道德责任判断的三重根据

道德责任判断的直接目的在于找出可称赞或谴责的原因,对行为者做出合理、公正的道德判断,使其承担应当承担的道德责任,从而减少和消除不公,融洽社会关系,引导行为主体朝向更崇高的目标.道德责任判定涉及行为者与行为之间的关系、行为后果和价值标准等方面.实际后果是道德责任判断的现实根据;因果关系是道德责任判断的逻辑根据;社会历史理性是道德责任判断的最终价值根据.     

论企业道德责任的依据、表现与内化

企业道德责任的含义大体有广义和狭义两个方面,从较为广泛和普遍的意义上,我们认为企业的道德责任是体现在企业的经济责任、法律责任和精神文化责任之中的,同时又是同企业伦理建设密切相关的诸种责任的有机统一。而从狭义的视角来看,企业的道德责任是企业所肩负的对自己、对同道和对社会的道德义务的自觉承担和精神担纲,它在其精神实质上可以用“敬业求精、贵和乐群”来概括。企业道德责任的内化即为企业良心。企业良心就是企业道德责任的自我意识和自我评价。它由企业爱心、企业诚心和企业义心或公正之心所构成。     

企业道德责任论

本文对“企业社会责任”与“企业道德责任”概念的内涵与外延进行了清晰化的梳理与条陈,明确了企业社会责任与企业道德责任通用的语义层次,阐述了企业社会责任与企业道德责任区分的价值和实践意义;立论了企业道德责任何以可能;具体分析了企业基本道德责任与积极道德责任实现的一般要件,指出法律制裁力、市场筛选力、中间力量的博弈力是企业基本道德责任实现的不可或缺的条件,而企业的盈利能力、企业经营团队尤其是主要领导者的较强社会责任感、社会组织和民众对企业的积极行善形成的褒奖机制则是积极道德责任必须附加的条件。     

企业生态道德责任浅析

本文分析了企业生态道德责任提出的原因,指出了企业承担生态道德责任是建设社会主义生态文明的内在要求,也是企业迎接国际挑战、增强企业核心竞争力的保证,更是企业自身建设伦理文化的需要.企业要具有生态道德责任,则必须从企业确立生态道德责任的价值目标、培养员工生态道德素质、建立企业生态道德责任的系统工程这几个方面入手.只有这样,我们的企业才能将经济活动、生态智慧和伦理关怀融为一体,最终才有可能实现与社会经济相协调发展.     

企业社会责任的道德考察

企业作为影响社会财富的创造积累、社会利益的分配格局和社会需求的有效供给的基本经济细胞,需要擢升其企业公民意识、关怀利益相关者以及尊重社会及其成员道德尊严的企业社会责任的履行能力,以向社会传递一种荻取企业自我价值实现的社会道德认同境界.     

道德自信及其三重阻碍

道德自信是人们在其社会行为中表现出的一种价值肯定、价值抉断并准备身体力行的行为状态,是信仰层面的坚定、判断层面的坚持、行为层面的坚守。道德自信是文化自信之根,决定着文化的发展走向,是一种文化的根本性标志,是文化的内核。道德自信的心理障碍、认识障碍、制度性障碍是当前提高道德自信必须扫除的关键因素。     

企业社会责任的道德基础探究

道德基础问题是企业社会责任研究的一个重要议题,在这一问题上,弗里德曼等人以企业利己主义为股东至上论进行辩护,弗里曼等人以义务论为利益相关者理论进行辩护,但这两种辩护都存在着问题而不足以为企业社会责任提供合理的道德基础.后果主义理论通过为波特等人提出的共享价值论进行辩护,以及为企业和其他社会成员之间利益冲突的解决提供合理辩护,显示了其优越性.     

道德的三层涵义与得道的三重境界

道德具有三方面的内涵,即德目、德行、德性,它们共同构成了道德在现实生活中的三种表现形态.道德是人们长期反复博弈的结果,然而由于现实生活中行为主体的生活环境、认知能力、实践效果等有所差异,所以行为主体在博弈中的得道境界亦有所不同,可以分为知道、行道、信道三重境界.但是无论得道的境界如何,博弈的终极目标都指向幸福.     

