后伯林自由观:概念辨析

本文旨在对以赛亚·伯林<两种自由概念>发表后西方政治哲学中关于自由概念与观念的争论作一综合评析.本文评介了麦卡勒姆的三要素自由概念,分析了哈耶克、阿伦特以及米勒等人对自由观念的划分,以揭示自由这一复杂的政治哲学概念的多重维度及其关联.     

伯林自由观念的重构

在《两种自由概念》中,伯林对消极自由的辩护是从两方面做出的:他既主张自由本身就是消极自由,又主张作为政治价值的自由只能是消极的.这两个主张虽然在形式上相似,但却缺乏逻辑上的必然联系.消极自由的继承者们同时接受了这两种观点,并进而认为消极的政治自由发源于消极的自由本身,由此得出了自由没有内在价值的结论.罗纳德·德沃金对自由问题的处理典型地体现了对伯林自由观念的这种解读,本文通过对德沃金论证的考察,指出政治领域中各项基本自由权利必须以追求理想人生的积极自由为前提才能得到理解,消极自由和积极自由并不截然对立,反而相互补充、共为一体.两种自由之间的这种内在联系为我们重新理解伯林的自由观念提供了新的线索,而对伯林文本的进一步考察和澄清则佐证了我们重构伯林自由观念的合法性.     

自由分殊的概念史考察:贡斯当、伯林与泰勒

倍受争议的自由概念在贡斯当对卢梭自由观的反思中获得了较为清晰的表达,自由概念的分殊由此而展开。贡斯当区分了"古代人的自由"与"现代人的自由",指出如果混淆这两种自由就有可能造成如法国大革命中发生的悲剧。伯林非常重视贡斯当对自由概念的区分,在提出"积极自由"与"消极自由"之差别的基础上对消极自由表示了亲近和拥护,由此引起了自由概念的更深层次反思。泰勒承继了伯林对自由的剖析,以自由的"运用性概念"与"机会性概念"的区分对自由进行了积极的再阐释,并在探讨专注于原子化自我的消极自由观之后果的基础上提出了"处境化自由"的观念。     

密尔与伯林自由观对勘

密尔是19世纪自由主义最坚定的捍卫者,他清醒地认识到,当广大民众获得广泛的政治权利之后,另一种压制力量——“多数人的暴政”——正在隐秘地侵袭个人自由.密尔试图以“自我保护”为原则给个人自由划定一条不受公共权力干涉的边界.伯林面对20世纪人类自己造成的巨大灾难,认为“理性一元论”所形成的“观念的压迫”是其根本原因.他把自由区分为“消极自由”和“积极自由”,以“消极自由”对抗“观念的压迫”,提醒人们警惕“积极自由”的变异.伯林的自由观是在继承、批判和发展密尔自由观基础之上形成的.     

论康德的消极自由与积极自由——兼与柏林两种自由概念的比较

康德的文本表明康德在自由概念上区分了消极自由与积极自由。康德消极自由的基本内涵是意志的实践法则独立于经验质料的先天形式;而先验层面的分析则表明康德消极自由指的是独立于自然因果法则的自由因果性。消极自由与积极自由的关系在一定意义上说明了康德自由观念内在的融贯性和统一性。相比于伯林两种自由概念的经验性本质,康德自由的先验特性与之形成了鲜明的对比,但这种差异应在康德与伯林迥然不同的哲学背景之中予以把握。     

论第三种自由概念

自由是政治哲学的核心概念。西方政治哲学过去三十余年的发展基本上是在消极自由与积极自由二分法(Berlin)的理论框架之中展开的。社群主义的崛起不但没有走出反而强化了这种二元对峙的概念樊篱。晚近以来公民共和主义的重新发现和阐释则另辟蹊径,提出了第三种自由概念(Pettit;Skinner,pp.237-268),试图运用全新的理论架构全面整合自由主义与共和主义的政治遗产。准确地把握第三种自由概念的内涵,不但影响到政治哲学史的谱系构成,关系到对自由主义、社群主义之争的恰当理解,而且有助于在既多元分化又全球一体的复杂社会中对自由理想的坚持与捍卫。     

两种不同的自由观

有两种不同的自由,一种是认识论意义上的自由,另一种是人类学本体论意义上的自由。由于未能区别这两种自由,在理论上就造成了不少误解和混乱。通常说“自由是对必然的认识和对现实的改造”。这是从认识论的角度来讨论自由问题的,其形成和提出当然具有重大意义,但主要表明的是认识者与客观事物及其规律的关系,主要涉及的是改造外部自然界的实践活动,不是自由的唯一表现形式。     

