Hermeneutical Injustice and Liberatory Education

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a gap in the interpretive resources available to members of a society due to the marginalization of members of a social group from sense‐making practices. In this paper, I address two questions about hermeneutical injustice that are undertheorized in the recent literature: (1) what do we mean when we say that someone lacks the interpretive resources for making sense of an experience? and (2) how do marginalized individuals develop interpretive resources? In response to (1), I argue that to lack interpretive resources is to lack conceptual skill or know how. In response to (2), I draw on resources from Gilbert Ryle and Andy Clark and provide a model of how marginalized individuals develop new conceptual skills by naming their shared experience and using it as a tool for scaffolding each other's conceptual performance. At the same time, I draw on the work of Gaile Pohlhaus and Kristie Dotson to show how these practices succeed only through the redistribution of epistemic power across differently situated social groups.     

Method and Explanation in History and in Social Representations

A commonly held point of view defines a discipline as a science if it uses inductive and/or deductive methods in studying phenomena in question, because these methods, it is believed, will enable generalization of findings. Both history and theory of social representations study unique phenomena and therefore, for these disciplines, induction and deduction are unsuitable methods of exploration. History and theory of social representations treat a historical event and a social psychological phenomenon, respectively, as dynamic, systemic and one of its kind. Using relational epistemologies, these disciplines produce context-dependent and context-specific knowledge. Whilst similarities among historical, as well as among social psychological occurrences do exist, they do not yield themselves to inductive generalization. Studies of unique cases require different kinds of generalization; rather than generalising to populations, they pose questions about generalizability, or transferability, with respect to theories of other historical events or social psychological phenomena.     

Social science research in the 1990s: The contribution of constructivism

Social science research in this decade has not made the progress we expected of it. Our findings still diverge, generalization from these findings remains restricted, and the many questions vital to achieving a better society continue to be unanswered. In the next decade, social science research may be able to benefit from constructivism. In this article I explore some of the constructivist assumptions about people. These include their subjectivity and purpose, the central role of meaning for them, and how that meaning can be both unique and shared. I also examine some constructivist assumptions about social science. These assumptions enable us as social scientists to understand better the constructivist nature of ourselves as researchers, our research participants, and our research interactions. These assumptions also have implications for the types of data collection methods we choose to use, as well as for data analysis. An example of each is provided. The application of these assumptions seems likely to result in social science research which continues to be diverse and permits only restricted generalization, but is more relevant to the needs of our society.     

Conditionals As Representative Inferences

According to Adams (Inquiry 8:166–197, 1965), the acceptability of an indicative conditional goes with the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. However, some conditionals seem to be inappropriate, although their corresponding conditional probability is high. These are cases with a missing link between antecedent and consequent. Other conditionals are appropriate even though the conditional probability is low. Finally, we have the so-called biscuit conditionals. In this paper we will generalize analyses of Douven (Synthese 164:19–44, 2008) and others to account for the appropriateness of conditionals in terms of evidential support. Our generalization involves making use of Value, or intensity. We will show how this generalization helps to account for biscuit conditionals and conditional threats and promises. Finally, a link is established between this analysis of conditionals and an analysis of generic sentences.

     

Supervision in the Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia: Awareness of and Mutual Reflection upon Fragmentation

Historical and newly emerging models of schizophrenia suggest it is a disorder characterized by the fragmentation of the experience of the self and the world, leading to the interruption of how a unique life is unfolding in the world. It has been proposed that psychotherapy might therefore promote recovery by facilitating the development of a greater ability to integrate information about the self and others. In this paper we explore how the supervision of a metacognitively-oriented psychotherapy can assist therapists to experience and conceptualize fragmentation within sessions, join patients in the gradual process of making sense of their psychiatric problems and life challenges, and ultimately envision and achieve recovery. Common challenges and responses within supervision are described and discussed.

