On the Role of Vertical Texture Cues in Height Perception

When people judge height from the top looking down they tend to overestimate vertical distance. Initial findings suggest that this perceptual bias may be in part due to the experienced fear of falling. However, previous studies did not control for potentially relevant optical invariants, especially vertical texture gradient cues, that may inform such perceptual judgments. In this study, we examined to what degree texture gradient cues may account for the perceptual bias in height perception. To this end, in 2 different conditions in which vertical texture gradient cues were either present or absent, participants provided distance and size judgments from an elevated position (5.68 m) and from the ground. Results revealed a systematic overestimation of vertical extent and object size when judged from a height. Yet, the absence or presence of texture gradient cues did not differentially influence these judgments. Finally, although fear levels were reported to be larger at the elevated position than on the ground, fear levels did not correlate with the perceptual bias, thereby demanding further research into the mechanisms underlying the perceptual bias in height perception.     

Losing control in front of a fearful face: the effect of emotional information on cognitive control

How is our cognitive control system modulated by emotional information, especially fearful stimuli? An intuitive hypothesis is that fearful stimuli would enhance cognitive control so that people could switch from the ongoing task to emergent events more quickly to secure themselves. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of emotional information on the shift function of cognitive control by using the task-cueing procedure, in which face images were presented as cues. With the gender of faces indicating which task to do, we manipulated the emotional valence of faces (neutral vs. fearful), finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues than in the trials containing neutral cues (Experiment 1). This effect was not caused by enlarging task-set interference (Experiment 2), nor by slowing down cue encoding (Experiment 3). Contrary to the intuitive hypothesis, our results suggested that the endogenous task-set reconfiguration process was impaired when fearful faces were presented. We speculated that the benefit of decreasing cognitive flexibility in face of fearful stimuli is to speed up response in a dangerous environment, and this accelerating response is achieved by suppressing the goal-directed system to permit the fast, automatic stimulus-driven system to govern behaviours.     

Losing control in front of a fearful face: The effect of emotional information on cognitive control

How is our cognitive control system modulated by emotional information, especially fearful stimuli? An intuitive hypothesis is that fearful stimuli would enhance cognitive control so that people could switch from the ongoing task to emergent events more quickly to secure themselves. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of emotional information on the shift function of cognitive control by using the task-cueing procedure, in which face images were presented as cues. With the gender of faces indicating which task to do, we manipulated the emotional valence of faces (neutral vs. fearful), finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues than in the trials containing neutral cues (Experiment 1). This effect was not caused by enlarging task-set interference (Experiment 2), nor by slowing down cue encoding (Experiment 3). Contrary to the intuitive hypothesis, our results suggested that the endogenous task-set reconfiguration process was impaired when fearful faces were presented. We speculated that the benefit of decreasing cognitive flexibility in face of fearful stimuli is to speed up response in a dangerous environment, and this accelerating response is achieved by suppressing the goal-directed system to permit the fast, automatic stimulus-driven system to govern behaviours.     

Working memory biasing of visual perception without awareness

Previous research has demonstrated that the contents of visual working memory can bias visual processing in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. However, the extent to which such top-down, memory-driven biasing of visual perception is contingent on conscious awareness remains unknown. Here we showed that conscious awareness of critical visual cues is dispensable for working memory to bias perceptual selection mechanisms. Using the procedure of continuous flash suppression, we demonstrated that “unseen” visual stimuli during interocular suppression can gain preferential access to awareness if they match the contents of visual working memory. Strikingly, the very same effect occurred even when the visual cue to be held in memory was rendered nonconscious by masking. Control experiments ruled out the alternative accounts of repetition priming and different detection criteria. We conclude that working memory biases of visual perception can operate in the absence of conscious awareness.     

Unconscious activation of task sets

Using an explicit task cuing paradigm, we tested whether masked cues can trigger task-set activation, which would suggest that unconsciously presented stimuli can impact cognitive control processes. Based on a critical assessment of previous findings on the priming of task-set activation, we present two experiments with a new method to approach this subject. Instead of using a prime, we varied the visibility of the cue. These cues either directly signaled particular tasks in Experiment 1, or certain task transitions (i.e., task repetitions or switches) in Experiment 2. While both masked task and transition cues affected task choice, only task cues affected the speed of task performance. This observation suggests that task-specific stimulus–response rules can be activated only by masked cues that are uniquely associated with a particular task. Taken together, these results demonstrate that unconsciously presented stimuli have the power to activate corresponding task sets.     

