Test context affects recollection and familiarity ratings: implications for measuring recognition experiences

The binary remember/know task requires participants to dichotomize their subjective recognition experiences into those with recollection and those only with familiarity. Many variables have produced dissociative effects on remember/know judgments. In contrast, having participants make independent recollection/familiarity ratings has consistently produced parallel effects, suggesting the dissociations may be artifacts of using binary judgments. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported a test-list context effect with binary judgments: Increased remembering but decreased knowing for a set of critical items tested with a set of less-memorable (vs. more-memorable) items. Here we report a parallel effect of test-list context on recollection and familiarity ratings, induced by a shift in response bias. We argue that independent ratings are preferable to binary judgments because they allow participants to directly report the co-occurrence of recollection and familiarity for each item. Implications for the measurement of self-reported recognition experiences, and for accounts of recognition memory, are discussed.     

负性情绪强度对双加工再认提取的影响

双加工理论认为再认提取存在回想和熟悉性两种认知加工过程。本研究采用修正的“记得/知道”范式,考察不同强度的负性情绪对这两种再认提取过程的影响。结果发现：（1）在记得反应上不同负性情绪强度的材料呈现出以下模式：高度负性 > 中度负性 > 轻度负性 > 中性;（2）在知道反应上,不同负性情绪强度的材料呈现出以下模式：中性 > 轻度负性 > 中度负性 > 高度负性。这些结果表明,不同强度的负性材料对情绪记忆的影响表现为两条途径：依赖于回想的再认随着负性情绪强度的增加而逐步提高,另外一个依赖于熟悉性的再认随着负性情绪强度的增加而逐步降低。     

Subjective experience guides betting decisions beyond accuracy: evidence from a metamemory illusion

The goal of this research was to test whether subjective memory experiences drive accuracy regulation decisions above and beyond objective memory indices. In four experiments (n?=?115) subjective recollection (i.e., reporting “Remember” in the Remember-Know task) was dissociated from memory accuracy by manipulating retrieval during a two-alternative forced-choice recognition task: in the Match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of the target (e.g., a studied and an unstudied toaster) and in the Non-match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of another studied but untested item (e.g., a studied toaster and an unstudied birdhouse). Participants were more accurate on Match trials, but reported subjective recollection more frequently on Non-match trials. Critically, participants also bet more often on Non-match trials to the detriment of their score (Experiment 1). This pattern persisted when participants were additionally required to retrieve details about items (Experiment 2) and when confidence assessments were collected (Experiment 3). Finally, participants bet more on Non-match trials even when subjective judgments were not elicited, suggesting that the decision process does not require reporting on subjective experience (Experiment 4). These results indicate that subjective memory experiences guide decision-making independent of objective accuracy and thus are critical to accuracy regulation.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

False recollection of the role played by an actor in an event

Two experiments demonstrated that eyewitnesses more frequently associate an actor with the actions of another person when those two people had appeared together in the same event, rather than in different events. This greater likelihood of binding an actor with the actions of another person from the same event was associated with high-confidence recognition judgments and “remember” responses in a remember–know task, suggesting that viewing an actor together with the actions of another person led participants to falsely recollect having seen that actor perform those actions. An analysis of age differences provided evidence that familiarity also contributed to false recognition independently of a false-recollection mechanism. In particular, older adults were more likely than young adults to falsely recognize a novel conjunction of a familiar actor and action, regardless of whether that actor and action were from the same or from different events. Older adults’ elevated rate of false recognition was associated with intermediate confidence levels, suggesting that it stemmed from increased reliance on familiarity rather than from false recollection. The implications of these results are discussed for theories of conjunction errors in memory and of unconscious transference in eyewitness testimony.     

