Motivated information processing and group decision-making: Effects of process accountability on information processing and decision quality

Integrating dual-process models [Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork: Guilford Press] with work on information sharing and group decision-making [Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision making: biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1467-1478.], we predicted that groups with high epistemic motivation engage in more information-driven and less preference-driven interaction, and achieve better decisions. An experiment manipulating process accountability showed that groups under process accountability experienced greater need for more information, repeated unshared information more often, and more often chose the correct decision alternative. Mediation analysis established that epistemic motivation produced high quality decisions because it stimulated systematic information processing. Results also revealed that preference heterogeneity stimulated information-driven interaction and led to higher decision quality.     

Team confidence,motivated information processing,and dynamic group decision making

According to the Motivated Information Processing in Groups (MIP‐G) model, groups should perform ambiguous (non‐ambiguous) tasks better when they have high (low) epistemic motivation and concomitant tendencies to engage in systematic (heuristic) information processing and exchange. The authors tested this prediction in an experiment with four‐person groups performing a complex and dynamic decision making task. Group confidence was measured after extensive training and prior to actual group decision‐making. Task ambiguity was manipulated. Results showed that when task ambiguity was low, group confidence indeed benefits decision quality and group performance. But when task ambiguity was high, group confidence hurt decision quality and group performance. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Biased information search in group decision making

Research has shown that people prefer supporting to conflicting information when making decisions. Whether this biased information search also occurs in group decision making was examined in three experiments. Experiment 1 indicated that groups as well as individuals prefer supporting information and that the strength of this bias depends on the distribution of the group members' initial decision preferences. The more group members had chosen the same alternative prior to the group discussion (group homogeneity), the more strongly the group preferred information supporting that alternative. Experiment 2 replicated these results with managers. Experiment 3 showed that the differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups reflect group-level processes. Higher commitment and confidence in homogeneous groups mediated this effect. Functional and dysfunctional aspects of biased information seeking in group decision making are discussed.     

Motivated information processing, social tuning, and group creativity

The extent to which groups are creative has wide implications for their overall performance, including the quality of their problem solutions, judgments, and decisions. To further understanding of group creativity, we integrate the motivated information processing in groups model (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Van Knippenberg, 2008) with work on epistemic social tuning (Lunn, Sinclair, Whitchurch, & Glenn, 2007). Three propositions were advanced: (a) Groups produce more ideas when members have high rather than low epistemic motivation, especially when members also have a prosocial rather than pro-self motivation; (b) these ideas are more original, appropriate, or feasible when a group norm favors originality, appropriateness, or feasibility; and (c) originality is valued more in individualistic cultures (e.g., the Netherlands), whereas appropriateness is valued more in collectivist cultures (e.g., Korea). Four studies involving 3-person groups generating ideas supported these propositions: Epistemic motivation (mild vs. intense time pressure; presence vs. absence of process accountability) stimulated production and originality, especially when prosocial rather than pro-self motives were present and participants were Dutch or originality norms were experimentally primed. When appropriateness norms were primed or participants were Korean, epistemic motivation stimulated production and appropriateness, especially when prosocial rather than pro-self motives were present. We discuss implications for research on group processes and for work on culture and creativity.     

On decision making without likelihood judgment

Subjective expected utility, prospect theory and most other formal models of decision making under uncertainty are probabilistic: they assume that in making choices people judge the likelihood of relevant uncertainties. Clearly, in many situations people do indeed judge likelihood. However, we present studies suggesting that there are also many situations in which people do not judge likelihood and instead base their decisions on intuitively generated, non-probabilistic rules or rationales. Thus, we argue that real-world situations are of two types. In situations eliciting a probabilistic mindset, people rely on judgments of likelihood. In situations eliciting a non-probabilistic mindset, they neglect judgments of likelihood. We suggest three factors that may influence the tendency towards either probabilistic or non-probabilistic mindsets. We also outline how extant probabilistic theories may be complemented by non-probabilistic models.     

决策与判断中的分解效应

分解效应是人类主观判断中的一种较稳固的行为偏差,并且判断结果会对随后的决策产生重要影响,因此,对该领域研究成果的全面梳理具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。本文主要介绍了支持理论中的分解效应,总结梳理了概率判断与时间判断中分解效应的研究,综述了其他社会判断中的分解效应研究成果,展望了决策与判断中的分解效应的未来研究方向。通过上述内容的阐述,希望能为该领域研究者提供新的思路,推动国内相关领域研究的发展。     

Quality of decision making and group norms.

