Psychological Emptiness in the Zhuāngzǐ

Three views of psychological emptiness, or xū, can be found in the Zhuāngz?. The instrumental view values xū primarily as a means of efficacious action. The moderate view assigns it intrinsic value as an element of one Zhuangist vision of the good life. The radical view also takes it to be an element of the ideal life, but in this case the form of life advocated is that of the Daoist sage, who transcends mundane human concerns to merge with nature or the Dào. The instrumental and moderate views articulate a relatively commonsensical position, on which the agent continues to pursue at least some characteristically human projects. On the radical view, by contrast, the agent ceases to exercise agency and lives a life hardly recognizable as human. The three views thus signal a tension in Zhuangist ethics, and the unattractiveness of the radical view poses a potential obstacle to the application of Daoist ideas in contemporary ethical discourse. The paper argues that there are principled grounds within Zhuangist thought for detaching the instrumental and moderate views from the radical view and rejecting the latter.     

The Rāga Bhāva in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā: Rectifying an Age-Old Mistake

The last foot of the 23rd verse of the Sā?khya Kārikā (SK)—‘tāmasam asmāt viparyastam’—is in need of reinterpretation. Prevailing interpretations are generally based on the primary meaning of the verse. In that sense, it is understood as a declaration of the four tāmasika bhāva that are contrary to the sāttvika ones. Taking the primary meaning of the verse is problematic because it contradicts the gu?a-bhāva coherence required by the doctrine of satkārya. The doctrine of satkārya is one of the foundational principles of Sā?khya. The avirāga or rāga bhāva shows coherence to rajas rather than tamas. I show that the verse needs to be interpreted by taking the secondary meaning. Accordingly, avirāga or rāga is established as a bhāva of rajas rather than tamas. Further, I also show that the idea of bhāva in the Sā?khya Kārikā and the Bhagavadgītā may be closely related.     

The Pari[ndot]āma Aesthetics as Underlying the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a

This paper offers a literary and ideological deconstruction of the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a; it traces the Purā[ndot]a's formation through the convergence of the Vedāntin, the Aesthetic and the Vai[sdot][ndot]ava traditions, and argues that it is the doctrine of Pari[ndot]āma which underlies the treatise. I first examine the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's literary components; the roots of these are traced back historically to the Vedānta and ālvār traditions, and the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's nature as an opus universale, representing an all Indian cultural ‘melting pot’, is highlighted. The paper then looks at the relations of Vai[sdot][ndot]avism and dramaturgy, both historically as well as theologically, and argues that the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a was traditionally read as a drama. It proceeds to decipher the aesthetic theory underlying the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a, and argues that it is Bharata's dramaturgical rasa theory. Within the rasa tradition, Abhinavagupta's and Bhoja's positions are highlighted and compared through three seminal points and it becomes apparent that the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's underlying aesthetic theory is close to the Pari[ndot]āma doctrine of Bhoja where ?[rdot][ndot]gāra is considered to be the supreme rasa. As Bhoja's date is no doubt later than the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's it is assumed that the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a was influenced by one of Bhoja's predecessors. The paper ends by reinforcing this analysis by highlighting a later tradition which had actually accepted this point of view and that is the Gau[ddot]iya Vai[sdot][ndot]ava tradition.     

Examining Hindu Ethics: The Three Yogas in Bhāgavata Purāṇa Commentaries

The object of this article is pre-colonial Hindu ways of distinguishing “the path of devotion” (bhakti-yoga) from “the path of knowledge” (jñāna-yoga) and “the path of work” (karma-yoga). It highlights how a developing religious group in early modern India explained and justified its path—its ethics, its ritual, its theology—while in conversation with the larger Brahminical tradition out of which it was emerging. I argue that early authors in the Chaitanya Vaishnava tradition such as Sanātana (c.1475–1554), Rūpa (c.1480–1554), Jīva (c.1510–1606), and Viśvanātha (fl. c.1650–1712) used the authority of the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa to elevate devotion to an ethical imperative by including and excluding the behaviors and the motives of the older and well-established paths like knowledge, works, and Patañjali’s yoga. Their ethics is connected to an ontology of god’s being in which the path of devotion is uniquely effective in revealing god’s being and uniquely salvific the among paths. I argue this discourse on the three paths is a type of Hindu ethics, but it is unclear how it might be reconstructed in rational terms to deal with contemporary issues and that its primary innovation for the time was the uncoupling of ethics from the caste system.     

Husserl’s Arguments for Psychologism

Axiomathes - The question of the psychologism of the theory of number developed by Husserl in his Philosophy of Arithmetic has long been debated, but it cannot be considered fully resolved. In this...     

The first argument for Sarvāstivāda

Philosophers belonging to the Buddhist school of Sarvāstivāda believed in the real existence of past and future dharmas. This paper explores the implications, soteriological and philosophical, of an argument for this belief presented at the beginning of an early abhidharma text. The argument is two‐fold: that past states of mind can be directly perceived; and that the temporal and causal context of these states of mind, including their karmic future and the possibility of an alternative saving future, can also be directly perceived. The paper relates the Sarvāstivādins’ theory of time to Buddhist concerns with self‐knowledge and with conditional‐ity; and suggests that the argument is an early example of their adherence to the epistemological position of Direct Realism.     