     

Contextual Challenges in South Africa: The Role of a Research Ethics Committee

This article parallels a debate similar to the one in Canada and elsewhere where researchers whose work involves humans now operate under a single ethics policy, with a strong biomedical emphasis. The institution of research ethics committees for humanities and social sciences in South Africa are relatively recent, posing unique challenges to researchers and academicians. These factors contribute to the complexity of conducting ethically sound research in the humanities and social sciences. The article explores this specific context and how a research ethics committee in the humanities and social sciences can meet the challenge of the unique South African context.     

Epistemic Unities

I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases in which it is symmetrical. These structures modela variety of social situations which can thus be given a unified treatment.Among the cases I discuss are persons, which I argue are multiple-expertunities of persons at times. Taking a person as a social unity like this offersa clear sense in which some groups can also be person-like.     

Two neural correlates of consciousness

Neuroscientists continue to search for "the" neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal-detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.     

Responsibility for Testimonial Belief

According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn’t clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey’s objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject.     

Do unto others as others have done unto you?: Perceiving sexism influences women's evaluations of stigmatized racial groups

The present research examines how making discrimination salient influences stigmatized group members' evaluations of other stigmatized groups. Specifically, three studies examine how salient sexism affects women's attitudes toward racial minorities. White women primed with sexism expressed more pro-White (relative to Black and Latino) self-report (Studies 1 and 3) and automatic (Study 2) intergroup bias, compared with White women who were not primed with sexism. Furthermore, group affirmation reduced the pro-White/antiminority bias White women expressed after exposure to sexism (Study 3), suggesting the mediating role of social identity threat. Overall, the results suggest that making discrimination salient triggers social identity threat, rather than a sense of common disadvantage, among stigmatized group members, leading to the derogation of other stigmatized groups. Implications for relations among members of different stigmatized groups are discussed.     

The Microevolution of Mathematical Representations in Children's Activity

In this article, I discuss children's design of mathematical representations on paper, asking how material displays are constructed and transformed in activity. I show that (a) the design of displays during problem solving shapes one's mathematical activity and sense making in crucial ways, and (b) knowledge of mathematical representations is not simply recalled and applied to problem solving but also emerges (whether constructed anew or not) out of one's interactions with the social and material settings of activity. A detailed characterization of student-designed tables of values to solve problems about linear functions is also presented.     

A critical review of postfeminist sensibility

This paper critically reviews how feminist academic psychologists, social scientists, and media scholars have developed Rosalind Gill's generative construct “postfeminist sensibility.” We describe the key themes of postfeminist sensibility, a noncoherent set of ideas about femininity, embodiment, and empowerment circulating across a range of media. Ideas that inform women's sense of self, making postfeminist sensibility an important object for psychological study. We then consider research that drew on postfeminist sensibility, focusing on new sexual subjectivities, which developed analysis of agency, empowerment, and the possibilities and limitations in taking up new subjectivities associated with postfeminism, as well as who could take up these subjectivities. We show how such work identified complexities and contradictions in postfeminist sensibility and offer suggestions for how this work might be further developed, particularly by intersectionality‐informed research. In the final section, we address contemporary debates surrounding postfeminism. We consider challenges and counterarguments to postfeminist sensibility as a useful term for describing contemporary patterns of sense‐making on gender, making the case for continuing research on postfeminist sensibility in the areas of digital cultures, a transformative imperative that includes the mind as well as the body, transnational postfeminism, and new forms of feminist activism. We conclude that such work would benefit from considering the ways that different technologies mediate the ideas and practices associated with postfeminist sensibility.     

On the Rationality of Vow‐making

I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow‐making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow‐making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow‐keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they are implicitly conditional on a personal identification or social role that is itself escapable.     

You owe it to yourself: boosting retirement saving with a responsibility-based appeal

Americans are not saving enough for retirement. Previous research suggests that this is due, in part, to people's tendency to think of the future self as more like another person than like the present self, making saving feel like giving money away rather than like investing in oneself. Using objective employer saving data, a field experiment capitalized on this phenomenon to increase saving. It compared the effectiveness of a novel message--one appealing to people's sense of "social" responsibility to their future selves--with a more traditional appeal to people's sense of rational self-interest. The social-responsibility-to-the-future-self message resulted in larger increases in saving than the self-interest message, but only to the extent that people felt a strong "social" connection to their future selves. These results broaden our understanding of the psychology of moral responsibility and refine our understanding of the role of future-self continuity in fostering intertemporal patience. They further demonstrate how understanding conceptions of the self over time can suggest solutions to important and challenging policy problems.     

