Shame as a Cultural Artifact: A Call for Self-Awareness and Reflexivity in Personality Assessment

It has become common for assessors to face therapeutic impasses and dilemmas when practicing within the Therapeutic Assessment (TA) model. This is due to the explicit goal of producing therapeutic changes in clients. In this article the author discusses the importance of assessors being aware of how their clinical practices relate to their assessment outcomes. To enhance such awareness, the author reviews the characteristics of psychological assessment practices as derived from 3 paradigms developed almost 1.5 centuries ago in Europe by the forefathers of psychology as a scientific discipline. Current assessment practices are deeply ingrained in specific cultural, social, and political frameworks originating in these paradigms. Being aware of such a historical and cultural background might help the assessor avoid blindly reenacting the values, norms, and latent relational schemas implied by different assessment methods, and instead use assessment tools as potent aids in the service of clients' change. Finally, the author illustrates how the experience of clients' shame in psychological assessment might also be understood as a by-product of the specific cultural and historical background of certain common assessment practices.     

Reflexivity,Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model

The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of ?āntarak?ita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating (svaprakā?ya). Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily involves minimal subjectivity. Third, I will argue that neither the reflexivity nor the subjectivity of consciousness implies that there is any entity such as the self or ego over and above reflexive consciousness. Fourth, I will argue that what we normally think of as ‘the self’ is best understood as a complex, multi-layered process (aha?kāra, ‘I-making’) that emerges within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness.     

佛教的"我"与"无我"

佛教以"无我"观念区别于其它宗教,通过提倡"无我"消除人们对两种自我的执着人我与法我,最终实现人的"真我",而把世间公认的人格我称为"假我".     

Inherent Self,Invented Self,Empty Self: Constructivism,Buddhism, and Psychotherapy

Constructivist and Buddhist approaches to counseling and psychotherapy share increasing popularity as well as similar epistemological assumptions and understanding of human dysfunction and its amelioration. These approaches can be seen as consistent with postmodern psychology, which is distinguished from a realist or foundationalist view. This article provides an overview of these 2 models and describes some of their implications for psychopathology and psychotherapy, including examples of specific therapeutic approaches drawn from each perspective that might mutually inform practitioners who wish to apply this perspective to a higher view of the human situation.     

Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self

In the contemporary debate on the nature of autonomy, it is generally taken for granted that autonomy is to be understood as rule by the self, with the debate centring on how that self is to be identified. Garnett [2013b Garnett, Michael 2013b. The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/4. [Google Scholar]] has recently proposed a theory that rejects the dominant understanding of autonomy as rule by the self and views it instead as resistance to rule by others. According to that theory, an autonomous agent is one whose various ‘autonomy traits’ render her sufficiently resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that Garnett has not given us good reason to abandon the understanding of autonomy as rule by the self. His account is plausible only if it is understood to require for autonomy the possession of at least one trait with which the agent can be identified. And the best explanation of the necessity of some such trait(s) is offered, not by Garnett's, but by the dominant understanding of autonomy he rejects.     

Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the Self

Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in ways in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title ‘bodily awareness’. The legitimacy of grouping together these ways of gaining information is shown by the fact that they are unified phenomenologically; they provide the subject with an awareness of his or her body ‘from the inside’. Bodily awareness is an awareness of our own bodies from within. This perspective on our own bodies does not, cannot, vary. As Merleau‐Ponty writes, ‘my own body…is always presented to me from the same angle’ (1962: 90). It has recently been claimed by a number of philosophers that, in bodily awareness, one is not simply aware of one's body as one's body, but one is aware of one's body as oneself. That is, when I attend to the object of bodily awareness I am presented not just with my body, but with my ‘bodily self’. The contention of the present paper is that such a view is misguided. In the first section I clarify just what is at issue here. In the remainder of the paper I present an argument, based on two claims about the nature of the imagination, against the view that the bodily self is presented in bodily awareness. Section two defends the dependency thesis; a claim about the relation between perception and sensory imagination. Section three defends a certain view about our capacity to imagine being other people. Section four presents the main argument against the bodily self awareness view and section five addresses some objections.     

Reflexivity without identity matching training: A first demonstration

Until now, the equivalence property of reflexivity—matching physically identical stimuli to themselves after training on a set of arbitrary matching relations—has not been demonstrated in any animal, human or nonhuman. Previous reports of reflexivity have either implicitly or explicitly involved reinforced training on other identity matching relations. Here we demonstrate reflexivity without prior identity matching training. Pigeons received concurrent successive matching training on three arbitrary matching tasks: AB (hue–form), BC (form–hue), and AC (hue–hue with different hues in the A and C sets). Afterwards, pigeons were tested for BB (form–form) reflexivity. Consistent with the predictions of Urcuioli's ( 2008 ) theory, pigeons preferentially responded to B comparison stimuli that matched the preceding B sample stimuli in testing (i.e., BB reflexivity). A separate experiment showed that a slightly different set of arbitrary matching baseline relations yielded a theoretically predicted “anti‐reflexivity” (or emergent oddity) effect in two of five pigeons. Finally, training on just two arbitrary successive matching tasks (AB and BC) did not yield any differential BB responding in testing for five of eight pigeons, with two others showing reflexivity and one showing antireflexivity. These data complement previous findings of symmetry and transitivity (the two other properties of equivalence) in pigeons.     

