Reason and revelation: Kant and the problem of authority

This paper explores the significance of authority for Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation. Beginning with the separation of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when one turns to Religion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between the two. Drawing on a variety of texts, in particular those concerning the public and private use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the authority of reason and that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct, the two are not necessarily in conflict and that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public reason must include some reference to revelation.     

Ethnicity,religious belonging,and inter faith encounter: Some survey findings from East London

Mainstream religion in contemporary middle England has been described as a matter of believing without belonging (Davie, 1994). In multi‐ethnic inner city districts, however, religious belonging remains significant; indeed it is probably growing as a key dimension of ethnic and communal identity. Recent survey research in East London offers empirical evidence for this thesis and shows that both fundamentalist proselytising forms of religion and pluralist syncretistic forms are to be found. Detailed statistical analysis of the data suggest that each of these are associated with other variables, such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, and age. The patterns which emerge are complex. There can be no doubt, however, that they illustrate the continuing importance of religion as a significant variable in the daily lives of many East Enders.     

Belief, faith, and acceptance

Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in some detail.     

Fear,faith, and movement

This paper describes the intra-psychic dynamics associated with faith development. Using James Fowler's stages of faith theory, the author attempts to demonstrate that growth in faith requires courage in order to confront the loss of self experienced in faith development. Using the work of Hartmann, Mahler, and Kegan in conjunction with the thought of Tillich regarding fear and faith, the article presents a process for transition from Fowler's stage four to stage five which relies heavily upon the interaction of the self and others for successful movement.Beth Causey is a student in the Master of Divinity Program at McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago and a candidate for ordination in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). The author acknowledges with gratitude the cogent comments of Homer U. Ashby, Jr., Ph.D., in the preparation of this article.     

Hatred,hostility, and faith: A theological perspective

This essay proffers a theological-ethical analysis of hate and hostility. More specifically the dynamics of protracted hate and hostility are explored utilizing Niebuhr's concept of evil imagination and his notion of the dialectical structures of human faith. There are two major claims in this article. First, evil imagination, which includes diverse forms of violence, hatred and hostility, is a response to the anxiety and fear associated with powerlessness and absolute dependence; it may be viewed as an attempt to secure one's personal and intersubjective identity and continuity against coming destruction and loss. Second, the protracted hate and hostility of evil imagination manifests a particular type of faith involving particular conscious and unconscious beliefs as well as objects of trust and distrust and loyalty and disloyalty.     

Justice,authority, and the world order

This paper defends the pertinence of global justice in the contemporary world. It accepts, for the sake of argument, Nagel's view that matters of justice arise only when political authority is asserted or exercised and, connectedly, his rejection of the cosmopolitan thesis. However, it challenges his conclusion that considerations of justice do not apply beyond the state. It argues that on any plausible account of the relationship between authority and justice international institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, are now authoritative in the right way to justify their evaluation from the point of view of justice.     

Biblical authority and the not-so strange silence of Scripture about abortion.

Biblical authority is definitive for many Protestants in matters of faith and practice. The question this essay addresses is the deafening silence of this Scriptural authority on the controversial issue of abortion, especially because Christian scholars have argued vehemently against this practice. In particular, Michael Gorman's recent article 'Why is the New Testament silent about abortion?' raises many substantive issues with implications for the very meaning of authority, faith, and the life of the community. It is contended that elective abortion poses significant substantive issues with which a woman, or couple, must struggle, and that it is inappropriate (perhaps unfaithful) to make such a profound decision according to unfeeling or out-modeled patriarchal rules.     

Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons

Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives.