Reply to Panel Questions

This commentary on papers by Neil Altman and Rachel Peltz argues that while the type of political culture in which one lives has a significant impact on the practice of psychoanalysis, no direct line can be drawn from psychoanalytic theory to any particular political persuasion. It is one thing to argue that psychoanalytic insights offer a way of thinking about political relations; it is quite another to suggest that they can be used to promote or justify a political agenda. While Altman and Peltz theorize about the negative impact of manic defense in contemporary culture, this commentary suggests that there are natural fluctuations in one's ability to respect inner reality and a degree of manic defense employed in everyday life that is quite normal. We all use reality to gain reassurance against death inside. But, when we are “distracted from distraction by distraction” (Eliot, 1971, p. 120) external objects are prematurely deadened so that the needed reassurance through external reality becomes increasingly elusive. Challenging some of Altman and Peltz's political assumptions, the commentary suggests that if psychoanalysis is to contribute to the political realm, it must do so on the basis of how it differs from other approaches to understanding what it means to be a human being.     

Reply to Panel Follow-up Questions

This paper discusses the impulse to psychic and political splitting with its consequent political demonization of the other when emotional helplessness and fear cannot be metabolized. I argue that it is through an acceptance of our feelings of helplessness that we are in a position to experience the subjectivity of the other and to begin the process of political discourse.     

Reply to Panel Follow-up Questions

When both therapist and client share a traumatic event, there are multiple levels of vulnerability to traumatization for the therapist. Our personal vulnerability is not only a backdrop for our clinical work but also an acknowledged fact in many therapeutic relationships, a situation that changes the frame of the work. In addition to clinical challenges, shared trauma increases a therapist's vulnerability to vicarious traumatization; VT is defined as the negative transformation of the therapist's inner experience as a result of his or her empathic engagement with and responsibility for a traumatized client. Emphasizing the importance of awareness, self-care, meaning, and community, the article summarizes important steps to anticipate, address, and transform the therapist's experience of vicarious traumatization.     

What Differentiates Declarative and Procedural Memories: Reply to Cohen,Poldrack, and Eichenbaum (1997)

Cohen, Poldrack, and Eichenbaum (1997; hereafter CPE) offer an account of the nature of individual items in memory and how they relate to one another. They argue that there are two separate memory systems, procedural and declarative (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Cohen & Squire, 1980). These systems differ in their neuroanatomic substrates, in their operating characteristics, and in the nature of the representations they use. CPE argue that representations in the declarative memory system are compositional, meaning that declarative representations may be composed of other declarative representations. Declarative memories are also flexible, meaning they can be accessed in contexts that differ from those in which they were encoded. Procedural memories, on the other hand, are neither compositional nor flexible. I will argue that there is not sufficient reason to argue that procedural and declarative memories have these distinct characteristics. Both procedural and declarative memories are arguably compositional, and both can appear flexible or inflexible, depending on testing conditions.     

Decision criteria do not shift: Reply to Treisman

Recently, we argued that the detection criterion representation of decision-making biases, embedded within the theory of signal detection, is empirically testable and has, in fact, been falsified by empirical results from visual discrimination experiments. Treisman (2002) attempts to show that there is an alternative interpretation of our results that could explain them without dropping the detection criterion construct. In lieu of attempting to fit the data with a model, however, he gives two kinds of theoretical examples, both involving manipulations of the spacing of criteria on a decision axis. The first example correctly predicts that the bias estimate we developed will be zero but does so by assuming zero spacing between some criteria (some rating responses are never used). We did not observe zero spacing between any criteria and did not perform any analyses on responses that never occurred. Moreover, this example does not explain why the upper-bound bias estimates that we obtained by combining results from two criteria placements were also trivially small. His second example predicts that the bias should have been detectable with sufficiently large sample sizes. In our experiments, the sample sizes were, in fact, quite large, large enough for the results to be consistent in 18 different experimental conditions. Finally, all of Treisman’s criteria placement examples also fail to explain the pronounced effects of base rates on the shapes of the rating ROC curves, and his suggestion that there are problems of logical interpretation with our proposed distribution model ignores the predictions of large classes of alternatives to detection theory, including the dynamic models of perception.     

Hemisphericsymmetries in the identification of band-pass filtered letters Reply to Christman et al. (1997)

Christman, Kitterle, and Niebauer (1997) have examined the hypothesis that the two cerebral hemispheres are specialized for processing different ranges of spatial frequency. Their two experiments partially replicated an experiment of Peterzell, Harvey, and Hardyck (1989), who used Sergent's (1982) letter identification paradigm with spatial-frequency band-pass filtered letters as stimuli. We acknowledge the unusual strengths of Christman et al.'s experiments, but argue that the results support the original conclusion of Peterzell et al.: The results are not attributable to hemispheric asymmetries in spatial frequency processing.     

Reply to Furedy (1991)

Furedy (1991) suggests that Goddard's (1991) US-US associative theory of habituation cites supporting studies that may not involve emotionally arousing stimuli or may not be associative in nature. The difficulty in characterizing a stimulus as emotionally arousing and the issues involved in what constitutes a US-US association are discussed. It is hoped that the Goddard-Furedy interchange might stimulate further empirical research on this issue and some constructive suggestions are offered.     

Explanation versus accommodation: Reply to Bowers (2010)

Bowers (2010) presented a critique of the account of masked priming presented by Norris and Kinoshita (2008) based on the Bayesian Reader model of visual word recognition (Norris, 2006). In this reply, we point out that: (1) Bowers' criticisms are based on his misunderstanding of both the Bayesian or ideal-observer approach, and the theoretical claims made in Norris and Kinoshita, and (2) Bowers' alternative account of the key data presented in Norris and Kinoshita relies on a series of ad hoc assumptions that are combined in different proportions to postdict any pattern of data.     

