On Aristotelianism and Structures as Parts

Aristotelian substance theory tells us that substances have structures (read: forms) as proper parts. This claim has recently been defended by Kathrin Koslicki who dubbed it the ‘Neo‐Aristotelian Thesis.’ Strangely, Aristotelianism has not yet been universally embraced by philosophers – partly because some of its claims, such as the Neo‐Aristotelian Thesis – are viewed by some as counterintuitive at best. In this paper, I argue for Aristotelianism by showing its philosophical usefulness: specifically, I put it to use in saving the metaphysical doctrine of endurantism and some central mereological doctrines (such as Transitivity) from recent attacks. This utility gives us reason to endorse Aristotelianism. Along the way, I defend Koslicki's argument for the Neo‐Aristotelian Thesis from a recent criticism, thus helping provide still more reason to endorse Aristotelianism: namely, Koslicki's vindicated argument.     

Ontology and ethics at the intersection of phenomenology and environmental philosophy

The idea inspiring the eco‐phenomenological movement is that phenomenology can help remedy our environmental crisis by uprooting and replacing environmentally‐destructive ethical and metaphysical presuppositions inherited from modern philosophy. Eco‐phenomenology's critiques of subject/object dualism and the fact/value divide are sketched and its positive alternatives examined. Two competing approaches are discerned within the eco‐phenomenological movement: Nietzscheans and Husserlians propose a naturalistic ethical realism in which good and bad are ultimately matters of fact, and values should be grounded in these proto‐ethical facts; Heideggerians and Levinasians articulate a transcendental ethical realism according to which we discover what really matters when we are appropriately open to the environment, but what we thereby discover is a transcendental source of meaning that cannot be reduced to facts, values, or entities of any kind. These two species of ethical realism generate different kinds of ethical perfectionism: naturalistic ethical realism yields an eco‐centric perfectionism which stresses the flourishing of life in general; transcendental ethical realism leads to a more ‘humanistic’ perfectionism which emphasizes the cultivation of distinctive traits of Dasein. Both approaches are examined, and the Heideggerian strand of the humanistic approach defended, since it approaches the best elements of the eco‐centric view while avoiding its problematic ontological assumptions and anti‐humanistic implications.     

Huston Smith Replies to Barbour, Goodenough, and Peterson

Responses and clarifications are given to the three respondents to my recent book, Why Religion Matters , in which I discuss what I see as the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Darwinism. While certain of their criticisms are understandable, others are based on a misreading of my work. Finally, my critics fail to show that my book is mistaken in its central claim that the modern loss of faith in transcendence, basic to the traditional/religious worldview, is unwarranted, because science has not been able to disprove the metaphysical claim that transcendence exists.     

How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?

Those who aim to give an account of modal knowledge face two challenges: the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of giving a plausible account of how we could have evolved a reliable capacity to acquire modal knowledge. I argue that recent counterfactual and dispositional accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics, and certain other areas of philosophy. I argue, however, that both of these problems look insuperable only if we assume that metaphysical modal discourse serves a describing or tracking function. If we adopt instead a normativist approach to metaphysical modal discourse, which sees the basic function of modal discourse as giving us perspicuous ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules, the problems show up very differently. The modal normativist can give a plausible response to both of the classic problems of how we can come to know metaphysical modal truths.

     

Dyslexia,authorial identity,and approaches to learning and writing: A mixed methods study

Background. Dyslexia may lead to difficulties with academic writing as well as reading. The authorial identity approach aims to help students improve their academic writing and avoid unintentional plagiarism, and could help to understand dyslexic students’ approaches to writing. Aims. (1) To compare dyslexic and non‐dyslexic students’ authorial identity and approaches to learning and writing; (2) to compare correlations between approaches to writing and approaches to learning among dyslexic and non‐dyslexic students; (3) to explore dyslexic students’ understandings of authorship and beliefs about dyslexia, writing and plagiarism. Sample. Dyslexic (n= 31) and non‐dyslexic (n= 31) university students. Method. Questionnaire measures of self‐rated confidence in writing, understanding of authorship, knowledge to avoid plagiarism, and top‐down, bottom‐up and pragmatic approaches to writing (Student Authorship Questionnaire; SAQ), and deep, surface and strategic approaches to learning (Approaches and Study Skills Inventory for Students; ASSIST), plus qualitative interviews with dyslexic students with high and low SAQ scores. Results. Dyslexic students scored lower for confidence in writing, understanding authorship, and strategic approaches to learning, and higher for surface approaches to learning. Correlations among SAQ and ASSIST scores were larger and more frequently significant among non‐dyslexic students. Self‐rated knowledge to avoid plagiarism was associated with a top‐down approach to writing among dyslexic students and with a bottom‐up approach to writing among non‐dyslexic students. All the dyslexic students interviewed described how dyslexia made writing more difficult and reduced their confidence in academic writing, but they had varying views about whether dyslexia increased the risk of plagiarism. Conclusions. Dyslexic students have less strong authorial identities, and less congruent approaches to learning and writing. Knowledge to avoid plagiarism may be more salient for dyslexic students, who may benefit from specific interventions to increase confidence in writing and understanding of authorship. Further research could investigate how dyslexic students develop approaches to academic writing, and how that could be affected by perceived knowledge to avoid plagiarism.     

