We almost had a great future behind us: The contribution of non-linear dynamics to developmental-science-in-the-making

Classical developmental theories, like those of Piaget, Werner and Vygotsky, were on the verge of developmental science, the study of phenomena from the point of view of development. Methodological and theoretical shifts in the 1960s changed the original goals and questions and turned developmental psychology into a discipline that is, on the whole, more like a subservient than a leading branch of psychology. Dynamic systems theory, which has its roots in mathematics and physics, can help developmental theory out of its current blind alley by providing the general theoretical frameworks and methods for bringing the dynamic aspects of change back to the fore. By doing so, it will help turn the scientific course back in the direction of developmental science.     

Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control

This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention‐attention nexus, we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so that we have a uniform explanation of basic cases of causal deviance in action as well as other defects of agency (distraction), explain cases of skilled agency and sharpen questions about the role of thought in agency. This provides for a different orientation in the theory of action.     

Goal theory vs. control theory: Contrasting approaches to understanding work motivation

Control theory has been propounded as an original and useful paradigm for integrating a number of theories of human (especially work) motivation. This paper challenges that claim. First, it is shown that the original, mechanical control theory model is not applicable to human beings. Second, it is shown that the two approaches used by control theorists to remedy its limitations did not succeed. One approach involved incorporating propositions drawn from other theories with the result that there was nothing distinctive left that was unique to control theory. The other approach involved broadening the scope of control theory by adding deduced propositions; however, these propositions were inconsistent with what was already known about the phenomena in question based on empirical research. The control theory approach to theory building is contrasted with that of goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990). Goal-setting theory is a grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) which evolved from research findings over a 25-year period. Goal theory developed in five directions simultaneously: validation of the core premises; demonstrations of generality; identification of moderators; conceptual refinement and elaboration; and integration with other theories. It is hypothesized that the grounded theory approach is a more fruitful one than the approaches used by control theory.The author wishes to thank Judy Olian for her helpful comments on this paper and Dong-OK Chah for making the figures.     

Observations on some aspects of current psychoanalytic theories

The competing theories in the psychoanalytic marketplace today should be judged on their merits, not on the basis of the authority of whoever first proposed them. What is valid in each theory should be included in any formulation of a psychoanalytic theory of mental development and functioning. Since psychoanalysis, as part of psychology, is a branch of natural science, pluralism in theory is to be avoided in psychoanalysis as in every branch of science. The psychoanalytic method is a valid one of studying a particular aspect of brain functioning. The method and the theories based upon it are as "organic" as is the case with any of the other neurosciences. Any valid psychoanalytic theory of mental functioning and development should include the following conclusions: (1) Unconscious mental processes are omnipresent and of great importance in mental functioning; (2) Thoughts are as causally related to one another as are other events in the universe; (3) Mental functioning is a developmental phenomenon with describable, sequential features; and (4) A major role in mental functioning and development is played by conflicts over the sexual and aggressive wishes that characterize mental life during the period from three to six years of age, and by the compromise formations that result from those conflicts. The last of these conclusions, though disputed by many, is abundantly supported by evidence that is not dependent on the use of the psychoanalytic method, as well as by evidence furnished by the use of the psychoanalytic method. There is also much evidence to support the assertion that any psychoanalytic theory that attributes language-dependent thoughts to a child whose brain is not yet mature enough to be capable of language is to be considered invalid, as are any observations made by the psychoanalytic method (= clinical observations) that are influenced by such an invalid theory. In psychoanalysis, as in every other branch of science, an observer--no matter how astute and how experienced--who subscribes to an invalid theory will be led astray by that theory, sooner or later, in one way or another.     

Implicit Theories of Well-Being Predict Well-Being and the Endorsement of Therapeutic Lifestyle Changes

The current studies investigated whether beliefs concerning the malleability or immutability of well-being (i.e., incremental and entity implicit theories of well-being, respectively) are predictive of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being and of the endorsement of activities conducive to well-being. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that, relative to entity theory endorsement, the endorsement of an incremental theory of well-being predicted greater hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Moreover, regression analyses showed that these associations remained when including scores on measures of socially desirable responding, implicit theories of ability, and related variables of striving for personal growth, hope, and character strengths usage. Study 3 showed that greater endorsement of an incremental theory of well-being predicted greater perceived utility of well-being activities. Study 4 showed that an experimentally-induced incremental theory of well-being caused greater endorsement of well-being activities than an experimentally-induced entity theory of well-being. These findings suggest that amenability toward, and responsiveness to, existing well-being interventions may be fostered by an incremental theory of well-being. Furthermore, they suggest that cultivating an incremental mindset regarding well-being may facilitate adaptive functioning and, thereby, serve as a well-being intervention.     

