AAASP: A vision for the 1990's

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to emphasize why social-psychological be practical for both theory and practice. As investigators attempt to which theories are most parsimonious, there is often encouragement to pit against each other rather than also examining their similarities and their mentary nature. The former strategy may lead to fragmentation of illustrate the benefit of the latter strategy, the theories of selfe5cacy, action, and planned behavior are discussed relative to practical good theories and their conceptual and measurement similarities. This is extended intojoint use considerations for planning practical signed to impact on health and exercise behavior. It is suggested that such ventions have more potential to induce health/exercise change than any theory. The appropriateness of using these practical theories to study adherence isdiscussed. Lewin's (195 1) point about there being nothing so as a good theory for applied research and intervention is the underlying of the article.     

Current issues and new directions in Psychology and Health : Theory,translation, and evidence-based practice

Health psychology has at least two masters; cognitive behavioral theory and clinical and public health practice. We are expected to contribute to theory by creating new models and adding to existent models of human behavior, and to contribute to improvements in health outcomes for the public. In this brief note, we propose that translating concepts from practice into theory to create interventions that meet the standards of evidence-based practice will satisfy both masters. However, the integration will require a re-examination of our current understanding of how to use theory, the process of translation, and the development of pragmatic evidence-based practice.     

Social cognitive models of health and exercise behavior: An introduction and review of conceptual issues

Abstract

This article reviews the major social cognitive models of adherence or compliance in health and exercise behavior and attempts to show that these models are more similar to each other than different from each other. Self-efficacy theory and the theory of reasoned action/planned behavior have guided most of the theory-based research on exercise behavior. Two other models, protection motivation theory and the health belief model, have guided much research on the role of social cognitive factors in other health behaviors. These models are comprised largely of the same basic set of social cognitive variables: self-efficacy expectancy, outcome expectancy, outcome value, and intention. Two other factors, situational cues and habits, although not common to all the models, round out the theoretical picture by explaining how the relationship between the major social cognitive variables and behavior may change with repeated performance of a behavior over time.An integration of these models is offered using the theory of planned behavior as a foundation. It is suggested that research on health and exercise behavior that pits one model against another to determine which one is the better predictor of behavior is likely to be unproductive due to the striking similarities of the models. It is suggested instead that theorists and researchers focus their efforts on integration of the major social cognitive models and on determining the relative predictive utility of the various social cognitive factors with various health behaviors and in various contexts.     

Theory-Based Health Behavior Change: Developing, Testing, and Applying Theories for Evidence-Based Interventions

Theories are needed to explain and predict health behavior, as well as for the design and evaluation of interventions. Although there has been a history of developing, testing, applying, and refining health behavior theories, debates and limitations in evidence exist: The component of theories which, for example, predicts change should be better elaborated so that we can more easily understand what actually drives behavior change. Theories need to be empirically testable in two ways. Theories need to specify a set of changeable predictors to describe, explain, and predict behavior change, and they should enable us to design an effective intervention that produces exactly those changes in behavior that are predicted by the relevant theory. To make this possible, theories need to be specified in such a way that they can be rigorously tested and falsified. Moreover, for the design of theory-based interventions it must be possible to derive change techniques from the theory and to use them to generate changes in behavior. Based on eight state-of-the-science articles that make conceptual and empirical contributions to the current debate on health behavior theories, various approaches are discussed to gain further insights into explaining and changing health behaviors and the iterative process of theory development.     

Use of correlational data to examine the effects of risk perceptions on precautionary behavior

Abstract

The idea that perceptions of high personal risk lead people to adopt precautionary behavior (the “motivational hypothesis”) is mainly tested with correlational data. A review of studies from selective journals reveals a high proportion with methodological and conceptual problems that make them invalid as tests of this hypthesis. Three problems arc emphasized: (1) the misinterpretation of correlations from cross-sectional studies as testing the motivational hypothesis when they actually indicate the accuracy of risk perceptions; (2) the failure to control for prior behavior in prospective studies; and (3) the we of prospective studies in situations of little behavior change. Path models are used to help explain these problems. Recommendations for selecting research designs and for calculating the least problematic correlations are given, along with warnings about the many assumptions needed to interpret even these correlations.

Summary

Overall, 27 of the 61 cross-sectional analyses listed in Tables 2 and 3 were conducted using clearly inappropriate variables. The appropriateness of the remaining correlations rest on one or two rather questionable assumptions: (1) that people do not distort their risk perceptions to justify their behavior or intentions and (2) that negative screening results a problem like breast cancer do not affect perceptions of future risk. The correlations preferred for testing the motivational hypothesis are listed in Table 4.