Suffering and the Dialectical Self in Buddhism and Relational Psychoanalysis

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

自我对话与情绪智力的关系:自我意识的中介作用

以389名大学生为被试,采用自我对话量表、自我意识量表和情绪智力量表,考察了三者之间的关系,以说明自我意识在自我对话与情绪智力的关系中所起的中介效应。结果表明,在中国大学生群体中,自我对话的自我激励维度得分最低,其次是社会评价维度,自我批判和自我管理维度得分最高;自我意识在自我对话和情绪智力的关系中起着完全中介作用;自我意识包含两个维度即私我意识与公我意识,私我意识在自我对话与情绪智力的关系中起着部分中介作用,公我意识在自我对话与情绪智力的关系中起着部分中介作用,并且私我意识的中介效应大于公我意识的中介效应。     

Buddhism and bell hooks: Liberatory Aesthetics and the Radical Subjectivity of No‐Self

This article engages bell hooks's concept of “radical black subjectivity” through the lens of the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. Relying on the Zen theorist Dōgen and on resources from Japanese aesthetics, I argue that non‐attachment to the self clarifies hooks's claim that radical subjectivity unites our capacity for critical resistance with our capacity to appreciate beauty. I frame this argument in terms of hooks's concern that postmodernist identity critiques dismiss the identity claims of disempowered peoples. On the one hand, identity critique has an emotional component, as it involves questioning the self and possibly letting go of aspects of that self in which a person has inevitably made emotional investments. On the other hand, it has an aesthetic component, as it opens a space for the creative crafting and recrafting of identity. Japanese aesthetics emphasizes that all aesthetic appreciation is accompanied by feelings of mournfulness, for the object of aesthetic appreciation is transient. Linking hooks's liberatory aesthetics with the resources of the Japanese tradition suggests that mournfulness in the face of self‐loss necessarily accompanies all instances of critical resistance. Thus non‐attachment becomes a useful framework in which to understand both the emotional and aesthetic components of empowered identity critique.     

The Effect of New Religious Movement Affiliation and Disaffiliation on Reflexivity and Sense of Self

Challenging the contemporary belief that emotional damage invariably results from new religious movement (NRM) participation, this study shows that membership in and exit from a world‐rejecting NRM may initiate the development of increased reflexivity and a personal sense of self for some former members. Out of a sample of 23 former members, 12 participants were identified who report prior histories of “other‐directedness” and for whom exit from an NRM instigated a shift toward increased independence and individuality. Employing symbolic interactionist theories of self, this article conceptualizes the process through which these participants may be understood to have gained in reflexivity and personal autonomy. Four case studies demonstrate how the identity loss and uncertainty suffered following exit can “shock” former members into self‐awareness and reflexivity, instigating a period of active learning about personal emotions, thoughts, and beliefs that leads to the active construction of a stronger personal self.     

The Square and Semi-Circle of Existence: An Experiential Account of Development of Self Awareness

The paper is an experiential account of my journey through life and a study of different roles I play in my life which has led me to come up with the ‘square of existence’. This square details upon shared identity and how eventually the process of detachment is born which gives a more objective perspective to life. Three layers of emotions - anger, prayer and surrender which developed as a result of these processes and further paved way for the ‘semi circle of existence’. The semi circle comes to life only when we live truly in the square of existence and follow the meditative path of connecting and responding. The paper discusses various life aspects relating to detachment, surrender and meditation inspired by the teachings of Sri Aurobindo, The Mother and Sant Kabir and how they affect our way of being and becoming, thus laying foundation for a healthy psychological and emotional development.     

Strangers to Ourselves: Exploring the Limits and Potentials of the Analyst's Self Awareness in Self- and Mutual Analysis

The analyst's self-analysis—originally fashioned on Freud's solo foray into his own unconscious mind—continues to play an important psychoanalytic role. A summary of relevant literature is presented that includes recent relational psychoanalytic and neuroscientific data. Three major findings emerge: First, analysts' achievement of self-awareness in the analytic setting is clearly limited, more limited than we might like to admit, especially when we act alone; second, analysts reaching clinical self-awareness is a mutual, interactive process that, in addition to psychological processes, can be understood on the basis of operations uncovered by neuroscience, especially the mirror neuron system; third, accordingly, a form of “mutual” analysis is seen as an indispensable element of the analytic process. Analysts' achievement of self-awareness is discussed with a particular focus on our intrinsic relationality, and on mentalization, self-reflexivity, new relational experience, and therapeutic action. Illustrative case material is discussed.     

Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness

Topoi - This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take...     

Self-Images without Awareness and Projective Methods of Personality Assessment

Ss' responses to tachistoscopic exposures of self-photographs have been suggested as one approach to self-images without awareness. Sixty-three Ss completed a Q sort for themselves and after tachistoscopic exposure of their own and control photographs, for the persons in the photographs. Ss also completed the Structured-Objective Rorschach Test and Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank. The self was sorted most favorably, the control tachistoscopic exposure significantly less favorably, and the self tachistoscopic exposure significantly less favorably than the control. These differences were found to be related to sex and adjustment measured with the Rotter. The SORT correlated insignificantly with Q sort and Rotter.