Unconscious fantasy and theories of cure

It has long been known that patients' wishes for cure by analysis give expression to unconscious wishes for instinctual gratification which originate in childhood mental life. Patients sometimes develop theories about how they believe analysis attains its ends; these are likely to affect the way they behave in the analytic situation, and analysis of them may therefore constitute an important contribution to progress in the analysis. Two illustrative cases are presented; in both, the unconscious determinants of the patients' theories turn out to be infantile sexual fantasies connected with their uncon scious wishes for instinctual satisfaction. It is further suggested that analogous unconscious fantasies also influence the theories of analysts and other therapists about how analysis works. In some instances these factors, while not affecting theory formation explicitly, may, without being recognized as doing so, contribute to decisions regarding the modification of analytic technique. Awareness of that possibility may aid analysts in assessing the indications for such proposed modifications.     

Emotivational psychology: How distinct emotions facilitate fundamental motives

Fundamental motivational systems and distinct emotions have both been suggested to be critically involved in the orchestration of adaptive responses to recurrent challenges in humans' evolutionary history. Research on motivation has, however, proceeded largely independently from research on emotions. Here, we contend that distinct emotions are what motivate behavior, and that these emotions may have evolved in tandem with fundamental motivational systems because they play a critical role in the functioning of those systems. Specifically, once a threat or opportunity has been identified, a distinct emotion is elicited, automatically galvanizing and guiding physiological, cognitive, and behavioral responses toward an adaptive outcome; this entire process occurs via a motivational system. We map six characteristic distinct emotions to six fundamental motivational systems and review evidence supporting each hypothesized link. In doing so, we propose a novel framework for understanding human motivation and the corresponding emergence of distinct emotions.     

Dual-process theories and cognitive development: Advances and challenges

Dual-process theories have gained increasing importance in psychology. The contrast that they describe between an old intuitive and a new deliberative mind seems to make these theories especially suited to account for development. Accordingly, this special issue aims at presenting the latest applications of dual-process theories to cognitive development. Dual-process theoreticians mainly focused on adult functioning have been invited to elaborate the developmental implications of their theory, while developmental psychologists who have proposed dual-process theories of development in the domain of thinking and reasoning present the most recent formulation of their theory and review supporting empirical evidence.     

Theories of mind in infancy

This paper reviews and evaluates various theories of the origins of theory of mind in infancy. In what a theory of mind consists is first considered. It is argued that any theory of mind has two important features. Firstly, a theory of mind recognizes, at least, the existence of psychological relations between agents and objects, including some relations which involve “action at a distance”. Secondly, in a theory of mind, self and other are equivalent in that both can act equally as agents of psychological relations. Any theory of the development of theory of mind must explicate how it is possible to acquire an understanding of these two features. With this requirement in mind, four main types of recent theories are considered — modularity theories, Piagetian theories, matching theories, and intersubjectivity theories. While no decision is made amongst these theories, suggestions for further improvement in theorizing on this topic are presented.     

Psychosocial therapies for children and adolescents: Overview and future directions

The assessment and psychosocial treatment of children must consider developmental phase and stage, developmental tasks, the nature of the disorder (does it affect a narrow sector or one developmental line or is there a broad disruption of development?) and biological contributions (including constitution, maturational rate, and factors such as the onset of puberty). Treatments can be distinguished along dimensions, including theoretical emphases, degrees of definition of the treatment, scope, the “patient” (child, family), duration, frequency of contacts, combination with other modalities, etc. Similarly, choice of treatment is based on many factors, including the clinician's expertise, availability of resources, wishes of parents, cost, etc. Future research should be grounded in a theory of child developmentas well as a theory of therapeutic action.Treatments should be well defined and currently practiced, provided by experts, and arise from realistic situations. The study of therapies bridges basic and applied research and provides data of profound relevance for theories of child development.     

Fundamental movement skills and motivational factors influencing engagement in physical activity

To assess whether subgroups based on children's fundamental movement skills, perceived competence, and self-determined motivation toward physical education vary with current self-reported physical activity, a sample of 316 Finnish Grade 7 students completed fundamental movement skills measures and self-report questionnaires assessing perceived competence, self-determined motivation toward physical education, and current physical activity. Cluster analysis indicated a three-cluster structure: "Low motivation/low skills profile," "High skills/low motivation profile," and "High skills/high motivation profile." Analysis of variance indicated that students in the third cluster engaged in significantly more physical activity than students of clusters one and two. These results provide support for previous claims regarding the importance of the relationship of fundamental movement skills with continuing engagement in physical activity. High fundamental movement skills, however, may represent only one element in maintaining adolescents' engagement in physical activity.     

Toward a general theory of motivation: Problems,challenges, opportunities,and the big picture

Motivation theories have tended to focus on specific motivations, leaving open the intellectually and scientifically challenging problem of how to construct a general theory of motivation. The requirements for such a theory are presented here. The primacy of motivation emphasizes that cognition, emotion, agency, and other psychological processes exist to serve motivation. Both state (impulses) and trait (basic drives) forms of motivation must be explained, and their relationship must be illuminated. Not all motivations are the same, and indeed it is necessary to explain how motivation evolved from the simple desires of simple animals into the complex, multifaceted forms of human motivation. Motivation responds to the local environment but may also adapt to it, such as when desires increase after satiation or diminish when satisfaction is chronically unavailable. Addiction may be a special case of motivation—but perhaps it is much less special or different than prevailing cultural stereotypes suggest. The relationship between liking and wanting, and the self-regulatory management of motivational conflict, also require explanation by an integrative theory.     

