Stern words on the mind-brain problem: Keeping the whole person in mind

The presentation of recent research in neuroscience in articles, books, and the popular press, has reflected what Bennett and Hacker refer to as the mereological fallacy, in which a variety of psychological aspects of experience such as distorting, telling, directing, controlling, producing, managing, winning, interpreting, being political expecting, sensing, or talking, have been attributed to the brain or parts of the brain. In each and every case, the authors of such locutions are begging the question and creating a new form of Cartesian dualism that their efforts were undertaken to avoid. In this article I present Stern's view of the mind/brain relationship as found in his Critical Personalism, wherein he anticipates and refutes such attributions as are being made presently and instead attributes such experiences and tendencies not to the brain, but to the person. Stern's views and the relationship between brain development and culture are briefly explored.     

Drawing the boundary between subject and object: Comments on the mind-brain problem

Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists (among others) still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes ‘objectivity’, especially in identifying it with what a ‘machine’ can do. I approach the problem in the light of two cognate circumstances: (a) the ‘measurement problem’ in quantum physics, and (b) the objectivity of standard mathematics, even though most of it is beyond the reach of ‘machines’. I argue that the only resolution to such problems is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are ‘objective’; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism. A material system which contains such loops is called ‘complex’. Such complex systems thus must possess nonsimulable models; i.e. models which contain impredicativities or ‘self-references’ which cannot be removed, or faithfully mapped into a single coherent syntactic time-frame. I consider a few of the consequences of the above, in the context of thus redrawing the boundary between subject and object.     

Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion,belief and Searle's theory of intentionality

Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality.     

The mind-brain relationship: the emergent self

This paper explores the mind-brain relationship, using insights from contemporary neuroscience. It seeks to investigate how our brains become who we are, how subjective experience arises. In order to do this some explanation is given of the basic concepts of how the brain produces our subjective mental life. Current neuropsychological and neurobiological understanding of early brain development, memory, emotion and consciousness are explored. There is also an attempt at mapping the mind-brain-self relationship from a uniquely Jungian perspective. Clinical material is included in order to show the relevance of these insights to our work in the consulting room, arguing the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of the analytic dyad that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection. Such experience forms the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function.     

Event perception: a mind-brain perspective

People perceive and conceive of activity in terms of discrete events. Here the authors propose a theory according to which the perception of boundaries between events arises from ongoing perceptual processing and regulates attention and memory. Perceptual systems continuously make predictions about what will happen next. When transient errors in predictions arise, an event boundary is perceived. According to the theory, the perception of events depends on both sensory cues and knowledge structures that represent previously learned information about event parts and inferences about actors' goals and plans. Neurological and neurophysiological data suggest that representations of events may be implemented by structures in the lateral prefrontal cortex and that perceptual prediction error is calculated and evaluated by a processing pathway, including the anterior cingulate cortex and subcortical neuromodulatory systems.     

The dreaming mind-brain: a Jungian perspective

In this paper I discuss the nature and role of dream and the dreaming process in Jungian clinical practice in the light of neuroscience. Insights from contemporary neuroscience support rather than contest Jung's view that emotional truth, not censorship or disguise, underpins the dreaming process. I use clinical material to illustrate how work with dreams within the total interactive experience of the analytic dyad enables the development of the emotional scaffolding necessary for the development of 'mind'. Large scale evidence-based research reveals that dreaming is caused by brain activity during sleep that is both biochemically and regionally different from that of waking states. Recent imaging studies confirm that dreams are the mind's vehicle for the processing of emotional states of being, particularly the fear, anxiety, anger or elation that often figure prominently. Dream sleep is understood as also being the guardian of memory, playing a part in forgetting, encoding and affective organization of memory. In the clinical section of the paper I let a series of dreams speak for themselves, revealing the emotionally salient concerns of the dreamer, weaving past and present, transference and reality together in a way that demonstrates the healthy attempt of the brain-mind to come to terms with difficult emotional experience from the past. The dreams become dreamable as part of the meaning-making process of analysis.     

Higher mind-brain development in successful leaders: testing a unified theory of performance

This study explored mind-brain characteristics of successful leaders as reflected in scores on the Brain Integration Scale, Gibbs’s Socio-moral Reasoning questionnaire, and an inventory of peak experiences. These variables, which in previous studies distinguished world-class athletes and professional classical musicians from average-performing controls, were recorded in 20 Norwegian top-level managers and in 20 low-level managers—matched for age, gender, education, and type of organization (private or public). Top-level managers were characterized by higher Brain Integration Scale scores, higher levels of moral reasoning, and more frequent peak experiences. These multilevel measures could be useful tools in selection and recruiting of potential managers and in assessing leadership education and development programs. Future longitudinal research could further investigate the relationship between leadership success and these and other multilevel variables.     

当代道众的信仰建设刍论

前段时间,拜读了邱清辉道长的《试论如何使道众以庙为家》一文,作者从目前的道风不整问题,谈及使道众以庙为家的重要性和措施,主要是加强宫观管理者的自身修养、营造宫观的家庭温暖、加强道众的素质教育与信仰建设几方面,笔者深以为然。特别是对加强道众的信仰建设这一条有更深的体会。文章说:"道     

A unified treatment of the weighting problem

A general procedure is described for obtaining weighted linear combinations of variables. This includes as special cases, multiple regression weights, canonical variate analysis, principal components, maximizing composite reliability, canonical factor analysis, and certain other well-known methods. The general procedure is shown to yield certain desirable invariance properties, with respect to transformations of the variables.The author wishes to thank Dr. A. J. Cropley for preparing the necessary computer programs for this study.