Who wrote that? Automaticity and reduced sense of agency in individuals prone to dissociative absorption

Dissociative absorption (DA) is a tendency to become completely immersed in a stimulus while neglecting to attend to one’s surroundings. Theoretically, DA implies automatic functioning in areas that are outside the focus of attention. This study examined whether high absorbers indeed act more automatically, i.e., with decreased meta-consciousness for, and therefore poor memory of, their own actions, along with reduced sense of agency (SoA). High and low absorbers (N = 63) performed three DA-promoting tasks: choice-reaction time (CRT), Tetris, and free writing. Participants were tested on memory of task details and self-reported their state SoA. As hypothesized, trait DA was correlated with impaired autobiographical memory for self-generated writing. However, DA was not related to episodic memory disruptions in externally-generated content tasks (Tetris, CRT). In most tasks, DA was associated with decreased SoA. Absorbers’ specific difficulty in identifying self-generated content suggests that their memory failures stem from reduced accessibility to self-actions and intentions.     

Who is doing what to whom? Young infants' developing sense of social causality in animated displays

In two different experiments a visual habituation/dishabituation procedure was used to test groups of 3-10-month-old infants for their ability to discriminate the role reversal of two abstract figures (discs of different colors) chasing each other on a computer screen. Results of the first experiment point to a reliable age effect. Only 8-10-month-old infants tended to dishabituate to a role reversal between chaser and chasee. A second experiment shows that in dishabituating to the role reversal, 8-10-month-olds do base this discrimination on relational information between the two discs and not merely on the contrast between their respective vitality or discrete dynamic. By the age of 8-10 months, infants demonstrate sensitivity to information specifying what one disc does to the other, at a distance. These findings point to important changes in perceptual-cognitive development and are discussed in the context of a well described key transition in social-cognitive development occurring at around 9 months of age.     

Who or what is the preembryo?

...The moral status -- and specifically the controversial issue of personhood -- is related to attainment of developmental individuality...This contrasts with the view that holds that personhood occurs earlier, at the point of genetic uniqueness. I believe that an embryo that has developed to the point where it can be one individual and one individual only, differs in moral status from a preembryo that has not, even if in many cases we may choose to treat them similarly...In view of the conviction that the preembryo is not yet a person and that its statistical potential for becoming such is small, it is not clear that nontherapeutic experiments can be excluded in principle. However, because the preembryo does have intrinsic potential...the preembryo should be treated as a person...Any exceptions from the prima facie duty to treat the preembryo as a person should be based on criteria established at the national level....     

Schizotypal personality traits and prediction of one's own movements in motor control: what causes an abnormal sense of agency?

Background. Positive schizophrenic symptoms, especially passivity phenomena, including auditory hallucinations, may be caused by an abnormal sense of agency, which people with schizotypal personality traits also tend to exhibit. A sense of agency asserts that it is oneself who is causing or generating an action. It is possible that this abnormal sense of self-agency is attributable to the abnormal prediction of one’s own movements in motor control. Method. We conducted an experiment using the “disappeared cursor” paradigm in which non-clinical, healthy participants were required to click on a target using an invisible mouse cursor. Prediction error was defined as the distance between the target and the click point. Results. The results showed that schizotypal personality traits, but not depressive or anxious traits, were correlated with deficits in predicting movements of the subjects’ left hand. In particular, auditory hallucination proneness had the strongest relationship with movement prediction error. In this report, we also discuss the error tendency (overestimations or underestimations of one’s own movements). Conclusions. This finding is in accordance with the idea that passivity phenomena or proneness may be caused by the abnormal prediction of one’s own actions or movements.     

In what sense is the no-no paradox a paradox?

Philosophical Studies - Cook regards Sorenson’s so-called ‘the no-no paradox’ as only a kind of ‘meta-paradox’ or ‘quasi-paradox’ because the symmetry...     

In what sense is implicit memory "episodic"? The effect of reinstating environmental context

We consider three aspects of the term episodic. Previous literature shows implicit memory does not make conscious autobiographical reference but does code an item's intrinsic context (e.g., perceptual detail). Here, we consider extrinsic context--namely, that not directly processed as part of item identification and not overtly relevant to the task. Study-test mismatch in environmental context (outdoors vs. indoors) reduced memory in an explicit stem-cued recall task but had no effect on repetition priming in an implicit stem completion task. This was true even for very low frequency words. We support the view that implicit memory reflects traces within perceptual (or semantic) knowledge-based systems that are instance specific but do not code the full spatiotemporal context information necessary to support conscious recollection. We also interpret our results as consistent with differences in environmental context specificity between free recall and recognition.     

