The evolutionary significance of habituation and sensitization across phylogeny: A behavioral homeostasis model

The phenomenon of habituation may be interpreted as a process that has evolved for filtering out iterative stimuli of little present relevance. That habituation is seen in aneural as well as neural organisms throughout phylogeny with remarkably similar characteristics suggests that its role is an important one in animal survival. If habituation is to be viewed as a process to filter out iterative stimuli that have no significant consequences, then how is sensitization to be viewed? One way of viewing these two behavioral changes, i.e. habituation and sensitization, is that they are homeostatic processes which optimize an organism’s likelihood of detecting and assessing the significance of a stimulus in a new iterative series or a change in it. If one views the level of initial responsiveness to a new stimulus as a function of an organism’s threshold just prior to stimulus occurrence, then “high responders” (i.e. those who initially react more strongly) are assumed to have a lower threshold for detecting and assessing the significance of this stimulus than are the “low responders” (i.e. those who initially react more weakly). Thus, high-responders would initially receive more sensory input and progressively decrease their responsiveness to a non-threatening stimulus (habituation). Likewise, initial low-responders would receive less sensory input followed by a decreased threshold and an increased response to the next stimulus occurrence (sensitization). The level of responsiveness achieved in both habituaters and sensitizers, as an asymptote is approached, is a balance between being too sensitive to an unimportant stimulus (and possibly missing other significant stimuli) and being too insensitive, and missing a change in the relevance of the present stimulus. These response changes can be taken as indices of the organism’s mechanisms for achieving an appropriate threshold level to an iterative stimulus in order to accurately assess its present significance and then eventually to asymptote at an optimal stable response level. This approach toward an asymptote is a behavioral homeostatic process that reflects the accumulated significance of the iterative stimulus at each occurrence. The purpose of adding “behavioral” to the term “homeostasis” is to extend the usual meaning of the concept from primarily internal processes to also include (a) iterative external stimulation, (b) the organism’s initial threshold to the initial stimulus as well as (c) the behavior which results from it. Since we are discussing organisms that range from intact, single-celled protozoa to intact mammals, as well as surgically simplified preparations, the termsstimulus, response andbehavior will be used broadly. While other investigators have focused on specific cellular mechanisms underlying habituation and sensitization in a given organism, this paper focuses on the adaptive significance of these two behavioral processes viewed across phylogeny.     

The covariation of independent and dependant variables in neurofeedback: A proposal framework to identify cognitive processes and brain activity variables

This methodological article proposes a framework for analysing the relationship between cognitive processes and brain activity using variables measured by neurofeedback (NF) carried out by functional Magnetic Resonance Imagery (fMRI NF). Cognitive processes and brain activity variables can be analysed as either the dependant variable or the independent variable. Firstly, we propose two traditional approaches, defined in the article as the “neuropsychological” approach (NP) and the “psychophysiology” approach (PP), to extract dependent and independent variables in NF protocols. Secondly, we suggest that NF can be inspired by the style of inquiry used in neurophenomenology. fMRI NF allows participants to experiment with his or her own cognitive processes and their effects on brain region of interest (ROI) activations simultaneously. Thus, we suggest that fMRI NF could be improved by implementing “the elicitation interview method”, which allows the investigator to gather relevant verbatim from participants’ introspection on subjective experiences.     

Meaning and the mediation of emotional experience: Placing mediational meaning at the center of psychological processes

This paper outlines a framework to understand and further study how meaning mediates psychological processes. Central to this paper is the concept of mediational meaning: a representation of “me in the world,” socially distributed as a cultural artifact, that “encodes” emotion and motivates social activity. It is suggested that the emotional encoding of mediational meaning can be understood through the study of its structure, which is conceptualized on two levels: a conceptual level, called the “view,” and a narrative level, called the “narrative structure.” This paper proposes an operationalization of both structural levels and hypothesizes specific relationships between certain structural aspects of mediational meaning and certain dimensions of emotional experience: valence, action readiness, and some aspects of the quale.     