Two studies investigated the impact of group norms for maintaining consensus versus norms for critical thought on group decisions in a modification of the biased sampling paradigm (G. Stasser & W. Titus, 1985). Both studies showed that critical norms improved the quality of decisions, whereas consensus norms did not. This effect appeared to be mediated by the perceived value of shared and unshared information: Consensus norm groups valued shared information more highly than critical groups did, and valence was a good predictor of decision outcome. In addition, the 2nd study showed that the group norm manipulation has no impact on individual decisions, consistent with the assumption that this is a group effect. Results suggest that the content of group norms is an important factor influencing the quality of group decision-making processes and that the content of group norms may be related to the group's proneness for groupthink.     

Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions.     

行为决策中的描述–经验差距:信息加工角度的解释

选项信息获取过程会影响决策,描述–经验差距简称D-E差距,是指个体进行决策时根据概括性描述信息得到的结果与依据序列体验信息的经验得到的结果之间的差异。文章以认知因素在决策范式演进过程中的角色为线索,梳理了D-E差距的提出及最新的研究发现。参考决策认知过程框架从信息加工角度探讨D-E差距影响因素,从整体上解释D-E差距的原因。未来需要从全面对比两种决策范式,改进经验决策研究方法等角度进行深入探讨。     

Cognitive ecology: the evolutionary ecology of information processing and decision making

edited by Reuven Dukas, University of Chicago Press, 1998. $95.00/￡75.95 hbk, $30.00/￡23.95 pbk (x+420 pages) ISBN 0 226 16932 4 (hbk), 0 226 16933 2 (pbk).     

Altering information to gain action control: Functional aspects of human information processing in decision making

In recent approaches to social judgment, information distortion has been discussed primarily as a violation of individual rationality, due to unintentionally occurring biases. In contrast to this view, it is argued that frequently individuals make purposive use of selective changes in information processing in order to avoid indecisiveness. In this sense, selective changes in information processing may be considered a functional requirement of a volitional process which protects the current intention (or tentative decision) from being replaced by competing behavioral tendencies. On the basis of J. Kuhl's theory of action control (1981, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 155–170; 1982, in W. Hacker, W. Volpert, & M. von Cranach, Eds., Cognitive and Motivational Aspects of Action, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984, in B. A. Maher, Progress in Experimental Personality Research, Vol. 13, New York: Academic Press) it was predicted that subjects having a high score on the action-control scale (i.e., action-oriented subjects) should show a stronger tendency to increase the attractiveness rating of a tentatively preferred decision during the process of decision making than subjects scoring low on that scale (i.e., state-oriented subjects). To test this assumption, students searching for an apartment were offered 16 apartments along with a list containing information about the alternatives. The subjects had to rate the attractiveness of each apartment twice before they were asked to indicate which apartments they would like to rent. The results confirmed the predictions. It was found that action-oriented subjects increased the divergence of their attractiveness ratings from the first to the second point of evaluation, whereas state-oriented subjects did not.     

Knowledge acquisition and information searching strategies in diagnostic decision making.

The effect of three learning procedures on diagnostic information searching strategies was investigated. Undergraduate students acquired an artificial knowledge domain through either a Taxonomic-, Inductive-, or Case-oriented knowledge acquisition procedure. The use of the competing-hypotheses heuristic as a practical strategy to guide decision making in the face of uncertainty, was compared among the three learning conditions and between each condition and a non-learning control group using the method developed by Kern and Doherty (1982) and Wolf et al. (1985). The small instruction intervention had an effect on the diagnostic nature of subjects' information-searching strategies. Subjects in the Inductive-learning condition exhibited a stronger tendency to seek diagnostically worthless information than the other learning conditions. The outcomes are considered relevant to the nature of expertise in decision making, and to the effect of instruction methodologies on the knowledge representations available to diagnostic classification and decision-making processes.     

Group information elaboration and group decision making: The role of shared task representations

Decision making groups often exchange and integrate distributed information to a lesser extent than is desirable for high-quality decisions. We propose that group members’ shared task representations play an important role in this respect, because groups are often insufficiently attuned to the task’s information elaboration requirements. Task representations emphasizing elaboration of decision-relevant information should therefore enhance decision-making performance. This should hold especially when group members realize that they share these task representations, because this realization removes psychological barriers to introducing new insights. Testing these hypotheses, we compared information elaboration and decision-making performance of control groups and groups receiving instructions emphasizing information elaboration in two experiments. Half of the experimental groups were also made to realize that they shared the elaboration instructions. As predicted, groups with task representations emphasizing information elaboration and the realization they shared these representations outperformed groups in the other conditions. This effect was mediated by information elaboration.     