Episodic feeling-of-knowing relies on noncriterial recollection and familiarity: Evidence using an online remember-know procedure

We examined the hypothesis that feeling-of-knowing judgments rely on recollection as well as on familiarity prompted by the cue presentation. A remember-know-no memory procedure was combined with the episodic FOK procedure employing a cue–target pair memory task. The magnitude of FOK judgments and FOK accuracy were examined as a function of recollection, familiarity, or the “no memory” option. Results showed that the proportion of R and K responses was similar. FOK accuracy and magnitude of FOK judgments were higher for R and K responses than for N responses. FOK accuracy related to R and K responses were above chance level, but FOK was not accurate in the “no memory” condition. Finally, both FOK magnitude and FOK accuracy were related more to recollection than to familiarity. These results support the hypothesis that both recollection and familiarity are determinants of the FOK process, although they suggest that recollection has a stronger influence.     

Detecting personal familiarity depends on static frames in “thin slices” of behavior

Brief glimpses of nonverbal behavior (or “thin slices”) offer ample visual information to make reliable judgments about individuals. Previous work has largely focused on the personality characteristics and traits of individuals; however, the nature of dyadic relationships (strangers, lovers, or friends) can also be determined (Ambady & Gray, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 947–961 2002). Judgments from thin slices are known to be accurate, but the motion features supporting accurate performance are unknown. We explored whether personal familiarity was detectable within the context of “thin slices” of genuine interaction, as well as the invariant properties of thin-slice recognition. In two experiments, participants sequentially viewed two 6-s silent videos on each trial of an individual interacting with an unfamiliar partner; the other depicted the same person interacting with a personally familiar partner. All sequences were cropped so that only the target individual was visible. In Experiment 1, participants viewed either the original sequences, reversed sequences, a static-image “slideshow” of the sequence, or a static-image slideshow with blank frames separating the images. In Experiment 2, all participants viewed the original sequences and clips played at either double speed or half speed. Participants’ performance was above chance in the forward and reverse conditions, but was significantly better in both the static-image slideshow conditions. When task speed was manipulated, we found a larger performance cost for fast than for slow videos. Detecting personal familiarity via spontaneous natural gestures depends on information in static images more than on face or body movement. Although static images are typically less important for recognizing nonverbal behavior, we argue they may be valuable for making familiarity judgments from thin slices.     

Environmental context and recognition: the role of recollection and familiarity

Evidence for effects of changed environmental context on recognition has been equivocal. Using 3 experiments, the author investigated the role of environmental context from a dual-processing approach. Experiment 1 showed that testing word recognition in a novel context led to a reliable decrement but only for recognition accompanied by conscious recollection, with familiarity-based recognition judgments being unaffected. This was replicated in Experiment 2 using stimuli that were novel to the participants (nonwords). Experiment 3 showed that the decrement in recollection also occurred when the changed-context condition involved presenting items in a different but familiar context. The results suggest that effects of environmental context will only be found when recognition is accompanied by conscious recollection and that this effect is due to a specific item-context association.     

Recognition memory ROCs for item and associative information: The contribution of recollection and familiarity

Receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs) were examined in three recognition memory experiments. ROCs for item information (i.e., was this word presented?) were found to be curvilinear. However, ROCs for associative information (i.e., were these two words presented together?) were found to be linear. The results are in agreement with the predictions of a dual-process model that assumes that recognition judgments are -based on familiarity and recollection. Familiarity reflects the assessment of a continuous strength dimension and is well described as a signal detection process, whereas recollection reflects the retrieval of qualitative information about the study episode and behaves like a discrete threshold process. The results showed that memory judgments about items relied on a combination of recollection and familiarity, but that judgments about associations relied primarily on recollection. Further examination of the associative ROCs suggested that subjects were able to recollect that old pairs of items were in the study list, and, under some conditions, that new pairs were not in the study list.     

The distinctiveness effect in forenames: The role of subjective experiences and recognition memory

We describe two experiments that tested the prediction that distinctive forenames would be better recognized than typical forenames and which investigated whether this distinctiveness effect, if obtained, occurred in subjective experiences of the recollective or familiarity components of recognition memory. To that end, the remember‐know paradigm was used to measure people's experiences of recollection or familiarity. The results revealed that distinctive forenames were more memorable than typical forenames and that that this distinctiveness effect was present only in the subjective experience of remembering. Additionally, the present research showed that these distinctiveness effects were present after retention intervals of both 1 and 7 days. These results replicate and extend past research on distinctiveness effects and also provide support for Rajaram's (1996) distinctiveness‐fluency account of the 2 states of subjective awareness.     