论道德科学的立论依据

近几年来出现了一种思潮,以社会是由“人”组成的为理由,抓住“人”这个概念作为一切社会活动的主体大作文章,形成一种人本主义思想的回潮。于是“人性自私”论、“人的主体”论、“人的需要”论、“个人本位”论等,便在社会科学的一些学科里活跃起来,并成为各种“创新”的理论依据。在道德科学的领域里,同样受到这类思潮的影响,这主要表现在以“人的需要”为研究道德问题的出发点和理论依据,从而引伸出一系列与马克思主义的道德观不同的     

责任与道德

道德是由经济关系决定的,利益是道德的基础。这些无疑都是正确的。然而如果再深一层的探讨一下,它们是如何产生道德的呢? 马克思恩格斯说:“作为确定的人,现实的人,你就有规定、就有使命、就有任务,至于你是否意识到这一点,那都是无所谓的。”(《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷,第329页)这个规定、使命、任务当然是由经济关系决定的,是在一定利益基础上产生的。问题在于这个规定、使命、任务和道德有没有直接关系呢?这很值得分析研究。 对于这个“规定、使命、任务”,马克思、恩     

Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations

In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people which – while not constituting a collective agent – are nonetheless capable of performing a joint action. It attempts to defend a notion of joint duties which are neither duties of a group agent nor duties of individual agents, but duties held jointly by individuals in unstructured groups. Furthermore, it seeks to illuminate the relation between such joint duties on the one hand and individual duties on the other hand. Rebutting an argument brought forward by Wringe, the paper concludes that it is not plausible to assume that all humans on earth can together hold a duty to mitigate climate change or to combat global poverty given that the members of that group are not capable of joint action. ¹      

Moral Individualism,Moral Relationalism,and Obligations to Non‐human Animals

Moral individualists like Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer argue that our moral obligations to animals, both human and non‐human, are grounded in the morally salient capacities of those animals. By contrast, what might be called moral relationalists argue that our obligations to non‐human animals are grounded in our relationship to them. Moral relationalists are of various kinds, from relationalists regarding assistance to animals, such as Clare Palmer and Elizabeth Anderson, to relationalists grounded in a Wittgensteinian view of human practice, such as Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. This article argues that there are, in fact, two distinct types of moral reasons, those based on salient capacities and those based on relationships. Neither type of reason is reducible to the other, and there is no third type to which to reduce them both. Any attempt at reduction would run counter to deep intuitions about our moral relation to non‐human animals as well as to other humans. Among the implications of this is that certain kinds of arguments, such as the argument from marginal cases, seem to be incomplete precisely because they do not capture the complexity of our moral relations to non‐human animals.     

The Moral Hazards Of Christian Obligations In Brazil's Rural Zona Da Mata

From 1999 through 2003, applied research in Brazil's Zona da Mata was undertaken to identify the reasons why some households choose, either actively or by default, not to participate in rural assistance efforts. Class-based guiding hypotheses held that participation would correlate positively with economic, demographic and health measures of household need, but found only limited support. These hypotheses found their greatest support within the community's small but rapidly growing Pentecostal congregation, but were generally contradicted within the community's much larger Catholic congregation, and totally contradicted by full participation, regardless of need or religious affiliation, within one of the research community's 14 hamlets. The hamlet's contradiction resulted from a pooling of an extended family's labour and resources to achieve full participation. The larger community's contradiction of the guiding hypotheses resulted from the wealthiest Catholic households' self-described ‘Christian obligations’ to provide garden produce upon request to the poorest Catholic households.

The earth does not yield its fruits without a particular human response to God's gift, that is to say, without work. (John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, cited in Neuhaus 1999 Neuhaus, Fr. Richard John. 1999. Appointment in Rome, New York: The Crossroads Publishing Company.  [Google Scholar])