从道德本位到权利本位的转换——梁启超《新民说》审视

梁启超《新民说》是对以《大学》为代表的中国传统“新民”思想的改造和发展。他以民权、独立、自由的资产阶级“公德”代替以伦理道德为核心的封建主义的“私德” ,用中西文化中的优秀道德传统构建新国民 ,实现了从以伦理道德为本位的旧道德向以权利为本位的新道德的转换 ,“旧国民”向“新国民”的转换。     

Sin and bioethics: why a liturgical anthropology is foundational.

The project of articulating a coherent, canonical, content-full, secular morality-cum-bioethics fails, because it does not acknowledge sin, which is to say, it does not acknowledge the centrality of holiness, which is essential to a non-distorted understanding of human existence and of morality. Secular morality cannot establish a particular moral content, the harmony of the good and the right, or the necessary precedence of morality over prudence, because such is possible only in terms of an ultimate point of reference: God. The necessity of a rightly ordered appreciation of God places centrally the focus on holiness and the avoidance of sin. Because the cardinal relationship of creatures to their Creator is worship, and because the cardinal corporate act of human worship is the Liturgy, morality in general and bioethics in particular can be understood in terms of the conditions necessary, so as worthily to enter into Eucharistic liturgical participation. Morality can be summed up in terms of the requirements of ritual purity. A liturgical anthropology is foundational to an account of the content-full morality and bioethics that should bind humans, since humans are first and foremost creatures obliged to join in rightly ordered worship of their Creator. When humans worship correctly, when they avoid sin and pursue holiness, they participate in restoring created reality.     

The Evolutionary Roots of Morality in Theological Perspective

Theological ethics can interpret the relation between evolution and morality in at least three ways. The reductionist approach holds that morality emerges because it is adaptive. The independent approach maintains that morality develops without registering the influence of evolution. Finally, the interdependence position holds that morality reflects the influence of evolution to the extent that the latter shapes human emotional capacities and predispositions, for example, those regarding reciprocity and kin preference. The third approach is more suitable for theological ethics, which attends to ways in which natural desires can be ordered to serve morality, for example, to be habituated to virtue, and to ways in which we must strive to curb or minimize their disruptive effects on human communities.     

类同一性:道德产生的主体基础

人最早的存在形态是类存在形态,人的类同一性是道德产生的主体基础,类自然同一性是道德产生的主体自然基础,类社会同一性是道德产生的主体社会基础。     

论世俗道德的特点及其困境

世俗道德的产生是社会生活世俗化的必然结果,是经济发展的内在逻辑.它具有现实性、人本性和平凡性等特征.世俗道德不可避免地陷入利益主义、享乐主义和庸俗化等困境.只有"回到人本身",才能走出困境.     

伦理道德的管理功能分析

伦理道德是协调和处理人与自身、人与人之间关系的行为规范,而管理实质上也是协调和处理关系的活动。协调人际关系,以形成良好的社会秩序,是伦理道德和管理共同的价值指向。在协调这一点上,伦理与管理得以同构。这决定了伦理道德是人类的一种特殊的管理活动或方式。就社会管理而言。伦理道德可以弥补规章制度之不足并克服其局限性,提高组织的有效性,通过降低管理成本、创造合作效益、克服“外部性”等来提高管理效率,作为一种精神动力推动管理实践和理论的发展;就个体管理而言,伦理道德可以促进个体认识和把握社会,协调人际关系,理性地控制自身,促进自身成长,从而实现个人的全面而自由的发展。     

Embodied and Embedded Morality: Divinity, Identity, and Disgust

Our understanding of human morality would benefit from an integrated interdisciplinary approach, built on the assumption that human beings are multidimensional unities with real, irreducible, and mutually interdependent spiritual, relational, emotional, rational, and physiological aspects. We could integrate relevant information from neurobiological, psychosocial, and theological perspectives, avoiding unnecessary reductionism and naturalism. This approach is modeled by addressing the particular limited role of disgust in morality. Psychosocial research reveals disgust as a universal emotion that enables evaluation and regulation of certain moral behaviors and is involved in cultural identity. Theologically, many religious traditions, including the Judeo‐Christian, use disgust in conjunction with moral codes designed to preserve purity and communal identity as the people of God. The concept of natural moral law suggests that morality is embodied in human nature. Neurobiology is beginning to trace the neural circuitry involved in disgust and in moral evaluation, suggesting that emotions are a necessary basis for moral judgment and revealing intriguing relationships between disgust, morality, and other aspects of the psyche. Several problems that arise within these disciplines and at their intersections are identified. Extension of the model to other aspects of human morality would further illuminate our understanding of morality without sacrificing its complexity and richness.     