A decrease in conjunction error rates across lags on a continuous recognition task: A robust pattern

In four experiments, the lag retention interval from parent words (e.g., blackmail, jailbird) to a conjunction word (blackbird) was manipulated in a continuous recognition task. Alterations to the basic procedure of Jones and Atchley (2002) were employed in Experiments 1 and 2 to bolster recollection to reject conjunction lures, yet conjunction error rates still decreased across lags of 1 to 20 words. Experiment 3 and a multiexperiment analysis examined the increments of forgetting in familiarity across lags of 1–20 words. Finally, in Experiment 4, participants attempted to identify conjunction probes as “old”, and the data were contrasted with those from a previous experiment (Jones & Atchley, 2002, Exp. 1), in which participants attempted not to identify conjunction probes as “old”. In support of earlier findings, the decrease in familiarity across lags of 1–20 words appears robust, with a constant level of weak recollection occurring for parent words.     

On the validity of remember-know judgments: evidence from think aloud protocols

The use of remember–know judgments to assess subjective experience associated with memory retrieval, or as measures of recollection and familiarity processes, has been controversial. In the current study we had participants think aloud during study and provide verbal reports at test for remember–know and confidence (i.e., sure–probably) judgments. Results indicated that the vast majority of remember judgments for studied items were associated with recollection from study (87%), but this correspondence was less likely for high-confidence judgments (72%). Instead, high-confidence judgments were more likely than remember judgments to be associated with incorrect recollection and a lack of recollection. Know judgments were typically associated with a lack of recollection (62%), but still included recollection from the study context (33%). Thus, although remember judgments provided fairly accurate assessments of retrieval including contextual details, know judgments did not provide accurate assessments of retrieval lacking contextual details.     

Assessing text representations with recognition: The interaction of domain knowledge and text coherence

Readers construct at least 2 interrelated mental representations when they comprehend a text: a textbase and a situation model. Two experiments were conducted with recognition memory to examine how domain knowledge and text coherence influence readers' textbase and situation-model representations. In Experiment 1, participants made remember-know judgments to text ideas. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence remember judgments differently than know judgments. In Experiment 2, the authors used the process-dissociation procedure to obtain recollection and familiarity estimates. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence recollection estimates but not familiarity estimates. The authors claim that recollection and familiarity can be used as markers of the different processes involved in constructing a textbase and a situation model.     

Differential effects of familiarity on judgments of sameness and difference

Ss indicated whether pairs of simultaneously presented objects were “same” or “different.” In Experiments 1, 2, and 3 the stimuli were pairs of letters, and familiarity was manipulated by showing the letters in either an upright or an upside-down orientation. In Experiments 4 and 5 the stimuli were pairs of trigrams, and familiarity was manipulated either by rotation or by selection according to rated meaningfulness. Analysis of reaction times indicated that familiar pairs were responded to more quickly than were unfamiliar pairs; however, this was true only for “same” judgments, not for “different” judgments. In addition, Experiment 3 indicated that familiarity influenced discrimination accuracy under conditions of tachistoscopic exposure. Finally, in Experiment 6 an effort was made to disentangle the effects of meaningfulness from the effects of pronounceability. The present results stand in contrast to previous research using perceptual comparison tasks, since the earlier work failed to indicate any effect of familiarity.     

