Predicting diagnosis performance with measures of cognitive style

This study examines the relationship between performance on a context-independent fault diagnosis task and two dimensions of cognitive style: field dependence/independence (D-I) and focusing/scanning (F-S). The effects on diagnosis performance of training and the ability of both dimensions of style jointly to predict fault-finding ability were considered. The results showed that field independents and focusers were superior fault diagnosticians. Training, in the form of verbal feedback messages, was uniformly effective for the D-I dimension although field independents maintained a superior level of performance, over field dependents. In general, for the F-S dimension, training had little effect on either the focusers or scanners. A combination of scores on the F-S and D-I dimensions significantly enhanced the proportion of the variance in testing efficiency that could be accounted for during fault-finding. Finally it is argued that the F-S and D-I dimensions should be recognized as measures of ability, not style. Future research should be directed at identifying between subject differences on fault diagnosis tasks with reference to theories of information processing.     

Predicting diagnosis performance with measures of cognitive style

This study examines the relationship between performance on a context-independent fault diagnosis task and two dimensions of cognitive style: field dependence/independence (D-I) and focusing/scanning (F-S). The effects on diagnosis performance of training and the ability of both dimensions of style jointly to predict fault-finding ability were considered. The results showed that field independents and focusers were superior fault diagnosticians. Training, in the form of verbal feedback messages, was uniformly effective for the D-I dimension although field independents maintained a superior level of performance, over field dependents. In general, for the F-S dimension, training had little effect on either the focusers or scanners. A combination of scores on the F-S and D-I dimensions significantly enhanced the proportion of the variance in testing efficiency that could be accounted for during fault-finding. Finally it is argued that the F-S and D-I dimensions should be recognized as measures of ability, not style. Future research should be directed at identifying between subject differences on fault diagnosis tasks with reference to theories of information processing.     

Depression and cognitive style: comparisons between measures

Several instruments have been developed recently to measure cognitive styles associated with depression. At least four of them appear to have an underlying similarity. Each appears to reflect a tendency for respondents to infer a general lack of self-worth (or a continued likelihood of bad events) on the basis of a single discrete failure. The present research was a comparative test of one of these scales against the other three in terms of associations with Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores. Though all instruments were significantly correlated with BDI, partial correlations revealed that our generalization scale was a more robust predictor of BDI than were (a) a measure of characterological self-blame, (b) a measure of cognitive bias, and (c) a measure of attributional style.     

Correlations among scores on measures of field dependence-independence cognitive style, cognitive ability, and sustained attention

The Children's Embedded Figures Test, the Rod and Frame Test to measure the field dependence-independence cognitive style, Cattell's Culture Fair Intelligence Tests to measure cognitive ability, and two cancellation tasks (Zazzo task and Bourdon task) to assess sustained attention were administered to 179 boys and 110 girls whose average age was 9.0 yr. Correlations between scores on measures of field dependence-independence and cognitive ability were moderated. Average correlations between scores on measures of field dependence-independence, cognitive ability, and measures of sustained attention was .23 for the Zazzo task and quite weak (.06) for the Bourdon task.     

Interrelationships among three measures of preference for cognitive style based on hemisphere specialization theory

Right and left cerebral hemisphere and limbic scores derived from the Herrmann Brain Dominance Profile were correlated with left, right, and integrated scores from the Torrance-Reynolds Your Style of Learning and Thinking and four cognitive style scores from the Kolb Learning Style Inventory. Coefficients from 40 students in occupational therapy indicated low moderate positive relationships between like-named hemisphere scores, lack of significant relationships between cognitive style and two independent measures of hemispheric preference, and relative independence of preferred hemisphere mode as well as relative independence between cerebral and limbic systems. The data are interpreted as requiring cautious concern about the validity of these measures by potential users.     

Cognitive processes in the reflective-impulsive cognitive style

In this study, the authors improved the understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the reflective-impulsive cognitive style (RI), which was initially measured by J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, and W. Phillips (1964) on the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). The authors determined the relationships between the RI style and the cognitive factors, which would be likely to explain different MFFT solving modes-field dependence or independence as a cognitive style, the g factor, the spatial factor, and a metacognitive control index, which the authors developed for this study. The hypotheses were largely based on various studies (J. P. Ancillotti, 1984, 1985; J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, & W. Phillips, 1964; T. Zelniker & W. E. Jeffrey, 1976; T. Zelniker, A. Renan, I. Sorer, & Y. Shavit, 1977). The results are presented separately for each of four groups: (a) reflective individuals, who implement an analytic process and are cognitively mature; (b) impulsive individuals, who use a holistic process and are cognitively immature; (c) fast-accurate individuals, who are capable of implementing both analytic and holistic processes and exhibit cognitive maturity; and (d) slow-inaccurate individuals, who exhibit good metacognitive control but have trouble implementing both types of processing.     

The relationship between social-cultural attitudes and behavioral measures of cognitive style: a meta-analytic integration of studies

The present meta-analysis investigates the relationship between social-cultural right-wing attitudes and objective measures of cognitive style on a set of 124 unique samples, with a total of 29,209 participants. Intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive ability yielded relationships of moderate strength with right-wing attitudes, whereas only mixed evidence was obtained for rigidity, complexity, and field dependence. In the discussion, we compare the present weak to moderate relationships with a meta-analysis conducted by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003b), included predominantly self-report measures of cognitive style, reporting moderate to strong relationships between conservatism. The need to study cognitive ability as a basis of ideological attitudes is also discussed.     