Two cheers for Tanhā

The central character in Sartre's 1938 novel La Nausée, Antoine Roquentin, has lost his sense of things, and now the world appears to him as utterly unstable. Roquentin suffers from what he calls ‘nausea,’ a condition caused by an ontological intuition that the self, as well as the world through which that ‘self’ moves, lacks a substantial nature. The novel portrays Sartre's own philosophical account of the self in La transcendence de l'égo. Here Sartre argues that Husserl's account of consciousness is not radical enough; the ‘I’ or ego is a pseudo-source of activity (and Sartre thus draws very close to a particularly Buddhist account of personal identity). My essay questions Roquentin's response to his ontological insight: why is this the occasion for ‘nausea’? Why doesn't Roquentin (as King Milinda famously does) celebrate and embrace his ‘non-self’? I argue that Sartre's depiction of Roquentin's ailment, and the unsatisfactory solution he provides, misunderstands both the aggregate nature of things as well as authentically rendered consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra).     

Rāgabodha: A Śābdabodha-Based Framework for a Theory of Rāga

In Indian knowledge traditions, Vyākaraṇa describes the rules for the formation (prakṛti-pratyaya-vibhāga) and use of correct words (sādhuśabda). The Vākya (sentence) is postulated as the primary unit of communication. “śābdabodha” deals with the cognition of sentential meaning. Similarly, in Indian music, every rāga has a lexicon and grammar (rāga-lakṣaṇa): a rāga only allows some notes and not others, and it has rules for constructing phrases—notes to be highlighted, notes to end phrases on, ornamentation, etc. These phrases of the rāga are comparable to “vākya” which when presented with due regard to certain other considerations generate an apprehension of the rāga (rāgabodha). During presentation of a rāga, an artist aims to evoke the rāga-cchāyā or rāga-svarūpa and also an emotive state in the listener. There is a cognitive aspect to the informed listening of a rāga that is parallel to linguistic communication. We seek to understand how these parallels work between śābdabodha and rāgabodha. We postulate that the conditions of expectancy (ākāṅkśā), logical consistency (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) in combination with the theory of sphoṭa provide a framework to explain how a rāga is expounded and cognised.

     

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.     

Kāma,Preman, and Bhakti in Śrīdhara’s Commentary on Kṛṣṇa and the Gopīs in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Although the Bhāgavata Purāṇa presents an innovative soteriology of emotion that explicitly identifies kāma as the gopīs’...     

The development and use of the eight precepts for lay practitioners,Upāsakas and Upāsikās in Theravāda Buddhism in the West

Sometimes translating religious texts brings us up against the problem of scatological language. The author examines this problem in relation to a story of a former life of the Buddha and explores a variety of avenues for guidance on how to render gūtha ‘shit’ into English. This includes looking at Buddhist monastic law, which does not necessarily give us the guidance we might expect, and how the existing translation of this source of guidance illustrates the very problem in hand. The textual history and context of the story precludes some otherwise useful strategies for determining our translation and the best guide to the translator's hand in this instance turns out to be humour. The author makes a case that, employed judiciously, humour could become a useful hermeneutic tool for drawing meaning from religious literature. Along the way the author also reflects on the influence of the social context of the translator, including changes in British obscenity law, and on the possibility that academia is unconsciously constrained by unexamined assumptions of ‘decency’. Buddhist attitudes to language are also touched upon.     

Are Conductive Arguments Possible?

Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (1971: 57) I argue that Conductive Arguments are not possible—the “ought” conclusion only holds if countervailing considerations are nullified.     

The nibbāna-parinibbāna controversy

Bahya ben Joseph Ibn Pakuda, The book of directions to the duties of the heart, Introduction, translation and notes by Menahem Mansoor. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. VIII + 472. £6

Marasinghe, M.M.J., Gods in early Buddhism — a study of their social and mythological milieu as depicted in the Nikāyas of the Pali Canon, Sri Lanka, 1974, pp. xviii + 301. Library ed. RS. 50.00, Popular ed. Rs. 37–50

Conze, Edward, Buddhist wisdom books, The diamond sutra and The heart sutra, London: George Allen &; Unwin, 1975, paperback edition, pp. 110 £1.95

Schloegl, Irmgard (ed.), The wisdom of the Zen masters, London: Sheldon Press, 1975, pp. 80, paperback and cloth (£2.75)

Davies, W.D., The gospel and the land, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974, pp. xiv + 521

Dumery, Henry, Phenomenology and religion. Structures of the Christian institution, Translated by Paul Barrett. Hermeneutics: Vol. V. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, pp. ix + 114 $7.95

Dhavamony, Mariasusai, Phenomenology of religion, Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1973, pp. 385. 4,000 lire

Larson, Gerald James (ed.), Myth in Indo-European antiquity, (co-edited by C. Scott Littleton and Jaan Puhvel), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 197. £5.00

Dumézil, Georges, From myth to fiction; the saga of hadingus, Translated by Derek Coltman, pp. 253, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973

Kinsley, David R., The sword and the flute, Kālī and Krsna: Dark visions of the terrible and the sublime in Hindu mythology, University of California Press, 1975, pp. 159 + bibliography, £7.80

McDermott, Six pillars. Introductions to the major works of Sri Aurobindo, Robert A. (ed.), Chambersburg, Pa.: Wilson Books, 1974, pp. 198

Sperber, Dan, Rethinking symbolism, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. £1.90 (paper)

Poliakov, Leon, The history of anti-semitism (The Littman Library of Jewish civilization), London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1974. Vol. I, pp. ix + 340, £4.25; Vol. II, pp. xiii + 400, £4.25