Skin conductance,reaction time,and observational ratings in learning-disabled children

Rates of GSR habituation, reactiontime responses, and observational ratings in normal and learningdisabled children were evaluated. Compared to normals, children with learning disabilities demonstrated faster rates of GSR habituation in a task involving active attention, slower reactiontime responses, and more characteristics of “minimal brain dysfunction” on a rating scale. Within the learningdisability group those subjects with a family history of reading problems showed fewer GSR, reactiontime, and rating responses characteristic of “minimal brain dysfunction.”     

On the automaticity of emotion processing in words and faces: event-related brain potentials evidence from a superficial task

The degree to which emotional aspects of stimuli are processed automatically is controversial. Here, we assessed the automatic elicitation of emotion-related brain potentials (ERPs) to positive, negative, and neutral words and facial expressions in an easy and superficial face-word discrimination task, for which the emotional valence was irrelevant. Both emotional words and facial expressions impacted ERPs already between 50 and 100 ms after stimulus onset, possibly reflecting rapid relevance detection. Following this initial processing stage only emotionality in faces but not in words was associated with an early posterior negativity (EPN). Therefore, when emotion is irrelevant in a task which requires superficial stimulus analysis, automatically enhanced sensory encoding of emotional content appears to occur only for evolutionary prepared emotional stimuli, as reflected in larger EPN amplitudes to faces, but not to symbolic word stimuli.     

Dreaming,cognition, and physical illness: Part I

Part I of a two part article on the effect upon dreaming on physical illness briefly explores the historical medico-philosophical antecedents of the notion that dreams can be diagnostic of bodily disease. Modern sleep research findings relating REM sleep to physiologic changes are also explored. The controversy of whether dreams are merely the consequence of random brain activity or whether they are a valid psychological phenomenon is discussed. Six contemporary views of the function of REM sleep are outlined. A seventh view of dreaming, that of a “cognitive monitoring system” is suggested. Like earlier historical notions, it is suggested that dreaming is a cognitive activity that processes bodily cues indicating illness or disease. Part II. presents a clinical compendium of dreams relating to Part I.     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

Consciousness as a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality

The work demonstrates that brain might reflect the external world causal relationships in the form of a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality, which shows up as consciousness. The paper analyses and solves the problem of statistical ambiguity and provides a formal model of causal relationships as probabilistic maximally specific rules. We suppose that brain makes all possible inferences from causal relationships. We prove that the suggested formal model has a property of an unambiguous inference: from consistent premises we infer a consistent conclusion. It enables a set of all inferences to form a consistent model of the perceived world. Causal relationships may create fixed points of cyclic inter-predictable properties. We consider the “natural” classification introduced by John St. Mill and demonstrate that a variety of fixed points of the objects’ attributes forms a “natural” classification of the external world. Then we consider notions of “natural” categories and causal models of categories, introduced by Eleanor Rosch and Bob Rehder and demonstrate that fixed points of causal relationships between objects attributes, which we perceive, formalize these notions. If the “natural” classification describes the objects of the external world, and “natural” concepts the perception of these objects, then the theory of integrated information, introduced by G. Tononi, describes the information processes of the brain for “natural” concepts formation that reflects the “natural” classification. We argue that integrated information provides high accuracy of the objects identification. A computer-based experiment is provided that illustrates fixed points formation for coded digits.     

The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

The problem of switching in conditional behavior

This article reviews studies of various authors on the phenomenon of “switching,” which is observed in both classical and instrumental conditioning and consists in elicitation of different responses to the same conditional stimulus (CS) when it is applied in an environment different than the original one. The different responses include a decrease or an absence of the previously trained conditional response (CR), elicitation of an appetitive response instead a defensive one, or vice versa, as well as elicitation of two different instrumental CRs in the same trial. The studies suggest that, due to the repeated occurrence of CS in the same environment (E), also called “situation” or “context,” associations are formed between CS and E. Consequently, the CR is elicited to a compound CS+E rather than to CS alone. When the CS is applied alone in a different E than the original one, the previously formed associations are inactive and the CR cannot be elicited; this leads to switching. Studies also suggest that E plays a dominant role in conditioning compared with that of CS alone, which often appears to be only a trigger for eliciting the response. However, CS tested in a different E may still produce some components of the previously acquired CR, such as a general fear behavior to an originally defensive CS or an approach behavior to an originally alimentary CS. The environmental stimuli can be considered the “determining” stimuli that determine the kind of reaction to be elicited, or “tonic” stimuli that increase the tonus in the brain but do not elicit the CR. The “determining” or “tonic” stimuli do not seem to be a special class of stimuli. Instead, they are stimuli that initially can produce the CR (e.g., intertrial CRs), but by being not reinforced they become partly inhibited; nevertheless, due to associations with the reinforcement, they still can produce some excitement related to it, thus facilitating the CR.     