Investigating the validity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale – The effect of task-related difficulty on subjective rating

The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is often used to probe conscious experience, but the assumptions behind the scale and its validity are rarely tested. Using a continuous colour estimation task to assess perceptual quality, we focus on how well PAS follows perceptual quality and how the presence of the estimation task affects PAS ratings. We varied the number and presentation time of stimuli in a simultaneous presentation and target position in a sequential presentation. In all experiments, PAS rating closely followed colour precision. However, it was affected by task-induced response bias, even when the possible task difficulty was judged, without performing the task itself. Still, this bias was only observed on the absolute rating level rather than the scale's ability to capture changes in perceptual quality. Reported studies shed light on factors influencing scales outside of the scale formulation and construction.     

Flowers and spiders in spatial stimulus-response compatibility: does affective valence influence selection of task-sets or selection of responses?

The present study examined the effect of stimulus valence on two levels of selection in the cognitive system, selection of a task-set and selection of a response. In the first experiment, participants performed a spatial compatibility task (pressing left and right keys according to the locations of stimuli) in which stimulus-response mappings were determined by stimulus valence. There was a standard spatial stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect for positive stimuli (flowers) and a reversed SRC effect for negative stimuli (spiders), but the same data could be interpreted as showing faster responses when positive and negative stimuli were assigned to compatible and incompatible mappings, respectively, than when the assignment was opposite. Experiment 2 disentangled these interpretations, showing that valence did not influence a spatial SRC effect (Simon effect) when task-set retrieval was unnecessary. Experiments 3 and 4 replaced keypress responses with joystick deflections that afforded approach/avoidance action coding. Stimulus valence modulated the Simon effect (but did not reverse it) when the valence was task-relevant (Experiment 3) as well as when it was task-irrelevant (Experiment 4). Therefore, stimulus valence influences task-set selection and response selection, but the influence on the latter is limited to conditions where responses afford approach/avoidance action coding.     

Beyond priming effects: The role of positive affect and discrepancies in implicit processes of motivation and goal pursuit

Recent research demonstrates that goal pursuit can be instigated without conscious interventions when the mental accessibility of goal representations is enhanced by environmental cues. However, the mechanisms producing this non-conscious, motivational, goal-directed activity are not clearly addressed in the literature. In this chapter we present a framework within which the non-conscious activation of goal-directed behaviour can be understood. The framework departs from the idea that a goal is represented as a desired state and identifies three characteristics of this representation that render non-conscious goal pursuit more likely to occur: its mental accessibility, the discrepancy of the represented state with the actual state, and its association with positive affect. We present findings, largely established in our own labs, that demonstrate the crucial role of these three factors. We will close the chapter by showing how the framework can help to address some of the pressing issues in the research on non-conscious goal pursuit.     

Contextual control over task-set retrieval

Contextual cues signaling task likelihood or the likelihood of task repetition are known to modulate the size of switch costs. We follow up on the finding by Leboe, Wong, Crump, and Stobbe (2008) that location cues predictive of the proportion of switch or repeat trials modulate switch costs. Their design employed one cue per task, whereas our experiment employed two cues per task, which allowed separate assessment of modulations to the cue-repetition benefit, a measure of lower level cue-encoding processes, and to the task-alternation cost, a measure of higher level processes representing task-set information. We demonstrate that location information predictive of switch proportion modulates performance at the level of task-set representations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that contextual control occurs even when subjects are unaware of the associations between context and switch likelihood. We discuss the notion that contextual information provides rapid, unconscious control over the extent to which prior task-set representations are retrieved in the service of guiding online performance.     

Why does a red snake in the grass capture your attention?

