On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments

We develop conceptions of arguments and of argument types that will, by serving as the basis for developing a natural classification of arguments, benefit work in artificial intelligence. Focusing only on arguments construed as the semantic entities that are the outcome of processes of reasoning, we outline and clarify our view that an argument is a proposition that represents a fact as both conveying some other fact and as doing so wholly. Further, we outline our view that, with respect to arguments that are propositions, (roughly) two arguments are of the same type if and only if they represent the same relation of conveyance and do so in the same way. We then argue for our conceptions of arguments and argument types, and compare them to alternative positions. We also illustrate the need for, and some of the strengths of, our approach to classifying arguments through an examination of aspects of two prominent and recent attempts to classify arguments using argumentation schemes, namely those of M. Kienpointner and D. Walton. Finally, we clarify how our conception of arguments and of argument types can assist in developing an exhaustive classification of arguments.     

AI &; Law,Logic and Argument Schemes

This paper reviews the history of AI & Law research from the perspective of argument schemes. It starts with the observation that logic, although very well applicable to legal reasoning when there is uncertainty, vagueness and disagreement, is too abstract to give a fully satisfactory classification of legal argument types. It therefore needs to be supplemented with an argument-scheme approach, which classifies arguments not according to their logical form but according to their content, in particular, according to the roles that the various elements of an argument can play. This approach is then applied to legal reasoning, to identify some of the main legal argument schemes. It is also argued that much AI & Law research in fact employs the argument-scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. Finally, it is argued that the argument-scheme approach and the way it has been employed in AI & Law respects some of the main lessons to be learnt from Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument.     

Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

Many public information documents attempt to persuade the recipients that they should engage in or refrain from specific behaviour. This is based on the assumption that the recipient will decide about his or her behaviour on the basis of the information given and a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. An analysis of 20 public information brochures shows that the argumentation in persuasive brochures is often not marked as such. Argumentation is presented as factual information, and in many instances the task of making argumentational links and drawing conclusions is left to the reader. However, since the information offered does follow familiar argumentational schemes, readers can, in principle, reconstruct the argument. All the brochures make use of pragmatic argumentation (argumentation from consequences),i. e.,they formulate at least certain benefits of the desirable behaviour or disadvantages of the undesirable behaviour. In addition, they make regular use of argumentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example. Argumentation from rules and argumentation from authority are less frequently used. This empirical analysis of the use of argumentation schemes is a solid base for interesting and rich hypotheses about the cognitive processing of persuasive brochures. Central processing requires the reader to be able to reconstruct argumentation from informational texts and to identify and evaluate various types of argumentation.     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

Balancing Critique and Commitment: A Synthetic Approach to Teaching Religion and the Environment

Courses about religion and the environment should work toward a synthesis of critical thinking – teaching students to examine and question the interplay of environmental degradation, religious traditions, and new religious movements – and advocacy – helping students to embrace, articulate, and refine their own environmentalist commitments, in religious terms when appropriate. To meet these goals, teachers of religion and the environment can learn from literature on balancing faith and critical analysis in other religion courses. This literature will help us to clarify the goals of our courses, critically examine the environmental movement with our students, and remain trustworthy to those who do not share environmentalist commitments. See a companion essay in this issue of the journal (Jennifer R. Ayres, “Learning on the Ground”) and a response to both of these essays (Forrest Clingerman, “Pedagogy as a Field Guide to the Ecology of the Classroom”) also published in this issue of the journal.     

Reasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like‐minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.     

A Sound and Complete Tableau Calculus for Reasoning about only Knowing and Knowing at Most

We define a tableau calculus for the logic of only knowing and knowing at most ON, which is an extension of Levesque's logic of only knowing O. The method is based on the possible-world semantics of the logic ON, and can be considered as an extension of known tableau calculi for modal logic K45. From the technical viewpoint, the main features of such an extension are the explicit representation of "unreachable" worlds in the tableau, and an additional branch closure condition implementing the property that each world must be either reachable or unreachable. The calculus allows for establishing the computational complexity of reasoning about only knowing and knowing at most. Moreover, we prove that the method matches the worst-case complexity lower bound of the satisfiability problem for both ON and O. With respect to [22], in which the tableau calculus was originally presented, in this paper we both provide a formal proof of soundness and completeness of the calculus, and prove the complexity results for the logic ON.     

