Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Self‐Reported Beliefs About Verbal Cues Correlate with Deception‐Detection Performance

In this study, we investigated whether people who hold more correct beliefs about verbal cues to deception are also better lie detectors. We investigated police officers and undergraduates' beliefs about (i) cues to deception via an open‐ended question and (ii) 17 specific verbal cues, after which participants were asked to judge the truthfulness of eight video fragments. Results showed that undergraduates and police officers still hold wrongful beliefs about nonverbal cues, but have better insight into verbal cues. Moreover, a better insight in verbal cues was related to an increased accuracy for identifying truthful statements, showing that verbal cues do drive credibility judgments to some extent.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments

Decades of research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies. Two explanations for this finding have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that lie detection is inaccurate because people rely on invalid cues when judging deception. Second, it has been suggested that lack of valid cues to deception limits accuracy. A series of 4 meta-analyses tested these hypotheses with the framework of Brunswik's (1952) lens model. Meta-Analysis 1 investigated perceived cues to deception by correlating 66 behavioral cues in 153 samples with deception judgments. People strongly associate deception with impressions of incompetence (r = .59) and ambivalence (r = .49). Contrary to self-reports, eye contact is only weakly correlated with deception judgments (r = -.15). Cues to perceived deception were then compared with cues to actual deception. The results show a substantial covariation between the 2 sets of cues (r = .59 in Meta-Analysis 2, r = .72 in Meta-Analysis 3). Finally, in Meta-Analysis 4, a lens model analysis revealed a very strong matching between behaviorally based predictions of deception and behaviorally based predictions of perceived deception. In conclusion, contrary to previous assumptions, people rarely rely on the wrong cues. Instead, limitations in lie detection accuracy are mainly attributable to weaknesses in behavioral cues to deception. The results suggest that intuitive notions about deception are more accurate than explicit knowledge and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers than by informing lie-catchers of valid cues to deception.     

Deception detection: interrogators' and observers' decoding of consecutive statements

This study is an examination of two forensically important but previously neglected issues in interpersonal deception. First, which cues do lie catchers-who have access to repeated interrogations-pay attention to in order to detect deception? Second, do face-to-face interacting interrogators differ from noninteracting observers in terms of how they perceive a suspect? After watching a staged event, 24 suspects (12 liars and 12 truth tellers) were interrogated three times over a period of 11 days. After the final interrogation, the veracity of each suspect was assessed by his or her interrogator and by 6 observers who had watched the interrogations on video only. The results of the experiment showed that consistency over time was by far the most commonly used cue for justifying veracity judgments. Critically, the predictive accuracy for this cue was alarmingly low. As opposed to results from previous research, the interrogators used verbal cues to a significantly greater extent than did the observers. Furthermore, a probing effect was shown (i.e., probed suspects were perceived as significantly more honest than nonprobed suspects). Finally, limited support for a previously reported honesty effect was obtained (i.e., that interrogators perceive suspects to be more honest than do observers).     

P300和CNV在GKT的延时反应范式中测谎效果的分离

在杀人游戏情境中,设置无反馈和有反馈两个实验组,采用GKT（guilt knowledge test）的延时反应范式,考察P300和CNV两种ERP成分的测谎效果。结果发现：刺激呈现后大约450ms诱发了一个正性ERP成分（P300）,大约800ms诱发了一个负性ERP成分（CNV）。在有、无反馈两种实验范式下,P300和CNV两种测谎指标的变化情况发生了分离——有无反馈不影响P300峰值大小;而在有反馈条件下,“杀手”对于犯罪细节词语（探测刺激）的CNV明显增大。使用Bootstrap波幅差异分析法,分别计算P300和CNV在有、无反馈情况下的检出率,结果发现：两个指标的检出率在有、无反馈两种实验范式下的变化情况也发生了分离。这些结果表明：P300和CNV两个指标具有不同的测谎功能,这可能和它们所反映的不同欺骗心理过程有关。     

On being happy and gullible: Mood effects on skepticism and the detection of deception

Are we more likely to believe or disbelieve another person depending on our mood state? Based on past research on interpersonal communication and recent work on affect and social cognition, we predicted and found that negative mood increased and positive mood decreased people’s skepticism and their ability to detect deception, consistent with the more externally focused, accommodative processing style promoted by negative affect. After a mood induction using positive, neutral or negative films, participants viewed deceptive or truthful interviews with individuals who denied committing a theft. Judgments of the targets’ guilt and their truthfulness were collected. As predicted, negative mood increased judges’ skepticism towards the targets, and improved their accuracy in detecting deceptive communications, while judges in a positive mood were more trusting and gullible. The relevance of these findings for everyday judgments of trust and the detection of deception are considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed.     