It has been suggested that affective stimuli automatically capture attention; this preferential processing is thought to be related to the evolutionary significance of affective stimuli. However, recent evidence suggests that perceptual salience alone might explain why some affective stimuli are more likely to influence attentional processes in certain contexts. In this study, we manipulated affective and perceptual salience to better understand how affective information is processed and how it impacts attentional processes in different contexts. We used stimuli that are both affectively and perceptually salient, while varying the task requirement to encourage the processing of perceptually salient (Experiment 1) or affectively salient (Experiment 2) information. This design made it possible to observe independent and interdependent relationships between perceptual and affective salience. The results showed that when the task encouraged the processing of perceptually salient information, affective salience did not influence task performance. In contrast, when the task encouraged the processing of affectively salient information, affectively salient information impaired task performance. The findings suggest that the affective nature of the stimuli does not always influence attentional processes.     

The coupling between spatial attention and other components of task-set: A task-switching investigation

Is spatial attention reconfigured independently of, or in tandem with, other task-set components when the task changes? We tracked the eyes of participants cued to perform one of three digit-classification tasks, each consistently associated with a distinct location. Previously we observed, on task switch trials, a substantial delay in orientation to the task-relevant location and tendency to fixate the location of the previously relevant task—“attentional inertia”. In the present experiments the cues specified (and instructions emphasized) the relevant location rather than the current task. In Experiment 1, with explicit spatial cues (arrows or spatial adverbs), the previously documented attentional handicaps all but disappeared, whilst the performance “switch cost” increased. Hence, attention can become decoupled from other aspects of task-set, but at a cost to the efficacy of task-set preparation. Experiment 2 used arbitrary single-letter cues with instructions and a training regime that encouraged participants to interpret the cue as indicating the relevant location rather than task. As in our previous experiments, and unlike in Experiment 1, we now observed clear switch-induced attentional delay and inertia, suggesting that the natural tendency is for spatial attention and task-set to be coupled and that only quasi-exogenous location cues decouple their reconfiguration.     

Seeing is believing: Utilization of subliminal symbols requires a visible relevant context

Sensory input that is not available for conscious report can still affect our behavior. Recent findings suggest that such subliminal information has the potency to influence behavior in a way that is dependent on the observer’s current intentions. Here, we investigate whether conscious observation of stimulus relevance provides an incentive for the utilization of nonconscious stimuli. We manipulated the predictive power of directional cues to selectively affect the incentive to utilize them for a subsequent target detection task. Central arrow cues rendered invisible by interocular suppression elicited a facilitatory cuing effect, but only when intermixed with visible arrow cues that were highly predictive with respect to (i.e., 80 % congruent with) the subsequent target location. When the visible cues were nonpredictive (50 % congruent), no subliminal cuing effect was found. An analysis of learning effects corroborates these findings; Cuing effects elicited by both visible and invisible cues increased over the course of the experiment, but only when intermixed visible cues were highly predictive. In a second experiment, we demonstrated that the intrinsic relevance of invisible cues (either 50 % or 100 % congruent) has no effect on the utilization of visible cues. We conclude that conscious perception is required to make statistical inferences about the relevance of symbolic cues. Once statistical information is extracted consciously, it affects subsequent nonconscious processing in a way that fits the current context. Accordingly, one of the possible functions of consciousness could be to extract general rules out of the conscious information, to provide guidelines for future behavior.     

冲突视阈下类别信息与个体信息知觉负载的认知控制效应

个体根据知觉选择、反应偏向以及实时更新的情境信息调节自身状态,以适应性地促进对当前知觉信息的灵活编码,这一过程即为印象形成的认知控制。采用词语判断任务与侧抑制任务的变式将他人信息(类别信息vs.个体信息)分成高、低知觉负载两种水平,考察了冲突视阈下认知控制策略对他人印象形成的调控作用及知觉负载的效应。结果发现:(1)知觉负载影响他人印象形成的认知控制策略。(2)当类别信息与个体信息存在知觉冲突且个体的知觉负载较高时,受到反应性控制的作用,他人印象形成易出现冲突适应偏向; 当个体的知觉负载较低时,他人印象形成易受主动性控制的作用,从而产生冲突抑制偏向。这些结果表明,当个体形成他人印象时,其认知控制策略因受知觉负载影响而呈现分阶段加工特征。     