The Rational Reconstruction of Argumentation Referring to Consequences and Purposes in the Application of Legal Rules: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective

In this paper, the author develops an instrument for the rational reconstruction of argumentation in which a judicial decision is justified by referring to the consequences in relation to the purpose of the rule. The instrument is developed by integrating insights from legal theory and legal philosophy about the function and use of arguments from consequences in relation to the purpose of a rule into a pragma-dialectical framework. Then, by applying the instrument to the analysis of examples from legal practice, it is demonstrated that the instrument can offer a heuristic and critical tool for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation that can ‘bridge’ the gap between more abstract discussions of forms of legal argumentation on the one hand, and legal arguments as they occur in actual legal practice on the other hand.     

If and Then: A Critique of Speculative NanoEthics

Most known technology serves to ingeniously adapt the world to the physical and mental limitations of human beings. Humankind has acquired awesome power with its rather limited means. Nanotechnological capabilities further this power. On some accounts, however, nanotechnological research will contribute to a rather different kind of technological development, namely one that changes human beings so as to remove or reduce their physical and mental limitations. The prospect of this technological development has inspired a fair amount of ethical debate. Here, proponents and opponents of such visions of human enhancement are criticized alike for engaging in speculative ethics. This critique exposes a general pattern that extends to other nano-, bio-, or neuroethical debates. While it does not apply to all discussions of “enhancement technologies” it does apply to all ethical discourse that constructs and validates an incredible future which it only then proceeds to endorse or critique. This discourse violates conditions of intelligibility, squanders the scarce and valuable resource of ethical concern, and misleads by casting remote possibilities or philosophical thought-experiments as foresight about likely technical developments. In effect, it deflects consideration from the transformative technologies of the present.

Cogex: A semantically and contextually enriched logic prover for question answering

This paper presents the architecture and functionality of a logic prover designed for question answering. The approach transforms questions and answer passages into logic representations based on syntactic, semantic and contextual information. World knowledge supplements the linguistic, ontological, and temporal axioms supplied to the prover which renders a deep understanding of the relationship between the question and answer text. The trace of the proofs provides a basis for generating human comprehensible answer justifications. The results show that the prover boosts the performance of the Question Answering system on TREC 2004 questions by 12%.     

Critical Consciousness: An Alternative Pathway for Positive Personal and Social Development

This paper presents a conceptual model of the integrative psychological construct of critical consciousness (CC), defined as a moral awareness which propels individuals to disembed from their cultural, social, and political environment, and engage in a responsible critical moral dialogue with it, making active efforts to construct their own place in social reality and to develop internal consistency in their ways of being. The ontogeny of CC is analyzed in terms of the synergistic interaction between its two main components, structural developmental and moral motivation. The paper describes the cross-cultural interview research which allowed the elaboration of the CC developmental pathway. It posits the dimension of moral motivation as distinguishing the CC pathway, and illustrates the continuum between predominantly moral and expediency motivation through brief case vignettes. The paper differentiates three developmental macrolevels of CC, and illustrates through case vignettes two alternatives of social consciousness at the level of conventional morality—CC and non-CC. Some possible sources of moral motivation in personal history and biography are discussed.     

Envy,Facts and Justice: A Critique of the Treatment of Envy in Justice as Fairness

A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed.