Philosophical Aspects of Dual Use Technologies

The term dual use technologies refers to research and technology with the potential both to yield valuable scientific knowledge and to be used for nefarious purposes with serious consequences for public health or the environment. There are two main approaches to assessing dual use technologies: pragmatic and metaphysical. A pragmatic approach relies on ethical principles and norms to generate specific guidance and policy for dual use technologies. A metaphysical approach exhorts us to the deeper study of human nature, our intentions, goals, values ideals and social relations when considering dual use technology. Use of science and technology (S and T) is determined by two components of human nature: human intentions and choices. We have drawn a distinction between specific measures, goals and intentions with respect to technologies in order to show that moral judgment about technologies must precede their use. Understanding of our intentionality and values, and our moral ideals, as a measurable, tangible part of the real world is important for the prevention of any possible harm from S and T. In the context of dual use technologies, we stress the importance of three main understandings of human nature: vulnerability, responsibility and narrative identity. These can become a strong ontological “antidote” to technology’s poisoning of modern man. Each new technology can be measured and compared with man’s values, traditions and societal norms. This can be done bearing in mind the concept that human nature is not dualistic, but pluralistic. A system of ethical principles that includes the principles of good intentions, the correspondence of goals and means, the balancing of risks and benefits, simplicity, and contextuality, will help ensure that technologies are more humanistic and friendly to human beings.     

THE MODERN STUDY OF MYTH AND ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE

The history of the modern study of myth can be divided into two main categories: that which sees myth as the primitive counterpart to natural science, itself considered overwhelmingly modern, and that which sees myth as almost anything but the primitive counterpart to natural science. The first category constitutes the nineteenth‐century approach to myth. The second category constitutes the twentieth‐century approach. Tylor and Frazer epitomize the nineteenth‐century view. Malinowski, Eliade, Bultmann, Jonas, Camus, Freud, and Jung epitomize the twentieth‐century approach. The question for the twenty‐first century is whether myth can be brought back to the physical world, but in a way compatible with science. The case of the myth of Gaia will be considered as a possible way of doing so.     

Ego transcendence in postmodern perspective

Based on the author's previous specification of the conventional ego mind as the primary barrier to “realization of the ground of consciousness,” postmodern perspectives on the ego mind barrier are compared with premodern and modern approaches. Postmodernists view the ego as a socio‐linguistic construct. Modern assumptions of consistent subjectivity and a unitary self or identity are rejected, and reduction of the ego mind barrier to transcendence is seen to follow from exploration of alternative self‐concepts. This perspective is manifest in theories of “possible selves” and in the contrast between formulations such as the “saturated self vs. the “empty self.” Though forms of ego transcendence likely in postmodern cultures will differ from those in premodern cultures, many of the same functions will be served, as may be observed in such phenomena as “ecomysticism.”     

ROCKMORE ON ANALYTIC PRAGMATISM

Abstact: This article responds critically to Tom Rockmore's essay “On Classical and Neo‐Analytic Forms of Pragmatism,” which appeared in Metaphilosophy in 2005. Rockmore charges analytic pragmatism with having a conflicted epistemology, relying on incoherent appropriations of Hegel, and maintaining an unpragmatic commitment to metaphysical realism. We rebut these charges by arguing that what Rockmore sees as conflicted in analytic pragmatist epistemology is simply fallibilism, that appropriations of Hegel needn't be as global as Rockmore claims, and that commitments to metaphysical realism need not disqualify philosophers from being pragmatists.     

Art as Neglected ‘Text’ for the Study of Gender and Religion in Africa

The visual and performing arts in Africa provide unique opportunities not just for the reinforcement of gender differences but also for the subversion or transcendence of those differences to ensure societal harmony. A close reading of the various forms of artistic expression provides valuable data on women's perceived mystical powers—procreation, metaphysical knowledge and intimate communication with the spirit world as well as their social and religious status.     

Art as Neglected ‘Text’ for the Study of Gender and Religion in Africa

The visual and performing arts in Africa provide unique opportunities not just for the reinforcement of gender differences but also for the subversion or transcendence of those differences to ensure societal harmony. A close reading of the various forms of artistic expression provides valuable data on women’s perceived mystical powers—procreation, metaphysical knowledge and intimate communication with the spirit world as well as their social and religious status.     

Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge

Philosophical Studies - I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional approach via conceiving viz. imagining a scenario and a more recent approach...     

THE BLANK FACE OF LOVE: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOODNESS IN THE LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF IRIS MURDOCH1

This article explores the value of Iris Murdoch's metaphysical ethics for the theologian. Although, in many ways, Murdoch does appeal to the theologian, a subtle form of nihilism underlies her thought insofar as human goodness—in the form of loving attention—is only possible once the individual has overcome his/her ego by staring into the void and accepting the ultimate meaninglessness of reality. As this article demonstrates, Murdoch's replacement of transcendence with void rules out any form of real love or human goodness: only a dualistic exchange of gazes remains possible. Real, selfless love is only possible when the ego understands itself in the context of theological transcendence.     

