Spider fear and covariation bias in children and adolescents

Covariation bias can be defined as phobic people's tendency to overestimate the association between fear-relevant stimuli and negative outcomes. The current article presents two studies that examined this type of cognitive bias in children and adolescents aged 8-16 years. Study 1 was concerned with a thought experiment during which youths (N=150) were asked to imagine that they participated in an experiment during which they had to view a series of pictures showing spiders, guns, and flowers, that were occasionally followed by a negative outcome (i.e., a mild electric shock). Participants were asked to estimate the relation between each type of picture and the negative outcome. The results indicated that youths with higher levels of spider fear displayed a specific tendency to relate spider pictures to a negative outcome. In Study 2, youths (N=220) actually participated in a computer game during which they were confronted with pictures of spiders, guns, and flowers, each of which was equally often followed by a negative (i.e., losing candy), positive (i.e., winning candy), or neutral outcome. After the game, participants had to estimate the relation between each type of picture and various outcomes. It was found that youths with higher levels of spider fear estimated more negative and less positive outcomes in relation to spider pictures. Taken together, these findings provide support for a fear-related covariation bias in youths. Further developmental analyses indicated that this type of cognitive bias seems to be more consistently present among adolescents than among children.     

No expectation bias in elite-level cricket umpires’ leg-before-wicket (LBW) decisions according to batting order position

ObjectivesPrevious studies have shown that sport officials’ decisions can be impacted by biases associated with expectations. The aim of this study was to determine whether elite cricket umpires’ decisions are also influenced by expectations associated with batter skill.MethodsLBW decisions (n = 5578) from actual elite level cricket matches in Australia between 2009 and 2016 were analysed in a multi-level binomial logistic regression paradigm. In our first model, we predicted the likelihood that an umpire will answer ‘out’ for batters in the top order (1–4), middle order (5–7), and low order (8-11). In our second model, we controlled for the correctness of a decision.ResultsUmpires were more likely to respond ‘out’ as the batting order progressed, however this did not appear to be due to biased decision-making. Instead, as batting order progressed, batters were more likely to actually be ‘out’.ConclusionsCricket umpires do not seem to be impacted by expectation bias associated with batting order. This study highlights the importance of controlling for the correctness of a decision when exploring bias in sport officials’ decisions.     

Age effects on different components of theory of mind

The effects of aging on the cognitive and affective dimensions of theory of mind (ToM), and on the latter’s links with other cognitive processes, such as information processing speed, executive functions and episodic memory, are still unclear. We therefore investigated these effects in young (n = 25), middle-aged (n = 20) and older adults (n = 25), using separate subjective and objective assessment tasks. Furthermore, a novel composite task probed participants’ abilities to infer both cognitive and affective mental states in an interpersonal context. Although age affected the objective ToM tests, results revealed a direct aging effect on the second-order ToM, but an indirect one on the first-order cognitive ToM, mediated mainly by age-related declines in executive functions. This study supports the notion of an age-related distinction between subjective and objective assessments of ToM, and confirms that ToM is a complex mental ability with several characteristics reliant to some extent on executive processes.     

Cognitive biases in aggressive drivers: Does illusion of control drive us off the road?

Anger has been shown to be a motivating factor in aggression and it is widely accepted that driving anger may lead to aggressive driving. However, the link between anger and aggressive driving is likely to be mediated by drivers’ pre-existing cognitive biases and the subsequent situational evaluations made. This study investigated the extent to which optimism bias, illusion of control beliefs and driver anger predict self-reported hostile driving behaviours. A total of 220 licensed drivers (106 men; 114 women) completed a self-report questionnaire measuring trait driving anger, optimism bias, illusion of control and driving behaviour. Structural Equation Modelling showed that trait driving anger and illusion of control beliefs account for 37% of the variance in hostile driving behaviour scores. Optimism biases were unrelated to hostile driving behaviours. Thus, driving anger propensities and feelings of control over the situation, but not a general tendency to underestimate the likelihood of adverse outcomes, predict aggressive driving.     

Developing a measure of interpretation bias for depressed mood: An ambiguous scenarios test

The tendency to interpret ambiguous everyday situations in a relatively negative manner (negative interpretation bias) is central to cognitive models of depression. Limited tools are available to measure this bias, either experimentally or in the clinic. This study aimed to develop a pragmatic interpretation bias measure using an ambiguous scenarios test relevant to depressed mood (the AST-D).¹ In Study 1, after a pilot phase (N = 53), the AST-D was presented via a web-based survey (N = 208). Participants imagined and rated each AST-D ambiguous scenario. As predicted, higher dysphoric mood was associated with lower pleasantness ratings (more negative bias), independent of mental imagery measures. In Study 2, self-report ratings were compared with objective ratings of participants’ imagined outcomes of the ambiguous scenarios (N = 41). Data were collected in the experimental context of a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner. Consistent with subjective bias scores, independent judges rated more sentences as negatively valenced for the high versus low dysphoric group. Overall, results suggest the potential utility of the AST-D in assessing interpretation bias associated with depressed mood.     

Health anxiety,anxiety sensitivity,and attentional biases for pictorial and linguistic health‐threat cues

The study investigated attentional biases for pictorial and linguistic health‐threat stimuli in high and low health anxious individuals, who were selected from the upper and lower quartile ranges of a normal sample using a screening measure of health anxiety. Attentional bias was assessed using a visual probe task which presented health‐threat and neutral pictures and words at two exposure durations, 500 ms and 1250 ms. The prediction that the high health anxious group would show a greater attentional bias for health‐threat cues than the low health anxious group was not supported despite the groups being well‐differentiated on a general measure of health anxiety, the Illness Attitudes Scale (IAS). Instead, the results indicated that individuals with high levels of anxiety sensitivity showed a significantly greater initial attentional bias for threat pictures compared with those with low anxiety sensitivity, as assessed by the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI).     

A quantification of robustness

Robustness is an important construct in domains as diverse as evolutionary biology, structural engineering, and decision-making. Unfortunately, in many domains, most relevantly cognitive science, considerations of robustness end with vague semantic references. Little attention is paid to formal analysis. The aim of this paper is to initiate a discussion in the scientific community regarding methods for quantifying and analyzing robustness. To this end, we propose a means for assessing robustness that may supplant the current ambiguous use of the term. We demonstrate our quantitative approach using examples of heuristic-based decision processes, selected due to their explicit association with robustness in the psychological literature. These examples serve to illustrate basic properties of our general methodology for quantifying robustness.     

Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Whether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime. When the SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long (84 ms), primes congruent with the task set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition (36 ms), no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the conscious decision.     

The neural basis of event-time introspection

We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for introspection of different event types, e.g., the bilateral angular gyrus for introspection of intention. Our results suggest that event-time introspection engages specific neural networks to assess the contents of consciousness. Subjective event times should therefore be interpreted as the result of complex interactions between introspection and experience networks, rather than as direct reproduction of the individual’s conscious state or as a mere post hoc interpretation.     

From cognition to consciousness

This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious. Received: 23 March 1998 / Accepted: 11 April 1998