Childhood amnesia: Empirical evidence for a two-stage phenomenon

The term childhood amnesia refers to the inability of adults to remember events from their infancy and early childhood. If we plot the number of memories that adults can recall as a function of age during childhood, the number of memories reported increases gradually as a function of age. Typically, this finding has been used to argue that gradual changes in memory development contribute to a gradual decline in childhood amnesia during the preschool period. Alternatively, it is possible that pooling data across participants has obscured more abrupt, stage-like changes in the remission of childhood amnesia. In the present study we examined the number and distribution of childhood memories for individual participants. Six adults were repeatedly interviewed about their childhood memories. We found that the distribution of adults' early childhood memories may be less continuous than pooled data suggest. This finding has important implications for current explanations of childhood amnesia.     

Childhood amnesia: Empirical evidence for a two-stage phenomenon

The term childhood amnesia refers to the inability of adults to remember events from their infancy and early childhood. If we plot the number of memories that adults can recall as a function of age during childhood, the number of memories reported increases gradually as a function of age. Typically, this finding has been used to argue that gradual changes in memory development contribute to a gradual decline in childhood amnesia during the preschool period. Alternatively, it is possible that pooling data across participants has obscured more abrupt, stage-like changes in the remission of childhood amnesia. In the present study we examined the number and distribution of childhood memories for individual participants. Six adults were repeatedly interviewed about their childhood memories. We found that the distribution of adults' early childhood memories may be less continuous than pooled data suggest. This finding has important implications for current explanations of childhood amnesia.     

Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning

This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it occurs. The theory predicts several phenomena of reasoning about absolute probabilities, including typical biases. It correctly predicts certain cognitive illusions in inferences about relative probabilities. It accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and it explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem. Finally, it dispels some common misconceptions of probabilistic reasoning.     

Arithmetic word problem solving: Evidence for the construction of a mental model

In the first experiment reported here, adults were given an unexpected task of problem recognition after a resolution task. During the recognition task, participants were presented with the original problems, inconsistent problems that had never been solved, and paraphrases, which respected the relational structure of the original problems but not their exact wording. More precisely, paraphrases were constructed by inversing the terms and the linguistic expressions in the original problems. Whereas the literal form of paraphrastic problems bore the least resemblance to original problems, paraphrastic problems were associated to higher recognition rates than inconsistent problems. A second experiment ruled out the interpretation that this result was due to a mere remembering of the exact values used in the problem text. Taken together, these results provide evidence that a non-propositional representation is built by individuals to solve arithmetic word problems and suggest that a mental model is constructed (Johnson-Laird, 1983).     

Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning

This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B , and A allows not-B , and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not-A and B, and not-A and not-B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the first and last of these possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do not depend on schemas or rules.     

Children's and adults' understanding of illness: evidence in support of a coexistence model

The authors investigated three seemingly contradictory views of the conception of illness: (a) the traditional, developmental "naive child" view; (b) a more contemporary, "sophisticated child" outlook; and (c) a largely social-psychological, "irrational adult" approach, They concluded that participants had a variety of views of the conception of illness and that they used different views in different experimental contexts. They found that, under certain conditions, children appeared to have sophisticated beliefs; under other conditions, children, and even adults, showed signs of folkloric and immanent justice reasoning. They also found that, with advancing grade level, children increasingly recognized psychological contributors to the cause of illness.     

Balance theory as a model for coordinating delivery of rural mental health services

The chaotic nature of rural mental health services is due, at least in part, to a lack of consistent theory guiding their purpose and structure. The failure to plan mental health care systematically for rural areas is a result of diverse opinions and policies grounded in changing social, political, and economic conditions. The Balance Theory of Coordination (Litwak & Meyer, 1966) offers a viable perspective to guide service system development and evaluation. This article identifies current difficulties in the rural mental health systems, offers balance theory as a basis for further work, and posits a model for case management rooted in balance theory. The intent is to stimulate research and theory development for rural mental health systems.     

Illusory-figure lightness: evidence for a two-component theory

Physical darkness gradients were introduced into an illusory-figure pattern which were sufficient to eliminate the illusory lightness effect otherwise seen there. Next, such a gradient was left in place along one edge of that figure while the other edges were returned to physical homogeneity with the surround. Rather surprisingly, the physical gradient still present along the unaltered edge was now overwhelmed by illusory lightness. It is argued that this anomaly suggests that illusory-figure lightness may be composed of two additive components, one of which is figure-ground contrast enhancement and the other of which is contingent upon that first component.     

