Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: The role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Working memory load differentially affects tip-of-the-tongue states and feeling-of-knowing judgments

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled, whereas feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) are predictions of successful recognition for items not recalled. The assumption has been that similar metacognitive processes dictate these similar judgments. In Experiment 1, TOTs and FOKs were compared for general information questions. Participants remembered four digits (working memory load) during target retrieval for half of the questions, and there was no memory load for the other questions. Working memory did not affect recall but decreased the number of TOTs and increased FOKs. In Experiment 2, participants maintained six digits during retrieval. TOTs decreased in the working memory condition, but FOKs remained constant. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while asking for FOKs for recall. In each of the first three experiments, positive metacognitive judgments also affected working memory performance, supporting the idea that working memory and metamemory use similar monitoring processes. In Experiment 4, visual working memory did not affect TOTs or FOKs. The data support a view that TOTs and FOKs are separable metacognitive entities.     

Selective target processing: perceptual load or distractor salience?

Perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995) states that participants cannot engage in focused attention when shown displays containing a low perceptual load, because attentional resources are not exhausted, whereas in high-load displays attention is always focused, because attentional resources are exhausted. An alternative "salience" hypothesis holds that the salience of distractors and not perceptual load per se determines selective attention. Three experiments were conducted to investigate the influence that target and distractor onsets and offsets have on selective processing in a standard interference task. Perceptual load theory predicts that, regardless of target or distractor presentation (onset or offset), interference from ignored distractors should occur in low-load displays only. In contrast, the salience hypothesis predicts that interference should occur when the distractor appears as an onset and would occur for distractor offsets only when the target was also an offset. Interference may even occur in highload displays if the distractor is more salient. The results supported the salience hypothesis.     

儿童计算的元认知监测及其对策略选择的影响

为了考察儿童在计算中的元认知监测及其对策略选择的影响,选用两种实验材料,对五种元认知监测判断的特点及监测判断对策略选择的影响进行考察,发现:儿童的元认知监测判断等级值总体上具有较高的一致性,元认知监测判断大多与策略选择高度相关,具有较好的预测力,但受材料、指导语等因素影响,又呈现出复杂的关系。本研究从一个侧面证实了元认知监控的基本假说和元认知监测判断的状态说。     

Capacity limits for face processing

We present three experiments in which subjects were asked to make speeded sex judgements (Experiment 1) or semantic judgements (Experiments 2 and 3) to face targets and nonface items, while ignoring a solitary flanking distractor face or a nonface stimulus. Distractors could be either congruent (same response category) or incongruent (different response category) with the target. Distractor congruency effects were consistently observed in all combinations of target-distractor stimulus pairs, except when a distractor face flanked a target face. The failure to find congruency effects in this condition was explored further in a fourth experiment, in which four task-irrelevant flankers were simultaneously presented. Once again, no face-face congruency effects were found, even though comparison distractors interfered with face and nonface targets alike. However, four simultaneously presented distractor faces did not interfere with nonface targets either. We suggest that these experiments demonstrate a capacity limit for visual processing in these conditions, such that no more than one face is processed at a time.     

Study repetition and the rejection of conjunction lures

Four experiments were conducted to provide further support for a dual-process approach to conjunction errors in recognition memory over a single-process approach. In Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b study words were repeated once (2 presentations) or several times (8 or 16 presentations), and a response signal delay (RSD) was manipulated (short vs long). Short RSD groups produced lower hit rates but higher conjunction error rates compared to long RSD groups. Repetition effects on conjunction errors occurred for short RSD but not long RSD groups. In Experiment 3, additional judgements on new items were solicited to show that the "null" effects for long RSD groups in the earlier experiments were, in fact, illusory. Together, the experiments provide evidence for recollection-based rejections of conjunction lures and support a dual-process theory of recognition memory over a single-process model.     

Attentional selection: A salience-based competition for representation

The role of salience in localized attentional interference (LAI) was examined. In two experiments, target discrimination performance was measured as a function of the spatial separation between the target and a salient distractor item. In Experiment 1, both the salience of the distractor and that of a target were manipulated. Distractor salience was manipulated via size changes to the distractor, and target salience was manipulated by using unmasked or onset targets. When the target was of low salience, the magnitude of interference from the distractor increased with distractor salience. However, when the target had an abrupt onset, the distractor had no impact on target performance. In Experiment 2, the attentional salience of the distractor was manipulated using a probability manipulation. Displays contained both a target and a color singleton distractor. The color singleton produced LAI when it was predictive of the target location but not when it was unpredictive of the target location. The results of both experiments are consistent with models of competition-based attentional selection.     

