SOME UNQUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS

I In 1848 Frederic Bastiat wrote an article in the Journal des Debats in which he said, Man struggles against pain and suffering. However, he is condemned by nature to suffering and to privation if he does not take upon himself the effort of work. Hence he has only the choice between two evils…. Up to now, however, no remedy has been found for it, except for one man to avail himself of the work of others…so that all work is for the one and all enjoyment is for the other. Hence [we have] slavery and robbery. [Today] the oppressor no longer directly compels the oppressed through his own strength. There is still a tyrant and a victim, but now the state, i.e. the law itself, is placed as a mediator between the two. What could be better for the purpose of stifling our doubts and vanquishing all resistance? We turn to the state and say to it: I find that between my enjoyment and my work there exists no relation that satisfies me. In order to bring about the desired balance, I would like to take away a little from others. However, that would be dangerous were I to do it myself. Can you, state, facilitate matters for me? Can you not assign me to a favorable position, or assign a more unfavorable one to my competitor? Can you not grant me a special “protection” and, not without plausible reason, lend me capital which you have taken from its possessors? Or, can you not educate my children at public expense? or guarantee me a carefree life from age 50 onwards?… In this case the law would be acting for me, and I would have all the advantages of exploitation without its risks and its onus.     

Becoming a person—Part II

Conclusion I have tried to tell you what has seemed to occur in the lives of people with whom I have had the privilege of being in a relationship as they struggled toward becoming themselves. I have endeavored to describe, as accurately as I can, the meanings which seem to be involved in this process of becoming a person. I am sure that I do not see it clearly or completely, since I keep changing in my comprehension and understanding of it. I hope you will accept it as a current and tentative picture, not as something final.One reason for stressing the tentative nature of what I have said is that I wish to make it clear that I amnot saying: This is what you should become; here is the goal for you. Rather, I am saying that these are some of the meanings I see in the experiences that my clients and I have shared. Perhaps this picture of the experience of others may illuminate or give more meaning to some of your own experience.I have pointed out that the individual appears to have a strong desire to become himself; that given a favorable psychological climate he drops the defensive masks with which he has faced life, and begins to discover and to experience the stranger who lives behind these masks—the hidden parts of himself. I have pictured some of the attributes of the person who emerges—the tendency, to be more open to all elements of his organic experience; the growth of trust in one's organism as an instrument of sensitive living; the acceptance of the fearsome responsibility of being a unique person; and finally the sense of living in one's life as a participant in a fluid, ongoing process, continually discovering new aspects of one's self in the flow of experience. These are some of the things which seem to me to be involved in becoming a person.     

The Trojan Horse of Terrorism

Down the road from where I live, lives my shadow.

It is amazing that such a powerful thing could escape my notice, but there it is. I have lived most of my life in relative ignorance of this powerful force, assuming (as most of us do) that what I see on the surface is all that is true, and that what I see in others has nothing to do with me.     

Am I You?

It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and the non-reflexive use exhibit the same logical grammar. The thesis that they do is in part motivated by the assumption that to show that my relation to you bears the same form as my practical self-relation is to show that, fundamentally, you are not an object for me to think about and act on, but a subject with whom to think and act together. I argue, to the contrary, that if my addressing you exhibited the same form as a relation I could literally be said to stand in to myself, then the nexus between us would be such that I am irretrievably alienated from you. To allow the possibility of addressing oneself is to assume one of the following accounts of the second-person pronoun. Either one has to follow R. Heck and conceive it as a merely linguistic phenomenon whose content can be analyzed in terms of “the person to whom I'm now speaking”; or one has to internalize the second person and follow Ch. Korsgaard in taking its prior use to be entirely within and independent of its linguistic expression. But to account for the idea of mutual recognition requires a third view according to which address is an act of mind sui generis for which linguistic expression is essential.     

Responsibility and Reciprocity

Discussions of responsibility typically focus on the person who is held responsible: what are the conditions or criteria of responsibility; what can be done to or demanded of a person who is responsible? This paper shifts focus onto those who hold, rather than those who are held, responsible: what do we owe to those whom we hold responsible? After distinguishing responsibility as answerability from responsibility as liability, it attends mainly to the former, and points out the ways in which it is multiply relational: I am responsible for something to someone who has the standing to call me to account for it, under the norms of some particular practice. Responsibility as thus understood is also reciprocal: if you are to be answerable to me, I must treat you with a certain respect, attend seriously to your answer, and be ready to answer to you myself. The paper explores some of the implications of this point both for our moral dealings with each other, and for criminal law and the criminal trial.     

The Greatest Priority for Genetic Counseling: Effectively Meeting Our Clients’ Needs 2014 NSGC Natalie Weissberger Paul National Achievement Award

Receipt of the 2014 Natalie Weissberger Paul (NWP) National Achievement Award was a highlight of my career. Thank you to all who nominated me for this prestigious NSGC recognition. I am humbled to join past NWP award winners many of whom are admired mentors, treasured colleagues and friends. I would like to express what a privilege it is to honor Natalie Weissberger Paul for whom this award is named. Twenty-nine years ago I co-edited a volume of the Birth Defects Original Article Series with Natalie summarizing a conference co-funded by the March of Dimes and NSGC (Biesecker et al., 1987). Natalie demonstrated her devotion to children with special needs through her work at the March of Dimes. As such I believe she would concur with the focus of my remarks on the partners in our work: our clients.     

Malcolm on Memory

Malcolm argues that memory takes a variety of forms and that philosophers go astray because they attempt to reduce this variety to a single form. We may grant that memory takes a variety of forms. It does not follow that these forms are of equal philosophical significance. In telling you my name, I do not have to recall it. I have repeated it innumerable times. If asked again, I simply repeat it once again. This is what Bergson called “habit memory”. But Proust, in tasting a madeleine cake, did recall the past. His childhood returned vividly to his mind. But since his experience was in the present and his childhood was in the past, how could the one be an experience of the other? Here, it seems, we do have a philosophical problem.     

Countertransference revisited

A female patient of mine recounts her week. I listen with interest, waiting for her to arrive at particular conclusions. She has suffered a great deal and still does, but prefers not to dwell on it. My interest turns into patience as she continues to talk but circumvents her discontent. She is adroit at avoidance, but easily offended when I point such things out. "I'd better wait" I think. I grow more aware that I must encourage her digressions. I feel frustrated. Getting further and further away, she skirts the issue with supple grace, then strays off into tangentiality. I forget her point and lose my focus, then get down on myself. The opportunity is soon gone. I glance at the clock as her monologue drones on into banality. I grow more uninterested and distant. There is a subtle irritation to her voice; a whiney indecisive ring begins to pervade my consciousness. I home in on her mouth with aversion, watching apprehensively as this disgusting hole flaps tirelessly but says nothing. It looks carnivorous, voracious. Now she is unattractive, something I have noticed before. I forget who my next patient is. I think about the meal I will prepare for my wife this evening, then glance at the time once more. Then I am struck: Why am I looking at the clock? So soon? The session has just begun. I catch myself. What is going on in me, between us? I am detached, but why? Is she too feeling unattuned, disconnected? I am failing my patient. What is her experience of me? I lamentingly confess that I do not feel I have been listening to her, and wonder what has gone wrong between us. I ask her if she has noticed. We talk about our feelings, our impact on one another, why we had lost our sense of connection, what it means to us. I instantly feel more involved, rejuvenated, and she continues, this time with me present. Her mouth is no longer odious, but sincere and articulate. She is attractive and tender; I suddenly feel empathy and warmth toward her. We are now very close. I am moved. Time flies, the session is soon over; we do not want it to end.     

THE NEUTRALITY OF RIGHTNESS AND THE INDEXICALITY OF GOODNESS: BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND BACK AGAIN

My purpose in the present paper is two‐fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision‐making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.     

How to deal with your most difficult client—You

Conclusion Therapists are human-and, believe it or not, fallible humans. Ideally, they are supremely well infored, highly confident, minimally disturbed, extremely ethical and rarely under- or overinvolved with their clients/Actually, they are hardly ideal. If you, as a therapist, find yourself seriously blocked in your work, look for the same kind of irrational beliefs, inappropriate feelings, and dysfunctional behaviors that you would investigate in your underachieving clints. When you ferret out the absolutistic philosophies and perfectionist demads that seem to underlie your difficulties, ask yoursell—yes,strongly ask yourself—these trenchant questions: (a) Why do Ihave to be an indubitably great and unconditionally lowed therapist?; (b) Where is it written that my clientsmust follow my teachings and absolutelyshould do what I advise?; (c) Where is the evidence that therapymust be easy and that Ihave to enjoy every minute of it?If you persist in asking important questions like these and insist on thinking them through to what are scientific and logical answers, you may still never become the most accomplished and sanest therapist in the world. But I wager that you will tend to be happier and more effective than many other therapists I could—but charitably will not—name. Try it and see!This article is adapted from an invited address presented at the 91 st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association at Anaheim, Calif., August 1983.     

Modern Philosophy,the Subject,and the God of the Bible

In my paper, I undertake to show that the God of the Bible is the subject of modern philosophy, i.e., that philosophy is biblical and that the Bible is philosophical. Central to the argument of my paper is an analysis of the fundamental difference between the philosophy of Aristotle (consistent with Socrates and Plato), as based on the law of contradiction and thus on the contradictory opposition between necessity and existence, and the philosophy of, in particular, Spinoza and Kant, as based on the transcendental logic of the necessary relationship of thought and existence. Thus, I argue that the ontological argument (proving the existence of God) demonstrates the necessary existence of the thinking subject and of the subject thought, at once human and divine. In short, metaphysics is practical reason, the practice of doing unto others what you want others to do unto you, and reason is metaphysical practice, the practice of proving that there is one thing that you, a subject, cannot think without it necessarily existing, and that is the other subject (the neighbor/God).     

The concept of the fully functioning person

Conclusion Here then is my theoretical model of the person who emerges from therapy—a person functioning freely in all the fullness of his organismic potentialities; a person who is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing, socialized and appropriate in his behavior; a creative person, whose specific formings of behavior are not easily predictable; a person who is ever changing, ever developing, always discovering himself and the newness in himself in each succeeding moment of time. This is the person who in an imperfect way actually emerges from the experience of safety and freedom in a therapeutic experience, and this is the person whom I have tried to describe for you in pure form.My purpose has not been to convince you of the correctness of this view. Indeed I would have to confess that I have written this paper primarily for my own satisfaction, to clarify the thoughts which have been stirring in me. But if this presentation causes you to formulate your view of the person who emerges from therapy, or enables you to point out flaws in my own thinking which I have not yet seen, or arouses in you the desire to put to objective test either this picture or one which you paint for yourself, then it will have fully served both its primary and its secondary purpose.Reprinted by permission from Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, August, 1963.     

Healing presence in the psychotherapist

Abstract

Throughout graduate school I felt compelled to become a fine psychotherapist. Implicit in that motivation was my curiosity about what makes a psychotherapist effective. My curiosity was inspired by my experience with one therapist who helped me activate profound transformation. After identifying intuitive inquiry (Anderson, 1998, 2000, 2004) as my research method, I explored that experience through meditation, reading, and conversation and eventually identified her healing presence as the core quality that differentiated her from other therapists I had known. Though technique and experience are important, I sensed that it was her healing presence that allowed her to use technique and experience skillfully. Throughout Cycle 1 of intuitive inquiry, the “text” that claimed me was my personal experience of her healing presence, her ability to be present, to connect with me, to see me, and even, to love me. Through intuitive inquiry, I was able to expand my understanding of the healing presence of a psychotherapist to incorporate the experiences of many others.     

Against Middle Knowledge

As a result of my teen–age conversion to the Catholic Church … I read a work called Natural Theology by a nineteenth–century Jesuit… and found it all convincing except for two things. One was the doctrine of scientia media , according to which God knew what anybody would have done if, e.g., he hadn't died when he did…. I found I could not believe this doctrine: it appeared to me that there was not, quite generally, any such thing as what would have happened if what did happen had not happened, and that in particular there was no such thing, generally speaking, as what someone would have done if… and certainly that there was no such thing as how someone would have spent his life if he had not died a child. I did not know at the time that the matter was one of dispute between the Jesuits and the Dominicans, who took rather my own line about it. So when I was being instructed a couple of years later by a Dominican at Oxford … and he asked me if I had any difficulties, I told him that I couldn't see how that stuff could be true. He was obviously amused and told me that I certainly didn't have to believe it, though I only learned the historical fact I have mentioned rather later.     

Some Musings About the Limits of an Ethics That Can Be Applied – A Response to a Question About Courage and Convictions That Confronted the Author When She Woke Up on November 9, 2016

I experienced the 2016 Presidential election as a loss of innocence. For the first time in my life, the prospect of losing my most basic rights and freedoms did not feel so remote. Confronting this possibility prompted the musings in this article. I call them ‘musings' because the article is not a systematic defense of a clearly demarcated position. It is, rather, a somewhat circuitous exploration of the many questions that pressed themselves upon me as I struggled to understand what distinguishes (a) reasonable accommodations to injustice from (b) morally unacceptable accommodations. When is a commitment not really a commitment? When does reasonable fear become shameful cowardice? When does my knowledge that I can do something to resist injustice give me good enough reason to resist? Under what conditions is my reason an enemy of my ideals? What is the proper balance between valuing myself beyond price and appreciating that many, many things matter far more than my own life and security? In grappling with these questions, I have been reminded of the extent to which moral discernment does not involve applying a ‘philosophy' and the extent to which it cannot be secured by prior training.     