Children's understanding of the pretence–reality distinction: a review of current theory and evidence

This paper provides an update on the current status of theory and evidence relating to children's understanding of the pretence–reality distinction. The paper starts by highlighting the striking paradox between children's early competence in pretence and their experiences of pretence–reality confusions as late as middle childhood. This is followed by a detailed review of various theories that have been offered to explain this phenomenon. Specifically, theories attributing the paradoxical findings to methodological differences between studies are reviewed and dismissed before considering the transmigration and availability hypotheses ( Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer, 1991 ; Johnson & Harris, 1994 ), the role of context and the child's emotional involvement in the pretence, and the pretence continuation account ( Golomb & Galasso, 1995 ). It is argued that none of these theories alone can explain pretence–reality confusions and that these are best explained in terms of the combined influences of cognitive availability, empirical evidence of reality, context, affect and individual differences. Further research is necessary to fully explore the nature, cause and developmental trajectory of individual differences in this domain.     

Arithmetic word problem solving: evidence for a magnitude-based mental representation

Previous findings have suggested that number processing involves a mental representation of numerical magnitude. Other research has shown that sensory experiences are part and parcel of the mental representation (or “simulation”) that individuals construct during reading. We aimed at exploring whether arithmetic word-problem solving entails the construction of a mental simulation based on a representation of numerical magnitude. Participants were required to solve word problems and to perform an intermediate figure discrimination task that matched or mismatched, in terms of magnitude comparison, the mental representations that individuals constructed during problem solving. Our results showed that participants were faster in the discrimination task and performed better in the solving task when the figures matched the mental representations. These findings provide evidence that an analog magnitude-based mental representation is routinely activated during word-problem solving, and they add to a growing body of literature that emphasizes the experiential view of language comprehension.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.     

Determinants of infant visual fixation: evidence for a two-process theory

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the dynamics of the human infant's (4 months old) visual fixation. The general finding that, over a series of trials, infants fixate longer to a complex than to a simple stimulus was replicated. The function relating fixation time to trials was shown to be nonmonotonic when the stimulus was complex (fixation time increased between Trials 1 and 2 and then decreased), but was monotonic when the stimulus was simple (it decreased systematically over trials). Additional experiments indicated that (a) the nonmonotonic function associated with the complex stimulus was eliminated when the interval separating Trials 1 and 2 was increased from 10 to 20 or 30 s (Experiment 2), and (b) the difference in fixation time between the complex and the simple stimulus was eliminated by controlling their effects in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These data challenge the prevailing cognitive-schema theories as a complete account of the dynamics of the infant's visual fixation. A two-process theory that accounts for these data was proposed.     

Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence

Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework.     

Attachment theory: a framework for understanding symptoms and interpersonal relationships in psychosis

We investigated associations between adult attachment, symptoms and interpersonal functioning, including therapeutic relationships in 96 patients with psychosis. Using a prospective design, we also assessed changes in attachment in both psychiatrically unstable and stable groups. We measured attachment using the Psychosis Attachment Measure (PAM) and interpersonal problems and therapeutic relationships were assessed from both psychiatric staff and patient perspectives. Avoidant attachment was associated with positive symptoms, negative symptoms and paranoia. Attachment ratings were relatively stable over time, although changes in attachment anxiety were positively correlated with changes in symptoms. Predicted associations between high levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance and interpersonal problems were supported, and attachment avoidance was associated with difficulties in therapeutic relationships. Findings suggest that adult attachment style is a meaningful individual difference variable in people with psychosis and may be an important predictor of symptoms, interpersonal problems and difficulties in therapeutic relationships over and above severity of illness.     

Children's solution strategies and mental rotation: evidence for a developmental shift

We examined children's ability to anticipate the appearance of transformed multicomponents using visual stimuli with variations of a mental rotation task. We hypothesized that (a) performance would depend on the presence, location, and spatial relationship of specific stimulus features, and that (b) younger children would use a single component to make their predictions, whereas older children would be more likely to use multiple components. In Study 1, 40 first-, and fifth-grade subjects were presented with 32 rotation problems consisting of varied stimulus characteristics; subjects selected the correct option from a field where foils were indicative of the strategy used. Analyses of variance and log linear analyses revealed the hypothesized stimulus effect differentially associated with the children's ages. In Study 2, sixty 5-, 7-, and 9-year olds confronted 64 mental rotation problems with multicomponent stimuli and a construction task. Results and implications confirmed those of Study 1.     

Testing a self-determination theory process model for promoting glycemic control through diabetes self-management.

A longitudinal study tested the self-determination theory (SDT) process model of health behavior change for glycemic control within a randomized trial of patient activation versus passive education. Glycosylated hemoglobin for patients with Type 2 diabetes (n=159) was assessed at baseline, 6 months, and 12 months. Autonomous motivation and perceived competence were assessed at baseline and 6 months, and the autonomy supportiveness of clinical practitioners was assessed at 3 months. Perceptions of autonomy and competence were promoted by perceived autonomy support, and changes in perceptions of autonomy and competence, in turn, predicted change in glycemic control. Self-management behaviors mediated the relation between change in perceived competence and change in glycemic control. The self-determination process model fit the data well.