NEVER forget: negative emotional valence enhances recapitulation

A hallmark feature of episodic memory is that of “mental time travel,” whereby an individual feels they have returned to a prior moment in time. Cognitive and behavioral neuroscience methods have revealed a neurobiological counterpart: Successful retrieval often is associated with reactivation of a prior brain state. We review the emerging literature on memory reactivation and recapitulation, and we describe evidence for the effects of emotion on these processes. Based on this review, we propose a new model: Negative Emotional Valence Enhances Recapitulation (NEVER). This model diverges from existing models of emotional memory in three key ways. First, it underscores the effects of emotion during retrieval. Second, it stresses the importance of sensory processing to emotional memory. Third, it emphasizes how emotional valence – whether an event is negative or positive – affects the way that information is remembered. The model specifically proposes that, as compared to positive events, negative events both trigger increased encoding of sensory detail and elicit a closer resemblance between the sensory encoding signature and the sensory retrieval signature. The model also proposes that negative valence enhances the reactivation and storage of sensory details over offline periods, leading to a greater divergence between the sensory recapitulation of negative and positive memories over time. Importantly, the model proposes that these valence-based differences occur even when events are equated for arousal, thus rendering an exclusively arousal-based theory of emotional memory insufficient. We conclude by discussing implications of the model and suggesting directions for future research to test the tenets of the model.     

Trauma Child on The Couch: Transference,Introjection, Identification

This paper attempts to explore some of the psychic processes at work with patients whom I identify as the “trauma child”. The term is a metaphor rather than a diagnosis of “traumatisation”, to indicate patients particularly resistant to maturational processes. They feel blocked and thereby find it difficult to evolve as creative adults. As opposed to the “traumatised” child no particular distressing event can be identified as a cause for emotional suffering. The malaise is often “low key” or silent but functions as a saboteur, undermining satisfactory existence. The trauma child is constantly seduced by regressive functioning and bound by numerous strategies of resistance of reality and often incapable of relinquishing the boundless pleasure of omnipotence. On the basis of my clinical work with the “trauma child”, I will explore the different processes of introjection in transference and counter transference, paying particular attention to the dynamics of identification between analyst and patient and its implications for object relations. Instead of “healthy” identification with the other, taking account of difference and reality, the mode of object relations can be that of “pathological imitation” based on fantasies of oral incorporation. A kind of regressive defense against “mature” relationships; it is an attempt to acquire a substitute identity through magical imitation. Analytical listening, associative work and interpretation stimulate maturational processes within the patient and help him/her to let go of immature relational modes fixated in childhood.     

Metaphysical Rationalism

The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are “metaphysically brute” and that the world could in so many ways have been different.     

An integrative review of sensory marketing: Engaging the senses to affect perception,judgment and behavior

I define “sensory marketing” as “marketing that engages the consumers' senses and affects their perception, judgment and behavior.” From a managerial perspective, sensory marketing can be used to create subconscious triggers that characterize consumer perceptions of abstract notions of the product (e.g., its sophistication or quality). Given the gamut of explicit marketing appeals made to consumers every day, subconscious triggers which appeal to the basic senses may be a more efficient way to engage consumers. Also, these sensory triggers may result in consumers' self-generation of (desirable) brand attributes, rather than those verbally provided by the advertiser. The understanding of these sensory triggers implies an understanding of sensation and perception as it applies to consumer behavior—this is the research perspective of sensory marketing. This review article presents an overview of research on sensory perception. The review also points out areas where little research has been done, so that each additional paper has a greater chance of making a bigger difference and sparking further research. It is quite apparent from the review that there still remains tremendous need for research within the domain of sensory marketing—research that can be very impactful.     