How to justify enforcing a Ulysses contract when Ulysses is competent to refuse

Sometimes the mentally ill have sufficient mental capacity to refuse treatment competently, and others have a moral duty to respect their refusal. However, those with episodic mental disorders may wish to precommit themselves to treatment, using Ulysses contracts known as "mental health advance directives." How can health care providers justify enforcing such contracts over an agent's current, competent refusal? I argue that providers respect an agent's autonomy not retrospectively--by reference to his or her past wishes-and not merely synchronically--so that the agent gets what he or she wants right now-but diachronically and prospectively, acting so that the agent can shape his or her circumstances as the agent wishes over time, for the agent will experience the consequences of providers' actions over time. Mental health directives accomplish this, so they are a way of respecting the agent's autonomy even when providers override the agent's current competent refusal.     

Common sense and psychological theories: The historical nature of logical necessity

The importance of common sense for psychological theories is construed as a limiting condition that must be transcended if a particular psychological theory is expected to have generalizability across cultures and over history. Discussion on the pages of this journal, initiated by Jan Smedslund in 1978, has brought the common-sensical nature of the majority of psychological theories into psychologists' focus of attention. Smedslund has attempted to explicate 'theorems' of common sense that underlie thinking and activities of human beings in a culture—and that are shared by laypersons as well as by psychologists. This article approaches the issue of common sense in psychological theorizing from a developmental perspective. This perspective emphasizes the process of emergence of qualitatively new cognitive phenomena in the course of cultural history. It is argued that the 'logical necessity' based on the 'theorems' of common sense is itself 'historical necessity', as it results from the history of human cultures. Smedslund's 'theorems' of common sense can only be formal, but not substantive, analogues of theorems in geometry, since the latter are ahistorical, whereas the former constitute products of the history of cultures and individuals.     

Psychological underpinnings of akrasia: A new integrative framework based on self-regulation vulnerabilities and failures

Akrasia is intentional behavior against one's better judgment. This concept has a rich history in Western philosophy, but it does not feature prominently in the psychological literature. After a brief conceptual review, I propose here a new integrative theoretical framework that draws on motivation science to explicate its psychological underpinnings. Leveraging cybernetic big five and regulatory mode theories, I argue that the self-regulation processes underlying key personality structures can explain why regulatory vulnerabilities can lead to various kinds of akratic failures. For example, I elucidate how maladjusted extraversion associated with a chronic malfunctioning of the assessment and locomotion modes could lead to hedonic dysregulations typical of a specific form of akratic behavior characterized by excessive self-indulgence. This new framework marries multiple disciplines and recomposes the fragmentation of the philosophical speculation on akrasia, suggesting pathways towards potential psychological interventions to mitigate its maladaptive consequences.     

The distinction between needs and wishes: implications for psychoanalytic theory and technique.

After a comprehensive survey of the literature is presented and some caveats entered, this paper delineates the concept of a psychological "need," noting that it bears a complex relation to the concept of a "wish." Need is universal, wish experience-bound. A need, unlike a wish, is not subject to repression. In addition, although a wish can be replaced by another wish, a need cannot be replaced by another need. Whereas the frustration of a wish causes dynamic shifts, the frustration of a need leads to structural disintegration. Needs and wishes can be in harmony or in opposition. The paper also identifies six basic psychological needs, which would seem to be ubiquitous, though the degree to which they are overt and the ways in which they are met vary across cultures. Their gratification seems necessary for healthy psychic development to occur, for relationships to survive, and for psychoanalytic work to take hold and to continue optimally. These needs are (1) the need for one's physical needs to be deemed legitimate; (2) the need for identity, recognition, and affirmation; (3) the need for interpersonal and intrapsychic boundaries; (4) the need for understanding the causes of events; (5) the need for optimal emotional availability of a love object; and (6) the need for a resilient responsiveness by one's love objects under special circumstances. Ordinarily these needs are met during the course of treatment with no deliberate effort by the analyst. In the treatment of some patients, however, they require more direct attention. A number of clinical vignettes are presented to elucidate these ideas.     

The wish to regress in patient and analyst

The analyst's wish to regress is used as a paradigm of the "forbidden" topic of what analysts want from their analysands. The aim is to expand the subjective domain of analysts' awareness so that they can analyze better by grasping more of their temptations with patients before enactment can occur. Clinical examples illustrate how the author temporarily joined patients in wish-fulfilling mutual regression. Analytic process is disrupted when the analyst wishes to relinquish the more differentiated role of the containing and interpreting analyst in favor of more childlike relatedness both with the patient and with the analyst's internal objects. The author, expecting a more typical counter-transference, had not anticipated that he might temporarily join these nonpsychotic patients in mutual regression. It is suggested that in the face of analytic impasse analysts should consider whether they might temporarily have joined the patient in mutually regressive wishes that have taken them away from more responsible analytic functioning.