Facing up to the issues: Reply to Hellige (1983)

In a recent article in this journal, Hellige (Brain and Cognition, 2, 199-203, 1983) presented a critique of the chimeric-face technique that was used by us to validate a hand preference questionnaire. Data were presented by Hellige to show that the left visual field (LVF) bias that occurs on this task is due primarily to differences in detail in the features of the two faces and not because of right hemisphere dominance for face perception. In our rebuttal, we acknowledge that the two faces are not mirror-image duplicates of each other, but contend that this fact does not explain why differences between left-handers and right-handers have been observed on this task. Further data on the role of handedness as well as other variables impacting on this task are presented. A possible explanation is also offered for the rather small extent of LVF bias that Hellige obtained when he used corrected (i.e., true mirror-image) versions of Jaynes' chimeric faces.     

Some Questions About Divergences and Similarities Between Kleinian and Intersubjective Approaches: Reply to Commentaries

In this response I focus on some key issues raised by the different approaches of Kleinian and intersubjective clinicians. In particular, I raise questions about how the analyst's subjectivity is to be understood, given that the analyst needs to offer something that is over and above her pure subjective reaction. I also discuss projective identification and its implications for understanding the analyst's subjectivity.     

Reply to Rouder (2014): Good frequentist properties raise confidence

Established psychological results have been called into question by demonstrations that statistical significance is easy to achieve, even in the absence of an effect. One often-warned-against practice, choosing when to stop the experiment on the basis of the results, is guaranteed to produce significant results. In response to these demonstrations, Bayes factors have been proposed as an antidote to this practice, because they are invariant with respect to how an experiment was stopped. Should researchers only care about the resulting Bayes factor, without concern for how it was produced? Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, and Dougherty (2014) and Sanborn and Hills (2014) demonstrated that Bayes factors are sometimes strongly influenced by the stopping rules used. However, Rouder (2014) has provided a compelling demonstration that despite this influence, the evidence supplied by Bayes factors remains correct. Here we address why the ability to influence Bayes factors should still matter to researchers, despite the correctness of the evidence. We argue that good frequentist properties mean that results will more often agree with researchers’ statistical intuitions, and good frequentist properties control the number of studies that will later be refuted. Both help raise confidence in psychological results.     

Principles of contour information: Reply to Lim and Leek (2012)

Lim and Leek (2012) presented a formalization of information along object contours, which they argued was an alternative to the approach taken in our article (Feldman & Singh, 2005). Here, we summarize the 2 approaches, showing that--notwithstanding Lim and Leek's (2012) critical rhetoric--their approach is substantially identical to ours, except for the technical details of the formalism. Following the logic of our article point by point, Lim and Leek (a) defined probabilistic expectations about the geometry of smooth contours (which they based on differential contour geometry, while we used a discrete approximation--the only essential difference in their approach), (b) assumed that information along the contour was proportional to the negative logarithm of probability, following standard information theory, and then (c) extended this formulation to closed contours. We analyze what they described as errors in our approach, all of which rest on mathematical misunderstandings or bizarre misreadings of our article. We also show that their extension to 3-dimensional surfaces and their "modified minima rule" contain fatal deficiencies.     

A theory of careers encounters sex: Reply to Holland (1976)

This paper is the third in a series beginning with a report (by the authors) of research on the application of Holland's theory of careers to women and men. Holland's response, “The Virtues of the SDS …” is considered, in particular, research he cites on the effect of the Self-Directed Search (SDS) on counselees and his advocacy of raw score reports of personality patterns. The widely divergent career options suggested to men and women by SDS raw scores are noted and misunderstandings concerning the implications of Holland's assessment procedures for his theory are discussed. Holland's defense of raw score reports of personality characteristics is found wanting, especially in light of the support provided for his theory by normed scores.     

Reply to My Critics: (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I...     

The lengthening effect revisited: A reply to Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999)

In the present study, the lengthening phenomenon (Tsal & Shalev, 1996), namely, the increase in perceived length of unattended lines, was reexamined in light of criticisms by Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999). Prinzmetal and Wilson suggested that the effect was not due to attentional factors but to the spatial interaction between the attended line and the cue used to direct attention. We have replicated the lengthening effect when both attended and unattended lines are preceded by cues at a nearby location, showing that the effect is not caused by spatial cues per se, but instead reflects an inherent property of the attentional system. Masin argued that the lengthening effect is not robust, because it occurs for some but not for all participants. In the present study, the lengthening effect was highly reliable, occurring for each participant for a variety of line lengths.     

Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics

In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky.     

Understanding developmental reversals in false memory: Reply to Ghetti (2008) and Howe (2008)

Replies to comments on the current authors' original article. S. Ghetti (2008) and M. L. Howe (2008) presented probative ideas for future research that will deepen scientific understanding of developmental reversals on false memory and establish boundary conditions for these counterintuitive patterns. Ghetti extended the purview of current theoretical principles by formulating hypotheses about how developmental reversals are controlled by the growth of phantom recollection and by the growth of false-memory editing. Some data are available on her hypotheses about phantom recollection, which distinguish phenomenology (vague or vivid) from memory representation (verbatim or gist). Howe introduced alternative theoretical principles that can be traced to the early work of Deese and Underwood. He argued that fuzzy-trace theory is subject to 3 limitations and that his alternative conception makes 3 predictions that contrast with fuzzy-trace theory's predictions. In the current reply, it is shown that the stated limitations do not apply to fuzzy-trace theory, that previously published research runs counter to the 3 predictions, and that the core difference between the 2 approaches is that fuzzy-trace theory is an opponent-processes model whereas the alternative conception is a 1-process model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).