IS THEOLOGY RESPECTABLE AS METAPHYSICS?

Theology involves inquiry into God's nature, God's purposes, and whether certain experiences or pronouncements come From God. These inquiries are metaphysical, part of theology's concern with the veridicality of signs and realities that are independent from humans. Several research programs concerned with the relation between theology and science aim to secure theology's intellectual standing as a metaphysical discipline by showing that it satisfies criteria that make modern science reputable, on the grounds that modern science embodies contemporary canons of respectability for metaphysical disciplines. But, no matter the ways in which theology qua metaphysics is shown to resemble modern science, these research programs seem destined for failure. For, given the currently dominant approaches to understanding modern scientific epistemology, theological reasoning is crucially dissimilar to modern scientific reasoning in that it treats the existence of God as a certainty immune to refutation. Barring the development of an epistemology of modern science that is amenable to theology, theology as metaphysics is intellectually disreputable.     

Critique and resistance: Ethical,social‐theoretical,political? On Fabian Freyenhagen's Adorno's Practical Philosophy

Fabian Freyenhagen's impressive reconstruction of Adorno's ‘practical philosophy’ provides a convincing defence of the possibility of making normative claims about the social world we live in without justifying these claims in terms of the right, the good, or human nature. More specifically, and more controversially, Freyenhagen argues that the normative resources Adorno's critique relies on are provided by a negative Aristotelianism. In this paper, I argue that this approach underestimates the extent to which Adorno follows the model of immanent critique, I highlight the socio‐theoretical underpinnings of what Freyenhagen calls Adorno's ‘ethics of resistance’, and I discuss the risk of overstating the danger of co‐optation that collective political action faces.     

Ecological and person‐oriented aspects of metacognitive processes in test‐taking

This study examines critical aspects of both the ecological and the person‐oriented accounts of observed biases in confidence judgements on tests of cognitive abilities. These biases reflect metacognitive processes involved in test‐taking. According to the ecological approach, poor realism of confidence judgements is due to the nature of the items included in general knowledge tests (test‐driven biases). The person‐oriented approach, however, argues that biases in confidence judgements may be due to a general self‐monitoring trait. The present study employed the ‘de‐biasing’ procedure proposed by Juslin ( 1994 ) for the selection of general knowledge test items, and used a newly developed geographical knowledge test suitable for the Australian population. Two other cognitive tests (Raven's Progressive Matrices and Line Length) were administered in order to determine whether there is a consistency in confidence ratings across diverse tasks. Statistical procedures traditional to both approaches‐calibration curves and factor analysis ‐ were employed. The results, with minor qualifications, support both perspectives. The study found a separate confidence factor, indicative of a self‐monitoring trait. Two other potential metacognitive factors (i.e. ‘expectation’ and ‘evaluation’, corresponding to self‐assessment/planning and self‐evaluation) could not be separated from accuracy and speed measures. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling Mental Spatial Reasoning About Cardinal Directions

This article presents research into human mental spatial reasoning with orientation knowledge. In particular, we look at reasoning problems about cardinal directions that possess multiple valid solutions (i.e., are spatially underdetermined), at human preferences for some of these solutions, and at representational and procedural factors that lead to such preferences. The article presents, first, a discussion of existing, related conceptual and computational approaches; second, results of empirical research into the solution preferences that human reasoners actually have; and, third, a novel computational model that relies on a parsimonious and flexible spatio‐analogical knowledge representation structure to robustly reproduce the behavior observed with human reasoners.     

Wittgenstein and Internal Relations

Abstract: Interpretations of the Tractatus divide into what might be called a metaphysical and an anti‐metaphysical approach to the work. The central issue between the two interpretative approaches has generally been characterised in terms of the question whether the Tractatus is committed to the idea of ‘things’ that cannot be said in language, and thus to the idea of a distinctive kind of nonsense: nonsense that is an attempt to say what can only be shown. In this paper, I look at this dispute from a different perspective, by focusing on the treatment of the concept of internal relations. By reference to the work of Peter Hacker, Hidé Ishiguro and Cora Diamond, I show how this concept is understood quite differently in each of the two interpretative traditions. I focus particularly on how Wittgenstein's idea of the ‘internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world’ (Tractatus 4.014) might be understood within the two interpretative approaches. I offer some reasons in support of the anti‐metaphysical treatment of the concept.     

Direct perception and the predictive mind

Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on the predictive approach, in the sense of being constructivist or inferential. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that perception is therefore indirect in a metaphysical or epistemological sense on the predictive approach. In the metaphysical case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect solutions to the metaphysical problem of perception (e.g. naïve realism, representationalism, sense datum theory). In the epistemological case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect approaches to the justification of perceptual belief. In this paper, I demonstrate how proponents of the predictive approach have conflated these distinct notions of perceptual directness and indirectness, and I propose alternative strategies for developing the philosophical consequences of the approach.