Comparison of two creativity style measures

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between two measures of creativity style for a sample of beginning teachers. 116 student teachers enrolled in an undergraduate teacher-education program in a medium-sized, metropolitan university completed the Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory and Basadur Creative Problem Solving Profile measures. A preference for an Innovator style (higher scores on Kirton's inventory) was correlated with the Generator profile on the Basadur profile (r=.36, p<.01). The KAI Efficiency scores, suggesting a preference for broad, global ideas as opposed to narrow, specific ones, was correlated with the Basadur Conceptualizer scores (r=.26, p<.01). Implications are discussed for teachers who must adapt to newer instructional and assessment methods designed to foster students' higher-level thinking skills.     

Mesomorphy correlates with experiential cognitive style

The purpose of this study was to test for a relationship between mesomorphy and experiential cognitive style (S. Epstein, 1994) in a sample of university students (30 women and 24 men). Anthropometric somatotypes were obtained using the Heath-Carter procedure (J. E. L. Carter, 2002). Experiential cognitive style was operationalized as scores on the experiential scale of the Rational Experiential Inventory for Adolescents (A. D. Marks, D. W. Hine, R. L. Blore, & W. J. Phillips, 2008). Nonparametric bootstrap correlations were calculated using 80% confidence intervals. There were significant correlations between mesomorphy and experiential cognitive style for men (r(s) = .33) and women (r(s) = .25). For men, experiential cognitive style was also correlated with endomorphy (r(s) = .39) and ectomorphy (rs = -.48).     

Modifying acute pain by matching cognitive style with cognitive treatment

To test whether congruence between cognitive style and cognitive coping would facilitate the attenuation of pressure pain, 30 verbalizers and 30 visualizers were assigned in equal numbers (ns = 10) to pleasant imagery, rational thoughts, and expectancy conditions. Separate 2 X 3 (cognitive style X experimental condition) analyses of covariance on pain tolerance and subjective discomfort indicated that imagery was superior to expectancy in raising tolerance. These findings are discussed in terms of the flexibility of cognitive coping and the content of the images and thoughts which were used.     

Individual differences in religiosity as a function of cognitive ability and cognitive style

The current study examines the degree to which individual differences in cognitive ability and cognitive style (rational thinking vs. experiential thinking) uniquely and jointly account for differences in religiosity. Using an array of measures of religiosity, results show that cognitive ability has a medium to large negative effect on various aspects of religiosity. Though also negatively related to religiosity, rational thinking style did not add significant unique effects, nor did it convey a significant indirect effect from cognitive ability. Experiential thinking was generally unrelated to ability but was positively related to some aspects of religiosity. Overall the results confirm that those with higher cognitive ability are less likely to accept religious doctrine or engage in religious behaviors and those with lower ability are more likely to accept religious doctrine and exhibit higher levels of fundamentalism. Cognitive style appears to play a lesser role in explaining individual differences in religiosity than cognitive ability.     

Hypnotic blindness and the relevance of cognitive style

Real, hypnotized and simulating, unhypnotized subjects were instructed to use either a constructive or a concentrative cognitive style when attempting to respond to a suggestion for hypnotic blindness; also, some subjects were administered the suggestion without any instructions about cognitive style. More reals who received the constructive rather than the concentrative instructions reported complete blindness; a similar number of simulators who received the different instructions reported complete blindness. Moreover, reals who received the constructive instruction reported a more rapidly developed belief in their blindness. The findings are discussed in terms of the relevance of cognitive style to subjects' reports of hypnotic blindness, and the possibility is considered that both reports of and belief in hypnotic blindness are determined in part by cognitive style.     

Development and validation of the cognitive style indicator

The authors describe the development and validation of the Cognitive Style Indicator (CoSI) using 3 diverse samples (N = 5,924; N = 1,580; and N = 635). Reliability, item, and factor analyses demonstrated the internal consistency and homogeneity of 3 cognitive styles: knowing, planning, and creating. The authors also found substantial support for the instrument's convergent and discriminant validity by including other cognitive style instruments and personality and academic performance measures in the validation process. Criterion-related validity was confirmed by examination of the relation between these cognitive styles and work-related characteristics. The main contributions of this study are (a) the further refinement of the analytic-intuitive cognitive style dimension by splitting the analytic pole in a knowing and a planning style and (b) the development of a valid and reliable cognitive style instrument for use in organizations.     

Divine intuition: cognitive style influences belief in God

Some have argued that belief in God is intuitive, a natural (by-)product of the human mind given its cognitive structure and social context. If this is true, the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by one's more general tendency to rely on intuition versus reflection. Three studies support this hypothesis, linking intuitive cognitive style to belief in God. Study 1 showed that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in God. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily solvable, have intuitively compelling incorrect answers. Participants who gave more intuitive answers on the CRT reported stronger belief in God. This effect was not mediated by education level, income, political orientation, or other demographic variables. Study 2 showed that the correlation between CRT scores and belief in God also holds when cognitive ability (IQ) and aspects of personality were controlled. Moreover, both studies demonstrated that intuitive CRT responses predicted the degree to which individuals reported having strengthened their belief in God since childhood, but not their familial religiosity during childhood, suggesting a causal relationship between cognitive style and change in belief over time. Study 3 revealed such a causal relationship over the short term: Experimentally inducing a mindset that favors intuition over reflection increases self-reported belief in God.