Summary

When the amount of precautionary behavior in a population has become relatively stable and behavior at time t+1 is well-predicted from behavior at time t, no independent variable other than B_t will have much predictive value in a prospective design. To avoid this problem, research should be conducted at a time when a substantial change in behavior is occurring, such as soon after the risk is recognized. If this is not possible, interventions that lead people to change their behavior (e.g., by raising risk perceptions or by lowering barriers to action) are required. In effect, they remove the system from equilibrium and allow one to watch what happens as people seek a new equilibrium. The least satisfactory choice is to use a cross-sectional correlation, such as R _H?B, that represents a summation over previous changes in behavior. The assumptions required to interpret such a correlation have been discussed earlier.     

Some Cautions for Research on Personality and Health

This article comments on three conceptualizations of the relationship between personality and disease as they relate to the papers in this issue. Despite the sophistication and promise of recent research in this area, conceptual and methodological difficulties present in earlier psychosomatic research have persisted. In this area, robust and convincing associations between traits and disease remain largely elusive, and stable, valid measures of psychological factors are relatively rare. In addition, the mechanisms relating behavior to health are sometimes sketchy or overstated. We suggest that the most productive research strategies will focus on mechanisms linking behavior to health, rather than merely correlating traits with measures of disease. Needed are continued close attention to these pitfalls by researchers as well as the maintenance of a critical attitude by readers.     

Conditional health threats: health beliefs, decisions, and behaviors among adults.

We combined the health belief model with the theory of subjective expected utility to derive hypotheses about the relations among health beliefs and preventive decisions. The central implication of this combination of theories is the importance of conceptualizing, measuring, and communicating about health threats in ways that are clearly conditional on action. It is important to distinguish, for example, between how susceptible to a disease a person thinks he or she would be if that person were and were not to take a preventive action. An experimental study of judgments about a hypothetical preventive action was conducted to test many of the theoretically derived hypotheses. A correlation study of dental flossing behavior was conducted to test the hypotheses as they apply to overt behavior rather than to judgment. Results of both studies supported most of the tested hypotheses, especially those related to the conditional conceptualization of health threats. Implications for theory, research methods, and practical applications are discussed.     

Pragmatics aid referent disambiguation and word learning in young children and adults

How do children succeed in learning a word? Research has shown robustly that, in ambiguous labeling situations, young children assume novel labels to refer to unfamiliar rather than familiar objects. However, ongoing debates center on the underlying mechanism: Is this behavior based on lexical constraints, guided by pragmatic reasoning, or simply driven by children's attraction to novelty? Additionally, recent research has questioned whether children's disambiguation leads to long-term learning or rather indicates an attentional shift in the moment of the conversation. Thus, we conducted a pre-registered online study with 2- and 3-year-olds and adults. Participants were presented with unknown objects as potential referents for a novel word. Across conditions, we manipulated whether the only difference between both objects was their relative novelty to the participant or whether, in addition, participants were provided with pragmatic information that indicated which object the speaker referred to. We tested participants’ immediate referent selection and their retention after 5 min. Results revealed that when given common ground information both age groups inferred the correct referent with high success and enhanced behavioral certainty. Without this information, object novelty alone did not guide their selection. After 5 min, adults remembered their previous selections above chance in both conditions, while children only showed reliable learning in the pragmatic condition. The pattern of results indicates how pragmatics may aid referent disambiguation and learning in both adults and young children. From early ontogeny on, children's social-cognitive understanding may guide their communicative interactions and support their language acquisition.

Research Highlights

• We tested how 2-3-year-olds and adults resolve referential ambiguity without any lexical cues.
• In the pragmatic context both age groups disambiguated novel word-object-mappings, while object novelty alone did not guide their referent selection.
• In the pragmatic context, children also showed increased certainty in disambiguation and retained new word-object-mappings over time.
• These findings contribute to the ongoing debate on whether children learn words on the basis of domain-specific constraints, lower-level associative mechanisms, or pragmatic inferences.

     

A RULES APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF TELEVISION AND SOCIETY

A rule-based theoretical framework is presented as an alternative to scientific laws or purely interpretive approaches for examination of the activities undertaken by television audiences. Communication rules, which explains human actions in terms of its pragmatic and normative rather than causal features, is productively applied to the study of audience activity at two levels—the family and the larger society. Habitual, parametric, and tactical rule types are defined and described in relation to basic mass communication processes. Television-related interpersonal activities in the home are shown to be rule-governed while audience members and sources of media programming at the societal level are revealed to engage in rule-based interaction that perpetuates selected ideologies and their accompanying lifestyle models. Communication rules is proposed as a viable approach for resolving fundamental problems in mass communication theory building, including the “effects” vs. “uses” argument regarding direction of influence, and conceptual and methodological differences that have often polarized media critics and empiricists.     

