). In the main study, 69 college students expressed their agreements with each belief, evaluated the consequences involved in the beliefs, and rated each leisure activity on 4 evaluative scales as a standard measure of attitude. The latencies of these responses were used to assess accessibilities of beliefs and attitudes in an effort to quantify degree of salience. Accessibility of beliefs was found to increase significantly with frequency of elicitation in the pilot study (salience) and with the judged favorability of the consequences. Salience was further found to be related to degree and extremity of agreement. Accessibility was also found to moderate the correlation between beliefs and attitudes posited in the expectancy-value model of attitude. The correlation between a given belief and the direct attitude measure increased with the belief's accessibility, and the correlation between a measure of attitude based on the set of salient beliefs and the standard attitude measures increased with the accessibility of the attitude. Implications for the identification and measurement of perceived benefits and costs of leisure are discussed.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Naturals and strivers: Preferences and beliefs about sources of achievement

To understand how talent and achievement are perceived, three experiments compared the assessments of “naturals” and “strivers." Professional musicians learned about two pianists, equal in achievement but who varied in the source of achievement: the “natural” with early evidence of high innate ability, versus the “striver” with early evidence of high motivation and perseverance (Experiment 1). Although musicians reported the strong belief that strivers will achieve over naturals, their preferences and beliefs showed the reverse pattern: they judged the natural performer to be more talented, more likely to succeed, and more hirable than the striver. In Experiment 2, this “naturalness bias” was observed again in experts but not in non-experts, and replicated in a between-subjects design in Experiment 3. Together, these experiments show a bias favoring naturals over strivers even when the achievement is equal, and a dissociation between stated beliefs about achievement and actual choices in expert decision-makers.     

Beliefs, attitudes, and intention in the context of abortion

Women's beliefs, attitudes, and intention, defined according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), were studied in relation to procedures for abortion: a commonly used surgical method, vacuum aspiration, and a recent medical alternative. Subjects were 53 women requesting an abortion and 53 nonpregnant women. Effects of having had an abortion prior to the study and of situation were obtained as expected in belief ratings and attitude measures. Choice of the medical alternative was related to having distinctly opposite attitudes to methods. Choice of the surgical treatment related to having slightly negative attitudes to both methods. In the actual situation more positive attitudes had been expected and were obtained. Previous experience of abortion and situation were assumed to be external factors with effects on intention if mediated by the attitudes. A logistic regression model showed a good fit and predicted the intentional choice of treatment from attitude scores.     

Beyond attitudinal ambivalence: effects of belief homogeneity on attitude‐intention‐behaviour relations

Attitudinal ambivalence extends the traditional unidimensional conceptualization of attitude by acknowledging that people can simultaneously evaluate attitude objects as positive and negative. The present paper argues that this bidimensional view of attitudes may be extended further to take account of multidimensional influences on attitudes using measures of belief homogeneity. Study 1 (n = 155) showed that attitudes based on homogeneous belief‐sets were significantly more predictive of subsequent behaviour (β = 0.47, p<0.01) than were attitudes based on heterogeneous belief‐sets (β = 0.08, ns). Study 2 (n = 136) manipulated belief homogeneity and found that when beliefs were made heterogeneous, attitudes based on heterogeneous belief‐sets were significantly less predictive of behavioural intentions (β = 0.46, p < 0.01) than attitudes based on homogeneous belief‐sets (β = 0.84, p < 0.01). Implications for research on attitudinal ambivalence and attribute importance are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.