It's not what you are,it's what you know: experience,beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews

This study investigated the ability of more or less experienced employment interviewers and laypersons to detect deception in employment interviews. Although correct beliefs about indicators of deception led to higher deception detection accuracy, more experienced employment interviewers did not show more accurate beliefs about indicators of deception and did not perform better at detecting deception than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. Furthermore, more experienced interviewers showed a less‐pronounced tendency of judging messages as true irrespective of their actual truthfulness (truth bias) than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. It is suggested that experience in employment interviewing does not automatically lead to higher deception detection abilities in employment interviews, but that correcting people's beliefs about indicators of deception can do so.     

Teenage Offenders' Ability to Detect Deception in Their Peers

This study investigated the deception detection abilities of teenage offenders and teenage non‐offenders who made veracity judgments about 12 videotaped interviewees and also explored the behavioural characteristics of teenage liars and truth tellers. The findings revealed that teenage offenders were significantly more accurate in their credibility judgments than teenage non‐offenders. However, the offenders' impressive accuracy rates were not as a consequence of using valid cues to deceit. The feedback hypothesis helps to explain why the offenders were more accurate in their decisions: Operating within a criminal environment may mean that teenage offenders frequently lie and are lied to. Consequently, they receive more feedback than non‐offenders regarding the effectiveness of their lies as well as how successful they are at detecting lies. As a result, their lie detection ability improves. The current study suggests moving away from individual deceptive cues as predictors of deceit towards a more intuitive and holistic approach to lie detection, such as the Brunswikian Lens Model.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The miscommunication of deception: An adaptive perspective

Undergraduates were videotaped as they told lies and truths about their last job. Later, these undergraduates viewed the videotape and tried to guess which of their fellow subject were lying. Monetary incentives had been offered for successful lying and lie detection. Our subjects showed a “demeanor bias”—some looked honest even when they were lying; others looked dishonest even when they were telling the truth. These differences in apparent honesty were the primary determinant of deception judgments; perceivers' detection skills played a lesser role. Honest-looking subjects were predisposed to perceive others as dishonest. In general, our liars used hand gestures, maintained eye contact, and refrained from smiling. Perceivers misconstrued these behaviors as signs of honesty and could not often detect deceit—unless the lie was being told by a subject who had earlier told the truth. We draw on sociobiological concepts and offer an adaptive perspective on human deceit.     

Home runs and humbugs: Comment on Bond and DePaulo (2008)

In 2006, C. F. Bond Jr. and B. M. DePaulo provided a meta-analysis of means and concluded that average lie detection accuracy was significantly greater than chance for most people. Now, they have presented an analysis of standard deviations (C. F. Bond Jr. & B. M. DePaulo, 2008), claiming that there are no reliable individual differences in lie detection accuracy; such differences are due to chance alone. Their conclusions are based principally on studies with college students as lie detectors and lie scenarios of dubious ecological validity. When motivated professional groups have been shown either high stakes lie scenarios or scenarios involving appropriate liars and truth-tellers, average accuracies significantly above chance have been found for 7 different professional groups reported by 12 researchers in 3 countries. The replicated and predicted performance of extremely accurate individual lie detectors ("truth wizards") also undermines the claim of no individual differences in lie detection accuracy. Psychometrically, the stochastic model used is problematic because it does not meet the assumptions of classical test theory.     

Detecting true lies: police officers' ability to detect suspects' lies

Ninety-nine police officers, not identified in previous research as belonging to groups that are superior in lie detection, attempted to detect truths and lies told by suspects during their videotaped police interviews. Accuracy rates were higher than those typically found in deception research and reached levels similar to those obtained by specialized lie detectors in previous research. Accuracy was positively correlated with perceived experience in interviewing suspects and with mentioning cues to detecting deceit that relate to a suspect's story. Accuracy was negatively correlated with popular stereotypical cues such as gaze aversion and fidgeting. As in previous research, accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, but the level of confidence was dependent on whether officers judged actual truths or actual lies and on the method by which confidence was measured.     

Adults' ability to detect children's lying

Adults are poor deception detectors when examining lies told by adults, on average. However, there are some adults who are better at detecting lies than others. Children learn to lie at a very young age, a behavior that is socialized by parents. Yet, less is known about the ability to detect children's lies, particularly with regard to individual differences in the ability to detect this deception. The current study explored adult raters' ability to discern honesty in children who lied or told the truth about committing a misdeed. Results showed that adults are no better at detecting children's lies than they are with adult lies. In particular, adults were very poor at identifying children's honest statements. However, individual differences did emerge, suggesting that the ability to detect lying in children might be facilitated by relevant experience working with children. Implications for legal and mental health contexts are discussed.     