Health promotion from the perspective of social cognitive theory

Abstract

This article examines health promotion and disease prevention from the perspective of social cognitive theory. The areas of overlap with some of the most widely applied psychosocial models of health are identified. The models of health promotion and disease prevention have undergone several generational changes. We have shifted from trying to scare people into health, to rewarding them into health, to equipping them with self-regulatory skills to manage their health habits, to shoring up their habit changes with dependable social supports. These transformations have evolved a multifaceted approach that addresses the reciprocal interplay between self-regulatory and environmental determinants of health behavior. Social cognitive theory addresses the socio structural determinants of health as well as the personal determinants. A comprehensive approach to health promotion requires changing the practices of social systems that have widespread detrimental effects on health rather than solely changing the habits of individuals. Further progress in this field requires building new structures for health promotion, new systems for risk reduction and greater emphasis on health policy initiatives. People's beliefs in their collective efficacy to accomplish social change, therefore, play a key role in the policy and public health approach to health promotion and disease prevention.     

Sources for Skinner's pragmatic selectionism in 1945

Skinner's pragmatic selectionism shows up strongly in his 1945 publication, "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms," in which he introduced a probabilistic three-term contingency for verbal behavior. This probabilism was accompanied by an expanded contextualism and an increased emphasis on consequences with a clear alignment to pragmatism. In total, these changes represent Skinner's most striking shift from mechanistic and necessitarian values to pragmatic selectionism, and these changes may be indebted more to the conceptual contributions of others than Skinner acknowledged. Before 1945, Skinner made at least some positive associations with the views of Watson, Russell, and Carnap. From 1945 and afterwards, he strongly disassociated his views on verbal behavior from theirs. Before 1945, Skinner did not associate his views with those of Darwin or Peirce. After 1945, he strongly associated his views with those of Darwin and Peirce (in one published interview). No sources for his pragmatic selectionism, however, were referred to in 1945.     

Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?

In Minds, Brains, and Law, Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson argue that current attempts to use neuroscience to inform the theory and practice of law founder because they are built on confused conceptual foundations. Proponents of neurolaw attribute to the brain or to its parts psychological properties that belong only to people; this mistake vitiates many of the claims they make. Once neurolaw is placed on a sounder conceptual footing, Pardo and Patterson claim, we will see that its more dramatic claims are false or meaningless, though it might be able to provide inductive evidence for particular less dramatic claims (that a defendant may be lying, or lacks control over their behavior, for instance). In response, I argue that the central conceptual confusions identified by Pardo and Patterson are not confusions at all. Though some of the claims made by its proponents are hasty and sometimes they are confused, there are no conceptual barriers to attributing psychological properties to brain states. Neuroscience can play a role in producing evidence that is more reliable than subjective report or behavior; it therefore holds out the possibility of dramatically altering our self-conception as agents and thereby the law.     

Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: beyond person--situation attributions

The traditional approach to studying behavior explanations involves treating them as either person causes or situation causes and assessing them by using rating scales. An analysis of people's free-response behavior explanations reveals, however, that the conceptual distinctions people use in their explanations are more complex and sophisticated than the person-situation dichotomy suggests. The authors, therefore, introduce a model of the conceptual structure of folk behavior explanations (the network of concepts and assumptions on which explanations are based) and test it in 4 studies. The modes and features of behavior explanations within this conceptual structure also have specific social functions. In 2 additional studies, the authors demonstrate that people alter distinct features of their explanations when pursuing particular impression-management goals and that listeners make inferences about explainers' goals on the basis of these features.     

Long life to emotions: Emotional response categorisation across the lifespan

People perceive and organise their social world on the basis of their previous semantic knowledge as well as on the basis of their emotional responses. We tested the hypothesis that emotional response categorisation, namely the tendency to group stimuli on the basis of the emotion they evoke, increases across the lifespan. Young and older adults were asked to categorise target words and either conceptual or emotional response similarity could be used to perform the task. Results showed that older adults were more likely than younger adults to rely on emotional equivalence to categorise stimuli. In addition, current affective state was significantly related to emotional response categorisation. These findings are discussed in relation to recent models that propose a prominent role for emotions in the social life of older adults.     

Long life to emotions: emotional response categorisation across the lifespan

People perceive and organise their social world on the basis of their previous semantic knowledge as well as on the basis of their emotional responses. We tested the hypothesis that emotional response categorisation, namely the tendency to group stimuli on the basis of the emotion they evoke, increases across the lifespan. Young and older adults were asked to categorise target words and either conceptual or emotional response similarity could be used to perform the task. Results showed that older adults were more likely than younger adults to rely on emotional equivalence to categorise stimuli. In addition, current affective state was significantly related to emotional response categorisation. These findings are discussed in relation to recent models that propose a prominent role for emotions in the social life of older adults.     