Use of narratives and collage in the exploration of the self and the meaning of a career

ABSTRACT

A methodological challenge during my doctoral research led me to use collage to reflect upon my own life and career. The insights it allowed me into the relationship between who we are and what we do led me to conclude that such methods can also illuminate these connections for clients of career counselling. In this paper I argue that such constructivist approaches allow the examination of that psycho-social space within which career is shaped and understood, allowing access to both the conscious and unconscious meaning made of a career and life story. I further argue that in times of increasing complexity such methods will be an important tool for career counsellors to meet the holistic needs of clients.     

“Pleasure and Joy in the Work”: Using Simone Weil in the Classroom

Richard Rorty once wrote that inspired teaching “is the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic torso which has made a difference to the [teacher’s] conception of who she is, what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter which has rearranged her priorities and purposes.” In a teaching career more than three decades long, no author has influenced me more profoundly as a teacher and as a human being than Simone Weil. She has changed how I think about myself, my relationships, the world around me and ultimately about what transcends me. And this could not help but change how I am in the classroom. This essay is a reflection on how Simone Weil has changed my life, both in and out of the classroom.     

Feminism and Psychological Autonomy: A Study in Decision Making

Women seeking to realize the feminist goal of autonomy, defined as self-interested decision making, encounter conflict and anxiety. This study reports a group experience that used life-space drawings and force-field analyses to reduce anxiety and foster autonomous decision making. The 15 women participants in the yearlong study reported at least one action in the area originally designated for decision making. Among the components in the process, participants cited identification with, and support and information from, other group members. The results suggest that for the women in this study, group participation enhanced individual autonomy. Autonomy for me is believing in my own ability to do what I want to do, … then taking productive, creative steps toward fulfilling my own goals. … Autonomy for me is a personal thing, an internal thing, feeling that I have power.*     

Journeys through the valley of death: multimethod psychological assessment and personality transformation in long-term psychotherapy

The Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM Task Force, 2006) is based on the assumption that an in-depth understanding of clients' underlying emotional, personality, and interpersonal patterns will facilitate their treatment. In this article I show how such an understanding can be achieved through multimethod psychological assessment, and how useful such information can be in long-term psychotherapy with high-achieving, successful clients who struggle with forming and maintaining intimate relationships. Such treatments are extremely difficult, because when these clients attach to their psychotherapists, many of them temporarily become more symptomatic. I illustrate these points with a detailed account of my long-term therapy with a resilient but highly traumatized young man. Repeated use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Disorder-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) and Rorschach with my client helped guide us in our work, and also helped create an important therapeutic "opening" into the underlying traumatic material. This and other experiences have convinced me that it is extremely useful for psychologists to have training in both assessment and psychotherapy.     

The twelfth Bartlett memorial lecture: The role of single neurons in the psychology of perception

I feel deeply honoured by your invitation to give the Bartlett lecture, and am especially glad to do so in Holland, the home of so many distinguished psychologists of sensation and perception. And there is a third reason why it has given me much pleasure, for Sir Frederick Bartlett was one of those who had an important influence on the direction of my career some 40 years ago. I had to decide whether to spend my last year at Cambridge reading psychology or physiology, so I attended a short course of introductory lectures he gave in July. About half a dozen of us sat on upright wooden chairs circled around him as he sat in an armchair, smiling benignly. The first thing he did was to tell us to close our notebooks, for he was not going to say anything that would help us to pass any exams. And I believe the very last words of his last lecture were, “So you see it is all very difficult”. I was very glad he said that, for I had in fact found it all very heavy going: my brain seemed always to be lost in clouds of uncertainty when “remembering”, “thinking”, or “perceiving” were mentioned, because there was no conceptual framework for these processes except the words themselves and others spun around them. What I was looking for were the definable quantities of physics, chemistry and even physiology, these I could handle conceptually in their geometric and functional interactions, whereas I always find a purely verbal argument about abstractions difficult to follow and impossible to believe. So this lack of any nonverbal conceptual framework was very painful.

There was one phrase I think I recall him using that particularly aroused my interest-“the effort after meaning”; intuitively this seemed to be very important, but however much effort I made the meaning never quite emerged. I had almost decided that my mistrust of words made me unsuited to a career in psychology, but all the same I put my problem about “physiology or psychology” directly to Bartlett. After finding out that I was mainly interested in problems of sensation and perception, he said he thought that E. D. Adrian's research over the last 20 years had made more difference to that subject than any results obtained from within psychology itself.