What Hope Is There: The Enthrallment of Empire Stories

In this article, I argue that many U.S. citizens are held captive by expansionist narratives and ideologies. Our enthrallment is explained, in part, by shared weak dissociation, rationalization, moralization, and denial. Theologically, I understand the ongoing presence of these narratives and ideologies in U.S. society as a manifestation of idolatry and a refusal to mourn. Furthermore, I argue that expansionist narratives signify the presence of fate and the distortion of hope, in particular, Christian hope.     

A Pastoral Analysis of the Three Pillars of U.S. Hegemony—“Free Market” Capitalism,Militarism, and Exceptionalism

In this article, I offer a pastoral analysis of the three interrelated pillars of U.S. hegemony, namely, “free market” capitalism, militarism, and exceptionalism. My claims are that these pillars 1) were and are integral to the rise and maintenance of the U.S. Empire or the U.S. as hyperpower, 2) while beneficial to some U.S. citizens (as well as Western Europeans) and accidentally to other peoples, have significant and extensive detrimental and long-term consequences for other peoples, and 3) represent fundamentally and profoundly flawed symbol systems vis-à-vis creating social policies and programs that involve the common good or foster community. I argue further that the fusion of these symbol systems—free market capitalism, militarism, and exceptionalism—gives rise to the interpretation of the Other as functional and is inherently flawed and dangerous, because these systems lead to controlling, manipulating, using, or destroying the Other. If the notion of the common good is to expand beyond the narrow confines of corporations or a nation and if we seek a good enough society that fosters diverse communities, then these semiotic systems must be subordinate to religious or humanistic symbol systems that elevate the personhood of the Other.     

Dualism in medicine,Christian theology,and the aging

Distinguishing a person's soul or mind from a person's body describes dualism, the philosophical premise that fails to integrate the person as one, but instead leaves the person as two, usually as souland body or as mindand body. In dualism, one tends to think of the soul or the mind as the person and the body as an appendage. I argue that 1) dualism is rampant in medicine; 2) that Christian theology has fundamentally opposed it, and 3) that cultural dualism today threatens the aging in particular. To deal with this threat, I argue that the moral task of being human is to become one in mind and body. That is, I argue that the unity of the person which is the unity of the mind and body is not really a metaphysical given, but rather the goal or end of being human.     

The Life of Spirit: The Self and Sanctification in Søren Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death

Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is often overlooked as an author in the Christian spiritual tradition. This paper answers Christopher Barnett's call to investigate themes of Christian spirituality in Kierkegaard's writing. In this paper, I argue that we can construct of vision of sanctification from Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death. While Kierkegaard does not directly deal with themes of sanctification in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus does demonstrate the ‘spiritless’ life of despair. The ‘spiritless’ life, as Anti-Climacus defines it, is a life that is not truly a ‘self’. Anti-Climacus systematically demonstrates four categories of despair, and all people not living in faith, whether they realise it or not, fit into one of these categories of ‘spiritless’ existence. I argue that by constructing the opposites of Kierkegaard's categories of despair I demonstrate that a ‘spirit-filled’ life exemplifies a vibrant Christian life of sanctification.     

Loneliness and innocence: A Kierkegaardian reflection on the paradox of self-realization

In this paper, I explore loneliness as a primordial call to find accord with the self that, as Kierkegaard claims, is born of spirit. I put Kierkegaard’s Anti-Climacan formula, “the more consciousness, the more self,” to work by examining lamentation over loss of the innocent days of youth as symptomatic of primordial loneliness. In loneliness, I argue, we confound loss of naivete (a developmental change) with loss of innocence (a spiritual failing). While each person is fated to lose naivete, no person loses innocence by developmental necessity. Each person loses innocence by his or her own hand in freedom.     

The Problem of Patriotism: A Psychoanalytic and Theological Analysis

In this article, I examine patriotism from psychoanalytic and theological perspectives, arguing that it is a deeply problematic form of love and devotion. After providing a brief overview of the discourse vis-à-vis patriotism, I depict the characteristics of a dominant form of patriotism (self-state) in the U.S. Given this, I argue that, while patriotism has a variety of forms, the most prevalent form tends toward tragic consequences and it is this tragic tendency that I depict from psychoanalytic and theological perspectives. From a psychoanalytic perspective, the extant form of patriotism in the U.S. represents a self-state that signifies an idealized, omnipotent, and imaginary identification, which is accompanied by and contingent upon a devaluation of the Other. Moreover, the dominant form of patriotic self-states is secured by weak dissociation, omnipotent thinking and, in most cases, a collapse of the symbolic equation. From a Christian theological perspective, patriotism signifies absolutizing the relative and contingent. This form of idolatry manifests a distortion of reason and will, which contributes to corrupted and corrupting forms of love and devotion.     

