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Topoi - According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel... 相似文献
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L.A. Paul 《Philosophical Issues》2017,27(1):204-222
Phenomenal character (or feel) is the what‐it's‐likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first‐personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third‐personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism. 相似文献
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Philosophia - In this paper I give an overview of the recent developments in the phenomenalism – intentionalism debate and try to show that the proposed solutions of neither sides are... 相似文献
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Synthese - In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue... 相似文献
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Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism 总被引:3,自引:2,他引:1
MICHAEL HUEMER 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2007,74(1):30-55
I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one. 相似文献
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Introspecting Phenomenal States 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
BRIE GERTLER 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2001,63(2):305-328
This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention done . This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions about phenomenal self-knowledge, makes possible an appealing diagnosis of blindsight cases, and yields a highly plausible view as to the extent of our first-person epistemic privilege. Because these virtues stem from construing phenomenal properties as non-relational features of states, my defense of DA constitutes a challenge to relational construals of phenomenal properties, including functionalism and representationalism. And I provide reason to doubt that they can meet this challenge. 相似文献
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现象概念是当前心灵哲学里物理主义和反物理主义争论的一个焦点,但尚未引起国内学界的重视。本文打算首先分析现象概念引起关注的主要原因。其次,参考最新的研究文献,考察现象概念的三个基本特性(孤立性、指称物在场、首尾相接),概述物理主义和反物理主义围绕现象概念而进行的主要争论。并在此基础之上,归结出一条约束现象概念与其指称之间关系的硬信念原则(hard belief principle,HBP)。最后,简略探讨了围绕现象概念的争论对于我们理解物理概念及其相关问题可能带来的一些影响。 相似文献
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Brad Thompson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(3):307-334
Sydney Shoemaker has given a sophisticated theory of phenomenal content, motivated by the transparency of experience and by
the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002). It centers on the idea that color experiences
represent what he calls “appearance properties”. I consider the different sorts of appearance properties that Shoemaker has
suggested might enter into phenomenal content – occurrent appearance properties, dispositional appearance properties, and
higher-order dispositional appearance properties – and argue that none of them are plausibly represented by color experiences.
I argue that Shoemaker's theory faces a dilemma – either it makes misperception too difficult, or it does not truly accommodate
veridical spectrum inversion. I then examine some alternative Russellian theories of phenomenal content that might be consistent
with Shoemaker's motivations, including a different sort of proposal recently suggested by Shoemaker (forthcoming). I argue
that these views are also lacking, for similar reasons as the appearance property view. Finally, I conclude that in order
for a representationalist theory to properly accommodate spectrum inversion without illusion, phenomenal content must include
an indexical element. Such a view requires the adoption of a broadly Fregean theory of phenomenal content, according to which
sameness of phenomenal character does not entail sameness in extension. What phenomenally identical experiences have in common
is not what they represent, but how they represent. 相似文献
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Qualitative characteristics of cryptomnesia, or unintentional plagiarism were investigated. In Experiment 1 we compared accurate and inaccurate source attributions in terms of their level of confidence using instructions that did not require a fixed number of responses. Confidence was lower for plagiarised responses than for correct responses. Nevertheless, participants provided high ratings of certainty for a large proportion of their plagiarised responses. In Experiment 2 the phenomenological differences between plagiarised recall and veridical recall were compared by using an adaptation of the memory characteristics questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Correct responses were associated with more experiential detail than plagiarised responses. However, a considerable number of plagiarised responses were accompanied by a confident memory of at least one qualitative characteristic. Results are discussed in terms of the source monitoring framework developed by Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993). 相似文献
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Susanna Siegel 《Philosophical Studies》2004,120(1-3):91-112
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