Religious exploration and conversion in forced displacement: a case study of Syrian Muslim refugees in Lebanon receiving assistance from Evangelical Christians

The idea of religious conversion as a break with one’s past and a change in identity and belonging is precarious when religious practices are considered in a context of displacement. Forced migrants’ sense of identity often becomes volatile when social and political pressures lead them to break with various aspects of their past lives. During a season of displacement, refugees and forced migrants may begin to attend religious meetings of a tradition different to that of their family or cease engaging in religious activities at all. Using the humanitarian engagement of Lebanese Evangelical churches with Syrian Muslim refugees as a case study, this article explores some of the unique dynamics in religious engagement in refugee communities. Many Syrian refugees began to attend church and study Christianity and this did indeed seem to have some sort of ‘spiritual’ influence on them, although few considered making a more radical change in their identity.     

“It's like you are just a spectator in this thing”: Experiencing social life the ‘aspie’ way

This study explores the experiences of people with Asperger syndrome (AS) from a sociological perspective using the theoretical approaches of ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism. In-depth interviews were conducted with 16 people with AS and three key themes of feeling different, trying to fit in and safe spaces are considered here. We suggest that people with AS develop a different symbolic capacity to most people and have difficulties in making sense of social encounters. While these difficulties can be overcome, to some degree, by developing strategies to try to fit in, this learning remains at a superficial level and is not internalised through the process of socialisation. Without being able to derive a firm sense of reality from spontaneous involvement in social encounters, participants feel “unruled, unreal and anomic” (Goffman, 1967: 135) and experience intense autistic emotion (Davidson, 2007a,b).     

ALTRUISM: TOWARD A PSYCHOBIOSPIRITUAL CONCEPTUALIZATION

Altruism, defined here as a regard for or devotion to the interest of others with whom we are interrelated, is pitted against two other dispositions in human beings: nepotism and egoism. We propose that to become fully human is to become more altruistic. We describe how altruism is mediated by our physiology, is expressed in our psychological development, is evolving in our social institutions, and becomes the moral communities that enforce our sense of right and wrong. A change in any one of these influences changes our disposition—changes who we are and what we do—potentially making altruism more possible in the world.     

Faith and Agency: The Relationships Between Sense of Control,Socioeconomic Status,and Beliefs About God

An individual's sense of control varies with religiosity, but the direction of this relationship can change based on one's social status and one's image of God. Using data from the Baylor Religion Survey Wave V, our current study investigates how secure attachment to God, belief in a judgmental God, and belief in divine control are associated with sense of control. Our findings indicate that the type of religious belief explains when religion is positively or negatively related to the believers’ sense of control. And secure attachment to God and belief in divine control will compensate for social and economic deprivation. Still, belief in a judgmental God is negatively related to agency for believers across the stratification hierarchy. This indicates that a traditional fire-and-brimstone God is related to a lower sense of control, while more contemporary and individualized beliefs about God are connected to greater agency, especially for believers in need.     

Transcending common sense in psychological theorizing: A developmental perspective

The necessity for transcendence of any particular system of common sense in psychologists' theorizing is reiterated in the process of analyzing Smedslund's response to the author's previous (Valsiner, 1985) critical analysis of the role of common sense in psychology. It is emphasized that the ways of how personally unique construction of meaning in individuals' ontogenies proceed are directed by social canalization, which guarantees sufficient (but not absolute) similarity in persons' individual thinking and acting. Such similarity forms the basis for intelligibility of interpersonal communication. A developmental perspective can overcome two opposite traditions in non-developmental psychologies which either disregard common sense, or make it the criterion of adequacy of thinking towards which psychological theories should strive. In contrast, it is suggested that common sense be studied in conjunction with research on psychological phenomena for which it serves as their context, and that generalizations about psychological phenomena retain information about the common-sense frames of the phenomena.