Frege's Elucidatory Holism

I argue against the two most influential readings of Frege's methodology in the philosophy of logic. Dummett's “semanticist” reading sees Frege as taking notions associated with semantical content—and in particular, the semantical notion of truth—as primitive and as intelligible independently of their connection to the activity of judgment, inference, and assertion. Against this, the “pragmaticist” reading proposed by Brandom and Ricketts sees Frege as beginning instead from the independent and intuitive grasp that we allegedly have on the latter activity and only then moving on to explain semantical notions in terms of the nature of such acts. Against both readings, I argue, first, that Frege gives clear indication that he takes semantical and pragmatical notions to be equally primitive, such that he would reject the idea that either sort of notion could function as the base for a non-circular explanation of the other. I argue, secondly, that Frege's own method for conveying the significance of these primitive notions—an activity that Frege calls “elucidation”—is, in fact, explicitly circular in nature. Because of this, I conclude that Frege should be read instead as conceiving of our grasp of the semantical and pragmatical dimensions of logic as far more of a holistic enterprise than either reading suggests.     

Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.     

Heart-rate and electrodermal orienting responses to visual stimuli differing in complexity

Orienting response (OR) theory predicts that amount of information in the stimulus, or stimulus complexity, should be an important determinant of OR elicitation and habituation, more intense and more slowly habituating ORs being expected to complex than to simple stimuli. This prediction was tested in an experiment where subjects were exposed to simple and complex visual stimuli in randomized order, while heart-rate and skin conductance were measured. Complex stimuli evoked a more pronounced deceleratory heartrate response than did simple stimuli. However, the two conditions did not differ in rate of habituation of this response. For skin conductance responses, on the other hand, the complex stimulus took more trials than the simple stimulus to reach habituation, whereas the two conditions did not differ in response magnitude. Thus, the hypothesis of more intense orienting to complex stimuli was supported by the heart-rate data, and that of slower habituation to complex stimuli, of the skin conductance data.     

Players,Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player's character commits murder and video games in which the player's character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck's “Gamer's Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, and argue that the ethical difference between so‐called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction‐making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation.     

Functional connectivity dynamics during film viewing reveal common networks for different emotional experiences

Recent theoretical and empirical work has highlighted the role of domain-general, large-scale brain networks in generating emotional experiences. These networks are hypothesized to process aspects of emotional experiences that are not unique to a specific emotional category (e.g., “sadness,” “happiness”), but rather that generalize across categories. In this article, we examined the dynamic interactions (i.e., changing cohesiveness) between specific domain-general networks across time while participants experienced various instances of sadness, fear, and anger. We used a novel method for probing the network connectivity dynamics between two salience networks and three amygdala-based networks. We hypothesized, and found, that the functional connectivity between these networks covaried with the intensity of different emotional experiences. Stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the medial amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across six different instances of the three emotion categories examined. Also, stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the ventrolateral amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across five out of the six different instances. Our findings demonstrate that a variety of emotional experiences are associated with dynamic interactions of domain-general neural systems.     

Habituation of the orienting reflex and the development of Preliminary Process Theory

The orienting reflex (OR), elicited by an innocuous stimulus, can be regarded as a model of the organism’s interaction with its environment, and has been described as the unit of attentional processing. A major determinant of the OR is the novelty of the eliciting stimulus, generally operationalised in terms of its reduction with stimulus repetition, the effects of which are commonly described in habituation terms. This paper provides an overview of a research programme, spanning more than 30 years, investigating psychophysiological aspects of the OR in humans. The major complication in this research is that the numerous physiological measures used as dependent variables in the OR context fail to jointly covary with stimulus parameters. This has led to the development of the Preliminary Process Theory (PPT) of the OR to accommodate the complexity of the observed stimulus–response patterns. PPT is largely grounded in autonomic measures, and current work is attempting to integrate electroencephalographic measures, particularly components in the event-related brain potentials reflecting aspects of stimulus processing. The emphasis in the current presentation is on the use of the defining criteria of the habituation phenomenon, and Groves and Thompson’s Dual-process Theory, in the development of PPT.