The influence of performance on action-effect integration in sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of being able to control an outcome through one’s own actions or will. Prior studies have shown that both sensory processing (e.g., comparisons between sensory feedbacks and predictions basing on one’s motor intentions) and high-level cognitive/constructive processes (e.g., inferences based on one’s performance or the consequences of one’s actions) contribute to judgments of sense of agency. However, it remains unclear how these two types of processes interact, which is important for clarifying the mechanisms underlying sense of agency. Thus, we examined whether performance-based inferences influence action-effect integration in sense of agency using a delay detection paradigm in two experiments. In both experiments, participants pressed left and right arrow keys to control the direction in which a moving dot was travelling. The dot’s response delay was manipulated randomly on 7 levels (0–480 ms) between the trials; for each trial, participants were asked to judge whether the dot response was delayed and to rate their level of agency over the dot. In Experiment 1, participants tried to direct the dot to reach a destination on the screen as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the computer assisted participants by ignoring erroneous commands for half of the trials (assisted condition), while in the other half, all of the participants’ commands were executed (self-control condition). In Experiment 2, participants directed the dot as they pleased (without a specific goal), but, in half of the trials, the computer randomly ignored 32% of their commands (disturbed condition) rather than assisted them. The results from the two experiments showed that performance enhanced action-effect integration. Specifically, when task performance was improved through the computer’s assistance in Experiment 1, delay detection was reduced in the 480-ms delay condition, despite the fact that 32% of participants’ commands were ignored. Conversely, when no feedback on task performance was given (as in Experiment 2), the participants reported greater delay when some of their commands were randomly ignored. Furthermore, the results of a logistic regression analysis showed that the threshold of delay detection was greater in the assisted condition than in the self-control condition in Experiment 1, which suggests a wider time window for action-effect integration. A multivariate analysis also revealed that assistance was related to reduced delay detection via task performance, while reduced delay detection was directly correlated with a better sense of agency. These results indicate an association between the implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency.     

Sense of agency in continuous action: Assistance-induced performance improvement is self-attributed even with knowledge of assistance

In a task involving continuous action to achieve a goal, the sense of agency increases with an improvement in task performance that is induced by unnoticed computer assistance. This study investigated how explicit instruction about the existence of computer assistance affects the increase of sense of agency that accompanies performance improvement. Participants performed a continuous action task in which they controlled the direction of motion of a dot to a goal by pressing keys. When instructions indicated the absence of assistance, the sense of agency increased with performance improvement induced by computer assistance, replicating previous findings. Interestingly, this increase of sense of agency was also observed even when instructions indicated the presence of assistance. These results suggest that even when a plausible cause of performance improvement other than one’s own action exists, the improvement can be misattributed to one’s own control of action, resulting in an increased sense of agency.     

Active control as evidence in favor of sense of ownership in the moving Virtual Hand Illusion

The sense of ownership, the feeling that our body belongs to ourselves, relies on multiple sources of sensory information. Among these sources, the contribution of visuomotor information is still debated. We tested the effect of active control in the sense of ownership in the moving Virtual Hand Illusion. Participants reported sense of ownership and sense of agency over a virtual arm in which we manipulated the morphological congruence of the hand and the visuomotor information. We found that congruent active control enhanced and maintained the reported sense of ownership over a hand that appeared detached from the body, but not in a morphological congruent limb. Also, incongruent active control, achieved by adding noise to the trajectory of the movement, decreased both reported sense of agency and ownership. Overall, our results are consistent with a framework in which active control acts as evidence for eliciting a sense of ownership.     

The time windows of the sense of agency

The sense of agency depends on some internal cues that derive from action control, as well as external cues like contextual information and prior information (degree of contingency between an action and is effect). We assessed whether external agency cues are combined with internal agency cues to affect the sense of agency. In two experiments participants performed a movement (button press) that elicited, after a varying delay, an effect (ball appearing on a screen), and reported their sense of agency over the effect (full, partial or no-agency) while internal cues (premotor information) and external cues (contextual and prior information) were manipulated. We assessed the effect of agency cues on the delays at which the sense of agency varied. The delays were increased with premotor signals but were decreased with contextual information. These findings favour a model of integration of internal and external agency cues over time.     

Emotional valence,sense of agency and responsibility: A study using intentional binding

We investigated how the emotional valence of an action outcome influences the experience of control, in an intentional binding experiment. Voluntary actions were followed by emotionally positive or negative human vocalisations, or by neutral tones. We used mental chronometry to measure a retrospective component of sense of agency (SoA), triggered by the occurrence of the action outcome, and a prospective component, driven by the expectation that the outcome will occur. Positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective component of SoA, but only when both occurrence and the valence of the outcome were unexpected. When the valence of outcomes was blocked – and therefore predictable – we found a prospective component of SoA when neutral tones were expected but did not actually occur. This prospective binding was absent, and reversed, for positive and negative expected outcomes. Emotional expectation counteracts the prospective component of SoA, suggesting a distancing effect.     