Effects of study list composition on the word frequency effect and metacognitive attributions in recognition memory

In two experiments, study-list composition was manipulated and its impact was observed on metacognitive judgements associated with recognition hits (Hs) and false alarms (FAs). Both studies involved recognition of high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words, and focused on the FA portion of the word frequency effect. Our hypothesis was that participants can actively reject items that are distinctive from the study list, and that this effect may be strong enough to overcome the FA word frequency effect. Experiment 1 manipulated list composition with a conjunctive rule and Experiment 2 varied it by having participants study either HF or LF items prior to a test consisting of words of both frequencies. In each study H rate, FA rate, and metacognitive attributions underlying recognition decisions were investigated. In both studies, participants reported rejecting test items predominantly through a process of active rejection, which was more often reported for LF items. This effect was strong enough to reverse the FA portion of the word frequency effect in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1. The results are discussed in terms of metacognitive rejection mechanisms in recognition memory.     

Effects of study list composition on the word frequency effect and metacognitive attributions in recognition memory

In two experiments, study-list composition was manipulated and its impact was observed on metacognitive judgements associated with recognition hits (Hs) and false alarms (FAs). Both studies involved recognition of high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words, and focused on the FA portion of the word frequency effect. Our hypothesis was that participants can actively reject items that are distinctive from the study list, and that this effect may be strong enough to overcome the FA word frequency effect. Experiment 1 manipulated list composition with a conjunctive rule and Experiment 2 varied it by having participants study either HF or LF items prior to a test consisting of words of both frequencies. In each study H rate, FA rate, and metacognitive attributions underlying recognition decisions were investigated. In both studies, participants reported rejecting test items predominantly through a process of active rejection, which was more often reported for LF items. This effect was strong enough to reverse the FA portion of the word frequency effect in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1. The results are discussed in terms of metacognitive rejection mechanisms in recognition memory.     

The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring

Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.     

Effects of dividing attention during encoding on perceptual priming of unfamiliar visual objects

According to the distractor-selection hypothesis (Mulligan, 2003), dividing attention during encoding reduces perceptual priming when responses to non-critical (i.e., distractor) stimuli are selected frequently and simultaneously with critical stimulus encoding. Because direct support for this hypothesis comes exclusively from studies using familiar word stimuli, the present study tested whether the predictions of the distractor-selection hypothesis extend to perceptual priming of unfamiliar visual objects using the possible/impossible object decision test. Consistent with the distractor-selection hypothesis, Experiments 1 and 2 found no reduction in priming when the non-critical stimuli were presented infrequently and non-synchronously with the critical target stimuli, even though explicit recognition memory was reduced. In Experiment 3, non-critical stimuli were presented frequently and simultaneously during encoding of critical stimuli; however, no decrement in priming was detected, even when encoding time was reduced. These results suggest that priming in the possible/impossible object decision test is relatively immune to reductions in central attention and that not all aspects of the distractor-selection hypothesis generalise to priming of unfamiliar visual objects. Implications for theoretical models of object decision priming are discussed.     

Task-relevance modulates the effects of peripheral distractors

The current study investigated whether task-relevant information affects performance differently from how information that is not relevant for the task does when presented peripherally and centrally. In three experiments a target appeared inside the focus of attention, whereas a to-be-ignored distractor appeared either in the periphery (Experiments 1 and 2) or at the centre (Experiment 3) of attention. In each trial the distractor carried both task-relevant and irrelevant information. The results confirmed the “task relevance” hypothesis: Task-irrelevant information affected performance only when it appeared at the centre of attention, whereas task-relevant information affected performance when it appeared inside as well as outside the main focus of attention. The current results do not support suggestions that spatial stimuli (e.g., arrows) draw attention automatically regardless of task relevance.     

Task-relevance modulates the effects of peripheral distractors

The current study investigated whether task-relevant information affects performance differently from how information that is not relevant for the task does when presented peripherally and centrally. In three experiments a target appeared inside the focus of attention, whereas a to-be-ignored distractor appeared either in the periphery (Experiments 1 and 2) or at the centre (Experiment 3) of attention. In each trial the distractor carried both task-relevant and irrelevant information. The results confirmed the “task relevance” hypothesis: Task-irrelevant information affected performance only when it appeared at the centre of attention, whereas task-relevant information affected performance when it appeared inside as well as outside the main focus of attention. The current results do not support suggestions that spatial stimuli (e.g., arrows) draw attention automatically regardless of task relevance.     

Study repetition and the rejection of conjunction lures

Four experiments were conducted to provide further support for a dual-process approach to conjunction errors in recognition memory over a single-process approach. In Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b study words were repeated once (2 presentations) or several times (8 or 16 presentations), and a response signal delay (RSD) was manipulated (short vs long). Short RSD groups produced lower hit rates but higher conjunction error rates compared to long RSD groups. Repetition effects on conjunction errors occurred for short RSD but not long RSD groups. In Experiment 3, additional judgements on new items were solicited to show that the “null” effects for long RSD groups in the earlier experiments were, in fact, illusory. Together, the experiments provide evidence for recollection-based rejections of conjunction lures and support a dual-process theory of recognition memory over a single-process model.     