Signal-detection analysis of group decision making

How effectively can groups of people make yes-or-no decisions? To answer this question, we used signal-detection theory to model the behavior of groups of human participants in a visual detection task. The detection model specifies how performance depends on the group's size, the competence of the members, the correlation among members' judgments, the constraints on member interaction, and the group's decision rule. The model also allows specification of performance efficiency, which is a measure of how closely a group's performance matches the statistically optimal group. The performance of our groups was consistent with the theoretical predictions, but efficiency decreased as group size increased. This result was attributable to a decrease in the effort that members gave to their individual tasks rather than to an inefficiency in combining the information in the members' judgments.     

Principles in judgment/decision making research pertinent to legal proceedings

Principles in the judgment/decision making literature relevant to the legal community are reviewed. These principles are divided into four areas: the decision process itself, communicating a judgment to others, evaluating a decision, and possible ways of “debiasing.” Several influences on the decision process are enumerated, among them being insufficient consideration of base rates, selective memory for relevant material, the framing of the decision in either the domain of losses or the domain of gains, and consideration of the “cues to causation.” Particular attention is paid to suboptimal consideration of covariation information. In communicating the decision to others the two most prominent findings are overconfidence in expressing one's decision and the inability to describe accurately the bases of one's decision. Evaluating a decision is plagued by two biases. The first is the hindsight bias. After an event has occurred we tend to exaggerate how easily we could have predicted the event beforehand. The second is the outcome bias. We tend to base our evaluation of the decision upon the evaluation of the outcome. Among the debiasing techniques mentioned are the admonition to “consider the opposite” of the preferred option, the reduction of reliance on memory, and the use of decision aids.     

Escalation of commitment in individual and group decision making

Previous research (cf. B. M. Staw, Academy of Management Review, 1981, 6, 577–587) has found that when managers are given negative feedback on an initial individual investment decision, they allocate more additional funds to that investment if they, rather than another member of their organization, made the initial allocation decision. Justification is thought to underlie this phenomenon. This study explored commitment in group and individual decisions and examined the plausibility of dissonance processes as the mediator of escalation of commitment. One hundred eighty-three individuals participated in a role-playing exercise in which personal responsibility for an initial decision was manipulated for groups and individuals. As expected, escalation of commitment occurred for both groups and individuals. In support of a dissonance explanation, dissonance processes did vary as a function of the personal responsibility manipulation, and individual variation in dissonance responses accounted for a substantial portion of variance in allocation behavior beyond that accounted for by the experimental manipulations. The results concerning dissonance processes suggest a number of ways in which escalation can be reduced in individuals and groups.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Group vs individual information processing: The effects of outcome feedback on decision making

Recent theories of individual decision making have emphasized the role of environmental feedback on decision performance and confidence. However, in relation to group decision making, feedback has received only minor attention. This study compared individual and group decision performance and confidence on a multicue personnel decision task under three different feedback conditions. Individuals and five-person groups decided whether to promote 48 different job candidates, and rated how confident they were in each of their decisions. Feedback as to the correctness of their decisions was provided after (a) every decision (Total Feedback), (b) only those decisions to promote the candidate (Partial Feedback), or (c) after none of the decisions (No Feedback). Results indicated that groups performed best under total feedback, while individuals performed best under partial feedback. In addition, greater amounts of feedback reduced individuals' confidence but had little effect on group member confidence. Implications for both current theory in decision making and group vs individual information processing are discussed.     

Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making

Three experiments with paired comparisons were conducted to test the non-compensatory character of the recognition heuristic (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002) in judgment and decision making. Recognition and knowledge about the recognized alternative were manipulated. In Experiment 1, participants were presented pairs of animal names where the task was to select the animal with the larger population. In Experiment 2, participants chose the safer 1 out of 2 airlines, and 3 knowledge cues were varied simultaneously. Recognition effects were partly compensated by task-relevant knowledge. The compensatory effects were additive. Decisions were slower when recognition and knowledge were incongruent. In Experiment 3, compensatory effects of knowledge and recognition were found for the city-size task which had originally been used to demonstrate the non-compensatory character of the recognition heuristic. These results suggest that recognition information is not used in an all-or-none fashion but is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and decision making.