Identifying the Basis for the Word Frequency Effect in Recognition Memory

Abstract

Recent theories of recognition memory have identified two bases on which recognition-memory judgments may be made: recollection, which involves retrieval of contextual information from an earlier episode of stimulus presentation; and familiarity, which is distinguished by a general sense of familiarity in the absence of recollection. Four experiments were conducted to test whether the word frequency effect (WFE) in recognition memory (superior performance with low- in comparison with high-frequency targets) results from recollection-based processes, familiarity-based processes, or both. In two of the experiments, superior memory for aspects of the study context was found for low-frequency in comparison with high-frequency words, suggesting frequency-related differences in recollection. The other two experiments used Jacoby's (1991) inclusion/exclusion paradigm to provide estimates of the contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition. In both experiments the data suggested that the WFE is primarily a recollection-based phenomenon. These findings suggest that the recognition memory WFE for old items results primarily from the effects of word frequency on recollection. The implications of these findings for theories of recognition memory are discussed.     

Conscious recollection and binding among context features

Recent research suggests that the subjective feeling of conscious recollection is uniquely characterized by joint memory for several context features while merely familiar memories lack this property (Meiser, Sattler, & Weisser, 2008). In the present research we took the novel approach of extending the dual task paradigm to the simultaneous study of subjective retrieval experience (using the remember/know procedure) and joint memory for two orthogonal context features. While dual task load during encoding lead to reductions in the frequency of the subjective experience of conscious recollection and reductions in overall context memory, joint context memory was not affected. Furthermore, the relation of higher overall context memory for consciously recollected items than for familiar items was preserved even under dual task load. These results have import implications for theories of long-term feature binding and the processes involved in producing the experience of conscious recollection.     

Familiarity is related to conceptual implicit memory: An examination of individual differences

Explicit memory is thought to be distinct from implicit memory. However, growing evidence has indicated that explicit familiarity-based recognition memory judgments rely on the same process that supports conceptual implicit memory. We tested this hypothesis by examining individual differences using a paradigm wherein we measured both familiarity and conceptual implicit memory within the same participants. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we examined recognition memory confidence ROCs and remember/know responses, respectively, to estimate recollection and familiarity, and used a free association task to measure conceptual implicit memory. The results demonstrated that, across participants, familiarity, but not recollection, was significantly correlated with conceptual priming. In contrast, in Experiment 2, utilizing a similar paradigm, a comparison of recognition memory ROCs and explicit associative cued-recall performance indicated that cued recall was related to both recollection and familiarity. These results are consistent with models assuming that familiarity-based recognition and conceptual implicit memory rely on similar underlying processes.     

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.     

I’d know that face anywhere!

Mandler (1980) provided the classic “butcher on the bus” example illustrating the feeling of familiarity without recollection that may arise when an acquaintance is encountered in an unusual context. We studied this phenomenon by pairing photos of faces with photos of distinctive contexts at study and later testing recognition memory andremember/know judgments for faces presented with studied, switched, or new contexts. Estimates of recollection and familiarity, based on the assumption that these processes are independent, showed that switching contexts significantly lowered recollection while leaving familiarity intact, just as Mandler described. False alarm rates were higher with old contexts, suggesting that subjects tended to misattribute memories of contexts to memories of faces. These results provide the first evidence of context effects on the subjective experience of recognizing faces. One-dimensional signal-detection models fit the data, but such models do not explain the difference in remember responses between studied and switched items, whereas dual-process models (which also fit the data) do while also capturing the phenomenology of the butcher-on-the-bus experience in an intuitively appealing way.     

Sensation seeking, recognition memory, and autonomic arousal

Substantial evidence shows that sensation seeking impacts memory; however, research has not examined how sensation seeking impacts automatic familiarity and conscious-controlled recollection memory systems. The present study (N = 80) examined high and low sensation seekers’ familiarity and recollection of high and low arousal images with negative valence using behavioral and skin conductance measures. Low sensation seekers had more accurate familiarity judgments to high than low arousal images, reflecting a heightened aversive motivational system. High sensation seekers showed an opposite pattern with memory enhancement for low arousal images, regardless of old-new status. The lack of any sensation seeking effects in relation to recollection judgments suggests that this personality trait is more influential on automatic than conscious controlled memory systems.