The nature and grounds of Xunzi's disagreement with Mencius

This, paper argues that the debate between Mencius and Xunzi, as to whether human nature is intrinsically good or evil, represents not so much a disagreement as to the empirical facts of human nature as a disagreement over the nature of morality. Specifically, it argues that Mencius holds a virtue‐theoretic conception of morality while Xunzi subscribes to a rule‐based conception of morality. These differences in their conceptions of morality lead the two philosophers to radically different evaluations of human nature although they are in substantial agreement as to the empirical facts of human nature.     

东西方文化的人性观差异及其对道德认知的影响

人性观,即认为人性究竟是本善的还是本恶的,不仅是哲学思辨的焦点,也是日常生活中形成的一种常人理论(lay theory)。对于东西方文化传统的检视表明,西方文化占主导地位的是性恶论人性观,东方文化占主导地位的则是性善论人性观。研究通过实证数据支持了这一结论,发现中国被试相对于美国被试,对于人性的主观评定更倾向于性善的一端(研究1)。这种人性观差异导致中国被试在道德方面,尤其是规范性道德(行善)方面,对人提出了更高的要求(研究1),并且这种因果关系得到了启动实验的支持(研究2)。这些研究结果有助于人们更好地理解文化如何塑造了人们对于人性和道德的看法。     

Organic Virtue: Reading Mencius with Rousseau

Both Rousseau and Mencius espouse a process-oriented morality that is attuned to nature. Rousseau maintains that human beings exit the realm of nature as soon as the process of civilization begins, necessitating the need for morality. Because he views the ‘natural’ human being as the pre-social and independent protohuman, the attempt to recapture the lost harmony of the state of nature will always fall short and the process of becoming moral is an endless task. Mencius, however, views nature as a dynamic process suggesting that morality demands a conscious participation in and extension of nature's rhythms. Artifice and nature are not as sharply demarcated as in the thought of Rousseau because morality is the particularly human way of integrating into the cosmos, by extending and channelling the flow of qi.     

论道德的本真形态与派生形态

道德的本真形态是“天理”和“良心”,即普遍的、至高无上的实践法则及其在人心中的体现。道德要通过人的理论和实践体现出来,就需要实现道德的学理化和规范化,从而形成道德理论与社会规范两种道德的派生形态。     

Common morality as an alternative to principlism.

Unlike the principles of Kant, Mill, and Rawls, those of principlism are not action guides that stem from an underlying, integrated moral theory. Hence problems arise in reconciling the principles with each other and, indeed, in interpreting them as action guides at all, since they have no content in and of themselves. Another approach to "theory and method in bioethics" is presented as an alternative to principlism, though actually the "alternative" predates principlism by about 10 years. The alternative's account of morality stays close to ordinary, common morality with its rules and ideals, which in turn are grounded in aspects of human nature. As such, morality must be understood to be a rational, impartial, and public system that is incumbent on everyone. Morality is a unified and integrated system. The moral rules and ideals are also "culture-" and "profession-sensitive" in that they are interpreted more specifically within these various contexts.     

肝移植的伦理学问题

肝脏移植和其它器官移植一起实现了人类长期以来渴望生命再生的梦想,并成为终末期肝病的有效治疗方法。器官移植也面对许多伦理道德方面的难题。供体,特别是活体器官的摘取,受体的选择等,都受到社会道德观的制约。从伦理道德角度来分析如何制定相关的法律法规,成为当前社会关注的热点。从受体的利益、人体科研的道德规范以及相关制度的伦理学要求等方面,较为详细的阐述肝移植伦理学的基本原则。     

In search of an everyday morality: the development of a measure

Current interest in moral theorizing has been dominated by Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view. Haan (1982) has challenged psychology's reliance on this rationalistic focus and has argued for a rethinking of morality's meaning in accord with everyday human experience. In light of this challenge, the present study gives both theoretical and empirical support to the advancement of a morality for everyday life. Specifically, a new measure called the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS) is reported. The VMS is sensitive to three dimensions which are necessary for an everyday morality: (1) a human constitutive component which is universally experienced by all human beings (empathy); (2) the inclusion of a behavioral component which reflects actual behavior (pro-social inclinations); and (3) a view of morality that is multilevel (private, interpersonal, and social). A brief sketch of the VMS is provided. Results are presented from a study of 181 high school students which relate the VMS to empathy and political orientation. Highly significant relationships were found among morality, political orientation, and empathy. In addition, results revealed numerous sex differences. Finally, the implications of an everyday morality are discussed.     

医德形成:外在强制与内在自觉

作为一种职业道德，医德的形成需要有一个过程。首先要以普通人或一般人的本质特性，即人是一个自由的有意识的存在者为前提条件。根据现代人的道德状况，将医德的形成分为两种路径，即医德形成的一般途径：靠制度约束的外在强制；医德形成的根本途径：对医生美德的内在自觉。     

HUMAN PHENOTYPIC MORALITY AND THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR KNOWING GOOD

Co‐creating knowledge takes a new approach to human phenotypic morality as a biologically based, human lineage specific (HLS) trait. Authors from very different backgrounds (anthropology and biology, on the one hand, and astronomy, philosophy, and theology, on the other) first review research on the nature and origins of morality using the social brain network, and studies of individuals who cannot “know good” or think morally because of brain dysfunction. They find these models helpful but insufficient, and turn to paleoanthropology, cognitive science, and neuroscience to understand human moral capacity and its origins long ago, in the genus Homo. An unusual narrative capturing “morality in action” takes the reader back 900,000 years, and then the authors analyze the essential features of moral thinking and behavior as expressed by early and later species on our lineage. In what has primarily been the province of philosophers to date, the authors’ morality model is presented for further scientific testing.     

Free Will, Art and Morality

The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject.     

试析德国纳粹人体实验的道德逻辑

德国纳粹人体实验与德国现代伦理思想中的超人道德和种族主义思想密切相关。超人道德是纳粹人体实验的“意志-伦理”基础,种族主义则是纳粹人体实验的“科学—伦理”依据。     

Bioethics critically reconsidered: Living after foundations

Given intractable moral pluralism, what ought one to make of the bioethics that arose in the early 1970s, grounded as it was in the false assumption that there is a common secular morality that secular bioethics ought to apply? It is as if bioethics developed without recognition of the crisis at the heart of secular morality itself. Secular moral rationality cannot of itself provide the foundations to identify a particular morality and its bioethics as canonical. One is not just confronted with intractable moral and bioethical pluralism, but with the absence of a secular ground that can show why one should act morally rather than self-interestedly. The result is not merely the deflation of much of traditional Western morality to life-style and death-style choices, but the threat of deflating to political slogans the now-dominant secular morality, including its affirmation of human autonomy, equality, social justice, and human dignity. All of this invites one critically to reconsider the meaning and force of secular bioethics.     

Agency,human nature and character in Kantian theory

Conclusion In order for the duty of friendship to be practically possible, and for gratitude and beneficence to be unencumbered virtues, Kant need not have held that human beings are basically good. He need only have understood that they are social beings, with desires for both independence and connection, autonomy and affiliation, and purposes that are not always merely their own. I have argued that because he did not, his moral theory is flawed in three important respects.In Kant's theory, morality is only possible because humans are rational, and necessary because (absent morality) they are self-interested individuals, egoistically motivated, distrustful and isolated. When this view is applied to particular questions of friendship and the virtues, it becomes a distorting medium. It is my contention that a more adequate theory of character would result from the application of Kantian moral principles to a sounder, more social conception of human nature.In conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I am not arguing that human beings are basically good, only that they are essentially social. In his political writings Kant has emphasized the social dimension of reason itself, and I believe he would agree with Thomas Nagel's recent claim about human nature and morality: To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which is precarious in any case.

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