Facial appearance and impressions of ‘credibility’: The effects of facial babyishness and age on person perception

T he babyface overgeneralization effect is perceiving that people whose facial features resemble those of children have childlike traits, and treating them accordingly. This experiment sought to replicate the US findings with a South‐European sample, to examine the impact of facial maturity on impressions of truthfulness, and to examine the influence of age on person perception. Three‐hundred and twenty‐four Spanish undergraduates were shown a photograph and had to rate it on a series of behavioural‐tendency and trait scales measuring honesty, truthfulness, strength, dominance, intelligence, naivety, and warmth. The photographs were babyfaced, intermediate, and mature faced computer‐manipulated versions of three pictures of the same individual at three different ages. Results indicate that the experimental manipulations significantly affected most of the dependent variables. Babyfaced individuals were perceived as the most truthful, and children as the most deceitful. However, when the deceit concerned a sexual abuse allegation, children were rated as the least deceitful. These results support the existence of (a) the babyface overgeneralization effect, (b) the stereotype that children are unreliable witnesses, and (c) the belief that children never lie about sexual abuse offenses. They also suggest that facial babyishness and age may be static perceived deception cues that may account for the demeanour bias found in nonverbal research on the detection of deceit.     

欺骗识别的准确率：影响因素与提高途径

欺骗是一种常见的社会现象,通过观察他人的行为表现识别欺骗则是人们的一项重要能力。研究表明,人们的欺骗识别能力仅仅略微高于随机水平。本文关注基于行为线索的欺骗识别研究。首先,介绍欺骗识别的准确率;然后,结合Brunswik的透镜模型从欺骗线索的有效性和欺骗线索的利用两方面分析识别准确率的影响因素;并在此基础上探讨了提高识别准确率的途径。最后,对未来可能的研究方向进行展望。     

Paraverbal indicators of deception: a meta‐analytic synthesis

This meta‐analysis provides a quantitative synthesis of paraverbal indicators of deception as a function of different moderator variables. Of nine different speech behaviours analysed only two were reliably associated with deception in the weighted, and four in the analysis unweighted by sample size. Pitch, response latency and speech errors were positively, message duration negatively related to deception. As most effect sizes were found to be heterogeneous, analyses of moderator variables revealed that many of the observed relationships varied as a function of content, preparation, motivation, sanctioning of the lie, experimental design and operationalization. Of different theoretical approaches reviewed, a working memory model of lie production may best account for the findings. Because of the small effect sizes, and the heterogeneity in findings, practitioners must be cautioned to use such indicators in assessing the truthfulness of reports but nonetheless practical implications for different types of situations are outlined. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

SELF-MONITORING,REHEARSAL, AND DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION

This study examined the effects of self-monitoring and rehearsal on the ability of observers to detect deception and on the behavioral correlates of deception. It was hypothesized that observers would be more accurate at detecting deception perpetrated by low self-monitors than by high self-monitors, with the difference particularly pronounced when messages were rehearsed. In addition, low self-monitors communicating spontaneously were expected to display greater rates of verbal and nonverbal responding than high self-monitors who planned their communications. Sixteen high and low self-monitors both lied and told the truth (either spontaneously or after 20-minute rehearsals) regarding their feelings while viewing slides of pleasant landscapes and of disfigured burn victims. Analysis of the responses of the 151 observers who made veracity judgments supported the hypothesis concerning accuracy of deception detection. Coding of 10 verbal and nonverbal behaviors revealed that unrehearsed low self-monitors displayed significantly greater pause and nonfluency rates than rehearsed high self-monitors. Additional findings are reported regarding the effects of self-monitoring, rehearsal, and truthful versus deceptive communication on the behavioral correlates of deception.     

Early versus Late Disclosure of Evidence: Effects on Verbal Cues to Deception,Confessions, and Lie Catchers' Accuracy

The strategic use of evidence (SUE)—a method of using case information to elicit different verbal responses from guilty and innocent suspects—has been shown to increase cues to deception and lie detection accuracy. This study manipulated the timing of evidence presentation to determine its effect on cues to deception, lie detection accuracy, and confession rates. Liars were less consistent with the evidence, and SUE was associated with higher lie detection accuracy. Results showed no difference between early and late disclosure of evidence on suspects' confession rates, nor on the diagnosticity of the confessions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Training Observers to Detect Deception Effects of Self-Monitoring and Rehearsal

It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses.     

Sender Demeanor: Individual Differences in Sender Believability Have a Powerful Impact on Deception Detection Judgments

Sender demeanor is an individual difference in the believability of message senders that is conceptually independent of actual honesty. Recent research suggests that sender demeanor may be the most influential source of variation in deception detection judgments. Sender demeanor was varied in five experiments (N = 30, 113, 182, 30, and 35) to create demeanor–veracity matched and demeanor–veracity mismatched conditions. The sender demeanor induction explained as much as 98% of the variance in detection accuracy. Three additional studies (N = 30, 113, and 104) investigated the behavioral profiles of more and less believable senders. The results document the strong impact of sender effects in deception detection and provide an explanation of the low‐accuracy ceiling in the previous findings.