Mary Astell’s theory of spiritual friendship

Mary Astell’s theory of friendship has been interpreted either as a version of Aristotelian virtue friendship, or as aligned with a Christian and Platonist tradition. In this paper, I argue that Astell’s theory of friendship is determinedly anti-Aristotelian; it is a theory of spiritual friendship offered as an alternative to Aristotelian virtue friendship. By grounding her conception of friendship in a Christian–Platonist metaphysics, I show that Astell rejects the Aristotelian criteria of reciprocity and partiality as essential features of the friendship bond and that she develops a theory of friendship that is neither reciprocal nor partial. Further, I argue that Astell’s theory of friendship advances her feminist aims by providing a justification for female–female spiritual bonds in contradistinction to female–male marriage bonds. Astell argues that the female–female bond of spiritual friendship is sanctioned by God, and is, therefore, a divinely authorized alternative to the male–female bond of marriage. Through her theory of spiritual friendship, Astell marks out a central place for female–female bonds and provides women with a justification for resisting marriage.     

Contempt and the Cultivation of Character

Macalester Bell urges the cultivation of apt contempt as the best response to what she calls “the vices of superiority” (arrogance, hypocrisy, racism, and the like). In this essay, I sketch two character profiles. The first—the ideal contemnor—paradigmatically answers the vices of superiority with contempt. The second—the ideal Christian neighbor—is marked by humility and love, and answers the vices of superiority in non‐contemptuous ways. I argue that the latter character rivals (and may even outshine) the former as a fitting moral response to the vices of superiority. Furthermore, I argue that the two character profiles are incompatible, so one cannot jointly cultivate humble love and contempt. Given contempt's nastiness, and the alternative resources available for answering the vices of superiority, I suggest one should focus one's character‐formation efforts on the cultivation of humility and love.     

Learning for oneself: A Confucian‐inspired case for moral formation in ethics pedagogy

This article explores the disconnection between ethical theory and ethical practice in ethics courses at secular U.S. colleges and universities. In such contexts academic ethics focuses almost exclusively on “ethical reasoning” and leaves the business of practical moral formation of students in the realm of “student life.” I argue this disconnection is inevitable given the dominant understanding that moral formation must be guided by a consistent ethical theory, and must eventuate in certain prosocial behaviors, while norms of pluralism and free inquiry mandate that academic courses not attempt to dictate certain views or behaviors as normative. Drawing on the Confucian model of moral cultivation expressed by the early Chinese figure Mengzi, I argue for a different understanding of moral formation that focuses on open‐endedness, self‐direction, and the acquisition of skills in directing attention and will. This approach avoids the most serious challenges to practical moral formation in secular contexts, and I suggest some broadly applicable principles for implementing these ideas in ethics courses.     

From Ousia to Sophia: The Patristic and Classical Background to Twentieth‐Century Essentialism and Personalism

Both Classical Greek philosophy and the early Christian theology that often drew upon it reflected a tension in their understanding of essence (ο?σ?α). Was it a concrete thing, something that could assume agency and be related to, or did it refer only to the shared characteristics that reflect things and persons of a common kind? In this article I first establish that this question pertains, mutatis mutandis, to the Platonic forms, as well as to Christian concepts of essence and nature. I then argue that the Christian theology of the conciliar period sided against the reification of essence/nature, noting that their misplaced concreteness resulted in problematic doctrines. In conclusion I briefly explore how this same dynamic plays out in twentieth‐century Orthodox theology, as expressed by Sergius Bulgakov, Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas.     

The non-Christian influence on Anselm’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Proslogion</Emphasis> argument

This paper considers Anselm’s Proslogion argument against a background of historical events that include philosophical disputes between Christian and Jewish polemicists. I argue that the Proslogion argument was addressed, in part, to non-Christian theists and that it offered a response to Jewish polemicists who had argued that the Christian conception of God as an instantiated unity was irrational. Anselm is not trying to convince atheists that there really is a God. He is arguing that the Christian conception of God is logically coherent.     

THREE THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE

In The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Steven Pinker maintains that at present there are three competing views of human nature—a Christian theory, a “blank slate” theory (what I call a social constructivist theory), and a Darwinian theory—and that the last of these will triumph in the end. I argue that neither the outcome of such competition nor the particular content of these theories is as clear as Pinker believes. In this essay I take a critical as well as a constructive look at the challenge presented by a Darwinian theory of human nature—a challenge to the social sciences and the humanities and also to theology and more specifically to a Christian understanding of human nature.     

Christian materialism in a scientific age

Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the “intermediate state” (if there is one).     