The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue

Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are not truth-conducive, it looks like we should either refrain from believing what we accept, and adopt some sort of instrumentalist attitude to the theories we cherish; or alternatively, we stand charged with engaging in theoretical irrationality in our belief formation. This paper discusses the appropriate response to this dilemma.     

Evoking the permission schema: The impact of explicit negation and a violation-checking context

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that realistic reasoning in deontic contexts is based on pragmatic schemas such as those for assessing compliance with or violation of permission and obligation rules, and that the evocation of these schemas can facilitate performance in Wason's (1966) selection task. The inferential rules in such schemas are intermediate in generality between the content-independent rules proposed by logicians and specific cases stored in memory. In one test of their theory, Cheng and Holyoak demonstrated that facilitation could be obtained even for an abstract permission rule that is devoid of concrete thematic content. Jackson and Griggs (1990) argued on the basis of several experiments that such facilitation is not due to evocation of a permission schema, but, rather, results from a combination of presentation factors: the presence of explicit negatives in the statement of cases and the presence of a violation-checking context. Their conclusion calls into question both the generality of content effects in reasoning and the explanation of these effects. We note that Jackson and Griggs did not test whether the same combination of presentation factors would produce facilitation for an arbitrary rule that does not involve deontic concepts, as their proposal would predict. The present study tested this prediction. Moreover, we extended Jackson and Griggs' comparisons between performance with an abstract permission rule versus an arbitrary rule, introducing clarifications in the statement of each. No facilitation was observed for an arbitrary rule even when explicit negatives and a violation-checking context were used, whereas strong facilitation was found for the abstract permission rule under the same conditions. Performance on the arbitrary rule was not improved even when the instructions indicated that the rule was conditional rather than biconditional. In contrast, a small but reliable degree of facilitation was obtained for the abstract permission rule, with violation-checking content even in the absence of explicit negatives. The theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas can account for both the present findings and those reported by Jackson and Griggs.     

Tracks of Relations and Equivalences-based Reasoning

It is known that the Restricted Predicate Calculus (RPC) can be embedded in an elementary theory, the signature of which consists of exactly two equivalences. Some special models for the mentioned theory were constructed to prove this fact. Besides formal adequacy of these models, a question may be posed concerning their conceptual simplicity, “transparency” of interpretations they assigned to the two stated equivalences. In works known to us these interpretations are rather complex, and can be called “technical”, serving only the purpose of embedding. We propose a conversion method, which transforms an arbitrary model of RPC into some model of the elementary theory TR, which includes three equivalences. RPC is embeddable in TR, and it appears possible to assign some “natural” interpretations to three equivalences using the “Track of Relation” concept (abbreviated to TR).     

Feeling bad about progress does not lead people want to change their health behaviour

Objective: When do people decide to do something about problematic health behaviours? Theoretical models and pragmatic considerations suggest that people should take action when they feel bad about their progress – in other words, when they experience negative progress-related affect. However, the impact of progress-related affect on goal striving has rarely been investigated.

Design and Methods: Study 1 (N = 744) adopted a cross-sectional design and examined the extent to which measures of progress-related affect were correlated with intentions to take action. Study 2 (N = 409) investigated the impact of manipulating progress-related affect on intentions and behaviour in an experimental design.

Results: Study 1 found that, while engaging in health behaviours had the expected affective consequences (e.g. people felt bad when they were not eating healthily, exercising regularly or limiting their alcohol consumption), it was feeling good rather than bad about progress that was associated with stronger intentions. Study 2 replicated these findings. Participants induced to feel good about their eating behaviour had marginally stronger intentions to eat healthily than participants led to feel bad about their eating behaviour.

Conclusion: The findings have implications for interventions designed to promote changes in health behaviour, as well as theoretical frameworks for understanding self-regulation.     

The Role of Intentions, Social Norms, and Attitudes in the Performance of Dental Flossing: A Test of the Theory of Reasoned Action

The theory of reasoned action proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) was tested as an explanatory model for a preventive dental behavior, dental flossing, in a sample of 65 undergraduate students. Intentions and direct attitudes were found to be the strongest predictors of flossing. Social influences exerted their influence by way of direct attitudes. Flossers (>1/week) and non-flossers (<1/week) were observed to agree with belief statements referring to the health value of flossing. However, statements referring to the social and sensory aspects of flossing were found to effectively discriminate the two groups. Implications for health education strategies are discussed in which a greater focus is placed on more immediate social and sensory benefits of flossing rather than on long-term health benefits.