Task switching: the effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness

Perceptual load theory offers a resolution to the long-standing early vs. late selection debate over whether task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, suggesting that irrelevant perception depends upon the perceptual load of task-relevant processing. However, previous evidence for this theory has relied on RTs and neuroimaging. Here we tested the effects of load on conscious perception using the "inattentional blindness" paradigm. As predicted by load theory, awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus was significantly reduced by higher perceptual load (with increased numbers of search items, or a harder discrimination vs. detection task). These results demonstrate that conscious perception of task-irrelevant stimuli critically depends upon the level of task-relevant perceptual load rather than intentions or expectations, thus enhancing the resolution to the early vs. late selection debate offered by the perceptual load theory.     

Task-set reconfiguration and perceptual processing: behavioral and electrophysiological evidence

Oriet and Jolic?ur (2003) proposed that an endogenous task-set reconfiguration process acts as a hard bottleneck during which even early perceptual processing is impossible. We examined this assumption using a psychophysiological approach. Participants were required to switch between magnitude and parity judgment tasks within a predictable task sequence while event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Stimulus contrast and response stimulus interval (RSI) were manipulated. Behavioral data demonstrated typical task switch costs that decreased as RSI increased. However, whereas ERP analysis of visual ERP component latencies sensitively revealed the contrast effect, a switch-specific postponement of perceptual processing during task-set reconfiguration at short RSIs was not observed. The present findings indicate that the process of task-set reconfiguration does not constitute a hard bottleneck that delays perceptual processing.     

Task switching: The effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

Voluntazy and automatic attentional control of visual working memory

Previous studies of attention-directing cues have focused largely on the effects of cuing on perceptual processes, but cuing may also influence the transfer of perceptual representations into visual working memory. In the present study, we examined this potential role of cues, using both predictive and non-predictive cues in the context of a visual working memory task. Each trial began with a cue, followed by an array of six colored squares, a delay interval, and then a probe square presented at th e location of one of the squares in the previous array. The subjects were required to indicate whether the color of the probe square was the same as the color of the square that had previously been presented at the same location. Performance on this working memory task was more accurate when the cued location was probed than when an uncued location was probed, even when the cued location was no more likely to be probed than any of the uncued locations. An additional experiment using the abrupt-onset paradigm of Yantis and Jonides (1984) yielded similar results. Thus, visual transients may automatically influence the transfer of perceptual representations into visual working memory.     

Evidence from a response choice task reveals a selection bias in the attentional cueing paradigm

In a typical attentional cueing paradigm, irrelevant peripheral cues produce early facilitation (fast responses) followed by later inhibition (slow responses) to cued locations. Here we examine whether cues not only influence the speed with which responses are produced, but also impact or bias which location is ultimately selected as requiring a response. Specifically, can cues influence not only the speed with which we respond but also influence the behavior produced? To examine this question, a choice localization task was used in which no targets were presented, and subjects were asked to choose which effector (left hand, right hand) to use in response to a centrally presented tone. Thus, following either a left or right peripheral cue, and then a central tone, subjects were free to respond with either their left or right hand. Early facilitation and later inhibition with this choice procedure were found in both response times and the proportion of responses to the cued and uncued locations. These results suggest that there are processes which initially bias response selection toward cued locations and then subsequently bias response selection away from cued locations.     

Voluntary and automatic attentional control of visual working memory

Previous studies of attention-directing cues have focused largely on the effects of cuing on perceptual processes, but cuing may also influence the transfer of perceptual representations into visual working memory. In the present study, we examined this potential role of cues, using both predictive and nonpredictive cues in the context of a visual working memory task. Each trial began with a cue, followed by an array of six colored squares, a delay interval, and then a probe square presented at the location of one of the squares in the previous array. The subjects were required to indicate whether the color of the probe square was the same as the color of the square that had previously been presented at the same location. Performance on this working memory task was more accurate when the cued location was probed than when an uncued location was probed, even when the cued location was no more likely to be probed than any of the uncued locations. An additional experiment using the abrupt-onset paradigm of Yantis and Jonides (1984) yielded similar results. Thus, visual transients may automatically influence the transfer of perceptual representations into visual working memory.