Understanding linear and exponential growth: Searching for the roots in 6- to 9-year-olds

Previous studies have suggested that children as young as 9 years old have developed an understanding of non-linear growth processes prior to formal education. The present experiment aimed at investigating this competency in even younger samples (i.e., in kindergartners, first, and third graders, ages 6, 7 and 9, respectively). Children (N = 90) solved non-verbal inductive reasoning tasks by forecasting linear and exponential growth. While children of all ages forecasted linear growth adequately, exponential growth was also estimated remarkably well. Surprisingly, kindergartners and third graders showed similar high achievement concerning the magnitude and curve shape of forecasts, whereas first graders performed significantly worse. We concluded that primary knowledge of both linearity and non-linearity exists even in kindergartners. However, children's understanding is quite fragile, as their performance was strongly affected by task sequence: Children underestimated exponential growth when the previous task required a forecast of linear growth, and overestimated linear growth when the previous task required forecasting of exponential growth.     

Reconceptualizing the Transitive Inference Ability: A Framework for Existing and Future Research

It has often been claimed that to demonstrate transitive inference is to demonstrate a logical ability, and by implication that transitivity as a property is generally a logical entity. Both claims are considered using a theoretically driven analysis together with consideration of relevant existing experimental research and some newly reported findings. This approach suggests an account of transitivity and transitive inferential reasoning that differs not only from the classic Piagetian account, but also from the information processing account so dominant today. We begin by considering one important issue, that the “logical” definitional criterion can only be approached if individuals are required to demonstrate a capacity for transitive inference that is discriminative in nature. This, together with interpretation of findings from existing transitive tasks, leads to the postulate of a three-component psychological system, with the components relying on perceptual, linguistic, and conceptual subprocesses and sensitivity to simple cues. The framework is testable and accommodates important aspects of classic and modern accounts of “transitive development” that until now have been taken to be mutually exclusive. It also readily accommodates both human and nonhuman research, yet neither a formal logical structure nor memory in any general sense need be assigned the primary role.     

Psychology and the End of History: A Critique and a Proposal for the Psychology of Social Categorization

This paper suggests that self-categories provide the basis for political action, that those who wish to organize political activity do so through the ways in which they construct self-categories, and that political domination may be achieved through reifying social categories and therefore denying alternative ways of social being. Hence, the way in which social psychology approaches the matter of self-categorization provides a touchstone for its politics. To the extent that we too take categories for granted, we are in danger of supporting conservative and undemocratic politics. The only way to eschew tendencies toward reification within social psychology is to add a historical dimension to our own analysis of self-categorical processes.     

A method for combining occurrence and nonoccurrence interobserver agreement scores

Various statistics have been proposed as standard methods for calculating and reporting interobserver agreement scores. The advantages and disadvantages of each have been discussed in this journal recently but without resolution. A formula is presented that combines separate measures of occurrence and nonoccurrence percentages of agreement, with weight assigned to each measure, varying according to the observed rate of behavior. This formula, which is a modification of a formula proposed by Clement (1976), appears to reduce distortions due to "chance" agreement encountered with very high or low observed rates of behavior while maintaining the mathematical and conceptual simplicity of the conventional method for calculating occurrence and nonoccurrence agreement.     

A brighter side to memory illusions: false memories prime children's and adults' insight-based problem solving

Can false memories have a positive consequence on human cognition? In two experiments, we investigated whether false memories could prime insight problem-solving tasks. Children and adults were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. In Experiment 1, the results showed that regardless of age, when the critical lure was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming. In Experiment 2, without an intervening recall test, children and adults still exhibited higher solution rates and faster solution times to CRAT problems that were primed than to those that were not primed. This latter result shows that priming occurred as a result of false memory generation at encoding and not at retrieval during the recall test. Together, these findings demonstrate that when false memories are generated at encoding, they can prime solutions to insight-based problems in both children and adults.     

Family Development and the Martial Arts: A Phenomenological Study

This article outlines the results of a grounded-theory, phenomenological study about the impact of the martial arts on the process of family development. Thirty-two couples and families with at least four months of martial arts study experience were interviewed to identify data and data themes about how the martial arts enhanced family development. Themes identified were self-defense, self-confidence, physical vitality, concentration, respect, friendship, moral development, spirit, training for life, grades, respect for life, and the importance of the martial arts instructor.