Detecting and identifying offset gaze

A number of experiments have demonstrated that observers can accurately identify stimuli that they fail to detect (Rollman and Nachmias, 1972; Harris and Fahle, 1995; Allik et al. 1982, 2014). Using a 2x2AFC double judgements procedure, we demonstrated an analogous pattern of performance in making judgements about the direction of eye gaze. Participants were shown two faces in succession: one with direct gaze and one with gaze offset to the left or right. We found that they could identify the direction of gaze offset (left/right) better than they could detect which face contained the offset gaze. A simple Thurstonian model, under which the detection judgement is shown to be more computationally complex, was found to explain the empirical data. A further experiment incorporated metacognitive ratings into the double judgements procedure to measure observers’ metacognitive awareness (Meta-d’) across the two judgements and to assess whether observers were aware of the evidence for offset gaze when detection performance was at and below threshold. Results suggest that metacognitive awareness is tied to performance, with approximately equal Meta-d’ across the two judgements, when sensitivity is taken into account. These results show that both performance and metacognitive awareness rely not only on the strength of sensory evidence but also on the computational complexity of the decision, which determines the relative distance of that evidence from the decision axes.     

Prior knowledge: the effects of natural category size on memory for implicitly encoded concepts

Studying a familiar word activates its associates, and these associates affect the likelihood of recalling the studied word in a cued recall task. These experiments examined variables that normally affect memory for the studied word to determine if they have similar effects on memory for the word's associates. Memory for associates was tested by cued recall (Experiments 1-3) or by recognition (Experiments 4-5), with the number and strength of the associates varied in all experiments. In different experiments, test instructions (direct-indirect), distractor tasks, lag, and amount of practice were manipulated. Provided that subjects were not distracted prior to test, the probability of recalling associates of the studied word decreased with the number of associates activated and with their strength under all conditions. The strength of the associates but not their number affected recognition. In general, variables that affected recall and recognition of studied words had parallel effects on their associates.     

Development of strategic skills in impulsive and reflective children: a longitudinal study of metacognition

This study examined the relationships between metamemory and strategic behavior in impulsive and reflective children. One hundred thirty children from the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades participated. Seventy-seven of these children had been tested 3 years earlier on metamemory and cognitive tempo tasks. At pretraining, children were assessed on metamemory, cognitive tempo, summarization skills, and teacher ratings of impulsive behavior in the classroom. Next, children in three experimental groups received prose summarization instructions, summarization instructions in conjunction with metacognitive training about the importance of a reflective approach to learning, or no instructions. Following training, children were again measured on tempo, summarization skills, and teacher ratings of impulsivity. Analyses of strategy maintenance data indicated superior performance for children who had received both summarization and metacognitive training. Causal modeling analyses showed that early metamemory was an antecedent of later strategy acquisition. The dual role of metacognition as a precursor of later strategy acquisition and controller of lower level strategies was highlighted.     

Processing similarity does not improve metamemory: evidence against transfer-appropriate monitoring

The transfer-appropriate monitoring (TAM) hypothesis of metamemory predicts that judgment of learning (JOL) accuracy should improve when conditions during JOLs closely match conditions of the memory test. The authors devised 5 types of delayed JOLs for paired associates and varied them along with the type of memory test (cued recall or recognition). If the TAM hypothesis is correct, JOL and test type should interact to influence metamemory. Contrary to TAM, metamemory accuracy did not improve when JOL and test conditions matched but instead tended to vary according to whether the answer was apparent at time of JOL. Memory test scores and JOL magnitude were both greater when the correct target was evident during JOLs. Overall, the results are largely consistent with a monitoring retrieval view of delayed JOLs and do not support TAM as a viable account of JOL accuracy.     

Does delaying judgments of learning really improve the efficacy of study decisions? Not so much

A widely held assumption in metamemory is that better, more accurate metamemory monitoring leads to better, more efficacious restudy decisions, reflected in better memory performance--we refer to this causal chain as the restudy selectivity hypothesis. In 3 sets of experiments, we tested this hypothesis by factorially manipulating metamemory monitoring accuracy and self-regulation of study. To manipulate monitoring accuracy, we compared judgments of learning (JOLs) made contemporaneously with a delayed retrieval attempt to JOLs either made at a delay without attempting retrieval or made immediately after study; in previous studies, delayed retrieval-based JOLs have robustly predicted recall with greater relative accuracy than have the other JOL types. To manipulate self-regulation of study, in Experiments 1A-1C and 2A-2C, we compared conditions in which participants' restudy selections were honored with conditions in which they were completely or randomly dishonored; in Experiments 3A-3C, we randomly honored or dishonored half of the restudy selections and half of the nonselections. Results revealed that the benefit of delayed, retrieval-based JOLs for final memory performance was due largely to the selection of more items for restudy rather than to better discriminations between items that would benefit more versus less from restudy. In most cases, gains in recall due to greater self-regulation of study did not increase with better monitoring accuracy; when they did, the effect was extremely small. The surprising conclusion was that restudy decisions were not very much more efficacious under conditions that yield greater monitoring accuracy than under those that do not.