The relationship between human agency and embodiment

Humans regularly feel a sense of agency (SoA) over events where the causal link between action and outcome is extremely indirect. We have investigated how intermediate (here, a robotic hand) events that intervene between action and outcome may alter SoA, using intentional binding measures. The robotic hand either performed the same movement as the participant (active congruent), or performed a similar movement with another finger (active incongruent). Binding was significantly reduced in the active incongruent relative to the active congruent condition, suggesting that altered embodiment influences SoA. However, binding effects were comparable between a condition where the robot hand made a congruent movement, and conditions where no robot hand was involved, suggesting that intermediate and embodied events do not reduce SoA. We suggest that human sense of agency involves both statistical associations between intentions and arbitrary outcomes, and an effector-specific matching of sensorimotor means used to achieve the outcome.     

Musical expertise affects the sense of agency: Intentional binding in expert pianists

Intentional Binding (IB), a subjective compression of the time interval between a voluntary action and its consequence, is an implicit measure of the sense of agency (the feeling of controlling one's own actions and their outcomes). The sense of agency is influenced by experience, e.g. learning, development, or learned contingency. The present study aimed at analyzing expertise – an expert competence acquired through experience alone – as a possible means to affect the sense of agency. We compared performance of expert pianists and non-musicians within the IB paradigm with two types of sensory outcome – a piano note and an electronic sound. Pianists showed significantly greater outcome binding and composite binding for both types of stimuli. Therefore, musical expertise might influence the sense of agency, possibly due to continuous exposure to action-outcome associations during the musical training. Additionally, such effect might extend beyond the specific expertise to the other types of auditory outcomes.     

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.     

Inferring sense of agency from the quantitative aspect of action outcome

The sense of agency refers to an experience in which one’s own action causes a change in environment. It is strongly modulated by both the contingency between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes. Recent studies have suggested that the action outcome can retrospectively modulate action awareness. We suspect that the sense of agency can also be retrospectively modulated. This study examined whether the quantity of action outcome could influence the sense of agency. The participants’ task was to trigger dot motion in a display and rate the extent to which they could control the initiation of dot motion. Independently of both the temporal contiguity between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes, the speed of dot motion as an action’s outcome strongly influenced the sense of agency rating. The present study suggests that the sense of agency stems partly from the inference of action efficiency based on the quantitative aspect of action outcome.     

目标包含结构的文本阅读中目标信息的激活

探讨读者在阅读目标包含结构的文本时,目标信息的恢复激活的条件。运用移动窗口技术,采用3（已经实现、尚未实现与控制条件）×3（强目标愈合信号、弱目标愈合信号与无目标愈合信号）的实验设计。结果是子目标实现与否有主效应,目标愈合信号有主效应,目标实现条件和目标愈合信号有交互作用。结论是在目标包含结构的文本阅读中,目标信息表现出恢复激活的方式,目标愈合信号是目标信息恢复的必要条件,弱的目标愈合信号就可以激活长时记忆中已实现的目标信息,而较强的目标愈合信号才能激活长时记忆中尚未实现的目标信息     

Spatial perception and control

We investigated whether the perceived vanishing point of a moving stimulus becomes more accurate as one’s degree of control over the stimulus increases. Either alone or as a member of a pair, participants controlled the progression of a dot stimulus back and forth across a computer monitor. They did so via right and left buttonpresses that incremented the dot’s velocity rightward and leftward, respectively. The participants in the individual condition had control of both buttons. Those in the group condition had control of only one. As the participants slowed the dot to change its direction of travel, it unexpectedly disappeared. Localizations of the vanishing point became more accurate as the participants’ control over the dot increased. The data bridge a gap between accounts of localization error that rely solely on stimulus and cognitive factors, and accounts derived from research on action and spatial perception, which tend to rely on action-planning factors.     

Power to the will: How exerting physical effort boosts the sense of agency

The sense of agency refers to the experience of being in control of one’s actions and their consequences. The 19th century French philosopher Maine de Biran proposed that the sensation of effort might provide an internal cue for distinguishing self-caused from other changes in the environment. The present study is the first to empirically test the philosophical idea that effort promotes self-agency. We used intentional binding, which refers to the subjective temporal attraction between an action and its sensory consequences, as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. Effort was manipulated independent of the primary task by requiring participants to pull stretch bands of varying resistance levels. We found that intentional binding was enhanced under conditions of increased effort. This suggests not only that the experience of effort directly contributes to the sense of agency, but also that the integration of effort as an agency cue is non-specific to the effort requirement of the action itself.     

Towards autonomous artificial agents with an active self: Modeling sense of control in situated action

In this paper we present a computational modeling account of an active self in artificial agents. In particular we focus on how an agent can be equipped with a sense of control and how it arises in autonomous situated action and, in turn, influences action control. We argue that this requires laying out an embodied cognitive model that combines bottom-up processes (sensorimotor learning and fine-grained adaptation of control) with top-down processes (cognitive processes for strategy selection and decision-making). We present such a conceptual computational architecture based on principles of predictive processing and free energy minimization. Using this general model, we describe how a sense of control can form across the levels of a control hierarchy and how this can support action control in an unpredictable environment. We present an implementation of this model as well as first evaluations in a simulated task scenario, in which an autonomous agent has to cope with un-/predictable situations and experiences corresponding sense of control. We explore different model parameter settings that lead to different ways of combining low-level and high-level action control. The results show the importance of appropriately weighting information in situations where the need for low/high-level action control varies and they demonstrate how the sense of control can facilitate this.     

Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

Multi-scale control influences sense of agency: Investigating intentional binding using event-control approach

Control exercised by humans through interactions with the environment is critical for sense of agency. Here, we investigate how control at multiple levels influence implicit sense of agency measured using intentional binding. Participants are asked to hit a moving target using a joystick with noisy control followed by an intentional binding task initiated by the target hitting action. Perceptual-motor level control was manipulated through noise in the joystick controller (experiment 1) and goal-level control in terms of feedback about successful hit (experiments 2a and 2b). In the first experiment, intentional binding increased with amount of joystick control only when goal was not achieved and independent otherwise suggesting that the two levels interact hierarchically. In the second experiment, the estimated duration was dependent on when participants knew about goal completion. The results are similar to those obtained with explicit measures of sense of agency indicating that multi-scale event control influences agency.     

Synchronous stimulation in the rubber hand illusion task boosts the subsequent sense of ownership on the vicarious agency task

The relationship between sense of agency and sense of ownership remains unclear. Here we investigated this relationship by manipulating ownership using the rubber hand illusion and assessing the resulting impact on self-experiences during the vicarious agency illusion. We tested whether modulating ownership towards another limb using the rubber hand illusion would subsequently influence the illusory experience of ownership and agency towards a similar-looking limb in the vicarious agency task. Crucially, the vicarious agency task measures both sense of agency and sense of ownership at the same time, while removing the confounding influence of motor signals. Our results replicated the well-established effects of both paradigms. We also found that manipulating the sense of ownership with the rubber hand illusion influenced the subsequent vicarious experience of ownership but not the vicarious experience of agency. This supports the idea that sense of agency and sense of ownership are, at least partially, independent experiences.     

Disappearing and appearing: Temporal binding effects are consistent across situations

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over actions and action outcomes. Previous studies were mostly confined to the situation of performing actions to make objects appear, while it remains unexplored whether we experience sense of agency when making objects disappear. Here, we examined the temporal binding effect, an implicit index of sense of agency, in performing actions to make objects disappear and compared the magnitude of this effect in the appearing and disappearing situations. Results showed that the temporal binding effect emerged when object’s disappearances served as action outcomes. Moreover, the temporal binding effects in the appearing and disappearing situations did not differ significantly. Our findings extend the temporal binding effect to the situation of voluntarily making objects disappear, suggesting a comparable level of implicit sense of agency when voluntarily making objects disappear and appear.     

The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action

Kinesthesis pertains to the perception of moving body parts, while the sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one’s action-effects. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that the sense of agency would decrease in joint action with a robot compared to a human partner. Pairs of participants were jointly manipulating two interconnected haptic devices enabling them to feel each other’s forces. Unbeknown to participants, their partner was sometimes replaced by a robot. The sense of agency was assessed using intentional binding, which refers to a contraction of perceived time between an action and its effect for intentional actions, and participants’ judgment of their contribution to joint action. Participants judged their contribution as higher when they were initiating action and when they were paired with the robot. By contrast, intentional binding occurred only with a human partner. This outcome supports the hypothesis that human-robot joint action hinders intentional binding.     

The interplay between goal intentions and implementation intentions

Two studies tested whether action control by implementation intentions is sensitive to the activation and strength of participants' underlying goal intentions. In Study 1, participants formed implementation intentions (or did not) and their goal intentions were measured. Findings revealed a significant interaction between implementation intentions and the strength of respective goal intentions. Implementation intentions benefited the rate of goal attainment when participants had strong goal intentions but not when goal intentions were weak. Study 2 activated either a task-relevant or a neutral goal outside of participants' conscious awareness and found that implementation intentions affected performance only when the relevant goal had been activated. These findings indicate that the rate of goal attainment engendered by implementation intentions takes account of the state (strength, activation) of people's superordinate goal intentions.     

The mechanisms behind the formation of a strong Sense of Coherence (SOC): The role of migration and integration

Considering how much we know about the impact of the Sense of Coherence (SOC) on different health‐related outcomes, we know surprisingly little about how a strong SOC actually develops. In this study we examine the mechanisms behind the formation of a strong SOC and study the role of migration, integration and general resistance resources (GRRs) in this process. We held 46 life‐story interviews with women of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese descent. We divided the respondents in a relatively strong and weak SOC group in order to discern patterns of life experiences associated with SOC development. We find that, as Antonovsky predicted, experiencing consistency and load balance are associated with a strong SOC. In opposition to Antonovsky's claims, decision making power is not a necessary condition to develop meaningfulness. Moreover, the women's life narratives show that migration and integration are related to the mechanisms shaping SOC, yet, the impact is subjective and depends on the availability and use of GRRs. Our findings provide improvements to Antonovsky's salutogenic theory and provide suggestions for interventions aimed at strengthening SOC.