A discussion of the mind-brain problem

In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are (i) located, (ii) unextended, (iii) incorporeal, (iv) capable of acting on bodies, (v) dependent upon body, (vi) capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and extension in time may be added. It is argued that a fuller understanding of the nature of forces is essential for the analysis of the mind-brain problem. The relative autonomy and indeterministic nature of mind is stressed. Indeterminism is treated in relation to a theorem of Hadamard. The computer theory of mind and the Turing test are criticized. Finally the evolution of mind is discussed.     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

Stern words on the mind-brain problem: Keeping the whole person in mind

The presentation of recent research in neuroscience in articles, books, and the popular press, has reflected what Bennett and Hacker refer to as the mereological fallacy, in which a variety of psychological aspects of experience such as distorting, telling, directing, controlling, producing, managing, winning, interpreting, being political expecting, sensing, or talking, have been attributed to the brain or parts of the brain. In each and every case, the authors of such locutions are begging the question and creating a new form of Cartesian dualism that their efforts were undertaken to avoid. In this article I present Stern's view of the mind/brain relationship as found in his Critical Personalism, wherein he anticipates and refutes such attributions as are being made presently and instead attributes such experiences and tendencies not to the brain, but to the person. Stern's views and the relationship between brain development and culture are briefly explored.     

Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion,belief and Searle's theory of intentionality

Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality.     

The mind-brain relationship: the emergent self

This paper explores the mind-brain relationship, using insights from contemporary neuroscience. It seeks to investigate how our brains become who we are, how subjective experience arises. In order to do this some explanation is given of the basic concepts of how the brain produces our subjective mental life. Current neuropsychological and neurobiological understanding of early brain development, memory, emotion and consciousness are explored. There is also an attempt at mapping the mind-brain-self relationship from a uniquely Jungian perspective. Clinical material is included in order to show the relevance of these insights to our work in the consulting room, arguing the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of the analytic dyad that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection. Such experience forms the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function.     

Awareness of one's body as subject and object

Abstract

This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences.     

道教咒术中的主客体思想

咒术作为一种普遍的文化现象 ,很早就已经出现 ,如《尚书·无逸》中便有 :“民否则厥心违怨 ,否则厥口诅祝”的记载。咒术的出现源于主客体的分化及其矛盾的发展。道教咒术的产生 ,一方面也是利用咒语这种特殊的语言来解决现实生活中的主客体矛盾 ;另一方面 ,道教重“道” ,追求与道同体。在道教看来 ,人是从“道”分化而来。《太上老君内观经》云 :“天地媾精 ,阴阳布化 ,万物以生 ,承其宿业 ,分灵道一 ,父母和合 ,人受其生。”① 道是绝对的存在 ,没有主客体之分。人若与道同体 ,也没有主客体矛盾 ,但人得生而不能 :“尊其气、贵其形、宝…     

From object to subject: pastoral supervision as an intersubjective activity

The author sketches the development of psychoanalysis in terms of its trends from notions of objectivity to intersubjectivity and how this movement can inform contemporary pastoral supervision. The article argues that these same trends may be noted in the development of contemporary educational and theological theories.     

A constraint-based lexicalist account of the subject/object attachment preference

When a noun phrase could either be the object of the preceding verb or the subject of a new clause or a sentence complement, readers and listeners show a strong preference to parse the noun phrase as the object of the verb. This can result in clear garden paths for sentences such asThe student read the book was stolen andWhile the student read the book was stolen. Even when the verb does not permit a noun phrase complement, soem processing difficulty is still found. This has led some theorists to propose models in which initial attachments are lexically blind, with lexical information subsequently used as a filter to evaluate and revise initial analyses. In contrast, we show that these results emerge naturally from constraint-based lexicalist models. We present a modeling experiment with a simple recurrent network that was trained to predict upcoming complements for a sample of verbs taken from the Penn Treebank corpus. The model exhibits an boject bias and it aloo shows effects of verb frequency which are similar to those found in the psycholinguistic literature.     

The processing of subject and object relative clauses in Spanish: An eye-tracking study

A normative study and an eye-tracking experiment investigated the influence of animacy on the processing of subject and object relative clauses in Spanish. The results showed that object relative clauses caused more difficulty than subject relative clauses, but that animacy modulated this preference. The overall pattern was similar to findings in other languages. However, because of the syntactic characteristics of Spanish relative clauses, the results give novel insights into the processing mechanisms that underlie relative clause processing.     

Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity

In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.     

Agrammatic aphasic subjects' comprehension of subject and object extracted Wh questions

This study attempted to replicate the unusual wh question comprehension pattern of Hickok and Avrutin's (1996) subjects who showed an expected subject/object extraction asymmetry for which NP questions, but not for who questions. We also examined comprehension of what and which one questions, which are similar to who and which NP questions, respectively, and we examined passivized wh questions in order to test predictions of Grodzinsky's (1995) restrictive theory of trace deletion, the Trace-Based Account (TBA). Results, using both a figurine manipulation task and a picture pointing task, showed that only one of four agrammatic (Broca's) aphasic subjects showed the pattern reported by Hickok and Avrutin and that this pattern extended to comprehension of what and which one questions. One of the subjects showed subject/object asymmetry for all wh questions tested, as would be predicted by the original trace deletion hypothesis (Grodzinsky, 1984), and two subjects showed neither pattern. None of our subjects demonstrated ability to comprehend passivized wh questions as predicted by the TBA. We discuss our findings in terms of the lack of homogeneity of wh question comprehension among individuals with agrammatic aphasia and we explore alternatives to the syntactic explanation for differences between who and which NP question comprehension advanced by Hickok and Avrutin.