Simone Weil’s Passion Mysticism: The Paradox of Chronic Pain and the Transformation of the Cross

Simone Weil’s theology is deeply connected to her experiences with chronic pain. Pain is paradoxical in that it is an essentially private phenomenon yet it simultaneously demands to be shared with another. Weil’s life and thought exemplify both aspects of this paradox, demonstrating how her pain alienated her from her own body and from others, and how her thought found full expression as she attempted to share experiences with pain. Weil’s experience of pain was transformed in her passion mysticism, the deep connection she felt with the crucified Christ. In this connection, the most unbearable aspect of her pain, the threat, which it presented to her very self through annihilation, was absorbed into the cross and transformed by God’s love. While this did not necessarily diminish Weil’s pain, the meaning it had for her as a person was transformed through an encounter with Christ crucified, in which she experienced God’s suffering along with her.     

Knowing One’s Own Self: An Analysis of Vivekananda’s Approach to One’s Identity

A successful declaration of one’s identity in saying “ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” is a result of knowing one’s own self as indistinguishable from Brahman. The non-difference between oneself and the Brahman is one’s true identity, and it goes without saying, knowledge of one’s true identity constitutes the correct knowing of one’s own self. That the said non-difference is upheld by vedānta, and we need to put this ideal non-difference into practice is the crux of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta. Vivekananda gives certain reasons for the practicability of vedānta. This paper’s part I is an exposition of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta, focussing on those reasons for practical vedānta and orienting each towards an analytical understanding. In part II, a linguistic analysis of Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity has been carried out after introducing J. Hintikka’s interpretation of Descartes’ “I think, therefore, I am” and G. Misra’s interpretation of sat (existence, reality or being) cit (consciousness, knowledge or cognition) ānanda (bliss, intense happiness or felicity). The latter’s interpretation displays a positivist’s linguistic analysis of vedānta, whereas the former’s does a speech act theorist’s analysis of Descartes’ cogito principle. The present analysis indicates that practical vedānta can be read in the light of analytic philosophy and Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity can be understood in terms of speech acts.

     

Anorexia Nervosa and the Analyst’s Paternal Function: Response to Schoen,Zerbe, and Boulware

To expand upon the commentaries by Schoen, Zerbe, and Boulware (this issue), I clarify my thinking about the entropic body as a defensive structure. I then introduce my own theorizing about the relationship between agency and anorexia nervosa. In agreement with Schoen that these patients relegate their agency to the somatic realm, I highlight the aggressivity of that agency. Amplifying Zerbe’s recognition of the patient’s “father hunger,” I point out the importance of the paternal presence in helping these patients to modulate their aggression and, in the process, develop their agency.     

Fishing: Finding One’s Way to the Unconscious

By imagining ourselves to be fishing in the deep waters of the unconscious, we consider here many questions about the meeting of the personal ego and the powerful unknown energies that lie below—questions ranging from “Why should we even want to connect with such forces?” to “What’s the best way of doing it?” There are many more questions to ask, such as how does the unconscious express itself and when should we avoid a direct meeting with it and why?

As individuals and as cultures, we have long histories with the unconscious, sometimes welcoming it, sometimes trying to wall it off, sometimes being overwhelmed by it. In this article the author emphasizes the necessity of becoming aware of the unconscious, knowing it as something that is always active in us, recognizing that it is not under our control, and realizing that it is not of our own making.     

Peirce on Education: Pragmatism and Peirce’s Definition of the Purpose of a University

Drawing on Peirce’s later as well as his early formulation of pragmatism, I show in this article how Peirce’s definition of the purpose of a university can be reformulated in terms of his semiotic pragmatism. The abstract educational principles appealed to in the definition may thus be rephrased in terms of our pre-spesialized capacities for learning and communication.     

Psychological Trauma,Christ’s Passion,and the African American Faith Tradition

This article argues that Christ’s passion/crucifixion functioned within the African American psyche as a religious narrative and symbol that uniquely addressed the severe trauma they underwent during the Middle Passage and slavery by enabling them to experience the presence of God in the depths of extreme suffering. Christ’s passion/crucifixion mirrored their experience of racial oppression and, thereby, provided a critique of the system and actors that perpetuated it. The Spiritual “Were You There?” is interpreted in this light. This correspondence between the African American’s historical experience and the narrative symbol of Christ’s passion/crucifixion helps explain their conversion to Christianity.     

Kant’s Better Man and the Confucian Junzi

This essay attempts to compare Kant’s better man and the Confucian junzi in the Zhongyong, and argues that Kant’s idea of the better man, which expresses human self-improvement in ultimate freedom, is in fact a conception very similar to that of the Confucian junzi, which denotes an ideal human being in cheng. Kant attributes the lack of emphasis on self-improvement in Western culture to the Christian conception of grace, and demonstrates the possibility of self-improvement on the ground of ultimate freedom. We may call this treatment “the Confucian solution” in Kant’s thought. My intention is to explicate the conceptual commonality between the better man and the junzi and demonstrate the Confucian element in Kant’s religious thought.     

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

In Defense of Walter Benjamin’s Constellational Curriculum: A Response to the Critics

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

John Calvin on the Lord’s Supper: Food,Rest, and Healing for Shivering Souls

This article explores how the Lord’s Supper may contribute to the healing of traumatized persons. Drawing on the 1541 French edition of John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion and on contemporary literature on trauma, I suggest that individuals who have experienced traumatic events may find in the Lord’s Supper a trustworthy and nourishing relational home, a therapeutic space for truth-telling, and a life-sustaining absolutism.     

Transcendence and Feminism: Response to Anderson’s “Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God”

An argument that Pamela Sue Anderson’s critique of Irigaray commits her to a version of the Ideal Observer Theory, a theory Anderson rejects. This paper was delivered in the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Causal and Constitutive Relations, and the Squaring of Coleman’s Diagram: Reply to Vromen

We respond to Jack Vromen’s (this issue) critique of our discussion of the missing micro-foundations of work on routines and capabilities in economics and management research. Contrary to Vromen, we argue that (1) inter-level relations can be causal, and that inter-level causal relations may also obtain between routines and actions and interactions; (2) there are no macro-level causal mechanisms; and (3) on certain readings of the notion of routines and capabilities, these may be macro causes.     

Response to MacIntosh’s Review and Discussion of the Psychoanalytic Couple Therapy Journal Literature: A Self Psychological,Intersubjective Perspective

ABSTRACT

After expressing my appreciation to Heather MacIntosh and highlighting her article’s significant contributions to the field, I comment briefly on some of the implications of her methodology and findings. I then elaborate on her summary of the history of the application of self psychology (Kohut, 1971) and intersubjective systems theory (Stolorow, Brandshaft, and Atwood, 1987) to couple therapy, highlighting the key contributions of both theories and describing the current state of the field.