MARGARET THATCHER'S CHRISTIAN FAITH: A Case Study in Political Theology

Throughout the 1980s Margaret Thatcher dominated British and global politics. At the same time she maintained an active Christian faith, which she understood as shaping and informing her political choices and policies. In this article I argue that we can construct from Thatcher's key speeches, her memoirs, and her book on public policy a cultural “theo‐political” identity which guided her political decisions. Thatcher's identity was as an Anglo‐Saxon Nonconformist. This consisted of her belief in values such as thrift and hard work, care for the family and local neighbor, and charitable generosity; her belief in the renewal of the national British Christian spirit; and her notion of morality as the opportunity for free choice. Without a recognition of the centrality of her theo‐political identity, it is difficult to understand the values and beliefs which were central to her political life. The methodological issues raised by the construction of this theo‐political identity are examined in this article. The aim of the proposed methodology is to develop theological insights into a political phenomenon like Thatcher rather than make policy judgments or recommendations.     

Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience

Empiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors (if any) need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic delusions, one which resists the trade-off view of pragmatic benefits and epistemic costs. Though monothematic delusions are often characterized by appeal to their epistemic costs, they can play a positive epistemic role, and this is a surprising conclusion on which, so I argue, all empiricists can agree. Thus, I show that all empiricists have the notion of epistemic innocence at their disposal.     

BETWEEN MT. MORIAH AND MT. GOLGOTHA: How Is Christian Ethics Possible?

In this paper, I explore a new way of understanding Christian ethics by critically interconnecting the theological meanings of the Aqedah (“binding”) narrative of Mt. Moriah and the Passion story of Mt. Golgotha. Through an in‐depth critical‐theological investigation of the relation between these two biblical events, I argue that Christian ethics is possible not so much as a moralization or as a literalistic divine command theory, but rather as a “covenantal‐existential” response to God's will in the impossible love on Mt. Moriah as well as in the Son's willing embrace of God's will on Mt. Golgotha.     

On Pike on “Union without Distinction” in Christian Mysticism

Perennialists regarding the phenomenology of mysticism, like Walter Stace, feel that all Christian mystical experiences are fundamentally similar to each other and to experiences described by mystics across religious traditions, cultures and ages. In his seminal work, Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism, Nelson Pike convincingly argues that this extreme position is inadequate for capturing the breadth of experiences described by the canonical Medieval Christian mystics. However, Pike may have leaned too far away from perennialism in claiming that all the experiences of (Christian) mystic union are essentially theistic. Here, I argue that Pike did not successfully establish this point and that union without distinction, often described as the pinnacle of “union” by Christian mystics, remains a viable candidate for an instance of a trans-traditionally type-identical mystical experience.     

Intentional collaboration,predictable complicity,and proactive prevention: U.S. schools’ ethical responsibilities in slowing the school-to-deportation pipeline

ABSTRACT

In the United States, constitutional and statutory law reinforce the right of all children to receive an education, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status. In a time of heightened anti-immigrant sentiment and law enforcement, however, partnerships among school districts, local law enforcement, and the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security subject undocumented and unaccompanied minor students to indefensible levels of risk for detention and deportation. We identify three stances that U.S. schools may take in the face of a potential ‘school-to-deportation pipeline.’ Schools that engage in intentional collaboration actively increase detention and deportation by referring students to immigration officials for criminal, non-criminal, and even non-disciplinary activity. Schools that engage in predictable complicity may not intend to subject their undocumented and unaccompanied minor students to detention or deportation, but still put students at risk by involving police in school policies. We argue that U.S. schools should instead engage in proactive protection of immigrant students and families, including actively resisting federal policies when necessary.     

The Mark of Cain: Sovereign Negation and the Politics of God

Hannah Arendt calls for the “abolition of sovereignty from the body politic.” In this article I affirm some key elements of Arendt’s critique, arguing against versions of Christian ethics that try to deploy divine authorization for particular policies, institutions, goals, or virtues. But I also argue that the attempt to abolish sovereignty allows the political process itself to become a sovereign good and erodes the forms of life that can sustain the kind of vision and politics that Arendt desires. The better alternative to the usual politics of sovereignty is not the absence of sovereignty, but a changed – and negative – conception of the relationship of sovereign power to the political order. In developing this argument I contend with Arendt’s reading of Herman Melville’s Billy Budd and, behind that, her reading of the biblical story of Cain and Abel. I argue that the city of Cain is made possible not by Cain’s murder of his brother, but by the mark with which God negates the legitimacy of both the murder and the violence to avenge the murder. Sovereign negation makes the polis possible.     

The queer life of Christian exceptionalism

This response to Jasbir Puar's monograph, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007. Durham, NC: Duke University Press), brings Puar's analysis to bear on the current attraction to ‘Christian identity’ as a historical analytic in the fields of New Testament and early Christian Studies, and to increasing associations of the ancient emergence of ‘Christian identity’ with transgressive queerness. I argue that this latter trend, especially, abets certain forms of Christian exceptionalism under the guise of resistance against empire, but I also suggest that this scholarship reveals certain affinities between the notion of queerness as pure transgression and contemporary Christianity.