A problem for Wegner and colleagues’ model of the sense of agency

The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental state causation. Here, I argue that this model is inconsistent with data from developmental psychology that suggests children can identify the agent behind an action without being capable of understanding the relationship between their intentions and actions. Furthermore, I argue that this model is inconsistent with the preserved sense of agency in autism. In general, the problem is that there are cases where subjects can experience themselves as the agent behind their actions despite lacking the resources to make the inference to apparent mental state causation.     

Who is David and who is Goliath? The Eddie Long scandal and the black mega-church

The recent scandal involving Bishop Eddie Long of New Birth Missionary Baptist Church has led millions of individuals to evaluate the guilt or innocence of Bishop Long as well the significance of the black mega-church. This study examined the possible effects of a well-publicised scandal involving a black mega-church pastor on the mental health of African Americans within and outside of the church. To address this paucity in the research, over 3000 comments made by anonymous contributors on CNN's public website were analysed using a grounded theory methodology. The following five themes were identified: (1) Keep an Open Mind: “Most People Thrive on Negativity;” (2) Hypocrisy as Part of Religion: “They aren’t real Christians;” (3) Greed as Part of Religion: “Just in it for the money;” (4) Religion and/or Christianity as Problematic: “Christians scare the Jesus out of me;” and (5) Religious Leaders Actions are separate from Individuals’ Personal Faith and Their Relationship with God: “You don’t put your faith in a man.” Narratives will be offered to support and illustrate each of these themes, and the implications for the mental health of African Americans will be discussed.     

Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.     

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.     

Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

Who is being deceived? The experimental demands of wearing a backpack

A growing literature argues that wearing a heavy backpack makes slopes look steeper and distances seem longer (e.g., Proffitt, 2006). To test for effects of experimental demand characteristics in a backpack experiment, we manipulated the experimental demand of the backpack and then used a postexperiment questionnaire to assess participants’ beliefs about the purpose of the backpack. For participants in the low-demand condition, an elaborate deception was used to provide an alternative explanation of the requirement to wear a heavy backpack (i.e., that it held EMG equipment). The highest slope judgments were found for those undeceived participants who guessed that the backpack was intended to affect their slope perception and also reported that they thought they were affected by it. When persuaded that the backpack served another purpose, participants’ slope estimates were no different from those of participants not wearing a backpack. These findings suggest that backpack effects, and other reported effects of effort on perception, are judgmental biases that result from the social, not physical, demands of the experimental context.     

Who is exaggerating cognitive impairment and who is not?

This chart review examined the effects of effort on neuropsychological assessment and test performance patterns among genuine and exaggerating patients, with and without neurological findings, as aids to diagnosing symptom exaggeration. The sample consisted of 561 consecutive patients involved in compensation claims. With a flexible neuropsychological test (NPT) battery, the claims were assessed over 2 days. The sample included 303 patients evaluated for traumatic brain injury, 55 patients with neurological disease, and 203 patients assessed for other conditions (eg, depression or chronic pain). An average of 38 ability measures per patient were used to generate an overall NPT domain score. Composite scores were also computed for symptom validity tests, self-report measures of psychiatric symptoms, and memory complaint inventory. Seven NPT cognitive subdomain scores were multiply regressed onto the symptom validity test composite, accounting for 45% of its total variance. Patients were also assigned to Genuine or Exaggerator groups based on symptom validity test performance. The NPT for Exaggerating patients averaged 1.43 standard deviations below that of Genuine patients, suggesting that NPT scores for most Exaggerating patients are underestimates of their true ability. Factor analysis results differed between these groups. As a result, clinicians might avoid falsely identifying genuine patients as exaggerating by incorporating their self-reports of psychiatric symptoms and memory complaints into the diagnostic process.     

But what about the Empress of Racnoss? The allocation of attention to spiders and Doctor Who in a visual search task is predicted by fear and expertise

If there is a spider in the room, then the spider phobic in your group is most likely to point it out to you. This phenomenon is believed to arise because our attentional systems are hardwired to attend to threat in our environment, and, to a spider phobic, spiders are threatening. However, an alternative explanation is simply that attention is quickly drawn to the stimulus of most personal relevance in the environment. Our research examined whether positive stimuli with no biological or evolutionary relevance could be allocated preferential attention. We compared attention to pictures of spiders with pictures from the TV program Doctor Who, for people who varied in both their love of Doctor Who and their fear of spiders. We found a double dissociation: interference from spider and Doctor-Who-related images in a visual search task was predicted by spider fear and Doctor Who expertise, respectively. As such, allocation of attention reflected the personal relevance of the images rather than their threat content. The attentional system believed to have a causal role in anxiety disorders is therefore likely to be a general system that responds not to threat but to stimulus relevance; hence, nonevolutionary images, such as those from Doctor Who, captured attention as quickly as fear-relevant spider images. Where this leaves the Empress of Racnoss, we are unsure.