两种自我（ego和self）的概念关系探析

在英语中,“自我”主要有“self和“ego”两个对应词或概念。前者是作为意识对象或客体(object)的、具有反身意识性质的、与他人相对应的“自我”或“自身”,后者则是作为施事(agent)并在一定程度上涉及潜意识活动的“自我”。从学术渊源上看,后者可视为精神分析心理学意义上的“自我”,而前者则可视为非精神分析理论意义上的“自我”。然而,ego意义上的自我似乎一直未能引起我国科学心理学研究的注意,     

两种自由与道德的理由

近几十年来,以神经科学、人工智能、互联网、基因技术等为首的"人学新科技群"飞速发展,并以新科学主义的强势姿态大举进入人文社会科学中,认识人,改变人,甚至制造新人,彻底改变人类政治经济生态。新科学主义高调主张还原论与决定论,否认自由意志。这将深刻影响伦理生活和道德哲学。如何理解和论证自由的存在,是人文哲学刻不容缓的任务。从古希腊哲学到康德、黑格尔和柯耶夫,人文哲学论证了各种类型的自由;"苏格拉底道统"中的知识追求取向和自我成就取向,后者中的斯多亚路径与普鲁塔克路径,以及它们各自对血气的不同看法,都提醒我们在回答这个问题时需要反思和澄清自由的概念和丰富性。     

康德的自由概念

要解释某一种概念,须阐述一下产生这一概念的最直接的原因,正因为自由概念举不出自由以外的原因,所以才是自由。因此,要解释自由概念本来是不可企及的,也许会使人“离开哲学的解释的领域”。但是另一方面,由于自由概念是理解康德哲学的极其重要的概念,所以康德说:自由概念“对于所有经验主义者都是一块绊脚石,但是同时对于批判的道德学家说来,却是开启崇高的实践原理的一把秘钥”。我们在学习康德哲学的时候,无法避     

"Two Concepts of Liberty" Through African Eyes

In "Two Concepts of Liberty" Berlin notes the protean nature of the word "freedom" and then systematically proceeds to narrow its range of meanings. In the process, Berlin eliminates much of what most people, in everyday communication, regard as freedom, believing that this is in the best interest of intellectual clarity. As he puts it:
[N]othing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that I am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow men. I should be guilt-stricken, and rightly so, if I were not, in some circumstances, ready to make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedom, however great the moral need or the compensation for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. (Emphasis added).
Berlin's other, perhaps overarching, aim is to show how inattention to the specificity of the meanings of concepts might have potentially dangerous political repercussions. He implicitly argues that the intellectuals who promoted the idea of positive freedom as opposed to that of negative freedom contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism and fascism in Europe.     

Two Concepts of Effort

Philosophia - I distinguish between two concepts of effort, E-effort and T-effort. E-effort is the familiar one, which focuses on the experiential qualities of making an effort (such the energy and...     

论两种不同的自然辩证法的概念——兼论康德哲学的一个理论贡献

一　问题的提出正如黑格尔屡次指出过的那样 ,熟知的东西并不一定就是真知的东西。对于那些主要是在马克思主义哲学的理论话语中思索问题和叙述问题的人来说 ,“自然辩证法”无疑是一个熟知的概念 ,但人们是否已经真的把握了这个概念的含义了呢 ?我们的回答是否定的。在我们看来 ,谈论“自然辩证法” ,就须先对“自然”概念的含义获得一个明确的认识。这里我们并不打算引入海德格尔式的、具有强烈的主观倾向的词源学的方法来解读“自然”这个概念 ,我们不妨直接引证Ｊ .Ｓ .密尔的一段广有影响的话来阐明这个概念 :自然这个词有两个主要的含…     

The Liberty of the Liberty Principle

Res Publica - Mill’s Liberty Principle aims to protect ‘social’ freedom, which is traditionally understood as negative freedom. I argue that Mill’s conception of social...     

The Psychological Citizen and the Two Concepts of Social Contract: A Preliminary Analysis

A shift in focus from the logical to the psychological social contract allows us to better explore the socialization of the psychological citizen, and the relationship between identity of individuals and the socio‐political order, with its particular group‐based inequalities. Traditional psychological studies have provided valuable insights into certain aspects of identity, but the new narrative research is leading to novel insights into longer term processes associated with the positioning of identity. The new approach recognizes the dual nature of mental processes and the integral role of context in individual development. Illustrative examples are discussed of the role of cultural carriers in the formation of identity, highlighting the infusion of the macrolevel normative system to thought and action at the microlevel of individuals.     

Two Concepts of Basic Equality

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else).