On euthanasia: blindspots in the argument from mercy

In the euthanasia debate, the argument from mercy holds that if someone is in unbearable pain and is hopelessly ill or injured, then mercy dictates that inflicting death may be morally justified. One common way of setting the stage for the argument from mercy is to draw parallels between human and animal suffering, and to suggest that insofar as we are prepared to relieve an animal's suffering by putting it out of its misery we should likewise be prepared to offer the same relief to human beings.
In this paper, I will argue that the use of parallels between human and animal suffering in the argument from mercy relies upon truncated views of how the concept of a human being enters our moral thought and responsiveness. In particular, the focus on the nature and extent of the empirical similarities between human beings and animals obscures the significance for our moral lives of the kind of human fellowship which is not reducible to the shared possession of empirical capacities.
I will suggest that although a critical examination of the blindspots in these arguments does not license the conclusion that euthanasia for mercy's sake is never morally permissible, it does limit the power of arguments such as those provided by Rachels and Singer to justify it. I will further suggest that examination of these blindspots helps to deepen our understanding of what is at stake in the question of euthanasia in ways that tend otherwise to remain obscured.     

The kindness of strangers: organ transplantation in a capitalist age.

The topic of organ transplantation is examined from the perspective of three authors: Robert Bellah, Jeremy Rifkin, and Margaret Jane Radin. Introduced by reflections on the development of the justification of organ transplantation within the Roman Catholic community and the various themes raised by the historical study in Richard Titmuss's The Gift Relationship, the paper examines how and in what ways the possible commodification of organs will affect our society and the impacts this may have on the supply of organs.     

Voluntary euthanasia and the right to die: a dialogue with Derek Humphry

Both the terminally ill and those responsible for their care may experience conflict and limited freedom of choice with respect to the right to die. Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, shares his personal experience, as well as his efforts to educate the public and stimulate legal reform. He has dedicated more than a decade of prime professional years to this highly charged universal problem.     

Killing and Letting Die: the Similarity Criterion

abstract   Applied ethics engages with concrete moral issues. This engagement involves the application of philosophical tools. When the philosophical tools used in applied ethics are problematic, conclusions about applied problems can become skewed. In this paper, I focus on problems with the idea that comparison cases must be exactly alike, except for the moral issue at hand. I argue that this idea has skewed the debate regarding the moral distinction between killing and letting die.
I begin with problems that can arise from attempts to produce comparison cases that are exactly alike, except for the moral issue at hand. I then argue that attempts to produce such examples are doomed to failure. Finally, I argue that abandoning concerns about similarity advances the debate regarding the moral distinction between killing and letting die.     

Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to.     

从"杀盗非杀人"看逻辑与价值的混淆

"杀盗非杀人"是墨辩的一个自相矛盾的诡辩命题,墨者之所以提出这个命题,论者之所以倾心辩护,是由于逻辑与价值的混淆.本文对这个命题进行了逻辑分析和价值分析,通过追究墨者提出这个命题的用意和后果,发现了墨辩停留在逻辑萌芽状态而未能发展为逻辑学的症结所在,就是:逻辑屈从价值,价值牺牲逻辑.     

Do not hinder them: educating children with mental disabilities in the church

Developmental disabilities in children can be challenging to the family who desires a spiritual home for their family. Parents may hesitate to bring a special needs child to a church service, uncertain of the outcome. While public schools have amazing support for the differently abled, the Church very rarely has assistance in place for the families of handicapped individuals, let alone theology for the parents of mentally disabled children. This paper will examine possible ways for a local church leader or volunteer to educate children with mental disabilities, drawing on a variety of texts for support. The paper will conclude by offering resources for the teachers of special needs children in church education.     

After the slippery slope: Dutch experiences on regulating active euthanasia

"When a country legalizes active euthanasia, it puts itself on a slippery slope from where it may well go further downward." If true, this is a forceful argument in the battle of those who try to prevent euthanasia from becoming legal. The force of any slippery slope argument, however, is by definition limited by its reference to future developments which cannot empirically be sustained. Experience in the Netherlands--where a law regulating active euthanasia was accepted in April 2001--may shed light on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the slippery slope argument in the context of the euthanasia debate. This paper consists of three parts. First, it clarifies the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and explains the cultural context in which it originated. Second, it looks at the argument of the slippery slope. A logical and an empirical version are distinguished, and the latter, though philosophically less interesting, proves to be most relevant in the discussion on euthanasia. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether Dutch experiences in the process of legalizing euthanasia justify the fear of the slippery slope. The conclusion is that Dutch experiences justify some caution.